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ABSTRACT 
There has been much discussion in the literature concerning the potential conflict over 
transfer pricing techniques used by MNCs to shift profits outside the borders of a host 
country. This happens whereby MNCs artificially lower their profits by manipulating 
transfer prices with their subsidiaries. They can achieve substantial benefits by 
adopting effective pricing policies. Careful planning of intra-company prices can take 
full advantages of differences among such things as corporation tax rates, tax 
incentives and reliefs and customs duties. 
The decade of the 1970s produced important economic changes in the Egyptian 
economy as a result of the economic open door policy. Since then Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) grew rapidly which reflects confidence in the Egyptian economy. 
Despite initiatives undertaken by the Egyptian government to attract greater inflows 
of FDI, greater efforts should be devoted to streamline and simplify the rlevant 
administrative procedures of the government. 
Governmental policies and regulations could encourage multinationals to engage in 
transfer pricing manipulation more often in developing countries than in more 
develped countries. This is rarely due to the ignorance of the governments of 
developing countries to transfer pricing issues at the international level. Also, 
authorities concerned with the the issue are poorly equipped. The purpose of this 
study has been to investigate transfer pricing and profit shifting practices by MNCs 
doing business in Egypt. The case study approach has been used in the empirical 
work, including eleven companies. The investigation involved governmental 
authorities and an accounting firm that has an interest in the transfer pricing issue. 
The empirical study focused on factors influencing transfer pricing strategies which 
represent a motive to shift more profits from Egypt. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Transfer Pricing Problem 
The subject of transfer pricing has been of great interest and has received extensiVe 
debate by academics and scholars in different fields of study. Most of this was 
directly concerned with transfer pricing as a managerial tool to facilitate decentralised 
operations. These sources mainly treated the topic in two ways: (1) theoretical 
approaches, and (2) descriptive analyses of problems incurred in the use of transfer 
pricing. The remaining studies dealt with the intra-company pricing in an 
international dimension, giving consideration to specific environmental factors. 
However, the problem has been left without an acceptable solution. 
On the domestic level, writers emphasised intra-company pricing as a means of 
measuring, controlling, and evaluating divisional performance. Different models were 
illustrated such as economic, accounting, operations research, and behavioural. 
On the other hand, the transfer pricing issue from the international view changes 
significantly from that of the domestic view. The basic changes are: (1) the content of 
recent works no longer contain theoretical analyses; and (2) the majority of 
publications perceive the transfer pricing problem from one specific viewpoint, 
normally taxation. 
It should be noticed that a substantial amount of intra-company transfers generated by 
process- specialisation takes place within Multinational companies, henceforth MNCs. 
Intra-company transactions in MNCs are important for several reasons: 
First, raw materials not available or in short supply for a subsidiary in one country 
can be obtained for sale or further processing by another subsidiary located in another 
country. 
Second, production economies are required to minimise total production costs. This 
can be conducted more efficiently by producing or assembling components in 
countries where the cost of labour is low. Then production can be exported to 
headquarters or subsidiaries for distribution. For example, a substantial percentage of 
car and computer production takes place in this manner. 
Third, many services are rendered by headquarters or other subsidiaries for the 
benefit of all mernbers of a MNC. Examples are R&D, advertising campaigns, 
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management consulting and the like which are often conducted by the headquarters 
for the whole MNC. 
Finally, there are many financial flows between members of a MNC. Some are 
payments related to tangible and/or intangible transactions provided by other units: 
some are loan repayments; some are dividends; and some are designed to lessen taxes 
or financial risks. 
The term of "transfer pricing" refers generally to the deterrnination of the value of 
tangible and intangible transactions exchanged among business units that share 
common ownership either on the domestic or international level. Since intra-company 
transfers are not subject to competitive market conditions, the pricing of these 
transfers can be decided and dictated by the headquarters of the company. The 
transfer pricing issue of MNCs is more sophisticated than those for their domestic 
counterparts as a result of some environmental factors that influence the Multinational 
(MN) transfer pricing decision. 
MN transfer pricing can be altered to shift profits from one country to another in a 
clandestine manner for tax and tariff avoidance, foreign exchange control avoidance, 
competitive issues, or other reasons. The potential for such manipulations is already 
great and increasing as a result of continued business concentration of MNCs in both 
developed and developing countries, and the significance of intra-corporate 
transactions in the total global trade, reflecting the horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate nature of MNC activities. In most countries, manipulating transfer 
prices is kept confidential and is in any case often difficult to prove unambiguously. 
While in theory transfer prices facilitate efficient exchange between divisions, in 
practice they are often the source of tension between host countries and MNCs. This 
is especially true when the host country is a less developed country. Studies provide 
empirical evidence that taxes, tariffs, exchange rate volatility, price controls, and 
profit remittance restrictions all served as inducements for manipulative transfer 
pricing (Lall, 1983, and Lall and Streeten, 1977, Vaitsos, 1974). 
MNCs use artificial transfer prices to shift profits and liquid funds form one country 
to another if doing so raises net profits. When MN managers are concemed with flows 
of their funds from one nation to another, they naturally act to minimise the outright 
costs associated with such movements of funds. Therefore, instead of using solely 
dividend remittances, MN managers often resort to underinvoicing or overinvoicing 
the transactions that move from one of their foreign subsidiaries to another or their 
headquarters. Underlying the declared profits and dividend remittances are a whole 
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host of arbitrary pricing possibilities relating not only to tangible transfers. but also to 
the terms of intangible transfers (royalties, technical assistance fees, management 
fees, payment of interest, overhead charges and the like). Kopits (1976) suggested that 
MNC subsidiaries in the UK probably pay 30-50 per cent more than they should for 
such services. Even when the parent company invests in a foreign subsidiary, it often 
extends such investment under the name of "long term loans" and charges the 
subsidiary interest on them. 
So, transfer pricing is an accounting methodology that makes foreign investment 
attractive by gaining advantages both in the host and home countries. Of course, 
abusing transfer prices affects many areas of a national economy: tax and customs 
revenues, balance of payments, market structures, and domestic capital formulation. It 
should be also noticed that the practice of transfer pricing not only affects the 
expected contribution of MNCs and worsens the terms of trade by increasing the costs 
of imports, but it may also indicate other long term impacts on the developing 
countries in terms of blocking the dynamics of investment, technology transfer and 
growth (Lall, 1983, p. 130 and p. 135). 
Conflicts of interest between MNCs and the governments have been frequent in mally 
host countries. The country is basically interested in maximising benefits for its own 
territory. The MNC, engaged in world-wide manufacturing operations, is interested in 
maximising benefits for its own international organisation. In this way, it attempts to 
find a way of achieving the economic efficiencies of world-wide specialization of 
production and development within the political constraints imposed by national 
policies. While the country can control its own corporation and strongly influence 
national private enterprises, it can find it difficult to exert influence over MNCs. 
1.2 Foreign Direct Investment and MNCs in Egypt 
Host countries accept foreign direct investment (FDI) because of the common attitude 
that considerable benefits and opportunities are available from direct investment 
operations (Carr, 1979, p. 3). Since the early 1970s the Egyptian government has 
pursued an open door economic policy. Foreign investors are welcome to invest. The 
government policy in the in,.,, estment field seeks to encourage investors to transfer 
capital, technology, and managerial and organisational skills. Law 230 of 1989 which 
replaced Law 43 of 1974 offers many incentives and numerous guarantees to lure 
foreign business to take its part in realizing economic development in Egypt. 
Consequently, foreign investors, individuals and MNCs set up establishments either 
in the form of joint ventures with Egyptians or wholly wxned. FDI has involved many 
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activities such as petroleum. pharmaceuticals, textiles, chen-Licals. construction. 
beverage and food processing, tourism, and ban-king. 
These establishments, especially subsidiaries of MNCs, transfer a multitude of goods 
and services to and from Egypt. They transfer also profits and dividends tO their 
parents. The transfer price of exchanged transactions is based on a transfer pricing 
method. The pricing method chosen, being influenced by a variety of factors, can be 
used to shift profits from a subsidiary to its parent or another sister company in the 
group. Accordingly, the host country's benefits are affected negatively, especially 
taxes and customs duties. This leads also to the distortion of financial information. 
Joint venture partners and those trading with them may base policy decisions on 
transfer price sensitive data. 
1.3 Transfer Pricing Techniques and Profit Shifting in MNCs in Egypt 
This study concentrates on the extent of suspicious activities by MNCs to shift profits 
from Egypt to other countries using transfer pricing techniques. Currently, the 
Egyptian government is mistakenly unconcerned with MNC practices in shifting 
profits through transfer pricing techniques. Not to mention, there is a lack of 
coordination and cooperation among Egyptian authorities interested in controlling 
transfer pricing, each of which approaches the question from it's own standpoint. 
Customs authorities, for example, are generally not concerned with import prices 
being higher than they should be, since those result in higher duty payments. Tax 
departments, on the other hand, are likely to be concerned since such prices lead to an 
increase in production costs and hence lower profits and tax collection. The extent to 
which MNCs manipulate transfer prices depends upon the vigour with which controls 
are applied by the different authorities on the company's overall strategies. 
Hence, considered collectively, intra-company transfers are a vitally important issue 
to most MNCs. However, they are also of considerable importance and concern to 
most governments. As noted in Rugman and Eden (1985), the chief reason for 
governments' interest is potential misuse and frequent abuse of transfer pricing by 
MNCs. 
MNCs are in a powerful position when they negotiate with host countries, particularly 
third world countries, to establish projects. They rnight stipulate some conditions 
which could be prejudicial to host nations. For instance, they rnight stipulate a 
restrictive clause allowing the purchase of all necessary production requirements (rax 
materials and intermediate goods) only from the parent or members of the same %1NC 
family. 
1.4 Control of Transfer Pricing 
Abusing transfer pricing presents challenges for the governments of home and host 
countries. There is growing suspicion among most countries, especially developed 
ones that by using sophisticated transfeTpricing strategies and accounting procedures. 
large MNCs dissimulate the true profitability of local subsidiaries and deprive host 
governments of "legitimate" tax revenues. Controls by host governments tend to 
restrict FDI and, because such investment tends to be in the more dynamic 
manufacturing sectors, industrial growth as well. Lack of controls can also have 
adverse effects, permitting excessive profit shifting and royalties, the financial 
juggling of cost across national boundaries and causing an over-reliance on locafly- 
generated capital. 
It is believed that the control of MN transfer pricing manipulations is difficult without 
co-operation among countries. The effects of such manipulations transcend national 
frontiers, and information on how the transfer prices have been established is 
frequently located outside the country wishing to control them. 
Empirical evidence relating to the use of transfer pricing is notoriously difficult to 
obtain. First, the MNC is not very willing to provide the necessary jnformation, and 
second, the information that is available to the host country is usually scattered in 
different departments of the government, such as the tax collections, customs, and the 
central bank. There appears to be no published study relating to the use of transfer 
pricing in Egypt. However, if transfer pricing is used to shift profits from a subsidiary 
in Egypt, this decreases profits in the subsidiary and hence value added. Hence, an 
examination of profit rates of value added as a percentage of sales could indicate the 
use of profit shifting. 
It is probably true that MNC subsidiaries in Egypt have considerable opportunity to 
use profit shifting transfer pricing, because of the volume of intra-company Imports. 
As indicated from the field study, the great part of production requirements come 
from the parent company. Therefore, when all or the greatest part of company profits 
are alleged to disappear abroad, Egypt will not gain any benefits. 
The Egyptian government, among other developing countries, should pay attention to 
the extent to which MNC transfer pricing tends to be unfair to them. Transfer prices 
of intra-company transactions should be based ideally on an arm's-length basis, i. e., 
the reasonable and acceptable price in the competitive market. If such arm's-length 
prices existed and could be identified for all intra-company transactions, or if such 
prices could easily be arrived at by developing couritnes in cases where they are not 
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readily available, then these countries would not be concerned about M'NC,, and 
transfer pricing. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and developing countries have real 
problems related to: 
I- assessing arm's-length prices where no comparable market substitute exists (there 
can be wide variations, at any specific time or over a short period, in the prices of 
products frequently traded- in similar quantities and on similar terms of sale - 
nationally or internationally by a number of companies); 
2- difficulty in obtaining from companies the data necessary to reconstruct prices on 
the basis of actual costs. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, this study aims to pinpoint the extent of 
manipulation of MN transfer pricing in order to shift profits from the host country, 
Egypt. The study investigates whether MNCs have made negative or positive 
contributions to world growth and development. The study will be focused on MNCs 
commencing their activities in Egypt. Also, the study recommends that payments 
made by MN subsidiaries in Egypt to their parents must be based upon truthful and 
accurate pricing. 
The purpose of the study therefore is to answer four questions: 
1) To what extent do MNCs abuse transfer prices in order to shift profits outside the 
country'? 
2) What are the factors that induce MNCs to shift profits through transfer pricing 
strategies'! 
3) What effect do MNCs have on the Egyptian economy? 
4) How may the Egyptian government control MNC's operations in order to prevent 
or lessen the abuse of transfer pricing? 
To answer these questions, an interview guide and questionnaire have been developed 
to collect the required data. The data have been collected from three groups: (1) 
MNCs located in Egypt, where II case studies have been carried out; (2) government 
officials dealing with FDI, including General Authority for Investment, tax and 
customs, and (3) an independent accounting firm. 
/ 
1.6 Research Design 
The structure of the study is exhibited in Figure 1.1. It involves four stages: I- 
Conceptulisation, 2- Questionnaire design and surveys, 3- Analysis, and 4- 
Conclusions. 
In the first stage, since the research problem has been clearly stated, the relevant 
literature was reviewed. The purpose of the literature review was to construct a basis 
for the study and understand the nature of the transfer pricing topic, in both the 
domestic and international environment. 
The second stage involved collecting data from two groups: MNCs working in Egypt-, 
and government authorities dealing with MNCs. The multiple case- study approach 
was adopted to collect data from companies. 
The third stage is concerned with analysing the findings of the study. The last stage is 
to write up the research work. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This study deals with the extent of the use of transfer pricing techniques by MNCs to 
shift profits outside the host country. The study will assess this issue by applying a 
case study methodology to II MNCs in Egypt. 
The thesis consists of 9 chapters. The present chapter has described the problem, the 
significance of the study, and its purposes. 
A literature review of transfer pricing approaches is presented in Chapter (2). It also 
sheds some light on transfer pricing policies which are based on market factors and 
cost variables. 
In order to assess variables that induce MNCs to shift profits via transfer pricing 
techniques, Chapter (3) focuses on investigating these determinants. This chapter 
includes a discussion of the nature of MNCs and the significance of intra-company 
transactions. Sources of transfer pricing information are also discussed at the end of 
the chapter. 
Chapter (4) is devoted entirely to a discussion of the business environment and FDI in 
Egypt. Attention is given to the major provisions of the Foreign Investment Code. The 
evaluation and effect of MNCs on different issues of the Egyptian economy are 
discussed as well. 
Figure 1.1 
The Framework of Research Methodology 
1. Conceptulisation 
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Definition 
Lb 
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H. Questionnaire 
Design and 
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2. a 
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2. b 
Interview 
Survey 
HI. Analysis 
IV. Finalising 
Conclusions 
3. 
Analysis of 
Results 
4. a 
Conclusion 
4. b 
Research 
Writing up 
I. c 
Case 
Studies 
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Chapter (5) discusses the research methodology and data techniques to be used in the Z 
empirical study. The data was collected from two main sources: companies 
participating in the study and government bodies. 
The results of the research findings are presented in details in Chapters (6), (7). and 
(8). The case study analyses are presented, where each companý' is, discussed 
individually, in Chapter (6). The overall analysis of the data collected from companies 
is discussed in Chapter (7). 
Chapter (8) analyses data collected from government authorities: tax departments. 
customs officials, and General Authority for Investment (GAFI). The view of the 
external auditor regarding examining transfer prices is discussed as well. 
The conclusion and recommendations of the study are presented In the final chapter. 
The chapter suggests additionally further departures for future research. 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
This study is intended to investigate the extent of transfer pricing manoeuvres by 
MNCs in order to utilise their returns on the account of host and home country 
benefits. Among other considerations it deals with the techniques MNCs use to 
eliminate or neutralise the distorting effects of widely varying national and 
international business environments, including tax and customs rate differences and 
political factors. In the case of fluctuating exchange rates, the company could abuse 
transfer pricing in order to secure a common ground against which to measure the 
financial performance of its subsidiaries. 
This study, like any other empirical study, has its own limitations. Because of the 
confidentiality and complexity of the transfer pricing issue, response to the study is 
always uncertain. The uncertainty makes the empirical and statistical approach to 
studying transfer pricing a high risk in terms of efforts and results. Perhaps this 
explains why researchers in the past engaged only in descriptive study. 
In all case study approaches, the researcher must be aware of the potential problem of 
the difficulty of generalisation. This research is no exception. As the field work 
involves eleven MN subsidiaries operating in Egypt, it cannot claim to generalise the 
results to all MNCs working there. 'I"his would need further investigation in order to 
trace all the effects of N1NCs there. However, there is no reason to believe that results 
from other companies not involved in the study would differ significantly from those 
involved in the study. 
Since most of the MNCs in Egypt direct their sales to the local market, no re,, earch 
was directed toward the transfer pricing strategies from the Egyptian subsidiaries to 
their parents or other foreign units. 
Chapter 2 
Different Approaches to Transfer Pricing: A Survey of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The transfer pricing issue increases in importance in parallel ý, vith the trend towards 
large firms and with the increased interest of decentralisation and divisionalisation. 
The need for determining a transfer price arises when goods or services are exchant-yed zr 
between organisational units of the same company. It should be noticed that transfer 
pricing is a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is an essential part of a 
decentralised profit control system in any company where divisions buy from and sell 
to each other. Therefore, the determination of "correct" transfer prices gives division 
managers both the economic basis and the incentives for "correct" decisions. This 
involves resource allocation, divisional profitability evaluation, creation of 
profitability and cost awareness, production-mix decisions, make or buy decisions, 
etc. 
Although the transfer pricing problem became conspicuous more than sixty years ago 
with the invention of the multidivisional structure (Chandler, 1962), its management 
is still not well understood (Vancil, 1979; Kaplan, 1982). The transfer pricing 
problem is a difficult and frustrating one. Although there has been substantial interest 
in the problem among academics, many managers consider it to be unsolved. The 
current state of knowledge has been well summarised by Vancil (1979, p. 142) as 
follows: 
"My third disappointment in this studý, is that I have been unable to say anything 
definitive- or even mlldy useful- on the subject of transfer prices .... The issue 
remains a perennial puzzle for academicians, while practitioners continue to cope. I 
wish the best of good fortune to the next researcher to tackle this problem. " 
When it is desired to classify literature on transfer pricing according to the scientific 
perspective from which the problem is treated, a variety of approaches have been 
Each approach is designed to establish transfer prices that are fair, flexible, 
acceptable to the divisions, and consistent with corporate objectives. Each approach 
has its advantages and disadvantages, and no single approach is superior in all 
situations. 'I"herefore, the purpose of this chapter is to review and appraise the nature 
and scope of some major models that deal "'Ith the problem of transfer pricing. One 
of the reasons that transfer pricing has remained a dilemma for academics for so long 
is the numerous of research on how it is actually done in companie,,. A few survey%ý 
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have been conducted that rely on data provided by companies. Ho"N'ever. no study 
based on in-depth research, involving collection of extensive data on the company 
and its transfer pricing policies from the perspective of both general and functional 
managers, has ever been conducted. However, a number of descriptive empirical 
studies will be discussed. 
This chapter is devoted to four main points, as follows: 
(1) The concept of transfer pricing and its objectives; 
(2) Theoretical approaches to transfer pricing, 
Practical studies of transfer pricing; and 
(4) Different policies for transfer pricing. 
2.2 The Concept of Transfer Pricing and its Objectives 
The term of "transfer pricing"' is used to describe the intra-company charge applied to 
transactions between two or more profit centres of the same company. In another 
words, transfer pricing is an artificially assigned price which occurs when several 
units of one firm are involved in non-market transactions. This definition coincides 
with the description of transfer prices by Horngren and Foster (1991, p. 855) and 
Barfield et al. (199 1, p. 684). 
The most important criterion when determining the price is to be true and fair. This 
could be applied in similar transactions between unrelated parties occurring in the 
market place; each negotiates the terms and conditions of the transaction and looks 
after its own interest. The price in this matter is reached by the "arm's- length" 
principle. Normally, the an-n's-length price involves profits because unrelated parties 
sell at a profit. 
Transfer pricing, aside from being a necessary accounting practice, serves important 
managerial functions. It is generally agreed that the transfer pricing system should 
accomplish certain objectives simultaneously, including: 
Assure that the oýjectives of company units coincide with overall company 
objectives, 
"- Foster operating efficiency, 
Ensure an efficient allocation of resources, 
'niere are sonic terms which are used as synonyms of transfer pricing such as "internal pricing". "accounting prices". and the 
terni of "price of internal consignment". which is used by OECD Guidelines. 
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Evaluate the performance of managers, and 
5- Ensure an effective communication within the entire company. 
Achieving these objectives may be difficult. So, transfer pricing policies must be 
constructed to reflect the relative importance of these goals. A manager ideally acts in 
the best interests of the company as a whole, even at the expense of the reported 
profits of a division. To effect this ideal behaviour, the system of performance 
evaluation must reward a manager who chooses company wide goal congruence over 
divisional performance. 
Determining transfer prices is not easy and represents a major issue in integrated 
business organisation even in a domestic environment. Eccles (1983, p. 150) considers 
transfer pricing a nagging problem as it includes two portions: the sourcing decision 
and the pricing decision. The divisional manager has to compare the advantages of 
internal and external sources to decide which is best for his division and for the firm 
in general. If the manager opts for the first alternative, what price should be charged 
for the transfers'? Consequently, the transfer pricing problem causes serious headaches 
for the firm and its divisions. 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Transfer Pricing Systems 
Approaches to transfer pricing provide an apparatus for the analysis of the behaviour 
of decentralised firms. All these approaches have focused on two main aspects: "By 
whom should the prices be set'? " and "How should the prices be chosen or 
calculated'? " Usually the discussions concentrate on the second aspect. The question 
that arises is: should prices be based on cost, or market value or be decided upon by 
negotiation? In the researcher's opinion, these approaches could be divided into four: 
economic, mathematical, accounting, and behavioural. 
2.3.1 Economic Approach 
The traditional economic answer to the maximisation of a firm's profit is to produce to 
the point when marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Marginal cost in the economic 
sense is the additional cost of producing an additional unit, where the cost involves 
returns to all factors of production, including capital. The problem of transfer pricing 
within a decentralised firm arises from the conflict between the objectives of each 
division and those of the firm. 
Therefore, the role of transfer pricing, in this situation, is to maximise the total profit 
of the firm. The problem of transfer pricing was addressed in business literature 
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as early as 1908/1909 by Eugen Schmalenbach2 (Drumm, 1983. p. 34-35) , althou2h 
most of the works on this issue developed from the middle of the 1950's. The main 
point raised in the early studies was whether cost or market price should be used for 
the internal pricing. 
The first economic theory which outlined an optimal transfer pricing strate(-, y between 
divisions of the firm was presented by Jack Hirshleifer (1956,1957). His analysis is 
considered one of the most important theoretical bases for transfer pricing. As an 
economist, he developed theoretical models for using a market price as a trans'fer 
pricing method as suggested by Cook (1955). Hirshleifer (1956, pp. 172-173) 
presented some general simplifying assumptions for operationali sing his model, as 
follows: 
I- The firm has two profit centres: a manufacturing division, and a distribution 
division, and each division produces only one product which can be sold 
externally. 
2- The output of the manufacturing division is an intermediate good which is used 
as input for the distribution division. In another words, the manufacturing 
division is referred to as a seller division and the distribution division as a buying 
division. 
3- The operating costs of each division are independent of the other, i. e., 
technological independence. 
4- The external market's demand for each division's product has no effect on the 
demand of the other, i. e., demand independence. 
It is clear that these assumptions are made in an environment of certainty. In his first 
paper, Hirshleifer (1956, pp. 173-180) suggested solutions for three conditions: 
a) There is no external market for the intermediate product, that is, there is no 
demand and supply of the good other than that generated by the two divisions. 
b) The demand for the intermediate product is perfectly competitive. 
The demand for the intermediate product is imperfectly competitive. 
The three conditions will be discussed to show how transfer pricing is set. 
2 Drumm mentions that Schmalenbach developed transfer pricing as a theoretical concept in his thesis which was published in 
1908/1909 and extended in 1947/1948 in two books (in German). Schmalenbach suggested applying circumstances and 
directions of the market to negotiation between divisions of the firm. He also recommended the marginal cost (it each 
division's product as a base of transfer pricing. 
Iý 
Condition 1: When there is no external market for the intermediate product. The 
transfer pricing should be equal to the marginal CoSt3 of the selling dil, 'ision XA 'hether 
the final product is sold in a perfect competitive or imperfectly conditions. 
Condition 2: In the case of a perfectly competitive market existing for intermediate 
goods, both divisions could be given the autonomy to trade inside or outside. The 
transfer price should be equal to the market price for the intermediate product. 
Condition 3: When the firm is confronted by an imperfectly competitive market for 
the intermediate good. The optimal transfer price is equal to the marginal cost of the 
manufacturing division. In most cases, the market price for the intermediate product 
will be higher than the marginal cost of the manufacturing division. 
Hirshleifer (1957, pp. 96-108) extended his analysis to include the case of a 
multiproduct divisionalised firm. He assumed the firm produces a number of final 
products besides a number of intermediate goods which are used as inputs to the final 
products. Also, he assumed that the operating cost function for each final product is 
independent of the others. 
For this case, he found that the results do not lend themselves to an easy 
generalisation. His abandonment/continuation of one or more of the divisions, are 
involved, the marginal solution must be supplemented by conditions concerned with 
the company as a whole. He also raised the operational difficulty of an optimal 
pricing rule where autonomous divisions convey misleading information in order to 
secure a more beneficial transfer price. To overcome this, he pointed out that in 
practice divisions should be permitted to resort to the external market if the price 
demanded by the internal partner is too unfavourable. 
Hirshleifer's suggestion, was criticised by some authors. A strong criticism is by 
Anthony (1973, p. 45). He cites: 
...... many economists state that businessmen should act so as to equate marginal costs 
with marginal revenue. In order for such a precept to be feasible, the businessman 
must be able to estimate the shape of his demand curve. The economist assumes that 
this information is obtainable, but the fact is that few businessmen have it. Without 
this information, structures such as the one Hirshleifer erected, collapse. " 
Hirshleifer's analysis can be used only when a specified set of conditions exists: It 
must be possible to estimate the demand curve for the intermediate product, the 
assumed conditions must remain stable-, there can be no alternative uses for the 
3 'Me torni of marginal cost is used in accounting which is equad to the variable cost ot producing an additional unit. 
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facilities use to make the intermediate product; and the model is applicable only to the 
situation in which the selling division makes a single intermediate product, which it 
transfers to a single buying division, which uses that intermediate product in a single 
final product. Such conditions exist rarely, if at all, in the real world. 
2.3.1.1 Limitations of the Economic Approach 
Besides constraints in each situation that has been described. the econon-uic approach 
assumes static conditions. This analysis is concerned only with a particular market 
situation at one point in time. Also, the models assume a linear production function, 
i. e., the inputs of each of the buying and selling divisions are considered to be inputs 
to the final product. 
There are many assumptions in the economic approach which make it complicated, 
even in the simple context. The firm consists of two vertically integrated divisions, 
with no demand or cost interdependencies, practicing in a perfectly competitive 
external market. 
Moreover, the Hirshleifer and Gould analyses illustrate the existence of transfer 
pricing along the marginal cost curve, but they fail to suggest an operational method 
of implementation. Furthermore, the interpretation of marginal cost differs between 
economics and accounting. Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974, p. 13) indicates: 
"In summary, Hirshleifer suggests as a transfer pricing rule: price along the marginal 
cost curve. Hirshleifer has used the term "marginal cost" in the context of economic 
theory, i. e., the additional cost of producing an additional unit where cost includes 
returns to all factors of production including capital. In accounting, marginal cost has 
a different connotation; it is equated with the variable cost of producing one 
additional unit. Thus, pricing at the accounting marginal cost would not recover 
investment in fixed assets or returns to capital. Therefore, if the Hirshleifer system is 
to be implemented, modifications to the information generated by the accounting 
system become necessary. " 
Abedl- Khalik and Lusk (1974, pp. 14-15) criticised economic models as follows: 
I- These models are static, presun-dng monetary stability, 
2- The independence of demand and technology might be difficult to justifý, 
3- The models assume a linear production function which might not exist in the real 
world at actual levels of output, 
4- Marginal cost pricing might incite dysfunctional behaviour by divisional 
managers, 
I -/ 
5- A division's inefficiency may be moved to another division, which n-fight induce 
the divisional managers to impose seek by central management. This procedure 
may vitiate the autonomy of divisions, 
6- These models do not include cost-benefit criteria to compare the advantages of 
establishing marginal cost pricing systems with the cost of producing the 
appropriate information, and 
7- No one of the writers presented a case with more than two divisions. 
2.3.2 Mathematical Programming Techniques 
This approach treats transfer pricing as being analogous to the problem of 
optimisation under a set of economic constraints. 
The value of mathematical programming in setting transfer prices lies mainly in the 
information extracted from the shadow prices produced by several models. The 
shadow prices provide a measure of the opportunity cost internal to the organisation 
and are believed to be the most realistic method of internal pricing. However, if 
efficient market prices exist for internal transactions, these are the most effective 
transfer prices. This is due to the fact that such market prices reflect the best 
opportunity cost and provide ideal conditions for the use of income figures as a 
control and evaluation tool. The required competitive market is scarce, however, and 
this unavailability of a suitable market price has prompted the basics of mathematical 
programming. 
The basics of mathematical progranu-ning techniques are determining how many 
resources should be allocated where, in conditions with more than one buying 
division and with capacity constraints. Therefore, this approach deals with transfer 
pricing as analogous to the problem of optimisation under a group of economic 
limitations (Wu and Sharp, 1979, p. 71). Most of the assumptions of the economic 
approach are used in mathematical programm-ing, especially with regard to incentives 
for managers. But this technique deals with the concept of opportunity cost as 
mentioned previously instead of marginal cost to determine transfer pricing. The 
Opportunity cost refers to the benefits foregone by failing to undertake the next best 
alternative. 
The most important models will be mentioned under three subtitles: linear 
programming technique, opportunity cost technique and decomposition approach t, 
is 
Linear programming may be described as no more than a mathematical technique 
which is used for solving a particular kind of optimisation. Alternatively. the linear 
programming technique deals with problems which are characterised by: 
a) The objective function is defined which must be maxirrýsed or n-iirilmised. 
b) There are some constraints (scarce resources) to achieving the target, 
c) The objective function and constraints are linear, and 
d) Variables of the problem can take any real positive value. 
The solution in linear programn-iing has two closely related aspects: the primal 
solution, and the dual solution. The optimal value of the dual variables is called 
"shadow prices", which reflect the imputed value of scarce resources suggested in the 
primal problem and with limited outputs. Shadow prices can be used as a basis to 
compute transfer prices. Shadow prices should not be used directly as transfer prices 
but must have the variable cost of the intermediate product added to it so as to 
represent the real transfer price (Dopuch and Drake, 1964, p. 16; and Solomons, 1976, 
P. 18). 
The opportunity cost transfer pricing was referred to by Cook (1955), as he pointed 
out: 
"An opportunity cost is probably the best choice, since it reflects the alternatives of 
the whole company. This would be the actual increase in total cost brought on by 
filing the order, plus any loss in net revenue to the selling division that resulted from 
transferring rather than using the material for its own products. " (p. 9 I) 
In fact, the opportunity cost of the best alternative rejected is rarely incorporated in 
the formal accounting system, especially for external reporting. The reason for this is 
the opportunity cost neither represents an incurred cost nor comprises cash flow in the 
transactions involved. 
Onsi (1970, pp. 535-543) suggested a system for applying opportunity cost to transfer 
pricing in the absence of a market price for internal transactions. His analysis is based 
on linear prograrrinung which maximýises the total joint profit from the firm-wIde 
view. 
Onsi suggested a system for use when actual production costs of the supplying 
division differ from the plan agreed with the headquarters. The difference between 
actual and planned divisional profits should be credited as "motivational costs" to the 
supplying division. The procedure will cope with conflicts between divisional goals 
and those of the fin-n. That is, divisional managers will be motivated to establish the 
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optimal action to maximise the profit of the firm as a whole. This would pen-nit 
divisions to work as profit centres. Onsi's system, aims to find a means of evaluating 
the performance of the division as a profit centre. 
Benke and Edwards (1980, p. 59) pointed out disadvantages of opportunity cost 
transfer pricing. It might be hard to define the concept of opportunity cost and it is 
difficult to determine the additional profit foregone or the cost saved. Moreover, the 
opportunity cost is zero when there is no alternative to be taken into account, but a 
transfer price of zero is unacceptable. Frankly, if these shortcomings can be 
overcome, the concept of opportunity cost might generate an appropriate transfer 
price. 
The decomposition technique approach was used to increase the level of the 
divisional autonomy and improve the linear programming technique, especially to 
solve large problems. 
The basic conception of this technique is that each division calculates its objective 
function separately in the light of its particular constraints. The top management is not 
responsible for knowing anything about the internal technological arrangements of the 
division. However, it should know the requirements of each division for corporate 
resources. 
Conclusions about the mathematical programming approach are far more complex. 
This approach ends up by top management allocating corporate resources to the 
various competing divisions. Therefore, it does not maintain a high level of divisional 
autonomy. 
Kaplan (1982) pointed out three problems with mathematical programming 
approaches to transfer pricing. First, linear approaches yield multiple optimal 
solutions, only one of which is globally optimal. Second, a great deal of information 
must be supplied to and analysed by corporate staff, which gives divisional managers 
the opportunity to manipulate this information to their advantage. Third, the 
divisional managers have a strong incentive to do so, since shadow prices impute all 
profits to the scarcest resource, thereby penalising divisions that have adequate or 
surplus capacity. "This induces a strange set of incentives, encouraging each division 
to Iii-nit capacity so that any profits will be imputed to use of its resources" (Kaplan, 
1982, p. 496). 
I () 
The shortcomings of mathematical programn-dng prevent it from being a solution to 
the transfer pricing problem, even if it is narrowly defined in terms of profit 
maxin-ýsation. 
2.3.3 Accounting Approach 
Accountants have long debated the transfer pricing problem. They have recognised 
the effects of transfer pricing on major decisions such as make-or-buy, capital 
budgeting, introducing a new product or dropping an old one, product output level. 
and final product pricing. They aspired to develop a pricing system that maximises 
the overall profit of the firm, and at the same time, motivate the divisional managers 
and provide a fair performance evaluation. Therefore, the transfer pricing system 
should be designed to reach that objective.. They have been concerned with the 
recognition of the unrealised profits that result from a market-based transfer price. On 
the other hand, they were not unaware of the allocation problems that accompany a 
full cost pricing system. 
Many accounting writers recommended using market prices as a base for transfer 
pricing. For example, Solomons (1976) suggested using market prices if there is a 
competitive market for internal transfers. 
Others defended using cost-based transfer pricing. Most of the methods suggested to 
determine transfer pricing depend on the cost principle, especially if market prices are 
not easily available. Many methods have been derived from cost concepts to be a base 
for transfer pricing. The most common method is the actual cost method, which may 
involve full cost, full cost plus mark-up for profit, variable cost or marginal cost, and 
variable cost plus profit margin. Standard cost and opportunity cost are also used. 
Obviously, the accounting debate about transfer pricing concentrates on whether 
market price methods or cost methods should be used. Another point of dispute is 
whether or not the division might be free to decide to deal internally or externally. 
2.3.4 Behavioural Approach 
Prior approaches are criticised as they give high priority to production efficiency, cost 
minimisation, and profit maxin-iisation. However, they tend to ignore athe human 
dimension in transfer pricing strategies. The most recent transfer pricing theory 
offers a behavioural interpretation of transfer pricing as a control device in an 
organisation. This behavioural approach states that transfer pricing systems 
simultaneously facilitate an organisation's decentralisation and integration. It is 
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believed that for transfer pricing to perform the integration process, the evaluation of 
managers must be based on company profits rather than divisional profits. 
Cyert and March (1963) developed a behavioural approach of the firm which 
concentrates on organisational goals, expectation and choice. The organisation 11", 
viewed as a coalition of participants in which conflict is only partially solved. The 
basics of this coalition include a production plan, sales and inventory policies, market 
resources and profit policy. The goals of such a coalition are settled by bargaining to 
avoid uncertainty by, at least, reacting to short-run feedback from the environment. 
The allocation of resources among divisions requires a kind of bargaining. As transfer 
pricing is a part of the problem of resource allocation, it is important to the concept of 
"efficiency" and "fairness". Cyert and March (1963, p. 267) considered transfer 
pricing as part of a long-run bargaining process rather than as economic decisions. 
Transfer pricing is a result of long-run negotiation, because initial solutions will 
probably need adjustment. The process of negotiation and re-negotiation of transfer 
pricing might create conflict between divisions. But presumably divisional managers, 
in their negotiations, arrive at a satisfactory decision which allows them to give 
attention to the target of achieving cost reductions. 
Cyert and March (1963, p. 276) concluded that transfer payments should be made as 
follows: 
"In general, we should find that transfer payments are made on the basis of a few 
simple rules that (1) have some crude face validity and (2) have shown some historic 
viability. We should find that they are the focus of conflict among subunits in the 
same way as other allocative devices. " 
Watson and Baun-der (1975) investigated transfer pricing in terms organisational 
conditions (uncertainty, differentiation and integration). They concluded that transfer 
pricing is regarded as a problem in conflict resolution. They argued that transfer 
pricing is only one of a number of inputs to a multidimensional process of conflict 
resolution. In this process they believe that transfer prices are most likely be 
negotiated as an aid to integration when profit centres are strongly differentiated and 
highly interdependent. But they did not show the nature of these negotiations. Noting 
the lack of empirical evidence in this area, they suggested as a hypothesis for further 
exploration "that accounting data are completely irrelevant or unimportant in the more 
difficult integrating situations" (p. 472). 
It might be deduced from the behavioural approach that it is concerned with 
managerial conflict and fairness. Shillinglaw (1982, ) regards fairness as one of three 
criteria for setting of a transfer pricing system. He mentions: "The transfer pricing 
system should be designed so that the divisional managers will regard the transfer 
prices as fair" (p. 819). However, fairness is a relative concept, i. e., it hinges on the 
personal view of the divisional manager, what he considers as fair may seem 
absolutely unfair to another manager. Shillinglaw considers this criterion. along with 
profit maxiTrUsation as more important than appraising divisional profitability. 
2.4 General Comments on Theoretical Approaches 
The previous review shows that the economic approach focuses on economic 
decisions; it does so primarily in terms of outputs levels. Also, it focuses on profit 
maximisation under the unstated assumption that the other factors are given. As a 
general rule, a transfer pricing policy should be consistent with the corporate strategy 
of the company. This approach ignores strategy, since it does not address the question 
of what business a company chooses to be in or how it chooses to compete in these 
businesses. It ignores the effect of transfer prices on product pricing for external 
transactions and on capital investment decisions. 
The mathematical approach to the transfer pricing problem requires a less restrictive 
set of assumptions than the marginal cost analysis of the economic approach. But this 
approach reduces divisional decsion making autonomy, and ignores strategy and 
individual fairness through performance evaluation and reward. It focuses only on the 
economic decision of the divisional output levels. 
The accounting approach deals with transfer pricing for two situations: (1) the rational 
transfer price for decision making, and (2) when no market price exists or the market 
is imperfectly competitive. In this case, the incremental cost or variable cost is 
recommended. This will avoid dysfunctional decision making which may arise from 
using market price, especially, if there is surplus capacity in the supplying division. In 
the second case, the main contribution of the accounting approach is to fill the gap in 
the economic approach where full cost plus a profit margin can be used to present 
transfer prices. The accounting approach pays more attention to the role of transfer 
prices in measuring and evaluating divisional performance, even if this implies some 
sacrifice of profit- maximi sation. 
The behavioural approach focuses on individual fairness and administrative process, 
and considers managing conflict as the central administrative process. But the 
approach gives little attention to performance evaluation and reward. Finally, it 
ignores completely the economic decisions of the company. 
As mentioned earlier that the transfer pricing approaches focus on whether cost or 
market value base should be used, it can be said that using cost methods as a hasis for 
transfer pricing means shifting profits from the transferor division to the transferee 
division. This means that market price could represent an arm's-length base for all 
divisions. 
2.5 Empirical Research on Transfer Pricing Practices 
In the previous sections the theoretical basis for various transfer pricing models \vas 
emphasised. The objective of this section is to give a brief account to these studies at 
the domestic and international levels. 
2.5.1 Domestic Empirical Studies 
There are several practical studies of the domestic transfer pricing problem. Most of 
these studies depend on questionnaire surveys to collect the required data. It may be 
noted that few of these studies have shown a disparity between theoretical studies and 
practice. 
Principally, the descriptive studies grade transfer pricing methods into two, cost-based 
methods and market-based price methods. Some of the studies showed that some 
companies use more than one method in conformity with a multiplicity of situations. 
Table 2.1 presents a sununary of the major empirical studies: 
Table 2.1 
A Summary of the Major Domestic Empirical Transfer Pricing Studies 
Author or Institution Data Gathering Method Data Source 
National Industrial Conference 
Board (1967) Questionnaire 190 U. S. industrial companies 
Mautz (1968) Questionnaire 341 U. S. corporations 
BIM (1971) Questionnaire 293 U. K. industrial companies 
Tomkins (1973) Questionnaire 200 U. K. indus. companies 
Larson ( 1974) Interviews 8 U. S. corporations 
Vancil (1979) Questionnaire 239 U. S. organisations 
Berikeand Edwads (1980) Interviews 19 U. S. firms in 10 industries 
Eccles (1985) Interviews 13 U. S. firms in 3 industries 
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2.5.1.1 National Industrial Conference Board Study (1967) 
This study was based on the experience of 190 U. S. companies and demonstrated the 
various pricing practices of products transferred among divisions of industrial 
corporations. 
Two-third of the firms participating in this study used cost-based transfer prices, 
especially where divisions are organised as cost centres rather than profit centres. 
These companies used several methods to determine the cost of transfers, including 
actual costs, standard costs, and direct or marginal costs. Some executives used cost- 
plus methods, especially when the price of finished goods is sufficient to give an 
acceptable return on the firm's investment. 
More than 50% of companies participating used market-based transfer prices either as 
a single pricing basis, or in combination with some forms of cost methods. Market- 
based methods were used in companies that are divided into profit centres. The most 
frequently used methods to determine the market price, in this study, were current 
market price, market price less a discount, and negotiated price. 
This study disclosed that chief financial executives of the firm are responsible for 
establishing transfer prices with the assistance of the corporate controller. Most 
companies permitted their divisions to buy from outside after approval from the top 
management. 
2.5.1.2 Mautz's Study (1968) 
Mautz's study on transfer pricing methods was part of a wide study in the field of 
financial reporting by diversified companies. The required data were collected using 
questionnaires. 
Mautz found that 341 companies responding had internal transactions between their 
divisions. Of the whole number, 166 firms (48.7%) used only one method of transfer 
pricing; 175 companies (51.3%) used two methods or more. Mautz found that the 
negotiated price method was used by 23.6% of corporations, but it is conceivable that 
respondents considered this method to be synonymous to the market price method. 
The study showed also that the arm's-length negotiated price method was used by 
26.7% of companies, cost-plus markup (21.1%), cost method (19.8%) and other 
methods 
-) Z) 
2.5.1.3 British Institute of Management Study (BIM), 1971 
The main concern of this study was to identify the main transfer pricing methods in 
293 companies in the U. K. that replied to the questionnaire sent to them. 
Of this number, 193 companies mentioned that they operated a transfer pricing systern 
between their divisions. Companies in this study were divided into three groups 
according to the number of employees. Two-thirds of the companies mentioned that 
only one transfer pricing method was used, while the greater number of the 
companies left used two or three methods. Half of the companies surveyed allowed 
divisions to obtain intermediate goods from external sources, although top 
management approval was essential in some cases. Likewise, 109 companies allowed 
selling divisions to trade outside. The responsible authorities for setting transfer 
pricing policies ranged between top management; the senior division staff (buying 
and selling divisions); or a group from the two organisational levels. 
With respect to transfer pricing methods in the companies studied, cost-based 
methods were used by 89 companies (46%), and 104 companies (54%) revealed that 
they used market-based methods. Out of the 89 firms, 55 firms depended on standard 
cost methods, while the remaining used actual cost principle. Of the companies that 
used cost-based prices, 54 companies adjusted the cost by adding a markup, where 
about 40 companies calculated this addition by a defined amount or a percentage, and 
14 companies depended on negotiation between divisions. 
Amongst the 104 companies that used market-based methods, 61 firms adjusted the 
market price to reduce it by the expenses saved in the case of internal transactions. 
Two methods were used for this adjustment: adjustment by a definite amount or 
percentage, and adjustment by negotiation. 
It is clear that the marginal cost basis was not used by any company in the survey. 
Also, no company reported that it used mathematical techniques in establishing 
transfer prices. 
2.5.1.4 Tomkins' Study (1973) 
Tomkins aimed at investigating transfer pricing in very large an important 
corporations. He carried out a questionnaire survey sent to 200 top companies 
(groups) in the U. K. listed in the "Times 1000". While fifty one consented to give the 
required information, the remaining replied on condition that their names and data 
were not published. 
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Of the 51 companies, 4 did not transfer goods or services between divisions and 3 
indicated that transfer prices were used but did not mention the basis. The findings of 
this study coincided with prior studies, that cost based and market based transfer 
prices were the most common in the companies examined. 
Table 2.2 displays transfer pricing policies in 44 companies. All companies 
mentioned that they did not use either mathematical techniques or marginal cost 
methods, except for three companies. Tomkins concluded the degree of transfer 
pricing conflict depends on the degree of divisional autonomy. which represents the 
key aspect of transfer pricing decision making. 
Table 2.2 
Transfer Pricing Policies in Tomkins Study 
Method Number of times referred 
to by groups 
Cost-based Methods 
Direct cost 
Direct cost plus 
Average total cost 
Total cost plus 
Sub-total cost-based methods 20 
Market-Based Methods 
Current market price 22 
Market price less discount 9 
Sub-total rnarket-based methods 31 
Negotiated bases 14 
Other bases 2 
Total 67 
Sourcc. - Tomkins (1973, p. 180). 
2.5.1.5 Larson's Study (1974) 
Larson conducted an empirical study in eight U. S. firms, built on in-depth interv ie ws- 
with nine division controllers or assistant controllers and eight top-level managers. 
All companies advocated market prices as the best method of pricing intra-company 
transfers. However, none of them used market price as a base for transfer pricing, but 
they used instead a price ranging from market-based to cost which "'as set by a 
special comn-iittee in the top management. 
Purchasing from external sources was very restricted in some companies. Also. some 
divisions had to get central management approval for dealing outside after giving Z:, 
appropriate reasons . Some of these companies preferred to make external purchases 
centrally to get better prices. 
Larson's opinion of the transfer pricing problem was cynical as can be seen from his 
conclusion: 
"The overall conclusion that emerges here is that the problem of conflict resolution 
that surrounds transfer pricing and decentraliZation is of such a complex nature that it 
is very doubtful that any present method of transfer pricing would be successful. As 
long as top management ignores profit in evaluating a division, the method of 
transfer pricing used is largely irrelevant. " (1974, p. 32) 
Of course, this study is limited to a small sample and it could be difficult to generalise 
these results to the whole community. 
2.5.1.6 Vancil's Study (1979) 
Vancil (1979) studied the management of decentralised firms under the auspices of 
the Financial Executive Research Foundation. The reported data are based on a mail 
survey sent to 684 U. S. manufacturing companies. Of the 291 companies which 
returned the questionnaire, 249 (85%) reported that goods were transferred among 
profit centres. The amount of transfers varied up to 65% of the total value of goods 
sold (or manufactured, depending upon whether a profit- or cost-based transfer price 
was used) by the profit centre. The majority of profit centres were not independent. 
Meanwhile, 239 companies specified transfer pricing policies, which are displayed in 
Table 2.3. 
Vancil noted that variable cost methods were limited in use, where 4.617c of 
companies used them. His comment was: 
Table 2.3 
Transfer Pricing Policies in Vancil Study 
No. of companies Percentage 
Partial Total Partial Total 
Cost-based methods 
Standard variable cost 7 
Actual Variable cost 4 
Standard full cost 30 
Actual full cost 31 
Full cost plus markup 
computed on return on sales 7 
Full cost plus markup on 
return on investment 7 
Full cost plus a defined 
profit 26 
Negotiated price method 
Market-based methods 
Competitor's price 28 
List or bid price 46 
Source: V, -uncil (1979). 
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53 
74 
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2.9 
1.7 
12.5 
13.0 
2.9 
2.9 
10.9 
46.8 
22.2 
11.7 
19.3 
31.0 
100% 
it center "From a business perspective. this is not surpfising because the profi 
managers of supplying divisions would have Iltde incentive to produce if their output 
were to be transferred on the basis of variable costs. " (p. 173) 
Full cost methods prevailed in 
7 
2511, c of the companies. This stud), also investigated 
whether there ý, vas a difference in the transfer pricing policy used depending upon 
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whether the goods were transferred out from a cost or a profit centre. It wLls found that 
if a corporate manufacturing function shipped the goods. a cost-based policy was used 
over 80% of the time. If goods were shipped from one profit centre to another profit 
centre, a cost-based policy was used less than half the time. When profit centres 
traded with each other, a market-based policy was used over 3017c of the time, and 
negotiation occurred more than 2017c of the time. These results are intuitively 
appealing. A profit centre would transfer goods out above cost so as to generate some 
contribution to profit. However, a corporate manufacturing function that generally 
served several profit centres would not be required to show a profit. There was no 
uniformity in the way all companies set transfer prices (i. e., each of the policies was 
used regardless of supplier by some of the companies). 
2.5.1.7 Benke and Edwards' Study (1980) 
In the past few years, Benke and Edwards have presented a study which provides a 
wealth of detailed information collected by in depth interviews with controllers and 
their staffs in nineteen companies in ten different US industries. It focused on 
policies, techniques and problems of transfer pricing. 
The study noted that transfer pricing conflicts were often settled by the top 
management, because "the greater the dollar value of the product involved the higher 
was the level of resolution" (Benke and Edwards, 1980, p. 10). fn some cases, conflict 
was resolved by the company president. Only minor problems, or those which related 
to lower levels in the organisation, were resolved by the controller's office. 
Benke and Edwards (1980, p. 29) distinguished between primary and secondary 
transfer pricing techniques. The techniques are primary if the company uses a single 
technique for internal transfers. The division may choose another (secondary) 
technique if the primary technique does not fit the prevailing conditions. The study 
has disclosed that most of the companies examined were divided into profit centres, 
i. e., the degree of decentralisation was very high. 
Market-based transfer prices were used by 15 firms as a primary technique, while 12 
firrns used it as a secondary technique. On the other hand, cost-based technique were 
used by three companies as their primary techniques, while four firms used it as a 
secondary technique. 
Market-based prices were divided into four classes, namely: current market prices, 
adjusted market price, negotiated price, and contribution margin. The last method 
involves allocating the difference between the sales price and variables costs between 
the supplying division and the receiving division. 
3() 
Cost-based methods were found with either profit centres or cost centres. 
Actual/standard variable cost and actual/standard full cost methods were prevailing in 
cost centres. Sin-filarly, these methods were used by profit centres after adding a 
margin for profit. 
2.5.1.8 Eccles' Study (1985) 
Eccles presented a study hinged on extensive interviews with general managers of 
profit centres in 13 firms in three industries: chemicals, electronics, and hea\, y 
machinery. 
Eccles developed some hypotheses which revolve around the importance of transfer 
pricing and conditions that govern adjusting transfer pricing policies and their effects 
on conflict between divisions. 
Eccles divided transfer pricing policies used in the companies investigated into four 
bases: mandated full cost-based; mandated market-based; exchange authority; and 
dual pricing. Most of the firms used more than one policy at the same time. Only two 
firrns used four methods simultaneously. Eccles considered that vertical integration4 
is the most important reason for establishing transfer pricing policies. 
The main conclusion that can be inferred from the empirical studies is that no best 
transfer pricing method exists. A variety of methods were employed and the particular 
i-nethod chosen was probably based on the primary objective the company was 
attempting to accomplish through the transfer pricing process. 
2.5.2 International Empirical Studies 
With the tremendous growth of international trade, the transfer pricing issue became a 
major concern of corporate management in MNCs. Various empirical studies related 
to international transfer pricing were carried out since the 1960s. Most of these 
studies have contributed in identifying and analysing the key environmental variables 
influencing the MN transfer pricing practices. Table 2.4 presents a summary of the 
niajor empirical studies on international transfer pricing. These studies will be 
discussed according to the chronological sequence of their publications. 
4 Vcriical integration means unification of different activities of the business within the boundaries of a single firm. The 
obJectives of vertical Integration may be achieving economics of production or securing supply or demand. 1-()r more details 
see Eccles (1985.1). 79). 
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2.5.2.1 Greene and Duerrs' Study 
Greene and Duerrs (1970) examined transfer pricing practices in IN \I\C,,. The 
results showed that transfer prices were usually established on a cost-plus basis, but if 
the goods could be obtained from outside market, a negotiated transfer price was used 
between the units involved. 
The important factors that influenced transfer pricing decision included tax and 
customs duties and the desires of domestic divisional executives and local managers 
abroad to have an effective influence on corporate policy in MN transfer pricing. 
2.5.2.2 Arpan's Study 
The study by Arpan (1972) focused on transfer pricing practices of non-American 
MNCs with respect to their wholly owned American subsidiaries. Arpan collected 
data from 60 companies, representing 10 countries. The purpose of the study was to 
explore non-American transfer pricing systems and to compare them with those of 
American MNCs in terms of orientation, variables considered, degree of system 
complexity, problems encountered and method used. 
Among 30 respondents, 17 subsidiaries used market prices (ann's-length negotiated 
prices), 3 reported a market price less commission method, 4 mentioned a cost plus 
method, and 6 called theirs a combination system. 
Arpan concluded that transfer pricing system was one of the most closely supervised 
corporate operations and policies determ-ined by parent company executives with 
minimal participation by subsidiaries. 
2.5.2.3 BIC Study 
The Business International Corporation's study (BIC), 1973, discussed the problems 
involved in interdivisional transfers of intangibles such as, technology, services. 
patents and trademarks. 
BIC found that pricing of intangibles is one of the most politically sensitive questions 
faced by MNCs. It offered two criteria for setting transfer prices on intangibles: 
a) Transfer prices for intangibles are based on market value or they are essentially 
arbitrary. 
b) The key external restraint on pricing intangibles is taxes. 
2.5.2.4 Shulman's Study 
In this study, Shulman (1975) examined environmental determinants affecting MN 
transfer pricing. These include income taxes, import duties, econorruic restrictions 
imposed by host goverriments, currency fluctuation, competitive positions of foreign It 
subsidiaries, and so on. All the companies interviewed stated the existence of these 
determinants but not all of them took all these determinants into account in transfer 
pricing. 
Shulman emphasised that a successful MN transfer pricing method should maintain a 
functional control system to measure, evaluate, and motivate divisional management. 
2.5.2.5 Milburn's Study 
Milburn Is study (1977) was concerned with the measurement of transfer transactions 
between controlled subsidiaries of MNCs. The focus of the study was the external 
user of subsidiary financial data in Canada and the U. S. and how the interests of third 
parties were affected by MN transfer pricing. Milburn found that major Canadian 
companies were highly sensitive to MN transfer pricing variability. 
In another study, Milbum (1977) suggested that Canadian professionals should 
concentrate on developing disclosure, to help financial statement users make 
informed decisions as to the impact of MN transfer transactions on company results. 
2.5.2.6 Tang's Study 
The primary objectives of Tang's study (1979) were to identify, measure and explain 
the similarities and differences in transfer pricing practices of selected manufacturing 
companies in the U. S. and Japan. 
Tang found that the use of transfer pricing techniques was more widespread among 
the U. S. companies than the Japanese companies. Of the U. S. companies, 92% used 
some form of transfer price, but only 731/-c of Japanese companies did. Full cost-plus 
was found to be the most popular international transfer pricing method among both 
the U. S. and the Japanese companies. Tang found that the key objectives for transfer 
pricing strategies of companies in the two countries were quite similar. Maximising 
consolidated profits and determining divisional performances were the most 
important objectives reported by the respondents in both groups. 
2.5.2.7 Yunker's Study 
In her study, Yunker (1982) showed that subsidiaries have the greatest autonomy with 
respect to short-run operations not directly related to other units. There was less 
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freedom with respect to activities directly affecting other subsidiaries that are covered 
by such variables as price of sales to subsidiaries in other countries. 
The most important objective of the transfer pricing decision was to increase overall 
profit. The market price was the most important transfer pricing basis, followed by 
standard full cost plus a fixed markup. Establishing the transfer price itself by the 
parent corporation on a case-by-case basis to benefit the overall corporation was 
given an intermediate rating by the respondents. 
2.6 General Comments on Empirical Studies 
The previous discussion shows that the empirical studies on domestic transfer pricing tý 
focused on transfer pricing methods. These studies disclosed that companies tend to 
adopt a transfer pricing method which is most relevant to their objectives and In the 
meantime is consistent with their internal and external conditions. 
Meanwhile, the empirical studies on international transfer pricing have contributed to 
the understanding of the major environmental determinants affecting MN transfer 
pricing decisions. Shulman's study is a primary example. Arpan's study and Tang's 
research have also provided some insight into the non-American systems of 
international transfer pricing systems. The study by Milburn dealt with the financial 
accounting aspect of transfer pricing. This was a major contribution to financial 
accounting literature. The study by Yunker focused on the effect of transfer pricing 
on performance evaluation in MNCs. 
There are, however, a number of lin-fitations to the above studies. The common 
problem with most of these empirical studies is that data obtained from questionnaires 
and interviews are often unreliable. Anoter limitation is that the samples, used by 
researchers such as Shulman were too small for his conclusion to be generalised. 
2.7 Different Policies for Transfer Pricing 
Determining the appropriate transfer pricing policy has been a controversial issue in 
accounting and business literature. As mentioned earlier, most transfer pricing 
policies in use today are based on either internal cost or external market prices. 'me 
following will give a brief discussion of these policies. 
2.7.1 Cost-Based Transfer Prices 
This approach n-iight be used for pricing internal transfers where the firm ,, divided 
into cost centres. Also, if companies are more concerned with determining the 
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profitability of the individual products than with that of the centres as such, they inaý' 
prefer to base transfer prices on production costs. 
There are two main methods for assessing the cost: prices based on actual costs of 
production and prices based on standard costs. Each method could be divided into 
sub-methods such as variable cost, variable cost plus markup, full cost. and full cost 
plus markup. 
Using markups to be added to the cost are detern-dned according to one or more of the 
following factors: 
a) the volume of the operations performed by the intermediary and the risks 
undertaken, 
b) whether the onward sale is affected bby the attachment of any form of intellectual 
property, such as trad mark, 
c) whether the intermediary had the exclusive right to resell the goods, and 
d) comparable mark-ups in transactions with unrelated parties. 
Cost-based methods of transfer pricing, according to the survey of the National 
Industrial Conference Board (1967, p. 6), are used most in practice, and the reasons for 
this popularity, also according to the survey were (Ibid, pp. 6-7): 
I- The selling (transferor) unit is considered a cost centre rather than a profit centre. 
2- Emphasis is on the profitability of products rather than on profits earned by 
operational units. To better evaluate product profitability, executives contend that 
product costs should reflect, or approximate, actual costs incurred in their 
production and distribution, undisturbed by the inclusion of interdivisional 
profits. 
3- Management's desire to achieve better utilisation of company facilities to avoid 
incurring idle plant cost. 
4- Sometimes the amounts involved in interdivisional transfers are so insignificant 
that the company's management does not consider it worthwhile to bother with 
the complications of inarket-based transfer prices, regardless of any other 
considerations. 
In fact, cost-based transfer pricing is subject to some criticisms. In the first place, the 
difficulty of allocating fixed and variable costs to products, because the costs are 
time- and volume-dependent. In the second place, including contribution margin for 
profits in the calculations can hide inefficiencies in the transferor centre and this wIII 
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be passed on to the receiving centre. A third disadvantage of transfer pricing at cost iC' 
neglecting the opportunity cost. A fourth disadvantage, is that receiving centres ", III 
not be motivated to use cost plus basis to make rationalisation in the manufacturing 
process, because they thereby decrease their own profits in absolute terrns. 
2.7.2 Market-Based Transfer Prices 
For goods that are traded both internally and externally, the market prices of the 
external transactions are often the basis of the transfer price. When the selling profit 
centre can sell internally and externally, outside customers represent the opportunity 
cost of having to trade with internal customers. The use of market prices is consistent 
with the concept of operating entities as decentralised profit centres. 
Top management and executive managements can be involved in setting transfer 
prices. Managers of transferor centres and transferee centres more frequently 
negotiate the transfer price according to some corporate policy guidelines. The role of 
top management is often low although they may intervene in the case of any disputes 
between departments. 
Market-based prices can be used by internal centres without any adjustments, i. e., the 
prevailing price in the market or so called "arm's-length price". The receiving centre 
might refuse to accept this price, preferring to buy from external vendors. Therefore, 
in order to motivate it to buy internally, the market price is adjusted downward by the 
amount of cost the supplying centre avoids by selling internally. Such costs include 
selling expenses, freight, advertising, and bad debt expenses. The applied price in this 
case is called an adjusted market price. The advantage of this price is that it 
encourages internal sales. 
When the market is perfectly competitive, the prevailing market price (arm's-length 
price) represents an ideal basis for setting transfer prices. It allows the transfer of 
intermediate goods between departments while accurately reflecting the performance 
of departments and preserving their autonomy. 
Moreover, this price is most acceptable to tax authorities and most likely to be the 
appropriate basis to MN subsidiaries, but this depends upon variables not easily 
controlled, and market conditions. 
Using the market-basis to set transfer prices is not always a simple process, 
particularly when volumes of intra-company transfers are extremely large or differ in 
some ý, N-ay from the products sold externally. The amount of internal transfers is often 
ge when a vertical 
integration strategy exists. When the transferor unit is one of the laq, 
i 
largest producers in its industry and the transferee unit is one of its largest customers, 
there may be no external sales of equivalent volume for comparison. 
In short, transfer pricing methods can be partitioned into cost-based and market- 
based. The cost-based methods are widely used in practice in both domestic and MN 
companies. They are considered easy to implement and can serve various purposes in 
most domestic companies. However, objectives such as profit maximisation and 
optimal resource allocation seem hard to achieve with these transfer pricing policies 
in the MN context. On the other hand, the market-based method is favoured as it 
serves different purposes inside and outside the firm. However it is not easy to get 
arm's-length prices. 
2.8 Summary 
The need for a transfer pricing system arises from the desire to measure where 'the 
value is being added' in the business process. Transfer pricing, is usually a highly 
contentious issue because it affects the relative profit contribution of various business 
units and so reflects on the perceived ability of the relevant managers, with managers 
of profitable business units being thought to be superior to those who are managing 
less profitable units. 
The transfer pricing problem will remain as long as top management seeks to 
decentralise operations and use a single tool to communicate, motivate, direct, and 
evaluate. Top management should decide what the transfer pricing mechanism should 
accomplish and use the method that best fills its needs. However, the transfer pricing 
mechanism cannot be used effectively for more than one objective. In fact, the 
transfer price should not be the sole, or even a major, determinant in performance 
evaluation since so many other factors (i. e., cost efficiency, total product 
performance, and other subjective measures) are important in determining managerial 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
From the findings of the previous studies one can sense a growing awareness of 
transfer pricing problems among many researchers. Even though they provide more tý 
disagreements than agreements on specific issues, these studies do contribute to a 
better understanding of transfer pricing policies. The significance of these studies 
sheds some light on the importance of the transfer pricing problem that exists in most 
companies. 5 
In Vancil study (1979), 249 of the 291 companies in his sample (85%) are confronted by the transfer pricing problem. Also, 
Tang (1979) found that 91 11"t- of 121 American companies used transfer pricing. 
Some studies regarded a transfer pricing system as a subset of the overall 
management control system of a company. Therefore, according to this vie"', for a 
transfer pricing system to be effective, its purpose should be compatible with 
corporate objectives, and its operating procedures must be compatible with other 
control techniques used in the company. 
No one method of transfer pricing can effectively satisfy all the informational 
requirements of a decentralised firm. The "best" transfer price can be defined only as 
being "best" for a particular purpose. 
Chapter 3 
imensions of Transfer Pricing Problems in the International 
Context 
3.1 Introduction 
International expansion through foreign direct investment (FDI) is an alternative to 
growth focused on the company's domestic market. As a result of the enlargement of 
business activities, which has taken place over the last three decades outside their 
national boundaries through controlled entities in other nations, the term of 
"Multinational" emerged. 
MNCs invest outside their inland borders to take advantage of economic differences, 
such as taxation differences, financial market differences, differences in product 
costs, and differences in selling prices in different markets. Also, the firm invests 
directly in a given country to avoid governmental restrictions on market access such 
as tariffs and quotas and the problems of currency variation'. For instances, the 
growth in protectionism by the European community (EQ and the rising of Japanese 
Yen, has been an important factor leading to increased Japanese investment in the EC. 
By the same token, companies may be able to benefit from the availability of grants 
and other subsidies given by host governments to encourage inward investment. 
When the FDI takes place, the MNC can avoid various transaction costs (i. e., the 
costs of finding suppliers of inputs and distributors and negotiating contracts with 
them. The main strategy of MNCs is to produce in the lowest cost production 
countries and sell in the countries where selling prices are highest (AAA, 1973, 
p. 13 1). 
Continuous reciprocal transactions take place between the MNC and its subsidiaries 
which include tangible and intangible assets, services. The U. S. section 482 
regulations partition intra-company transactions into five categories: (1) loans and 
advances, (2) the performance of services (3) the use of tangible property, (4) the 
transfer or use of intangible property and (5) the transfer of tangible property. 
With the growth of intra-company transactions, transfer pricing issues have become 
increasingly important to MNCs, and both home and host countries. Generally, Cý 
developing a transfer pricin, (,, system in the international milieu does not varv I 
compared to its domestic counterpart. However, the problem of transfer pricing in the 
I For more detads about reasons that \1\('s invest and grow see Levi (1990. pp. 392-397). 
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international context is more sophisticated and an extremely sensitive and confidential 
issue. Providing a reasonable measure of a subsidiary's econon-Lic performance is 
often irrelevant to the objectives of MN transfer pricing strategy. A MN pricing 
system must attempt to meet the objectives of the strategic plan, the management 
control system, and the system of performance evaluation. So, transfer pricing has 
indeed become a planning issue for all MNCs, Sensitivity to issues raised and the 
compliance requirements, may produce significant tax savings and reduce 
administrative burdens. Failure to address these issues, however, may be costly and 
severely troublesome for the MNC. This is due the existence of external dimensions 
in two state-nations at least (host and home countries). In addition there is the 
increasing concern about transfer prices by other parties both inside and outside the 
MNC. 
Many writers have shown that the difference between the MNC and other possible 
forms of the firm is its unique ability to transfer funds internationally. As Lall (1983, 
p. I 11) mentioned: 
The fact that a transaction involving a transfer or sale of goods takes place within a 
firm, regardless of whether or not the firm spans different countries, and the firm is 
free within broad firnits to assign whatever price it likes to those goods, means that 
the traditional theory of pricing in competitive, oligopolistic or monopolistic markets 
ceases to apply to the process of transfer-pricing. The essential difference is simply 
that in transactions on the open market or between unrelated firrns, the buyers and 
sellers are trying to maximise their profits at each other's expense, while in an intra- 
firm transaction the price is merely an accounting device and the two parties are 
trying to maximise joint profits. It is possible that the accounting price may 
approximate the arm's length price of the goods ....... but certainly adhere is no 
presumption that this should be so: any other price is equally plausible 
It will be to the advantage of the MNC to transfer as much income as possible to 
subsidiaries for whom the law and regulations offer privileged status and who are 
therefore taxed at lower rates. The flexibility of MNCs to shift resources across 
national frontiers has increased greatly over the last two decades (Cavanagh and 
Clairmonte, 198'. 2) This manoeuvrability expands the companies' economic power, as 
they can move readily to the most profitable areas. Naturally, the principal objective 
of MNCs is to maximise their world-wide net profits rather than profits of any given 
subsidiary (Copithorne, 1971: Diewert, 1971; Horst, 1972; and Eden, 1985). 
Plasschaert (1980, p. 1) mentions that the transfer price has acquired bad meaning 
because it "evokes the idea of systematic manipulation of prices in order to reduce 
profits artificially cause losses, avoid taxes or duties in a specific country". This 
means the company prefers to repatriate profits via transfer pricing technique rather 
than a dividend (Which rnigh be subject to withholding taxes). Uýsually, a dispute 
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emerges between MNCs and fiscal authorities about what transfer prices should be. 
This chapter devotes to discuss the following points: 
I- The significant role of MNCs in the Global Economy. 
2- Transfer pricing conflicts. 
3- Some evidence of transfer pricing manoeuvres. 
4- Factors influencing transfer pricing dermination. 
5- The cost of technology and transfer prices. 
6- Restrictions on the ability to manipulate transfer prices. 
7- International co-operation and exchange of information. 
3.2 The Significant Role of MNCs in the Global Economy 
Once a corporation establishes a production facility abroad, its international 
operations take on new meaning. The corporation is regarded a Multinational. As the 
MNC is an important concept in this study, a definition is made here. 
For the purpose of this study, a MNC is defined here as a corporation which exerts its 
activities through wholly or partially owned subsidiaries or affiliated divisions, in at 
least one foreign country. 
One of the most significant features of the contemporary world system has been the 
tendency towards FDI by MNCs. Generally, the significant role of MNCs has 
increased in the global economy, notably in developing nations. Jacoby (1973, p. 50) 
regards the MNCs as "the most powerful agency for regional and global economic 
unity that our century produced". In a sense the successful MNC "acquires more 
power than any single government on earth" (Evans, 1990 p. 237). 
Some factors have greatly encouraged MNCs to proliferate and expand. Firstly, there 
has been a huge expansion in world demand for existing, improved and new goods 
and services. The second factor that encouraging the rise of MNC activity has been 
the liberalisation of trade in goods and services (until the late 1970s) and more 
recently money, mainly between the developed countries but also, to a much lesser 
extent, between them and developing countries. Thirdly, technological innovation by 
large enterprises, has greatly reinforced their internationalisation capabilities. In other 
word, innovation enables some MNCs to expand and utilise advantages of production 
when costs are lower. The 1980s appear to be witnessing the emergence of new 
MNCs and the link-ups of existing MNCs, to penetrate and to internationallse R&D in 
a number of high technology fields. ýý I 
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Perhaps the best way to gain an appreciation for the importance of NINCs is to 
examine Table 3.1. The table exhibits the 50 largest industrial MNCs ranked by size 
of sales in 1990. It shows also profits, assets, and number of employees for the same 
period. Many of the world's largest companies listed in the table are larger 
economically than most of their host nations. Of the 50 firms listed. 22 are 
headquartered in Western Europe, 16 in the United States, 9 in Japan. 2 in South 
Korea, and one in Venezuela. 
The size of MNCs has increased greatly over the last three decades. Revenues of the 
top 500 largest companies totalled $5 trillion, while profits amounted to $178,349 
million (Fortune, 1991, p. 103). Some MNCs operate in many countries, for instance, 
General Motor has operations in 46 host countries (over 500 subsidiaries), and IBM 
operates in 49 nations (Who Owns Whom, 1991). As a matter of fact, MNCs account 
for roughly a quarter of the gross international production. 
Most of these large MNCs are household names: General Motors, Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group, Exxon, Nestle, Hitachi, Ford, British Petroleum, Toyota Motor, Toshiba, 
Peugeot, Hoechst, NEC, Sony, Xerox, and Pepsico. MNCs have achieved their 
globalisation of production by means of joint ventures, licensing and sub-contracting 
agreement, and taking advantage of the burgeoning free trade and export processing 
zones. Industries differ greatly in the extent to which foreign operations are of 
importance to them. For instance, the oil companies and banks are far more heavily 
involved overseas than are packaged food companies. 
MNCs play a great role in dominating the production sector in many developed 
countries. For instance, at the end of the seventies they wielded 25% of the industrial 
sector in the U. K., West Germany, France, and Italy. Even in some developing 
nations, the percentage was very considerable, for example, it was 44% in Brazil and 
43% in Columbia (Heininger, 1987, p. 352). This means that MNCs "exude an aura of 
strength and flexibility" (Vernon, 197 1, p. 4). 
Some questions have being asked concerning the potential costs and benefits of FDI 
for home and host countries. There is no doubt that MNCs have helped to develop the 
economic structure and promote the economic growth of the host country. In addition 
to having contributed to a more integrated world economy. They provide scarce 
capital, technology and know-how and in some cases they provide the access to 
export markets. The role of FDI has been seen as technology transfer. Technology 
transfer involves not only the introduction of new hardware to the market, but also the 
mproving the balance of payments of techniques and skills to operate it. This leads to II 
1, 
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the country as a result of increasing exportS2 and declining imports. \, I. NCs have 
various reasons for becoming more important. A more positive view towards the 
contribution of MNCs to industrial development has been expressed by Lewis (1955, 
p. 258): 
Domestic income increases because the undertaking pays wages and salaries to local 
people, buys local supplies, and pays local taxes; and these payments not only 
increase consumption, thereby stimulating local production, but also make it possible 
to have larger local savings, and also to spend on schools, medical services, and other 
permanent improvement. If the choice IS between local capital and foreign capital the 
advantage may be with the former, but if, as is more often the case, the choice lies 
between foreign capital or leaving resources undeveloped, then there is little doubt 
that foreign investment plays a most useful role in providing income to pay for 
higher standards of consumption, of education, and of domestic investment. 
Jobs are often the most obvious reason to cheer about FDL The benefits reach far 
beyond employment. Salaries paid by MNCs are usually higher than those paid by 
domestic companies. The creation of Jobs translates also into the training and 
development of a skilled workforce. In most cases, MN hotel chains have been 
instrumental in establishing a pool of trained hospitality workers and managers. The 
size of direct employment by the 500 largest MNCs was 25 million in 1990 (Fortune, 
1991, p. 103). All MNCs had 65 million workers, which equalled 317c of world 
employment in 1984. Of this, 65 million, approximately, 43 million are in the home 
countries and 22 million are employed abroad, (of which almost one third are in 
developing countries). This share is impressive in view of the fact that only one 
quarter of the FDI flows go to developing nationS3 (Kreye et al. 1988, pp. 4-5). 
In fact, the role of MNCs might be passive in many practices, notably in transferring 
technology and in intra-group pricing. With regard to the transfer of technology, 
MNCs, at least in manufacturing, might transfer older technologies to host developing 
countries. They might also exaggerate the value of technology in such a way that the 
host country has to pay higher royalties, technical fees and other costs. Regarding the 
transfer pricing aspect, the problem seems to be versatile, as companies use various 
transfer pricing policies in order to maximise global profits. 
2 It is remarkable that a MNC could export more than a national firm. This is due to the former has greater marketing 
network and can, sometimes, evade protections in other nations more effectively. About 3K of Argentinean 
manufacturing production came from M'sCs in 1983. Also, 7091o of manufacturing goods in Zimbabwe came from thow 
companies. (Economist, U. K., 1988, vol. 309 (7578) November, p. 103). Several countries also, such as Brazil, have 
imposed export requirements as a protection for FDL 
3 The size of employment in these sectors might constitute 6% of the World labour force. U. S. employed nearly 6.5 
million employees abroad in 1984.429, of these in Europe, 321, -ý in developing nation,,, 14% in Canada, and 5',, 'ý in Japan 
In addition to this. MN('s have created employment in sectors that deal with them such as suppliers. (Economist, U. K. 
1988, Vol. 309, No. 7578, November, p. 103, Kreye et al. 1988, pp. 4-5). 
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Table 3.2 summarizes the considerable positive and negative impacts of M. \Cs- In 
summary, arguments for and against FDI are endless. Costs and benefits must be 
taken into consideration. 
Some writers defend MNCs (Pollio et al. 1988, p. 115) when they use the transfer 
pricing device to achieve their goals. The dilemma is that the host country is in 
sovereign power to levy taxes and customs duties and apply restrictive regulations, 
which companies have to respond to. Therefore, the transfer pricing mechanism is, 
inter alia, a response by MNCs to achieve their targets. 
3.3 Transfer Pricing Conflict 
As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, all transactions taking place between 
related parties of a MNC fall under the transfer pricing issue. When transfers take 
place, they must be valued, i. e., transfer prices for these transactions are set. The 
transfer price is a substitute for the market price. 
Logically, it is hypothesized that these prices should be set according to appropriate 
criteria, which, theoretically, are not prejudiced, to maintain the interests of MNCs on 
one hand, and the benefits of the host countries on the other hand. 
The most important criterion when determining the price is to be true and fair. This 
could be applied in similar transactions between unrelated parties occurring in the 
market place; each negotiates the terms and conditions of the transaction to look after 
its own interests. The price in this case is reached by the "arm's- length" principle 
which normally involves profits. This price is generally an accepted standard used by 
fiscal authorities. Therefore, it is assumed that the company deals with its subsidiaries 
on this basis. From the MNC's point of view, setting transfer prices on an arm's-length 
basis depends on the dynamics of the market power and the targets which the MNC 
seeks to achieve (Hogg, 1983, p. 54). It seems that transfer pricing manipulations 
occur most frequently in areas where international market price can not be obtained 
easily and when vertically integrated MNCs dominate a market. A MNC might 
prevaricate the transfer price by biasing it in order to shift more earnings, for certain 
reasons, from the host country to the home country or to another subsidiary located in 
a more lenient jurisdiction. 
The parent, accordingly, will score advantages at the expense of the host country as 
well as the home country. This means that a MNC can maximise its earnings as inuch 
as possible regardless of the interests of the other groups or governments involved. 
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Table 3.1 
The FiftY Largest Industrial MNCs, 1990 
Rank Company Nationality Inclustm, Sales Pr of i tsý Assets EmplineeN 
1990 ($M) ($M) (SNI) (Numb 
. 
er) 
I General Motor-, U. S. Motor Vehicles 125.126 (1,986) ISO. 2", - 761AX) 
2 Royal Dutch/SheU Neth/U. K. Oil 107.204 6.442 106,341-) 
3 Exxon U. S. Oil 105.885 5.010 87.70- 
4 Ford Motor U. S. Motor Vehicles 98.275 860 1-7". 66', ý) 
7 0.4 00 
INTL Business U. S. Computers* 69,018 6.020 8-7. J68 31 3.8 1 t, 
6 Toyota Motor Japan Motor Vehicles 64.516 2.993 5 34 WK40 
7 IR-1 Italy Metals 61.433 927 NA 419.500 
8 British Petroleum U. K. Oil 59.541 3.013 59.199 116.750 
9 Mobil U. S. Oil 58,770 1.929 41.665 67.300 
1 () General Electric U. S. Electronics 58A14 4.303 153.884 298. WO 
II DaimleT-Benz Germany Motor Vehicles 54.259 1.042 44.983 376.785 
12 Hitachi Japan Electronics -50.686 
1.477 49.456 290.911 
13 Fiat Italy Motor Vehicles 47,752 1.346 66.027 303.238 
14 Samsung South Korea Electronics 45,042 NA NA NA 
15 Philip Morris U. S. Food 44.323 3.540 46.569 168.000 
16 Volkswagen Germany Motor Vehicles 43.710 652 41.892 268,744 
17 Matsushita Japan Electronics 43.516 1.649 49.749 199.299 
18 ENI Italy oil 41.762 1.697 60.467 130.745 
19 Texaco U. S. oil 41,235 1,450 25.975 39.199 
20 Nissan Motor Japan Motor Vehicles 40.217 808 36,402 129,546 
21 Unilever UK/Neth Food 39.972 1,637 24,806 304DOO 
22 E. I. Du Pont U. S. Chemicals 39.839 2,310 39,129 143,961 
23 Chevron U. S. Oil 3 9.2 62 21.157 35.089 54.208 
24 Siemens Germany Electronics 39.228 913 41.148 373,000 
25 Nestlý Switzerland Food 33.359 1,635 27,859 199,021 
26 Elf Aquitaine France Oil 32.939 1,951 42,559 90.000 
27 Chrysler U. S. Motor Vehicles 30.868 68 46.374 124.000 
28 Philips Neth Electronics 30, W (2.328) 30548 272,800 
29 Toshiba Japan Electronics 30.182 923 32,830 14 2, WO 
(continued) 
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Table 3.1 (concluded) 
Rank Company 
1990 
Nationality Industry Sales Prof its 
(SNI) 
AsseV; 
(IS NI 
Employee, 
(Numberi 
30 Renault France Motor Vehicles 30.050 -)' 
31 Peugeot France Motor Vehicles 29.380 1.7(-X) 2 2.6 52' 1A X) 
32 Basf Germany Chemicals 29.1 F, 4 W n 
33 Amoco U. S. oil 28.277 1.91 4.5 2 
34 Hoechst Germanv Chemicals 27,750 927 22.839 172.89() 
35 Asea Brown Boveri Switzerland Ind. & Farm Equip 27.705 590 30.24' 2 15.154 
36 Boeing U. S. Aerospace 2 7.5 95 1.385 14.591 162.7(X) 
37 Honda Motor Japan Motor Vehicles 27.070 572 18.019 79.2(XI 
38 Alcatel Alsthom France Electronics 26,456 943 38.147 205.5(X) 
39 Bayer Germany Chemicals 26.059 1.164 25.349 17 I. W0 
40 NEC Japan Electronics 24,391 597 23.343 114.591) 
41 Procter & Gamble U. S. Soap & Cosmetics 24,376 1.602 18.487 88.800 
4" Total France Oil 23.590 765 20.761 55. (X)O 
43 Petroleos de 
Venezuela Venezuela oil 23.469 '22.405 8,130 51883 
44 Imperial Chemical U. K. Chemicals 23.348 1,196 29.826 132.100 
45 Daewoo South Korea Electronics 22.260 122 31.555 85.831 
46 Occidental Petrol. U. S. Food 21.947 (1.695) 19,743 55.400 
47 United Tech. U. S. Aerospace 11,783 751 15.918 192.600 
48 Thyssen Germany Mining 21 A91 451 14.604 152,078 
49 Mitsubishi Electric Japan Electronics 21.228 538 20.108 89,113 
. 50 Nippon Steel Japan Mining 21.156 818 26,619 72,929 
* Includes Office Equipment NA: Not available 
Source: Excerpted from Fortune, July 29,1991. No. 15. 
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Table 3.2 
Positive and Negative Effects of FDI on Host Countries 
Positive Effects 
I- Capital formation 
2- Technology and management skills 
3- Regional and sectoral development 
4- Internal competition and entrepreneurship 
5- Balance of payments 
Labour 
Negative Effects 
I- Industrial dominance 
2- Technological dependence 
Disturbance of economic plans 
4- Cultural change 
5- Interference by home government of MNCs 
Source: Czinkota ef al. (1989). 
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On the other hand, there is a gradual realisation for home and host nations to protect 
their national interests. Host countries are becoming aware of the need to monitor and 
evaluate MNCs within their borders. Manipulting transfer prices has implication-s for 
the balance of trade, the balance of payments, and tax payments. The use of transfer 
pricing also distorts national statistics, in particular those relating to the value of trade 
flows, corporate profitability, and the value added. Parry (1980, p. 193) indicates that: 
"With increasing realization of losses that occur with transfer pricing. host and home 
nations tend to scrutinize those intra-fan-dly transactions that can provide the means 
for exercising this and related monopoly power. However, when the MNC is able to 
set monopoly prices within the host nation, the MNC's share of any gains from 
foreign investment will be increased at the expense of host-country's gains. If 
monopoly and/or transfer pricing are coupled with other distortions which lead to 
inefficiency losses in the level of gains, then there may well be no net benefits for the 
host country' 
Other significant not- governmental groups affected by transfer pricing are creditors, 
investors and trade unions. The creditors and investors must determine how much of a 
company's profit may have resulted from deflated transfer prices. Trade unions, on the 
other hand, need to know whether the profits are understated because of the use of 
artificial transfer prices. Briefly, many groups are affected by transfer pricing 
systems, but few have direct access to information about them. 
When transfer pricing is used to syphon profits out, the repercussions will affect the 
national interests and, to some extent, the morale and initiatives of affiliated managers 
abroad tend to be adversely affected. They not only see their accounting result 
influenced by considerations beyond their control, but find also that inter- subsidiary 
performance comparisons are difficult (Nevhawser, 1986, p. 181). Even the 
managernent of the parent company might find itself in a win situation, because the 
performance measurement and evaluation will be complex and might create more 
problems with regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of subsidiaries (Reuber et al, 
1973, p. 147). Despite this, a formidable barrage of incentives spur the MNC to shift 
earnings through pricing policies. 
As a matter of fact, the issue of transfer prices is usually deemed as one of the most 
pivotal problems fomented by the activities of MNCs. Heininger (1987, p. 353) 
describes the conflict by saying: "the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the 
corporations, because of their intra-firm production, price, and credit relations and 
their centralised pattern of decision-ma-king, can effectively use economic 
instruments, such as transfer prices, to evade full), or at least partially government 
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control and influence". Therefore, transfer prices are a function of environmental 
powers. 
3.4 Some Evidence of Transfer Pricing Manoeuvres 
Several empirical studies have found evidence of manipulation of transfer prices. 
Before discussing the moves in transfer pricing manoeuvres, practical evidence can be 
shown to give significant importance to transfer pricing in the context of the 
international milieu. 
Frequently, most evidence comes from developing countries "as tax differentials 
between origin and domestic destination countries are larger and tax administration is 
much laxer" (Adams and Whally, 1977, p. 165). The pharmaceutical sector had the 
lion's share in manipulating transfer prices. 
Some companies might exaggerate transfer prices indirectly by changing the 
ingredients of goods sent to subsidiaries. For instance, a study done by the Andean 
Group's commission, declared that U. S. pharmaceutical companies sent chemical 
ingredients to their subsidiaries in the Andean Group member countries under 
complex code names and with high values. The specialists in the group discovered 
that these chemicals were simple ingredients such as salt and ordinary inorganic 
chemicals which were being shipped for three to seven times their market price. 
Another example of abusing transfer prices involves the Ford Motor Company. The 
company used to export its complete knock-down parts of passenger cars to its 
subsidiary in Mexico, at first on a full cost plus markup formula. Every time some 
parts were deleted from the shipping kit, only the variable cost of the deleted parts 
was deducted from the total cost. This means that the company could have recovered 
at least the fixed cost of the passenger car merely by shipping empty crates. 
Some companies used to discriminate transfer prices between their subsidiaries. For 
instance, a MNC used to sell products to its subsidiary in Puerto Rico. a tax haven 
country, at a price of $2.5 per unit, while it sold the same product to another 
subsidiary in New York at a price of $12.5 per unit (UNCTAD, 1978, p. 22). Another 
example happened in the U. K. in the 1970s,, where the Monopoly Commission 
discovered that the Hoffmann La Roche, the Siss drugs company, charged its U. K. 
subsidiary for the active ingaredient supplied in bulk at 070 per kilo for librium and 
L927 for valiurn. The Commýission found that the same active ingredient could be 
bought from companies in Italy (where Roche's patents were not protected) for 1: 9 and 
E20 per kilo respectively. Roche said it was not fair to look at the profitability of 
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individual drugs rather than the company as a whole, since it needed high profits from 
successful drugs to finance reserech for new ones. However, it refused to supply data 
for its worldwide activities. Some inquiries into Roche's pricing policies across 
Eurpoe were made, and the Inland Revenue re-examined its scrutiny of MN, pricing 
policies. These cases declare that the price disparity takes place not only in 
developing countries but also in developed nations. 
The above cases are now in history, but similar ones could still occur. In all cases 
there was apparently significant transfer pricing by MNCs, with a consequent transfer 
actual of returns out of the host country. 
Recently, in the middle of 1990, the U. S. Congress has paid great attention to transfer 
pricing dodges as a means of tax avoidance by MNCs. The Congress asked to protect 
tax interests and a number of proposals have been submitted to increase taxes paid by 
those companies. The U. S. tax authorities called on some countries concerned like the 
U. K. and Germany to cooperate in a joint study (Financial Times, 1990, August, 1, 
No. 31214). 
Briefly, since the volume of intra-company transactions is high world-wide, and the 
incentive to engage in transfer pricing abuses usually are greater in the developing 
nations than in the developed nations. And since the risk of detection, generally, is 
less in the former countries than in the latter ones, it would be an incentive for MNCs 
to make use of their opportunities to shift profits properly attributable from one 
jurisdiction to another one. Therefore, however great the problem of transfer pricing 
abuses is in developed countries, it is an even greater problem in the developing 
nations. 
3.5 Factors Influencing Transfer Price Determination 
Generally, both host nations and MNCs recognise that freedom from regulations and 
restraints is a strong inducement to investment. Unequivocal regulations and market 
freedom are trump cards. This means no discrimination on the basis of foreign 
investment versus domestic: everyone has the same rate of taxes, no exchange control 
and can repatriate or export profits. Moreover, if a country suffers from economic and 
social problems such as unemployment and balance of payments deficit it can 
subsidise capital grants to foreign investors, albeit indirectly. For example, exemption 
of foreign investment from income taxes. 
The actual picture is different, both host and home countries tend to maxim-ise their 
welfare from the foreign investment. So, restrictive regulations could be imposed to 
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maximise their interests and to prevent MNCs from abusing them. By contrast. NINCs 
are driven by the profit motive, and react to any decision which affects this. In order 
to augment their benefits, they locate their accounting income either in the home 
country or in the host country where income burdens are lower. 
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to draw attention, in detail, to the factors 
which have greatest influence in formulating the international transfer prices. There 
are national differences in the relative importance attached to environmental variables 
when formulating guidelines for transfer prices. These differences are sununarised in 
Table 3.3. Arpan (1991, pp. 502-503) studied the intra-company pricing system of 60 
foreign-based MNC and concluded the following: 
U. S., French, British, and Japanese managements seem to prefer cost-based 
transfer prices, while Canadian, Italian, and Scandinavian managers prefer 
market-based transfer prices. German, Belgian, Swiss, and Dutch managements 
did not have a particular preference for cost or market. 
2- U. S., Canadian, French, and Italian MNCs considered income taxes the most 
important variable affecting transfer pricing methodology, while British firms 
considered improving the financial appearance of their U. S. subsidiaries as most 
important. With the exception of Scandinavian managers, inflation was identified 
as an important variable. 
3- In contrast to external influences such as those just mentioned, non-U. S. MNCs 
reportedly consider only about half as many internal parameters as their 
American counterparts do. With the exception of the British, most firms under 
consideration, viewed transfer pricing more as a means of controlling subsidiary 
operations than as a technique for motivating and evaluating subsidiary 
performance. This is largely explained by the fact that the profit centre concept is 
not very widespread among non-U. S. companies. Aside from control, the other 
major consideration deemed important by all companies was the acceptability of 
transfer prices to both host and parent governments. 
Jane Bums (1983) classified, in her survey, fourteen variables that affect transfer 
pricing decisions. These variables, in order of mean ranking, are shown in Table 3.4. 
She also conducted a factor analysis for these variables. and the resulting five most 
significant groups were as follows: 
Internal foreign environment (competition and market conditions in the foreign 
state). 
2- Influence on cash flmvs (management cash flows, exchange controls, floating 
exchange rates, and U. S. export incentives). 
3- Artificial harriers (import restrictions, customs duties. price control, and 
exchange controls). 
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Table 3.4 
Rank Order of Influence of 14 Variables in Transfer Pricing Decisions 
Rank Variable Mean Standard 
Ranking* Deviation 
I Market conditions in the 
foreign country 2.15 . 872 
2 Competition in the 
foreign country 2.26 . 964 
3 Reasonable profit for 
foreign affiliate 2.31 . 975 
4 U. S. federal income taxes 2.57 1.190 
5 Economic conditions in the 
foreign country 2.61 1.037 
6 Import restriction 2.62 . 986 
7 Customs duties 2.70 . 937 
8 Price control 2.80 . 997 
9 Taxation in the foreign country 2.84 1.143 
10 Exchange controls 2.92 . 954 
11 U. S. export incentives 3.10 1.121 
12 Floating exchange rates 3.16 . 916 
13 Management of cash flow 3.20 . 928 
14 Other U. S. federal taxes 3.64 . 876 
The mean of each variable is based on a scale of I= strongly agree through to 5= strongly disagree. 
Source: Burns. Jane (1983, p. 438). 
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4- Taxes (U. S. federal income taxes, taxation in the foreign nation, and other U. S. 
federal taxes). 
5- Economic structure (economic conditions in the foreign nation. and U. S. export 
incentives). 
It is clear that factors affecting transfer prices could be permanent, such as customs 
duties and taxes, or transitory like import controls. When a company formulates its 
transfer prices it must bear in mind permanent variables that prevail in the Ion, -run. If 2 
the company gives interest to the short-run factors, transfer prices will not satisfy the 
objectives that a MNC seeks. Besides, continuous changing of transfer prices may 
arouse the curiosity of the competent government authorities to scrutinise transfer 
prices. 
Variables that affect MN transfer pricing strategies can be identified under the 
following groups: 
I- Market and economic conditions. 
2- Legal and regulatory considerations. 
3- Political and social considerations. 
4- Other factors relating to covering losses in one centre of business, antidumping 
laws, augmenting fixed costs, restrictions by host governments, and winning 
host-country government approval through n-tinin-ýsing conflicts with it and being 
a good corporate citizen. 
It should be noticed that it is unlikely that a MNC will be able to accomplish all 
objectives with a single transfer pricing strategy. Strategies may vary as 
environmental variables change. Transfer prices may be designed arbitrarily after 
world-wide priorities have been determined. Priorities usually include minimisation 
of world-wide income taxes and import duties. 
These issues give a fairly adequate account of situations which induce MNCs to 
indulge in transfer prices. It should be recognised that incentives to abuse transfer 
prices depend upon the conditions prevailing in each country. Furthen-nore, when a 
MNC takes an action to exploit a particular incentive will depend upon what the 
objective is. For instance, if the company's objective is to reduce taxes and other 
payments to the host government, the company will abuse transfer prices to raise 
profits in those nations where tax rates are low. The following will provide a 
discussion of the most important factors in detail. 
3.5.1 Market and Econotnic Considerations 
This category involves the extent of the market and competition in the host countrv, 
reasonable profits for subsidiaries, the rate of inflation, restrictions on capital flow. 
repatriation of eamings, and exchange risks. 
These deten-ninants are important in so far as they have a critical impact on the 
overall profitability and the expected return on investment. Hence, they represent a 
major consideration in making international investment and resource allocation 
decisions. 
3.5.1.1 Market Conditions and Degree of Competition 
The ability of any firm to generate revenues and consequently achieving profits 
depends upon, inter alia, the extent that its products dominate in the market and the 
intensity of competition. When a company sets its strategic targets, it has to bear in 
mind how to invade the market. This implies that a MNC must develop a global 
strategy in addition to several national markets in sourcing patterns, pricing strategies, 
product designs, technology, successful management systems and financing. 
Competitive pressures are particularly important where a new product, sales outlet, or 
pricing strategy is to be employed. If the project is going to have a significant impact 
on the market, it should be assumed that competitors will react if possible. How they 
react and how quickly may well be difficult to estimate and quantify. So, this factor 
must be considered and documented in the investment decision. 
Supposing these patterns are equal between similar firms, the strategy of pricing could 
have a decisive influence in this matter, i. e., if a MNC derives a competifive 
advantage over existing rivals to discourage potential competitors from L- I entering Me 
rnarket, it may tend to reduce the final prices of its products in a certain consumer 
market, even if it has to sell at a loss in order to gain access to the market (Hood and 
Young, 1987, p. 107). 
Reducing prices could affect the subsidiary's profit. Pierefore, the parent could 
exercise a transfer pricing gambit to underprice inputs to the subsidiary in order to 
bolster the competitive position of the subsidiary or stab the position of rivals. 
Research has shown that MNCs regard the competition and market conditions as a 
very important factor in the use of transfer pricing, even more than income tax (see 
Table 3.4). If the MNC holds an influential market position, nationally and globallý,, 
and at the same tirne, the size of intra-firm transfers is large, it is probable that the 
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MNC will adopt policies which aim at maxin-dsing net profits rather than those of 
particular units (UNCTAD, 1978, p. 6). 
Despite the advantages that might be gained from using a subsidies policy, there are 
some dangers in this issue. A government may express greater concern over the 
problem of antidumping by the MNCs to protect the local industry. Local rivals might 
take a revengeful action against these companies. 
3.5.1.2 Exchange Risk 
A country that suffers from instability of exchange rates or whose monetary system 
has collapsed as a result of decreasing the value of its currency may tend to devalue 
its currency to express the real value. 
MNCs face exchange risk as a result of the impact of the changes of exchange rates 
on their operations. In other meaning, exchange risks occur when a MNC has assets in 
a foreign currency, or, conversely, liabilities which are dominated in foreign currency 
and "whose values in terms of domestic currency decrease following a shift in the 
exchange rate between the two countries" (ICMA, 1981, p. 13). The holder of a 
foreign currency asset gains if the local currency devalues under fixed-rate or floating 
rate systems. 
A MNC normally becomes liable to potential gains and losses due to changes in the 
values of its assets and liabilities that are dominated in foreign currencies. A MNC 
should manage exchange risk in order to shelter corporate profits from the negative 
impact of exchange rate fluctuations, also to benefit from exchange exposure 
management. 
Clearly, the problem emerges in the consolidation of the accounts of MNC and its 
subsidiaries, when the latter accounts are prepared in a local currency. Hence, when 
they are translated to the parent country's currency, exchange losses can appear. So, 
the risk here is called an accounting risk because it is derived from attempts to value 
foreign subsidiary firms in terms of the balance sheet currency of the parent company. 
But, what is the role of transfer pricing to diminish risks for the MNC? It should be 
stressed that a change in the price does not, in itself, affect exchange risks. The role of 
transfer pricing could be significant if the devaluation or revaluation is expected. For 
example, when a devaluation is imminent, it is probable that a company will shift 
profits and cash funds out of a country via transfer pricing devices. If the devaluation 
tends to be a permanent feature, profits are likely to be kept at a minimum level. If a 
country revaluates its currency, the company is likely to apply the opposite. 
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3.5.1.3 Inflation Risk 
Inflation is a complex phenomenon. The very fact is when inflation befalls a nation, 
especially within major industrial and trading nations, it tends to spill over and affect 
other countries. It is the major and stubborn crux for most developing countries as 
rates of inflation have escalated in the eighties, particularly in Latin American and 
some African countries. 
Inflation is of major significance in FDI planning, control of foreign operations and in 
the reporting of results and financial position. There are some influences of inflation 
on investment opportunities and financial aspects of growing firms. This leads to 
erosion of capital resources. 
Eiteman and Stonehill (1983, p. 618) point out that a company might moderate the 
sharpness of inflation through increasing the sales price by "the sum of the increase in 
replacement cost of the item sold, plus the loss in real value of the monetary profit 
expected, plus the increased income taxes that result if actual book cost rather than 
replacement cost must be used in determining income tax liability". That rneans a 
company must lift the price, not only to meet the increase of production costs, but 
also it has to raise it more than the amount of inflation to face income tax computed 
on a historical basis. The extent that sale prices are lifted depends on the price 
elasticity. 
The problem becomes more sophisticated, as it is likely that the increase of prices will 
not be met with favour by government authorities charged with the responsibility for 
lowering the inflation rate. Thus "a company frequently finds itself in the dilemma of 
having to accept a degree of decapitalization in order not to incur the wrath of the 
government" (Eiteman and Stonehill, 1983, p. 621). 
Hence, MNCs will be seeking to repatriate funds to a safer haven country using 
transfer pricing techniques. A question might arise when a company tends to syphon 
its funds off in the periods of withering inflation. How could a subsidiary exercise its 
activities with limited funds'? Of course the reputation, name and size of assets of 
MNCs, may serve to give them easy access to local credit. For instance, in Grosse's 
study (1986, p. 42), 80% of the 32 MNCs questioned, responded that they prefer intra- 
company loans to equity because loans guarantee repayment that is acceptable to host 
countries. 
3.5.1.4 Restriction on Earnings Remittance 
When a country invites foreign companies to exercise investment in its territorials. the 
latter bears in mind the extent of freedom of transformation of returns. Of course, 
these returns comprise distributed profits (dividends), interest, royalties, licensil-12 
fees, and capital. But many host developing nations express restrictions about the 
repatriation of returns, not to the extent of prohibiting it, but rather controlling it, so 
that it will not affect the balance of payments ferociously. Constraints on profit 
repatiation may deter investment. 
The main reason for this restriction is to minimise the outflow of funds and to 
enhance progress towards the balance of payments. For instance, due to drastic 
economic difficulties facing Latin American countries, most of these countries 
impose restrictions on the profit extraction. The Andean countries restrict the outflow 
of income to 20% of net capital invested (Plasschaert, 1985, p. 256; IMF, 1985, p. 3 1). 
Companies rigourously restrict repatriation funds outside a country's boundaries 
(Grosse, 1986, p. 33). In Argentina, the transmission of profit could be suspended 
during the periods of exchange restrictions and balance of payments deficit (Tang, 
1979, p. 83; and IMF, 1985, p. 30). The restraint of profit movement is applied in Italy, 
where the profit remitted ceiling is 8% of net invested capital (Tang, Idem). In Egypt, 
there is no restriction for companies who wish to repatriate profits abroad. 
This factor is very important for US-based MNCs, because of the sizable amount of 
dividends repatriated from their subsidiaries abroad. For instance, these companies 
earned $30 billion after-foreign-tax profits in 1984. Of this amount, $11.8 billion of 
dividends were repatriated to home companies (Hines and Hubbard, 1989). Therefore 
a MNC could infract restrictions imposed on the profit remittance by artificially high 
prices of goods transferred to the subsidiary, a high charge on services rendered, 
including overhead costs and fees of intangible assets and low transfer prices on 
purchasing goods from the subsidiary. 
In summary, when MNCs face some problems on how to repatriate funds across 
national frontiers, the transfer pricing technique will be a back door way to achieve 
this target. The larger the number of products being shipped between subsidiaries, the 
greater is the degree of freedom the corporation has in repatriating its earnings abroad 
and in setting what look like 'reasonable' transfer prices. 
3.5.2 Political and Social Pressures 
Political factors can create a high degree or risk or uncertainty, alter the investment 
climate, and have a material effect on transfer pricing policies. Moreover, pressures 
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from trade unions for a larger share of declared profits might lead to using transfer 
pricing techniques to evade these demands. 
3.5.2.1 Political Risk 
The political risk is referred to as an unfavourable intervention of a host government 
in the affairs of the enterprises. The change of political events in a host country n-iight 
affect the ability of corporations to continue their foreign investment. The political 
environment might make a country unattractive for MNCs and lead to outflo". of 
capital from an unstable state to the perceived stability in other countries. Robock and 
Simmonds (1983, p. 356) noted that the political risk in the international business 
exists in the following cases: "(1) When discontinuities occur in the business 
environment, (2) when they are difficult to anticipate, and (3) when they result from 
political changes". They also made a distinction between macropolitical risks, when 
politically motivated environmental changes affect foreign corporations, and 
micropolitical risks, when the changes affect only some foreign companies or 
industries or only foreign companies with specific characteristics. 
No doubt, political instability has a great influence on the economic system of a 
country, e. g., price stability, interest rate and exchange rates. These in turn affect the 
operations of the MNC. The result is minimum levels of cash kept in the unstable 
country. 
Scholars have studied MNC-host country conflicts of a non-econon-iic nature. 
Recently, Fatemi et al. (1987) found that the political and social environment of the 
host country played a major role in the operations of MNCs, with the political aspects 
being the most important. Likewise, Korbin (1980) identified four prominent areas of 
potential concerns: political stability, foreign investment climate, profit remittance 
and exchange controls, and taxation. 
Forms of political risk might be differentiated. The simplest form Is that a political 
regime could require the use of local nationals in management positions and require 
social and economic welfare to be created by the company. The extremest form of 
political danger is a wealth deprivation (expropriation and nationalisation). 
A study prepared for the Financial Executives Research Foundation diagnoses the 
following 12 political risk factors: radical change in government composition or 
policy, expropriation, national, sation, attitude of opposition group. probab I t" of I 
opposit i on- group takeover, attitude toward foreign investment, quality of government 
management, ownership requirements, anti-private sector influence, labour instability. 
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relationship with the company's home government, and relationship with 
neighbouring nations (Newman and Czechowicz, 1983, pp. 15-16). 
Worsening diplomatic relations between a host and home country increases the 
likelihood of political danger, at least, in the form of a national boycott of the 
company's products. Also, if the MNC strategy conflicts, to a large extent, with the 
national interests of the host country, the probability of political Intervention by the 
latter increases. 
MNCs need to plan protective steps in advance to minimise the probability of 
political danger that might be incurred. In this regard, manipulation of transfer prices 
may allow the MNC to shift profits out of the risky countries while protecting their 
corporate image. This result runs to the hypotheses that MNCs shift funds out of the 
unstable developing country to the more stable developed ones (Vaitsos, 1974, p. I 11). 
Royalties and other fees might be inflated as well to diminish the size of funds in the 
subsidiary. It might be thought that charging high transfer prices on exports to a 
subsidiary leads to increasing taxable income in the home country, and paying more 
import duties in the host country. But at least "what remains after taxes is safe from 
expropriation and other foreign risks" (Shutman, 1967, p. 7 1). 
In countries where foreign investors fear nationalisation, they tend to exercise their 
activities through debt rather than equity, therefore, the loss will be minimum. Also, 
MNCs have increasingly become interested in projecting an image of a good citizen 
to protect against expropriation. 
The MNC might also reduce risk by sacrificing a percentage of profits through joint 
ventures with local partners, but these may still be prone to the risk too. Bradley's 
study (1977) pointed out that, historically, joint ventures with local investors suffered 
only a 0.1-1/c rate of nationalisation. Seemingly. the reason is that this creates an 
influential local voice to protest against the government spasm. 
3.5.2.2 Social Pressures (Trade Unions) 
Trade Unions are interested in enhancing the standard of living of employees. The 
level of wages and salaries, and job security are likely to be a major concern to this 
interest group. 
This factor appears, manifestly, in developed countries more than in developing ones. 
Unions are politically and economically powerful in Britain and have an extrernely 
adversanal relationship with management. Swedish unions are very poweTlul, sharing I 
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management responsibility. Italian unions are primarily interested not only in 
negotiating better working conditions, working pace and hours, and standard of 
income, but also in the increasing need for improved housing, health transport ation 
and educational opportunities (Simonetti, 1973, p. 84). They have the right to 
scrutinise the accounting books of the firm to confirm whether the company Is results 
support a rise in wages. German unions are more cooperative, but under the doctrine 
of code determination, have a say in some management decisions. 4 
These differences must be considered by a company prior to its decision whether and 
to what extent to set up its activity. On the other hand, a company could avoid anly 
claims from trade unions to augment wages when the profit is high, via a transfer 
pricing device. An artificially low level of profits may be used by the company as a 
reason for evading these demands, or reduce the pressure from labour. Therefore, a 
high transfer pricing on intra-company transactions from the parent to its subsidiary, 
and vice versa, would be beneficial in this respect. 
3.5.3 Legal and Regulatory Considerations 
This set of considerations involves tax rate differentials, customs duties, import- 
export restrictions, price controls and joint ventures. 
3.5.3.1 Tax Considerations 
It is frequently alleged that MNCs astutely use their transfer pricing system to 
maximýise profits in low-tax countries and minimise them in high-tax ones. On the 
other hand, the protection of the domestic tax base is, of course, receiving an 
increasing amount of attention in many countries around the world. 5 
Differentials in tax rates between countries have an influence in setting transfer 
pricing strategies. To observe the difference, Table 3.5 identifies particular nations 
with both low and high rates of taxation. Tax rates on corporate income range from 
zero to 65%. Intuitively, if the tax rate is high then so will be the incentives for a 
MNC to evade paying taxes. A MNC could reduce its tax burden by charging, higher 
transfer prices to parts in high-tax jurisdictions and thereby shift earnings to a low-tax 
environment. It is important to mention that as a result of these manipulations overall 
group pre-tax profits will remain the same, but net of tax profits will have increased. 
Stich earning shifting may also be used for "dressing up" financial statements hy 
It is authorised tor trade untow, in Germany to appoint a representative on the corrK)rate board of 
director, 
A recent invo. stivation for a committee of the House of 
Representatives in the U. N. has reported that 16 \I\Cs achieved 
total sales of S329 bil. liot) in 1977-S7 but paid only taxes of 
S5 biLtion (Economist, 1990, July, vol. 3 16 (7664). 
increasing reported income in nations where borrowing and other financing are I 
undertaken. 
It is a common feature that most MNCs, especially U. S. ones, have over the last two 
decades become increasingly adept at planning their investment and financin-g- act'N'M' 
in order to reduce tax obligations (Hines, 1987, p. 4). 
All other things equal, an obvious way to avoid taxes is to locate as much foreign 
income as possible in tax haven nations. So, it is not surprising to find that most 
MNCs have subsidiaries which act as tax havens for corporate funds awaiting a 
decision on re-investment or repatriation. 
Tax haven countries are those in which the tax on foreign source income is either verv 
low or nonexistent and the climate is hospitable to business. The governments of tax 
haven countries are presumably willing to sacrifice some potential tax revenue in 
return for the employment, technology, and capital that MNCs can provide, and in 
some case, more favourable access to financing local development. 
Table 3.5 
Corporate Income Tax Rates for Particular Countries* 
High tax rates 
Nation 
India 
Papua New Guinea 
Gabon 
Germany 
France 
Australia 
Tax Rate(%) 
65 11'c 
58% 
50% 
46% 
42'7c** 
39% 
Low tax rates 
Nation 
Bahamas 
Bolivia 
Ireland 
Hong Kong 
Norway 
U. S. 
Tax Rate (%) 
Null 
2.5 "7c 
I () I/( 
16.517( 
-) 3 (7(- 
2 8% 
Mexico 35 11'c Egypt 32% 
The tax rates shown in this table are derived frorn a "Corporate Tax: A Worldwide Summary' 
(1990) by FIfice Waterhouse. They should be considered as indicative only and rcpresent the 
best information availableat the time of wrifing. 
The ua mte on undistributed profits Is 377,. 
Of course, levying new taxes has a conspicuous effect on investment flight outside a 
country's barriers. For instance, when the German government announced that it ývas 
inning to impose a 10% withholding tax on most savings and investments from the hegi i 
of 1989, the threat of this tax led to an unprecedented flight of capital from Germany. 
with DM60 billion leaving the country in the first six months of 1988 (Simonian, 
1988). 
There are three contradictory viewpoints with respect to taxation between the host 
country, the home country and the MNC. The host country endeavours to maximise 
its tax revenues to develop its financial resources. The home country's vie"N'point as to 
foreign investment is to acquire earnings after paying foreign taxes equal to the pre- 
tax earnings at home. But any MNC, as it puts its self-interest to maxin-use its 
investment, focuses its efforts on minimising its tax burden, at least by equalising post 
tax income between the two nations. Hence, it manages its financial flows to 
maxin-lise after tax global profits. The consequence is a bargaining situation. 
Using a transfer pricing device to change the reported profit between the MNC family 
is possible, particularly, in the absence of comparable market prices and if the transfer 
pricing modification is not observed by fiscal authorities in the host country. Even in 
case of regulating transfer prices by law, MNCs are able to abuse them to evade 
paying income tax. For instance, however the U. S. legislations regulate transfer 
pricing methods which should be applied for intra-company exchanges, the 
government alleged that underpayment amounted to approximately $50 billion for the 
first half year of 1990. The IRS statistics show while the FDI in the U. S. have tripled 
and income has doubled, tax payments have not been changed. The IRS accused 
notably Japanese MNCs of abusing transfer prices to avoid taxes (Paul el at. 1990, 
p. 26). 
On the other hand, there is a significant disparity between the tax accounting methods 
adopted by various countries of the world6- Therefore, even if tax rates are the same, 
or not considerably different, the MNC will still be induced to change transfer prices. 
Also, tax rates variance is not an absolute factor to syphon off income from a high 
rate country to a low rate country because of the method that each tax authority 
applies to compute the taxable income. One country may consider an expense or item 
of income fully acceptable in computing taxable income. However, for one reason or 
another, the same item of expense or income may not be recognized by another nation 
in which the MNC is conducting business. For instance, one country agrees to deduct 
sorne types of costs frorn the taxable income such as depreciation allowances, interest 
and royalty and technical assistance fees, or agrees to deduct some revenues from the 
taxable income like capital gains. In contrast, legislations in another country may not 
recognise these expenses for tax purposes. 
6 For more details atx)ui these differences. see 
Nobcs and Parker. 1985, ch. 15). 
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Nevertheless, the tax factor is of significant importance to the NINC in developiriLl 
transfer pricing system. For example, the tax adn-dnistration in many countneý, 
collected considerable amounts of additional taxes as a result of transfer price scrutilly 
in the last ten years (Sargent, 1987, p. 23). Some empirical studies declared that the 
transfer price manipulation is "less useful than often believed as a means to avoid 
taxes" (Brooke and Remmers, 1970, p. 176). On delving further into the same 
consequence, Arpan (1991, p. 496) found that the greater vigilance of tax authorities 
towards transfer pricing scrutiny is less important for tax considerations in 
establishing intra-company prices. The reasons for this conduct are: 
Differences in tax rates between countries which the parent and subsidiaries work 
are not large enough to manipulate transfer prices. 
2- The extent to which tax administrations in the host country as well as the home 
nation audit transfer prices. 
Another study carried out by Kim and Miller indicated that in the past, MNCs 
considered reducing income taxes as the most important objective in setting their 
transfer prices. Now, tax reduction is only a minor factor among many others, and the 
company's overall objective rather than income tax liability should be a major concern 
(1979, p. 71). 
In brief, differences in tax rates between nations stir MNCs to conduct operations so 
that high income accrues to firms in low tax countries, and vice versa, through 
artificial transfer prices. In other words, the more extensive the transfer prices, the 
smaller the income taxes paid by the company. Therefore, a kind of dispute emerges 
between MNCs and revenue collecting authorities. 
3.5.3.2 Customs Duties Considerations 
Customs duties or tariffs affect the competitiveness of a company by increasing costs 
and reducing profit marginS7. Tariff schedules of imported goods notably vary from 
country to another, even the application of these schedules often varies within the 
country of origin of the imported goods. 
The customs area usually coincides with national political boundaries. Most countries 
impose customs duties (mainly on imports) to develop their financial revenues, 
exercise control over foreign trade, and protect national industries against foreign 
competition and dumping policies. For this reason. duties seem to be relatively high 
in developing countries when compared with developed countries. 
7 Two of the better discussion can be found in Horst (1971 )and Lall (19,0). 
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Frequently, customs duties are set as a percentage of import values. Therefore, 
customs authorities benefit when the value of goods imported is high. Of course. 
tariffs affect the competitiveness of an enterprise by increasing costs and decreasing 
the accounting profit. Hence, the enterprise would attempt to set as low transfer prices 
as possible, with the optimal price being zero. This means the company could 
mitigate the effect of paying high tariffs through underpricing transfers. 
If the customs administration reveals that prices of goods are faked, it would insist on 
charging the tariff on another price. This could be a market price or even a fictitious 
price which is higher than the invoice price. Hence, a perpetual contest, between the 
MNC and the customs department, will be focused on what is the fair price to be used 
to determine customs duties and meet requirements of each party. In most situations, 
the customs administration succeeds in applying its estimates. The reason might be 
the company takes into consideration that slow negotiation leads to a delay in the 
entry of goods and hence production operations might be affected. 
There is some evidence of the manipulation of transfer prices for the purpose of 
decreasing the burden of customs duties and income tax. For instance, a company 
attempted to reduce these in Belgium, as an importing country, and reduce the income 
tax in two exporting countries. Hence, it sent the same goods to Belgium at different 
prices, this however attracted the attention of the two authorities there. The result was 
a review of price practices, which led to a change in pricing policies and a huge 
amount of taxes being paid by the company. This procedure drew the attention of 
other countries that had subsidiaries for the same company and likewise cracked 
down on some exercises which the company used in pricing. Besides the additional 
amounts that the company had to pay, it suffered from the populace brunt. (Benke and 
Edwards, 1980, pp. 116-117) 
Customs duties and income taxation often come to different decisions regarding to the 
value of goods. This is, principally, due to the different time of which the tax is 
assessed. Of course, customs duties are imposed on the value of goods at the time of 
their import, whilst the income tax is established at the time of realising net profit on 
selling goods. Therefore, when a MNC combines income tax and customs duties in 
order to maximise its profits, it might find a kind of conflict between them, i. e. low 
transfer prices reduce tariffs, but, on the other hand. raise the taxable income, and vice 
versa. The company needs to find a balance between charging very high transfer 
prices to minimise its income tax and charging very low transfer prices to lessen the 
amount of customs duties. 
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3.5.3.3 Joint Ventures (Existence of Shareholders) 
MNCs might prefer to take majority equity stakes and full management control over 
joint ventures. The reason also for preferring 10017c ownership might be based on 
financial concerns. For instance, the management of IBM believes that by 
relinquishing a portion of its ownership abroad, it would be setting a precedent for 
shared control with local partners. This practice would cost more than could possible 
be gained (Encarnation and Vachani, 1985). In some cases, IBM has withdrawn 
operations from a nation-state rather than agree to government demands for local 
ownership. 
There is also a great relationship between technology intensity and the type of 
ownership. Companies exploiting their own technology prefer whole ventures in 
industries with high R&D spending, but companies acquiring technology prefer joint 
ownership (Gomes-Casseres, 1990, p. 14). Moreover the relative size of the MNC 
could affect ownership preference. 
The existence of local shareholders might also undesirable for a MNC because it 
could impede the investment policy of the company. Local partners, notably 
individuals, expect a quick return on their investments. On the other hand, the 
company might wish to accumulate capital or might not achieve profits in the short- 
run, for instance, if it works in the construction sector. 
In addition to this point, local investors need infon-nation about the financial results to 
get a complete picture of the subsidiary activity. This means legal requirements for 
financial disclosure tend to be increased in the case of joint ventures. Disclosure of 
accounting results might harm the company by giving competitors knowledge about a 
kind of business that the MNC considers secret. 
Many countries prohibit outright ownership, making joint ventures virtually the only 
vehicle for FDI. There is a popular feeling in many developing countries that there 
should be a national presence in all foreign controlled companies in order to exercise 
some control or to extract larger shares of rent or simply to acquire more information 
about the operation of the foreign company (Helleiner, 1989, p. 1466). 
Even when host governments do not impose restriction on foreign ownership, a MNC 
might prefer joint ownership for its own benefits. Local shareholders could provide 
the company with valuable information regarding the conditions of local markets and 
consurners' mofives, so the company could easily penetrate the market. Also, local 
partners could , vell deal with the gover-nment authorities and might contribute useful 
technology and competent management. Hence, "Joint ventures with an agency of the 
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host government are becoming more common" (Eiteman and Stonehill. 1983. p. 322). 
Moreover, local partners n-dght act with the MNC to "provide funds for accumulation 
abroad or for resale in the black market" (Lall, 1983, p. 114). In vieNA' of these 
considerations, a MNC might bear in mind that it should select carefull%, the 
appropriate partner to reduce any trouble (Poynter, 1985, p. 17). Also, when a NINC 
starts business in a new country where there are established rivals, a joint venture rnav 
be an effective way to acquire local expertise, but there may be significant costs to 
shared management. 
Beyond the advantages and disadvantages of the joint venture, the existence of local 
shareholders encourages MNCs to use transfer pricing devices to penalise the joint 
venture. The MNC could manipulate transfer prices, so that it reaps the larger share of 
profits on the account of local partners. As the definition of transfer prices refers to 
payments for services. 
In summary, existence of a joint venture as a base for foreign investment is likely to 
encourage the corporation to manipulate transfer prices to embezzle the greater share 
of earnings. 
3.5.3.4 Import-Export Restrictions 
Countries could ration imports for several reasons: hard currency shortage, protection 
of the local production, and in some cases of the balance of payments deficit. 
Therefore, they n-fight regulate the foreign exchange and the size of imports of goods. 
When the balance of payments is affected by a deterioration in economic health, the 
government could retain imports as a way to fill the gap between inflow and outflow. 
So, the parent might underprice the affiliate's imports. 
On the other hand, if government restrictions on exchange do not give the freedom of 
the repatriation of monetary funds, a MNC would seek to syphon its funds off from 
that country to another way through high transfer prices. 
3.5.3.5 Price Controls 
From time to time, many countries might intervene to control final prices to protect its 
populace, as a whole, from an irksome exploitation. A company rnight tend to 
increase its prices, especially when the demand for its products is perfectly inelastic 
or it represents the only monopolist for a given product. 
The government might valorise the price of final products or determine a given 
margin for profit to be added to the costs of production. In most conditions, the 
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government control of prices in an industry is relative to the costs and profits 
experienced by firms in that industry (Lecraw, 1985, p. 228). For instance, the Belgian 
government determines the relationship between the market prices, cost, and hence 
profit ceilings. In this respect, the import cost must be 85% of the market price. In 
France, tax administrations determine a certain profit margin added to costs to extract 
the market prices (BIC, 1973, pp. 47-48). 
When a company is limited to price ceilings, some measures can be taken by the 
company to circumvent this restriction. The company could allocate the production to 
exports since exports are not likely to be subject to the price control. Similarly, import 
prices may be increased if the subsidiary is able to pass on its cost increases as higher 
prices. The parent will tend to overinvoice inputs exported to the subsidiary as a way 
to establish a higher cost basis, and hence, increase the profit margin above the level 
secured. It should be noted however that the resultant higher import duty payments, 
when applicable, need to be considered. 
3.5.4 Some Other Determining Factors 
A great number of various transfer pricing determinants could still be mentioned. This 
group includes winning host country government approval, legal constraints in the 
host country, and antidumping legislations. 
3.5.4.1 Winning Host-Country Government Approval 
The manipulation of transfer prices for the purpose of repatriation of profits can be a 
politically sensitive problem. It is important that host government should not consider 
the profit rate too high, or else the MNC is likely to face accusation of price gouging 
and lose favour. 
Consequently, a host govemment would be concerned about intra-company pricing 
and its effect on reported profits. In an era when a MNC must be concerned about 
justifying its existence, maintaining positive relations with the host government is a 
good idea. Continually changing and manipulating transfer prices is not good policy. 
Most governments are beconung more sophisticated and aware of the results of using 
hi(-, h or low transfer prices. Using unfavourable prices to a country's detriment may 
result in the loss of goodwill. It is beneficial in the long run to develop transfer pricing 
policies that satisfy the foreign authorities even though it may mean sacrificing some 
profits. 
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It is also possible that due to MNCs' monopoly patent rights, the company is making 
embarrassingly high profits as compared to the local firms and therefore feels 
compelled to reduce the book value of its profits by reporting higher costs 
3.5.4.2 Antidumping Legislations of Foreign Countries 
Dumping occurs when an exporter sells a product in a foreign market at a price lower 
than that at which it is sold on his home markets. They aim at capturing domestic 
market shares at the expense of domestic industries. Some countries step up their 
measures against these companies and charge them with using predatory pricing. 
Basically, when a country levies customs duties it aims, not only, at raising its 
revenues, but also at protecting local industries against the dumping of the excess 
production of foreign companies. Therefore, if dumping is proven, the firm may face 
a high tariff on its imports8 or a fine (or both). The company has to raise prices 
charged on intermediate goods somewhat to outflank the accusation of dumping. 
Anti monopoly legislations act the other way from antidumping. Anti monopoly 
occurs when one firm or a few firms dominate the market to the extent that final 
prices might be abused. In terms of the exercise of monopoly power, the MNCs may 
not wish to rriinimýise apparent returns in the host country, either to avoid taxation of 
profits or maintain a good corporate image within the host country. T'herefore the 
company has to decrease transfer prices of intermediate products to improve its 
picture within the host country. 
3.5.4.3 Management Control and Performance Evaluation 
The problem of management control and performance evaluation represents an 
internal factor when designing a transfer pricing system. The problem that arises is 
how does a MNC evaluate properly the profit performance of a foreign subsidiary 
manager whose operations show a loss when in fact it was the parent company 
executives who decided that the manager must buy at artificially high prices and sell 
at artificially low prices in order to shift profit to another subsidiary in a low-tax 
country'? And how does a MNC compare the performance of two managers who 
operate under exactly opposite conditions and instructions'! 
8 Somo evidence for using thi's technique to transfer funds is mentioned in Robbins and Stobaugh ( 1974, pp. 88-90). Also. 
more recentiv, countries that impose and subject to anti-dumping duties are mentioned in Financial Tunes, 24 July 1990, 
N o. 3 1207. 
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One solution is to evaluate what a manager's performance would have been if the 
subsidiary had operated as an autonomous profit centre, that is, had all Its internal 
transfers been at arm's-length prices or their equivalents. 
MNCs may resort to maintaining a separate set of financial information for the 
foreign governments and another set for headquarters to use in the management 
control process and the performance evaluation system. Unfortunately, the 
infon-nation provided to the host government is all too often used to evaluate the 
performance of a subsidiary that has been programmed to produce a low profit to 
minimize income taxes. If headquarters overlooks the fact that low profits were due to 
an unfavourable transfer price, hard feelings between subsidiary managers and 
headquarters may result. It may also cause subsidiary managers to act undesirably and 
long-run morale problems could develop, destroying the short-run effect of tax 
nunimisation. 
Ideally the objectives of the management control process should be separated from 
those of NIN transfer pricing. Headquarters must realise that the performance 
evaluation system should provide information that discriminates between subsidiary 
performance and world-wide corporate performance. 
3.6 The Cost of Technology and Transfer Prices 
The parent company often provides technical, managerial and administrative, and 
marketing services to its subsidiaries. Hence, not only are transfer prices applied to 
tangible transactions, but also intangibles. The area of intangible transfers has, in 
recent years, given rise to perhaps more controversy than any other. 
Intangible assets have been considered a fundamental area of concern with respect to 
the relationship of developing countries with MNCs. The income earned of U. S. MN 
subsidiaries in developing nations contains nearly 3517c of their total incorne 
(UNCTC, 1987, p. 3). At the same time, investment income from transfers of 
technology rose by approximately 87c1c from 1977 to 1980 (lbid). 
As a matter of fact, charging for services and royalties is another sensitive area of 
intra-family pricing, because these fees are frequently much less acceptable to host 
governments. However, some writers point out that, in general, host countries 
stipulate 5()'Z(- national ownership, but are lenient on transfers through royalty and fee 
payments for management and technical services. They do not consider such 
payments as repatriation of earnings, but it is often used as alternative method of 
profit shifting when other regulations are too restrictive. "Normally. these charges are 
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determined by the general economic conditions prevailing in the developing country 
and the attitude of the local government toward economic development" (Kim and 
Miller, 1979, p. 74). 
Using transfer pricing and royalty payments are not the only way for profit shifting tk 
outside a country, but other ways include using intra-company loans and intra-group 
services fees. These issues will be presented briefly as follows: 
3.6.1 Intra-Company Loans 
The OECD Report of 1979 determined the term "loan" between related parties is used 
in a broad sense and involves loans or advances of money. When a subsidiary obtain..,, 
a loan from its parent company or any member of the group the interest on the loan 
can be abused to syphon off funds. This happens when there is an overcharge of intra- 
company interest paid by the subsidiary. 
Syphoning funds in this way achieves two objectives, firstly accumulating funds 
outside the country, and secondly, minimising the taxable income of the subsidiary as 
the interest is deducted from it. Therefore, tax authorities of the host government are, 
out of necessity, much concerned with the rate of interest charged to the subsidiary. 
An arm's-length rate of interest for a loan between associated parties is the rate that 
would be charged in similar circumstances in a transaction between unrelated parties. 
Tax authorities might treat the excess amount above this arm's-length rate as a 
disguised profit distribution which should be subject to taxes generally applicable to 
dividends paid by the subsidiary to foreign shareholders. 
3.6.2 Intra-Company Service Fees 
These services cover industrial, marketing, administrative and management activities, 
and the like. When these services are to be carried out by the parent company or a 
specific subsidiary a search for a fair basis to allocate them is necessary. The 
considerations relating to the intra-company services present considerable difficulties 
as far as their evaluation is concerned. MNCs might use a different basis for the 
allocation of costs. The most frequent method that is used is "cost-sharing 
arrangement", that is allocating services fees among various subsidiaries in relation to 
the benefits that each of them may yield from the utilization. But an arbitrary and 
rough determination might be used by a MNC as a way to shift profits from one 
country to another. Another serious way to shift profits is through doubling these 
services by the parent company when it charges the subsidiary. This manoeuvre 
happens when it includes the cost of the services in the price of goods transferred to 
the subsidiary and at the same time charges the subsidiary separately. 
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There is a mutual relationship between charging these services and transfer prices. 
That is, a charge for intangible assets and management services might be used as a 
way to move funds from one country to another instead of transfer pricing devices for 
products. At the same time, if the host country legislations do not recognize senice, ý; 
as items of cost which should be deducted from the taxable income, or the regulations 
prohibit these payments, transfer prices could be inflated to include these services, 
The company should compare between shifting profits through transferring dividends 
or royalties. Some countries allow royalty payments after taxing them at a lower rate 
than dividends, or vice versa. But tax benefits from using the royalty technique mi, -, ht 
exceed than benefits from using exaggerated transfer prices (Grosse, 1986, p. 37). 
It should be noticed that some countries might restrict the level of royalties. Table 3.6 
indicates tax restrictions on dividends and royalty payments which were implemented 
in some Latin American countries during the 1970s. Tax officials in host countries 
should give attention to the amounts of royalty and management services, ascertain 
that the subsidiary has benefited from these services and that the amount allocated is 
not excessive. 
Of course, restrictions imposed on transfers of funds and royalties are likely to 
encourage disguised remittances through artificial transfer prices that would reduce 
the host country's share of income tax receipts. Also, this could be a major 
disincentive to new investment. Moreover, dividend remittances are sometimes 
subject to greater restrictions than interest payments on loans; this may encourage an 
excessive debt/equity leverage in the subsidiary's capital structure. 
3.7 Restrictions on the Ability to Manipulate Transfer Prices 
The foregoing discussion has reviewed variables that induce a MNC to rig transfer 
prices to achieve some gain or circumvent the burden of taxation or other regulations. 
Nevertheless, the ability of a company for such a manoeuvre is limited by a set of 
constraints. Some of these limitations have been mentioned incidentally in the 
previous discussion. These limitations might obstruct the control system in the 
company. Transfer pricing limitations could be internal (by firms themselves) or 
external (by authorities). 
3.7.1 Internal Limitations 
If transfer prices have been formulated not on an arm's-length principle, management 
problems could increase, especially with respect to the measurement, evaluation, and 
motivation of each unit. In order to keep the enterprise's control system useful, there 
-7 
I., 
is likely to be adjustment of some issues to give credit to certain units for their real 
contribution to the corporation. 
There are a number of references in the literature to MNCs maintaining t%vo or more 
sets of parallel accounting records (Schoenfeld, 1969; Brooke and Remmers, 1970-, 
Shulman, 1975). For example, the latter found that 3 of the 8 MNCs in his survey had 
some form of dual records, typically one for internal measurement and evaluation and 
to show real profits; and the other one for tax purposes and public consumption. 
But it should be noticed that the cost of maintaining several measuring systems is 
high. Therefore, most MNCs, instead, attempt to achieve a single price for each 
transfer transaction that will satisfy all internal and external purposes. 
Another internal constraint is technical in nature, the sophistication of internal pricing 
decisions. The amount of time and effort to determine and evaluate relevant strategies 
for multiproducts, in a MNC, could be significant. Therefore, a company n-Light direct 
its efforts to rig transfer prices for some components only. 
3.7.2 External Limitations 
A transfer price manoeuvre can hurt the company and damage corporate-host country 
relations. Therefore, besides the internal limitations, MNCs must take into 
consideration the impact of government controls, especially in terms of discovering 
the manipulation of transfer prices. Some government administrations can be 
involved, such as customs, tax, exchange control, and restrictive business practice 
authorities. This means that there is a limit to the adjustment of transfer prices. For 
instance, Article 482 of the U. S. Internal Revenue Code sets strict guidelines for 
determining a transfer price. 
Authorities that have an active role in this issue are customs and tax authorities and, 
to some extent, authorities concerned with restrictive business practices. As 
mentioned previously, customs departments are concerned with detecting the scaling 
down of imports; hence, the result is less duties being paid. Shulman points out that 
customs officers may get suspicious if prices are changed very often and by large 
amounts. Tax administrations are interested in whether the declared profit is less than 
a reasonable level, because of raised import prices or lowered export prices. 
There are some problems confronting the effectiveness of government control over 
transfer price manipulations. The first problem is obvious, especiallý' in developing 
countries, where there is a lack of skilled manpower and equipment and a likelihood 
of misinterpretation of legislations. So, "it is doubtful whether tax officials can 
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identify and eliminate all profit transfers through transfer pricing" (Reuber er al. 1973. 
p. 145) even in developed countries. 
The second problem is that arm's-length prices might be difficult to assign when there 
are no comparable prices to serve as a yardstick. Of course, comparisons require 
homogeneous products or, at least, a correction for heterogeneity since goods differ in 
terms of kinds, credit days, shipment size, and possibly other dimensions. 
In such a situation, if tax authorities, for instance, insist that transactions must take 
place on an arm's-length principle for the purpose of taxation, they "may produce a 
transfer pricing problem where in fact non existed" (Adam and Whalley, 1977, 
p. 164). Transfer pricing guidelines however should focus on setting the price that 
would prevail in the market-place. That is if the intra-farrffly transactions differ from 
the arm's-length criterion, then an adjustment which applies the criterion will be 
appropriate. 
Another conflict for defining an arm's-length price is that tax authorities might not 
agree among themselves on what comprises an arm's-length price. Hence, firms might 
find themselves "paying tax on more than 100% of their profit" (Idem). 
Some developed countries, in particular the U. S., define explicitly the arm's-length 
price. The U. S. Section 482 prescribes three methods of defining the arm's-length 
price which must be used for setting transfer prices. These methods are (1) the 
comparable uncontrolled price, (11) the resale price, and (111) the cost plus a mark-up. 
All three methods require reference to similar or comparable transactions with 
unrelated parties. Each method must be used in the order listed. If the requirements 
for any one of the three pricing methods are met, that method must be adopted unless 
the tax-Payer establishes that an alternative approach to transfer pricing is clearly 
more appropriate. If none of these methods can be properly applied, some other 
appropriate but undefined transfer pricing method may be used. This has included 
techniques such as a profit split analysis or a functional analysis. 
It should be noticed that U. S. government officials have the authority to adjust non- 
market based transfer prices to determine the proper tariff and taxes to be assessed. 
The OECD guidelines of 1979 also adopt these methods to define the arm's-length 
basis. 
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Table 3.6 
Regulations on Income and Royalties Repatriation for Latin American Countries 
Constraints Constraints Constraints 
Country on Income on Capital on Royalties 
Repatriation Remittance and Fees 
Argentina Tax on dividends Not allowed for 1811-c tax 
greater than 12% 3 years 
of capital 
Brazil Same as above Not allowed Not exceed 
511-c of sales 
Chile None Not allowed for Same as 
3 years above 
Colombia Maximum dividends None Prohibited 
20% of capital 
Ecuador Same as above Not allowed for Prohibited 
3 years 
Mexico Tax on dividends None Up to 5-61/-c 
of sales 
Peru Maximum dividends None Prohibited 
20% of capital 
Venezuela Same as above None Prohibited 
Source: Grosse, 1986. p. 40. 
The third problem concerning the effectiveness of transfer pricing legislations is 
related to the second, but it is logically distinct from it. It is that a government might 
find it difficult to obtain from firms the information necessary to reconstruct prices on 
the basis of actual costs. Necessary information might not be available with local 
authorities for some products, especially in developing countries, hence they have to 
obtain it from abroad. 
It may, therefore, be essential to create a kind of international co-operation for 
providing information required to pave the way for maintaining the rights of each 
state. Such co-operation represents a backbone to vanquish , to some extent, 
prevarication of transfer prices by MNCs- 
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3.8 International Co-operation and Exchange of Information 
Developing nations, as mentioned earlier. are usually facing overcharging transfer 
prices of domestic subsidiaries by foreign parents. Of course, these countries could 
look for guidance from those developed nations that also consider overcharging a., -, 
their main risk. tnternational codes also, such as OECD Code, or UN Code may help 
to reduce the potential issues of conflict. 
Control over transfer price manipulation is difficult without the co-operation among 
countries. So, host countries can seek greater co-operation with other nations in 
harmonizing and regulating transfer pricing issue. The most effective way to deal 
with the transfer price issue is to give attention to reasons that lead to the 
manipulation and economic conditions. Transfer prices are, frequently, set centrally 
by the parent company. When a jurisdiction needs information on how these prices 
have been formulated, it has to obtain it across national frontiers. Intuitively, it is not 
easy to get information, especially since most jurisdictions restrict the promulgation 
of information. So, the most crucial aspect is the availability of information. The 
source of this information could be the company itself, developed countries, or other 
international organisations. 
3.8.1 The Company Itself 
Obtaining information concerning transfer prices from the parent company itself is an 
important source. There is an arrangement between the European countries 
themselves in this matter. OECD issued helpful guidelines, especially in the area of 
taxation and disclosure of information. It points out that the MNC should: 
upon request Of the taxation authonties of the countries in which they operate, 
provide, in accordance with the safeguard and relevant procedures of the 
national laws of these countries, Oie information necessary to determine 
correctly the taxes to be assessed in connection with their operations, including 
relevant information concerning their operations in other countries; 
2. refrain from making use of the particular facilifies available to them, such as 
transfer pricing which does not conform to an an-n's length standard, for 
modifying in ways contrary to national laws the tax base on which members of 
the group are assessed (OECD, 1979, p. 23). 
This guideline also includes the disclosure of transfer pricing information by MNCs. 
It points out under the heading of "Disclosure of Information" that: 
Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and relafive size in 
Iti 
he 
economic context of their operations and to requirements of business confidenfia ty 
and to cost. publish in a torm suited to impnive public understanding a sufficient 
body of 1', ictu,, d information on the structure. activities and policies of the enterprise I 
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as a whole, as a supplement, in so far as necessary for this purpose, to information to 
be disclosed under the national law of the individual countries in which they operate. 
To this end, they should publish within reasonable time limits, on a regular basis. but 
at least annually, financial statements and other pertinent information relating to the 
enterprise as a whole, comprising in particular: 
the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and location of the parent 
company, its main aff-iliates, its percentage ownership, direct and indirect. in 
these affiliates, including shareholding between them, 
2. the geographical areas9 where operations are carried out and the principal 
activities carried on therein by the parent company and the main affiliates-, 
3. the operating results and sales by geographical area and the sales in the major 
lines or business for the enterprise as a whole; 
4. significant new capital investment by geographical area and, as far as 
practicable, by major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole; 
5. a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise as a whole; 
6. the average number of employees in each geographical area; 
7. research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a whole; 
8. the policies followed in respect of intra-group pncing; 
9. the accounting policies, including those on consolidation, observed in 
compiling the published information" (OECD, 1979, p. 24). 
For the purpose of the study, the most pertinent obligation placed on MNCs by this 
guideline on disclosure of information is "the policies followed in respect of intra- 
group pricing". The reference is to pricing policies for financial purposes. The OECD 
Guidelines (1988, p. 24) elucidate that: 
"without some disclosure of the transfer pricing policies adopted by enterprises, the 
reader of the financial statements cannot be sure of the reliability of the amounts 
used to measure intra-enterprise transactions. In particular, the disclosure of transfer 
pricing policies will assist in the understanding of financial statements when 
segmented information is presented". 
Many MNCs are now beginning to publish annual financial statements that purport to 
follow these guidelines and are containing descriptions of their intra-family pricing 
policies. It will become important to consider these description to ascertain whether 
the material contained is specific enough and sufficiently relevant to give the tax 
authorities information on what is actually involved in the particular prices. 
9 For the purposes of the guidelines on disclosure of infon-nation, the term "gcographical area" means groups of countrics or 
individual countries as each enterprise determines is appropriate in its particular circumstances. While no single method of 
grouping is appropriate for a1l enterprises of for all purposes, the factors to be considered by an enterprise would include 
the significance of operations camed oui in individual countries or areas as well as the effect,, on its competitiýccwss. 
geographic proximity. economic affinity, similarities in business environments and the nature, scale and degree of inter- 
relationship of the enterprise.,, ' operations in the various countries. 
Obviously, the OECD guidelines on taxation in general and transfer pricIng in 
particular give tax authorities the authority to get information on transfer pncing 
polices from the subsidiary. If it is available, the parent company can provide it, but at 
least where the national law specifically requires it. Moreover it many be made 
available under a request from tax authorities having jurisdiction over the subsidiary 
even though national law may not specifically require the parent itself to provide 
information. 
3.8.2 The Developed Countries 
Developed countries, generally the nations in which the parents of MNCs are located, 
may be a source of information for tax authorities in developing nations. 
Most developed countries set an audit system linked to their tax authorities. Tax 
administrations have the authority to scrutinise international transactions between 
related parts and to reallocate income or disallow costs that are not determined on an 
arm's-length basis. For example, tax authorities in the U. S. and most OECD member 
countries have the power to obtain all information linked to the determination of 
transfer prices. In Australia, special-purpose questionnaires are used to obtain 
information for the same purpose (OECD, 1987, p. 41). 
A few countries have adopted a system to deal with the international tax issue, and 
active steps have been taken to implement it fully. For instance, multilateral treaties 
are being made between different countries aimed at the exchange of information. 
These multilateral conventions raise the possibility of participation in simultaneous 
tax examinations abroad. Also, some countries have been working closely for the 
purpose of exchanging information. The "Group of Four" (U. S., U. K., France, and 
Germany) and "PATA" (Pacific Association of Tax Adrrunistrators: U. S., Canada, 
Japan, and Australia) are cases in point. Such treaties help to exchange information 
and conduct joint audits concerning MN operations. 
3.8.3 International Organisations 
It would be beneficial to developing nations, and to developed nations as well, if an 
international organisation would consider the task of systematically collecting and 
organising data on costs, prices and the other basics involved in these allocations, a 
feasible and useful task. If the answers are concurring, then a decision should be made 
as to which organisation or group of organisations should attempt to obtain the data. 
The data would apparently be a valuable resource to tax authorities everywhere. 
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It must be ta-ken into account that tax authorities should be govemed by very strict 
rules about the confidentiality of information received by them. The disclosure of 
such information should be prohibited except for tax purposes and other strictIv 
defined circumstances. 
So far, without the proposal to flow information these would seem to have been only 
limited co-operation among certain countries to control the transfer pricing 
manipulation, especially for supplying information. As the number of MNCs, or at 
least, the number of subsidiaries is in continuous propagation, and consequently the 
intra-company transactions between the members of the family expand, an 
international agreement is becoming necessary to prohibit all forms of transfer pricing 
manipulation. Corporations and governments should help each other to this end. 
Moreover, transfer prices between similar industries should be harmonised. 
3.9 Summary 
One of the most remarkable changes in this century has been the mushrooming of the 
MNCs with a budget greater than that of some countries. Foreign investments by 
MNCs around the globe have made an imPortant contribution to the international 
economy and in doing so have brought the nations of the world closer economically 
and culturally. 
The process of arriving at an appropriate transfer price, difficult even in a purely 
domestic setting, is further complicated in foreign operations. The many potentially 
distorting effects of international factors must be taken into account in setting transfer 
pricing policies for foreign units 
Most evidence of manipulating transfer prices comes from developing countries. 
Shifting profits via transfer prices, royalties, interest, dividends, and fees might affect 
the net flow of direct investments to these countries. This situation has led some 
economists to comment that poor countries are helping the rich countries financially 
instead the opposite (MUIler, 1973, p. 247). 
When a MNC designs its transfer pricing system, some environmental variables are 
taken into consideration to be assured that its objectives can be optimised within the 
appropriate pricing policies. If a MNC reported high profits in a particular subsidiary 
it will expect some consequences such as paying more taxes, inducing competitors to 
enter the market, leadino customers to brino pressure for price reduction, and 
stimulating labour unions to demand higher wages. A MNC uses transfer pricin. (-, 
policies to attain more benefits and evade restrictions imposed by both host countries 
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and home nations. The employment of transfer pricing to circumvent restrictions must 
be compatible with the long-range profitability objectives and can not be established 
or changed in major ways for short-ten-n conditions without risking serious 
consequences. The advantages of transfer pricing are obvious but a major criticism of 
this strategy exists. One problem with making a transfer pricing decision is that 
multiple objectives could conflict with each other. This is owing to the existence of a 
significant degree of conflict among all these objectives. So, the overall impact of a 
transfer pricing scheme must be analysed before a firm policy is selected. In other 
words, the MNC must weigh the gains and losses from using a particular level of 
prices. However, doing this is not easy. 
It is impossible to establish fixed rules for international transfer pricing. Pricing 
decisions cannot be made in the vacuum of a particular profit centre without 
measuring offsetting costs and knowing the ultimate effect on the entire system. 
Transfer pricing decisions require an understanding of the entire system and 
calculation of the net effects across all international operations. Therefore, the 
"correct transfer price would depend on the economic and legal circumstances at the 
time the decision is carried out" (AlHashim, 1980, p. 37). 
Host governments are devising different tools, techniques, or regulations more and 
more intensity to minimise the effect of transfer pricing policies of MNCs on their 
countries. As for the companies themselves, they should take into consideration when 
transfer prices are set, avoiding conflict with the host country government. 
Chapter 4 
Business Environment for MNCs in Egypt 
4.1 Introduction 
A study of transfer pricing and profit shifting by MNCs in Egypt must take into 
account some important environmental factors of the Egyptian society. Indeed, the 
question of the environment looms particularly large in the case of Egypt more 
perhaps than for other countries because things are changing so rapidly. 
The economic environment in Egypt is a complex mixture of government directives 
and market forces, The aim of this chapter is to summarise important features of this 
environment, and to identify significant policy issues relevant to FDI. 
The business environment in Egypt has undergone many crucial changes since the 
early 1970s. Since 1974, a new turn in Egyptian political and economic orientation 
has taken place. From the political perspective, Egypt moved from intemational 
confrontation and non-alignment to accommodation and closed alignment with the 
Western countries. From the economic perspective, the policy of the Egyptian 
government was to achieve development and progress through Arab oil wealth, 
Western technology, and abundant Egyptian manpowers and other resources. Here 
was the basic idea behind the Open Door economic policy that would set the tone of 
political and economic life in the 1970s. 
As part of this new policy, foreign investment was encouraged to participate in 
business ventures in Egypt, and Law 43 of 1974 was enacted to provide the legislative 
framework for inviting foreign capital and technology. The government enhanced the 
investment legislations, and hence, the previous law has been repealed and replaced in 
December 1989 by new "Investment Law" (Law 230 of 1989. 
This rneans that FDI is governed within a legal framework, including establishing 
central screening or approving agencies and lay down the procedures for applying for 
approvals, together with specific benefits and incentives. 
This chapter provides an overview of FDI in Egypt by presenting and discussing the 
available infori-nation about FDL Legislative and regulatory measures in Egypt that 
affect the activities of FDI and MNCs will be introduced. A critical perspective of the 
activities of MNCs and their effects on the Egyptian economy win also be studied. 
Hence, this chapter will discuss the following: 
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I- Balance of payments and Egyptian foreign trade 
2- Other important aspects of the business environment in Egypt Z7 
3- Monumental problems facing the Egyptian economy 
4- The Egyptian political environment 
The Open-Door economic policy 
6- The growing importance of FDI for economic development in Egypt. 
7- The creation of direct investment returns 
8- Government policies toward FDI and MNCs. 
9- Overview of Investment Law No. 230 of 1989 
10- The MNC and economic development: The Advocates and the critics 
Many of these areas may have far-reaching implications for MNCs in designing their 
transfer pricing strategies. 
4.2 Balance of Payments and Egyptian Foreign Trade 
4.2.1 Balance of Payments Position 
A history of Egypt's balance of payments for the 1970s and 1980s is depicted in Table 
4.1. The balance of payments, as shown, is characterised by a wide gap between the 
two sides of the current trade account, i. e., imports and exports. The table reveals 
clearly the divergent fluctuations between robustness and recession. Between 1975 
and 1988/89, visible imports increased by 115% from $4.7 to $10.1 billion., Visible 
exports, on the other hand, went up 69% in the same period from $1.6 to $2.7 billion. 
In fact, the percentage of visible exports to imports has declined every year. Whereas 
the percentage was 45.6% in 1980, it turned down to 26.7% in 1988/89. 
The $2.5 billion current account deficit in 1985/86 was the worst figure since 1975, 
Imports rose very rapidly from 1971 through 1980 when they exceeded US$9 billion, 
They stayed at essentially this level until the end of the 1980s. The fall of visible 
imports in 1986/87 is due to the chronic shortage of foreign exchange. 'Fhe 
government has increased restrictions over private sector imports. Import's of public 
sector commodities were constrained by the availability of foreign exchange in the 
commercial banks. 
On the other hand, exports in the second half of the 1980s were lower than in the first 
half. The table reveals that the balance of payments in the 1980s was heavily 
Imports exclude military and equipriient for exploring and developing Oil fields hrought in hýý foreign firms. 
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dependent on petroleum exports. The decline in exports of this item after 1985/86 was 
a result of the downturn in the international oil market prices comparing to the price 
after the October War of 1973.2 The volume of production of crude oil also fell. In 
January 1986, the government curbed production to about 650,000 barrels per day. 
just enough to meet domestic consumption requirements, payments to foreign 
companies and a small volume to fulfil long-term export agreements. 
The table shows a consistent pattern for Egypt's balance on invisible items. Not only 
is petroleum the largest source of visible revenues, other major invisible sources, that 
is workers' remittances, Suez Canal traffic, and even tourism are closely related to the 
conditions of world oil markets. The table shows that the country has always had a 
substantial surplus on invisible trade during the 1980s. 
Transfers by Egyptians working temporarily in the Gulf states represented 31 I/C of 
total visible and invisible revenues in 1983/84. The falls in the period of 1984/85 to 
1986/87 have been attributed to changes in the arrangements under which remittances 
enter the country, and instability in the Gulf area. 
Since the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, Egypt's revenues experienced a 
pronounced upward trend. The fall in 1984/85 was attributable to lower oil production 
in the Gulf. 
Capital grants and foreign assistance from Arab countries increased following the 
1973 war up to 1979, when Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. The U. S., as a 
partner in the peace treaty, provides Egypt with foreign aid which amounts to $2 
billion a year. It is expected that aid flows from Gulf states will rise after the Egyptian 
forces participating in protecting them against any Iraqi aggression. 
For Egypt, the balance of payment for 1990/91 has been affected adversely by the 
impact of the Gulf war. The Suez Canal lost revenues of US$400 million because of 
the naval blockade on Iraq. Exports to Iraq have been stopped completely. The 
outbreak of war has also affected tourism. Workers' remittances have fallen sharply. 
On the other hand, oil exports achieved a significant increase as they reached US$2.5 
billion. 
Egypt must make concerted efforts to stimulate growth in agricultural and 
merchandise exports. Non-oil visible exports (in absolute value) fell from USSIA 
billion in 1975 to US$I. l in 1980. And again from US$1-7 in 1987/88 to US$1.5 in 
2 Between 1974 and 1980. the price rose peaking in January, 1981 at a weighted average ot 
USS38 per barrel. Since then the 
price has fallen steadilv. until it reached about S 18 per barTel in 199 1. A 
fall of S20 per barrel over ten years. 
(s4 
1988/89. A major disincentive to exports might arise from Egypt's preference for 
production for the domestic consumption. Moreover, Egypt's traditional exports. such 
as cotton, citrus, and potatoes face hard competition. 
In summary, Egypt's crucial balance of payments problem is the crucial deficit which 
inust be brought down to levels that can be financed from available sources. There is 
no escape from adjusting consumption and imports to the reduced level of resources 
available to the economy. It is imperative to reduce the fiscal and external deficits. In 
the second half of 1980s, the fiscal deficit has been over 20% of GDP and the current 
account deficit has exceeded 10%. 
Relieving more than 50% of Egyptian debts means reducing the burden of external 
debt and debt service. By 1990, the government has reduced subsidies on basic 
commodities and services which could provide the basis of growing improvement in 
the balance of payments. The steep price increase on energy, consistent with the 
declared goal of reaching international prices by 1992, could help the fiscal balance. 
Introducing a sales tax is expected to add about ELI billion in revenue annually to 
government coffers. 
4.2.2 An Overview of Egyptian Foreign Trade 
Basically, foreign trade has been of vital importance to the Egyptian economy. The 
country relies on imports for almost half of its food consumption especially wheat, 
sugar, and cooking oil, and for a large portion of the raw material and capital goods 
needed for the industry. Oil, raw cotton and cotton products represent a significant 
portion of Egyptian exports. 
Table 4.2 summarises the commodity composition of Egyptian foreign trade for 
selected years in the 1980s. On the export side, It is clear that exports of oil have 
declined dramatically since 1984/85. This was probably caused by the increasing of 
local consumption combined with a 50% decline in the world price as previously 
mentioned. The same trend exists in the exports of raw cotton as here too tile 
proportion has fallen, notably in 1987/88. This however is due to different factors, 
such as the declining of volume of production, the wish to manufacture cotton and 
export it in the form of yarn and textiles, and the need to furnish investment 
companies with their requirements. Consequently, the table shows exports of spinning 
and weaving products have been growing rapidly since 1985/86. 
On the import side, the percentage of imported food and beverages in total imports 
have fallen in 1987/88, as the government rationalised imports due to the shortage of 
foreign exchange. There has been very little change in the percentat-, e of machinery 
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and transport equipment category. The percentage of imports of sundry manufactured 
items has been growing. 
The regional composition of Egypt's foreign trade is displayed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
and several general trends can be observed from these two tables. Most noteworthy is 
in the increase of the proportion of trade with the EEC countries. The U. S. is the most 
important exporter market after the EEC countries. Exports have swung in 1986/87 
progressively towards Arab nations as a result of military exports to fraq. On the other 
hand, imports from these countries have decreased. The proportion of foreIgn trade 
with Comecon countries is in continuous decline over the period. 
4.3 Other Important Aspects of the Egyptian Business Environment 
This part will review other important aspects of the Egyptian business environment 
which may also have some impact on MNCs and transfer pricing practices. These 
include the exchange system, tax trends, and customs duties legislation. 
4.3.1 Egyptian Exchange Control System 
The exchange system in Egypt has always been complex. Adopting exchange policies 
aimed at often regulating the currency of foreign exchange. Until October 1991 there 
was a multiple exchange rate system involving a number of rates declared by the 
Central Bank of Egypt. For example, the foreign exchange market was fragmented for 
the last two decades into three pools, the central bank pool, the commercial bank 
pool, and the free market pool. This process involved an even larger number of 
exchange rates. The majority of remittances to Egypt from Egyptians working abroad 
was used to be exchanged in the free market where it was illegal as the rate was 
higher than the commercial rate. 
The gap between the official and free market rates of exchange was substantial, 
especially for the US dollar. During the 1980s, many efforts by the Ministry of 
Economy have been made to regulate the demand for hard currency. In conjunction 
with these changes, an import licensing system was designed to reduce imports of 
luxury goods. In May 1987, the government devalued the exchange rate to close the 
gap with the free market price, 3 as a first step towards the full unification of the 
exchange rate. 
3 In that time the commercial rate of USS I= Ef 1.35 as opposed to the free market rate of USS I= Ef-2.20. The government 
introduced a new floating rate which it allowed to gradually rise from the first nate announced (USSI = Ef2.17) to 
ehimnate the black market transactions. 
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Table 4.1 
Egypt Balance of Payments, 1971-1988/89 (US$ Billions) 
1971 1975 1980 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/8S 1988 S9 
Visible Trade 
Exports,; 
Petroleum Expons 0.0 0.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.2 1.4 1.5 1 . 
21 
Other Exports 0.9 1,4 111.4 1.., 3 1-, " 1.4 1., Lý 
0.9 1.6 4.1 4.4 4.2 3.4 2.8 3.2 17 
Imports Li. 4.. j 21V 1= 1AL2, 2.1-5 M ! ýl I" 
Trade balance -ftj -LI 4ý, 9 -5.9 Al -All -5.2 -616 -7.4 
Exports/Imports % 75% 34% 45.6% 42.7% 40% 35.8% 35% 32.7% 2 6.7 
Injsible Receipts 
Suez Canal 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Tourism 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 
Worker Remittances 0.0 0.4 2.7 3.9 3.5 3.0 3. o 3.4 3.5 
Other Receipts 9 d 03 1"", L4 L3- A"& 2.6 21ý -1.1 
Sub Total 
-53- 
7.9 219- 1-9 iu 
Inv*soble PayMents 
Interest Payments 0.1 0.1 0.5 1 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.0 
Other Service Payments Q.. 3 M Dý L-9 11 ?. 
-1 
ZL) 1) 1) ALAft 
Sub Total 
.4 
0.7 2.1 3.1 2.8 3.4 3.1 2.6 3.2 
Balance of invisible -. 2 0.5 3.2 2 5. ý 5.1 3.6 4.8 6.3 6.8 
Current Account Deficit -0.5 -2.6 -1.7 -0.7 -1.2 -2.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 
Source: Adapted from Carr (1990, p. 227). 
Table 4.2 
Commodity Composition of the Egyptian Foreign Trade (in Percentage) 
Expoils, 
I- Agricultural Commodities 
Cotton 
Food and others 
2- Industrial goods 
Petroleum 
Spinning & weaving goods 
Other industries* 
3- Miscellaneous 
Total 
ImporAs 
Food and beverages 
Chemicals. rubber & leather 
Wood, cork, paper, & textiles 
Machinery & transport equipment 
Base metals 
Sundry manufactured articles 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
1982 1984 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988 89 
8.5 12.0 8.9 8.9 6.6 5.0 
4.0 5.3 5.6 9.1 6.1 ()ý 1 
72.0 64.5 57.7 23.4 29.0 22.0 
6.3 7.7 11.7 25.2 26.2 23.0 
4.7 8.0 9.3 21.5 21.1 29.6 
4.5 2.5 6.8 11.9 11.0 13.7 
I-QQ& 100.0 19M 100.0 100.0 
38.9 39.1 33.6 31.3 23.4 22.7 
7.7 7.4 11.4 10.8 14.4 11.1 
8.3 8.6 10.1 9.2 12.1 11.0 
29.7 23.9 25.5 )5., ) 24.2 22.1 
8.5 7.2 7.4 7.8 9.9 10.0 
3.8 4.3 4.3 4.7 5.3 3.7 
1-1 9.5 7,7 11.0 MQ 19.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* These include foodstuffs. chemicals. engineering & metallurgical products and others. 
Source: The percentage for years 1982 and 1984 are computed by the researcher based on the value of exports and 
imports extracted from Central Bank of Egypt. Economic Review (1985) vol. 15 (2). Whereas the 
percentage for the rest of years extracted from Table 4/5. Central Bank of Egypt, Annual Report 1978/88, 
and 1978/88, Cairo. 
Table 4.3 
Regional Distribution of Egyptian Exports (In Percentage) 
8ý 
Region 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988 89 
Arab league countries 7.1 12.2 10.4 12.7 
EEC countries 35.7 38.7 40.8 41.7 
Comecon countries 19.2 14.3 11.2 8.5 
Other European countries 2.9 3.4 4.7 3.0 
Afro-Asian countries 14.8 10.7 11.9 15.3 
United States 11.5 8.1 11.5 6.4 
Australia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other countries 8.7 12.5 9.4 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Excluding Arab countries. 
Source: Compiled by the researcher based on the value of exports extracted from Central 
Bank of Egypt, Annual Report 1987/88, and 1988/89, Cairo. 
Table 4.4 
Regional Distribution of Egyptian Imports (In Percentage) 
Region 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Arab league countries 2.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 
EEC countries 41.3 4 1.2 41.1 37.3 
Comecon countries 8.8 8.5 7.2 5.9 
Other European countries 10.7 12.6 14.6 12.7 
Afro-Asian countries 11.9 10.9 12.2 10.7 
United States 16.4 20.3 16.8 14.7 
Australia 3.4 )., 1 J. ') 1.4 
Other countries 4.9 3.9 5.6 5.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Excluding Arab countries 
Source: Compiled by the researcher based on the value of imports extmcled from Central 
Bank of Egypt. Annual Report 1987/88. and 1988/89, Cwro. 
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Since that time, various attempts have been made to rationalise the exchange rate. 
inevitably involving devaluations of the Egyptian pound. At the end of February 1991 
the Egyptian government arrived at an agreement with the IMF re-oarding 
liberalisation of the Egyptian economy. Under this liberalisation programme, the 
Egyptian pound has been devalued and action has been taken on introducing a 
uniform exchange rate. 4Ceilings on interest rates have been removed so that banks 
now base decisions on market rates rather than those set by the government. Trading 
in hard currency has been regulated, and so on. 
4.3.2 Egyptian Tax Trends 
Tax receipts constitute the major percentage of total government current revenues, as 
they were 76.6% and 72% for 1986/87 and 1.987/88 respectively (National Bank of 
Egypt, 1988). It is expected that with sophisticated methods and a more determined 
approach, the government should be able to double tax revenues. 
Basically, taxes are divided, in Egypt, into two main categories: direct and indirect. 
Direct taxes are imposed on income and wealth. These taxes are levied on cornmercial 
and industrial activities, wages and salaries, professional activities, movable capital 
assets, buildings and land, and general income. Indirect taxes are expenditure base 
and designed to guide purchasing power in the desired direction. These taxes are 
represented mainly in the form of customs duties, sales tax, and starnp duties. 
The framework of the income tax system has been established by Law 157 of 1981. 
The main taxes relevant to business in Egypt, in general, include: 
I- Corporate tax at the rate of 42% (includes 2% development duty tax). Corporate 
tax is applicable to the profits of all enterprises and subsidiaries of foreign 
companies operating in Egypt, except as follows: 
a) Profits of industrial and export activities - 34% (includes 2% development 
duty tax). 
b) Profits of oil exploration and production companies - 40.55%. 
The 2% development duty tax applies to enterprises and individuals. There is 
an exemption on the first ELI 8,000. 
2- Withholding taxes as follows: 
a) Royalty payments. As a rule, royalties are subject to a 4217c withholding tax. 
The level of royalties and similar licence fees are treated as being costs 
which should be deducted from the taxable income on which tax is levied at 
4 Under the terms of an INIF agreement, Egypt was obhged to unify its exchange rate by February 199". 'flie goý emment 
has moved quickIv and applied a unified rate in October 1991. This is due to the success of its tq: ht monetam, policy in 
, tabilisinp the value of the Egyptimi pound. 
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32%. Several tax treaties between Egypt and other countries have specific 
provisions for taxes on royalties, which vary from complete exemption to a 
tax up to 25%. 
b) Interest payments - 34% of amount paid, with the exemption for loans and 
credit facihties obtained by public sector companies, organisations or 
government departments. Also, interest on foreign loans obtained bY 
companies formed under the investment law is, exempted from all taxes and 
dues. The rate applied under double taxation agreements is 1517(,. 
c) Dividends. AD dividends are exempted from withholding taxes in both 
domestic and foreign firms. 
3- Stamp Tax. Stamp duties are levied on a wide range of documents including 
deeds, applications, contracts, company formation, ban-king transactions, 
insurance premiums, invoices, lotteries, posters and other advertisements, air 
tickets, supply of water, gas and electricity. 
4- Sales Tax. This tax has been applied since July 1991 after the repealing of 
consumption tax. It is applied on goods and services, but some exemptions frorn 
this tax exist, such as basic food products and basic raw materials. 
In order to avoid double taxation, Egypt has signed a number of tax conventions 
which are based on the principle of taxation at the source (i. e., profits earned and 
taxed in other countries are not taxable in Egypt). Agreements of this kind are in force 
with most European countries, Japan, and U. S. Some conventions not only provide 
for specific mechanisms to eliminate double taxation, normally by way of a credit, but 
also reduce, and put a ceiling on, the rate of withholding tax that can be imposed on 
dividends, interest, and royalties. 
4.3.3 Tariffs Legislation 
The Egyptian government employs tariffs for two purposes, either to finance its 
expenditures or to protect home industries from foreign competition. Duties are 
always calculated as a percentage of the value of goods being taxed, these are called 
ad valorem duties. 
Tariff revenues represent a substantial source of government income. Custom duties 
vary from duty free on basic foodstuffs, to 250clc on luxury products, like big cars. 
4.4 Monumental Problems Facing the Egyptian Economy 
Despite several positive developments in the Egyptian economy, there remain 
massive problems to overcome. The vital problems currently facing Egypt are the 
high rate of inflation, both the balance of payments and budget deficit are 
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unsustainably large, sizable foreign debts (totalling $50 billi 'on at the end of 1990)" 
and the problem of unemployment. 
With respect to the problem of inflation, Table 4.5 illustrates the inflation rate in 
Egypt during the second half of the 1980s. It is important to differentiate between the 
actual rate of inflation, for which there is no official assessment, and the 
governmental rate of inflation. There are some estimates which show the country's- 
actual rate of inflation has reached as high as 30% per annurn due to the rapid 
increase in money supply. The policy of financing the budget deficit by directly 
increasing the money supply, which led to chronic inflation. However, the latest 
economic reform programme involved using the money market for residual financing Z7 
needs. 
MNCs working in Egypt face the danger of. potential inflation because of incorrect 
pricing practices. The basic principle for companies is payments received must equal 
the replacement cost of the item sold plus overhead and normal profit on the day of 
receipt of funds, rather than on the day of sale. If this axiom is not followed, the 
company's normal financing cycle will be broken, since the funds from sales will not 
be sufficient to replace inventory, either through purchases of new production. 
Therefore, companies must make regular price increase in the hope that they will 
counter the inflationary factor. 
As mentioned before, the country continues to suffer a large balance of payments 
deficit, and has been witnessing a devastating national population increase. Moreover, 
the rate of unemployment has been increasing over the last decade and the problem is 
still unsolved. Official estimates put the unemployment rate at 22% and the rate could 
rise further if the economic reforms recommended by the IMF were to be 
implemented. 
Another serious problem facing the Egyptian economy is the migration of the most 
highly educated and trained people Egyptian labour pool to oil-producing Arab 
countries, the resulting in something of a brain-drain malady. 
5 As a result of the Gulf War and its effect on the Egyptian economy and the significant role of the Egyptian government in 
supporling affies. the U. S. Saudi Arabia and the four Arab Gulf countries have written off debts of some US. S 14.5 billion. 
Additiomdly, negotiation with member- of the Paris Club led to canceffing of the Egyptian government's guaranteed debts 
of about USS20 based on net present value. applyino on three stages from July 1991 tiH July 11)14 Reduction )I these 
debts r, firml-,, ticd to Frvpt meeting its [MF and World Bank obbgations on long overdue economic reforms. Also, the 
Paris Club has given the right to the Egyptian government to negotiate separately, with credit counines for more reduction 
of its debts. 
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Table 4.5 
Official Rates of Inflation in Egypt, * (1984/85 - 1989/90) 
Year Inflation Rate 
1984/85 9.617c 
1985/86 16.4% 
1986/87 21.6% 
1987/88 17.917c 
1988/89 16.7 II-c 
1989/90 21.4% 
These figures are built on the change of consumer retail price. For details of 
Index of consumer and wholesale prices, see CA-PMS (1989) Statistical 
Year Book 1952-1988, Tables 11-16 to 11-20. 
Source: Data for the first three years are from Khier-El-Din, 1990.1987/98 
Data are computed by the researcher and built on consumer prices. Data for 
the last two years are excerpted from Central Bank of Egypt, 1990, p. 3). 
4.5 The Egyptian Political Environment 
Studying the political aspect is of great importance for MNCs. This is simply because 
the political stability of the country stimulates these companies to come and invest 
there. As Farmer and Richman (1964, p. 132) pointed out: 
"A firm would hardly invest heavily in a country expected to undergo extensive 
political change fairly soon, particularly if such changes would lead to potential 
danger to the investment. " 
Since the political aspect makes an impact on foreign policy, it is worthwhile 
examining in brief the prevailing political environment. Prior to 1952, the economic 
system of Egypt was based mostly on private ownership, as the state encouraged it. 
But after the revolution of 1952 and a change of the political system from a monarchy 
to a republic, some important changes took place especially in the ten years following 
the revolution. The government played a significant role in developing the economy. 
The econornic programme involved land reform, constructing the Aswan Darn, 
development plans, and investment in heavy industries by the state itself. This 
programme led to the emergence of public sector companies 
During the period of his rule, President Nasser, due to his disputes with the U. S. and 
the Western block, adopted a socialist ideology. Expropriation and nationalisation 
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were the most important issues that affected foreign and private investments in Egypt. 
The government changed its attitude toward private sector investment by both 
foreigners and nationals. It generally intended to diminish the relative weight of the 
private sector and to bring the majority of the country's resources under the control of 
the public sector. 
As a consequence of the prevailing atmosphere in Nasser's period, private capital 
flowed out of the country. Foreign investors stressed the uncertain regional political 
situation as being among the most important factors for their hesitancy (Carr, 1979, 
p. 93). 
The outstanding change in the Egyptian foreign policy'took place when President 
Sadat succeeded Nasser in 1970. The direct results of the 1967 War involved the 
closure of the Suez Canal, the loss of oil wells in Sinai, an increase in military 
expenditure, and a sharp decline in the number of tourists. The economy lost foreign 
exchange resources. Therefore, Sadat's government realised that its existing policy 
was unable to accomplish the stated objectives. 
Moreover, it was apparent from the beginning of his rule that Sadat allied himself to 
the Western countries, especially the U. S. The relationship with U. S. improved 
remarkably after the signing of a peace treaty with Israel at Camp David. The 
importance of this treaty has been mentioned by Lucien Bruggeman, who served as 
it investment development officer" at the Egyptian Econon-& Mission in New York. 
He stated before Camp David: "Without a peace settlement in the Middle East, or at 
least significant movement in that direction, not many American corporations are 
going to be seriously interested in investing in Egypt" (Carr, 1979, p. 93). President 
Mubarak, Sadat's successor, continued the same direction, keeping a good 
relationship with Western countries. 
Generally speaking, the political climate of Egypt is described as remarkably stable, 
at least compared to other countries in the region. This climate should encourage 
investors to make decisions to invest in the country. 
4.6 The Open-Door Economic Policy 
Since the early 1970s there has been considerable concern in Egypt, as in any 
developing nation, over the impact of FDI on development and the metamorphosis of 
the industry and national economy. The government implemented a statute for an 
Open Door Policy, "Al-infitah" in Arabic, for encouraging investment by both 
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citizens6 and foreign nationals. This policy depends on three sources: foreien and 
Arab investment, private national investment, and the important role of the public 
sector. 
When the government adopted this policy it took into consideration that forejon 
investment and wealth will supplement domestic investment and enable E-oypt's 
econon-uc lag to be overcome. It has also hoped for more positive results from the 
investment reform process. 
In fact, there are some particular objectives that led the Egyptian government to trNT to 
attract FDI. These objectives are: 
1) Generation of the maximum amount of revenues in order to support the financial 
requirements of the development objectives, government administration, etc., 
2) Creation of foreign exchange earnings, 
3) Creation of a stable source of revenue in order to insulate government finances 
from the volatility of world markets, 
4) Promotion of efficient operation and management and, in the case of natural 
resources, the optimum exploitation of resources, 
5) Acquiring modern technology, 
6) Creation of new job opportunities for its citizens, either directly or indirectly 
(forward and backward linkages), and 
7) Endeavour to lessen the frequent deficit in the balance of payments which has 
existed since the Second World War. (SNC, 1982, p. 348 et seq) 
In June of 1974, the Government promulgated Law No. 43 concerning the Investment 
of Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free Zones. 7The government also held bilateral 
investment treaties with many developed countries to promote and protect FDI. Law 
43 was a Magna Carta that aimed at encouraging the inflow of foreign investment and 
regulating investment entry into the Egyptian market. Because this law had some 
impediments to foreign investor, the govemment abolished it and replaced the La", 
Recently, the government has focused on what it believes, is about USSSO-70 billion of Egyptian people held abroad that 
could he tapped to help finance the deficits in the balance of payments if these amount would be invested in 
Egypt. 
7 Frer zones represent areas exempted from: I) import and export regulations, 2) exchange control regulations and all taxes 
for an unlimited period. Only, an annual duty (1 17, ) of the value of the goods entering or leaving die 
free zones. Free z(mes 
areas are divided into two types. public and private. For more details: GAR (1989) Investment 
I-ox 2, () of 11W), Chapter 
I 
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230 of 1989. The new law avoided most difficulties in Law 43 of 1974, and provided 
more incentives to foreign investors. 
4.7 The Growing Importance of FDI for Economic Development in Egypt 
FDI has won more appreciation from developing countries. It has been realised that 
direct investment helps significantly to increase productive capacity and create 
employment in these countries- both vital prerequisites for growth. Econon-ii c -Trowth 
has been found to depend largely on private corporate investment. The debt crisis has 
curtailed private lending to developing countries, and official development assistance 
has not substantially taken up the slack. Under these circumstances, most developing 
countries have stepped up their efforts to lure foreign investment, not only for its 
contributions to their productive capital but also for its technology, training, 
management and marketing advantages. 
Towards the beginning of the 1970s, it was realised that industrialisation at any cost 
and the policy of import substitution were obsolete policies. The gains to the host 
economy from FDl arise both from the use of additional factor resources imported 
from advanced countries and from the generation of improved additional resources 
within the host country. Egypt is committed to economic growth and technological 
change both because it wishes to close the gap with the industrialised countries and 
because it is confronted with a set of concrete challenges. Moreover, inward 
investment is advantageous to the Egyptian economy, in terms of real income, 
efficiency, and all other relevant aggregate economic variables. 
Data currently published show the total stock of FDI in Egypt has amounted to a 
significant amount as illustrated in Table 4.6.8Table 4.7 also exhibits the gross value 
added (GVA), labour costs and average of the GVA per employee in each industrial 
sector for FDI projects. The spinning and weaving sector has had the highest 
proportion of employees but the average of GVA per worker is low compared to other 
sectors. The two sectors which have had the highest GVA per employee are food 
products and chemicals. Table 4.8 reports the distribution of FDI in Egypt by source 
country and sector up to the middle of 1989. Some features of the distribution of FDI 
in Egypt are indicated are as follows: 
Although Arab countries' investments represent an enormous percentage (60(7c), 
nearly a half of these investments were directed to finance and service actIvIties. 
8 The vice president of the GAH has announced that the total amount of investments In Egypt till the end of June 1990 has 
reached Ff 10 billion. Tb"-e investments are distributed according to the nationafitý as foflows: 64-7, 
for Egýptlans, 19-ý' 
forArabs, and 17% for Foreigners (A] Ahrarn newspaper. November 15 19,90) 
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2- The size of FDI in Egypt is still really far from satisfactory to meet the 
development requirements and help to decrease the size of unemployments. 
3- FDI is biased towards financial and service projects as they accounted 3317c of the 
total investments in inland projects. On the other hand. the agricultural and 
animal and construction sectors have received a scanty percentage (4.2,17c and 
4.6% respectively of the total investments in inland projects). 
4- Finally, the impact of FDI in Egypt up to the middle of 1989 on employinent, 
capital inflow, and on the balance of payments is not encouraging. 
4.8 Achieving Satisfactory Returns on Investment 
There is no doubt that achieving satisfactory returns on investment is the major 
objective of doing business. This is particularly in the case of conducting business 
abroad where greater risks are involved. 
FDI is undertaken by investors and is accepted by host countries because of the 
shared belief that substantial returns are available from direct investment operations. 
According to the new dominant industrial organisation approach to FDI advanced 
notably by Hymer (1976) and Caves (1971), these returns are attributable to the 
transfer and exploitation of special assets possessed by foreign investors. This transfer 
of technology or know-how takes place more efficiently or quickly through direct 
investment than through such alternative channels as imports licensing, consulting 
arrangements, or local generation. 
From the viewpoint of foreign investors, the returns attributable to the special asset 
must be high enough to offset the excess cost of production in an alien location, such 
as adjusting to different economic, social, legal, and cultural conditions. From the 
viewpoint of the host country, the cost of adapting foreign technology must be less 
than the local costs of developing sin-fflar technology, and the net benefit greater than 
seeking the technology through the other alternative mechanisms. 
The returns to the foreign investor are principally in the form of dividends, technical 
fees, any unusual profits received from the sale of raw materials and components to 
local firms. and capital appreciation above the normal rate of inflation. The returns to 
local firms may comprise higher productive capacities, higher wages, income, and 
employment, lower prices, more competitive market structure, tax revenues, more 
exports, a diffusion of skills, improved efficiency of production in foreign companies 
and throughout industry, and the gradual spread of an enterprising spirit and technical 
and innovational capacities. 
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Table 4.8 
FDI in Egypt Distributed by Country and Sector till the middle of 1989' (Ef NI 
Inland Projects Free Zones 
Total 
Indus. Financing Agri. & Constru- Service Projects'* 
Animal ction 
Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Arab Nations 287.000 490.000 60.000 76.000 240.000 45S. W0 1611.000 
USA 124.184 42.483 5.214 1.1775 157.750 79.760 411.666 
Germany 57.747 42.5 20 1.524 2.155 24.284 0.764 128.994 
Luxembourg 35.874 41.846 - 3.839 12.342 8.176 102.077 
U. K 35.194 16.631 0.225 2.953 11.086 19.62" 85.611 
Japan 57.135 1.300 1.090 - - I 1.00i 70.530 
France 21.470 25.168 4.100 0.808 12.736 2.533 66.815 
Switzerland 15.055 4.419 7.898 3.683 26.769 3.532 61.356 
Italy 39.155 3.375 0.429 0.830 5.798 2.902 52.488 
Holland 8.214 0.874 1.555 0.792 0.793 2.263 14.491 
Spain 5.853 5.600 0.420 - - 2.574 14.447 
Sweden 6.310 - - - 6.370 0.550 13-130 
Denmark 2.887 1.650 3.176 - 4.062 0.175 11.950 
Greece 1.988 1.500 0.400 - - 7.346 11.234 
Canada 1.769 2.400 0.500 - - 0.217 4.886 
Belgium 1.042 - - 1.088 2.387 0.140 4.657 
Austria 1.797 0.750 - 0.080 0.770 3-397 
Norway 1.575 - 0.400 0.127 2.102 
Finland 0.718 - 1.120 1.838 
Portugal 0.300 - 0.300 
Total 705167 680.516 86.530 94.323 504.857 601.576 2673.069 
Due to the lack of information. these investments do not Involve companies established outside the 
Investment Law. Also investment from developing countries and investmew by the Egyptians are 
not involved. 
010 Both general and private free zones projects. 
Source: CompJed from GAFFs Stafistics. 1990. 
Despite the advantages of FDI to a host country, it has some drawbacks. Many critics 
allege that this external dominance may have such costly effects as a possible stifling 
of the development of special skills and of R&D activity, the use of inappropriate 
scale technology, excessive importation, and biased transfer pricing. Other possible 
undesirable features, particularly if there is an oligopolistic market structure or 
excessive entry inducements, are diseconon-ties of scale, and high prices. 
It is important to note that the Egyptian government has hitherto largely ignored the 
transfer pricing problem. Consequently, there is no mechanism to deal with it. This 
rrýight be because, in general, developing countries eagerly seek FD1 and are more 
willing to accept the potential abuse of transfer pricing as a necessary cost of having 
MNCs (Lall, 1985, p. 78). The effects of FD1 on the host country are illustrated in 
figure 4.1. 
4.9 Government Policies Toward FDI and MNCs 
Generally, the investment proposal is judged by the Egyptian government on the 
extent to which it contributes to the attainment of, and conforms with, national 
development policy objectives. The Investment Law No. 43 of 1974 has been built on 
a series of historical steps to assure protection for foreign investors. This history 
encourages the belief that the recent liberalisation measures of law 230 of 1989 are 
not merely a momentary swing of the pendulum. 
Since 1974 the Egyptian government has introduced a package of incentives to attract 
investment in Egypt. Most incentives and protections included in the law aim at 
making investment opportunities more attractive to foreign investors. The most 
significant aspect of investment law was a guaranteed protection against 
nationalisation, confiscation, or sequestration of the assets by judicial procedure. 
Further, it exempted approved investment projects from many restrictive laws which 
would otherwise have applied to private sector companies. According to the 
investment law, companies are permitted to hire workers without going through the 
employment offices, to define their own arrangements for involving workers, to 
distribute any amount of profits to workers, to import and export without licences. and 
to set rentals in new buildings free of rent control. Generally, incentives could be 
divided into two main groups, as follows: 
Figure 4.1 
Effects of FDI on the Host country 
Local Learn improved production methods: 
suppliers develop capacity to produce 
more sophisticated components 
General community- 
government, workers, 
investors, consumers, 
Local 
competitors 
Foreign 
Direct -> Investment 
Foreign 
company 
I 
Customers I: 
Higher tax receipts, more, exports 
improvement of skills, more 
capital funds, building of 
infrastructural facilities, 
better or cheaper products, 
higher wages 
Stimulus to or stifling of 
higher productivity, greater 
R&D activity, higher 
profits, more competitive 
market structure or 
greater oligopoly, market 
fragmentation, or the possibility of 
undesirable technology 
Higher productivity, greater 
R&D activity, more innovation, 
higher profits, early import 
biases, possibly restrictive 
export franchises 
Learn additional uses or 
improved productivity in 
existing uses 
Sollf-cc. - Caff. David W (1979) The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Economic 
Dtwelopment of'Australia. Ph. D. diss., New York University, 
I () " 
4.9.1 Non-Financial Measures 
These are represented in the provision of infrastructure and business services. The 
government spent significant amounts, notably in the 1980s, in order to rene", and 
develop the infrastructure (telephone, water, roads, electricity, etc) especially in the 
new industrial sites. The government also built houses in these areas as a way to 
attract a work force via internal migration. 
4.9.2 Fiscal Incentives 
Law 43 of 1974 offered a variety of instruments in pursuing the objectives set for 
investment in Egypt. These include assurance against expropriation, tax concessions, 
import/export regulations, and foreign exchange control. 
In addition to fiscal incentives, there are other advantages from investing in Egypt. 
For instance, Egypt is a growing market with substantial growth in power generation 
and transportation. Also, it has the largest pool of trained labour among Arab 
countries, the broadest agricultural and industrial base in the Arab Region, and a 
stable and popular government. 
Notwithstanding the incentives of the Law 43, some shortcomings were encountered 
and these prevented the Egyptian government from reaching the required level of 
investment to meet the development programmes. These obstacles created investment 
costs and risks that in turn decreased the expected return. 9 The government has 
repealed Law 43 and replaced it by Law No. 230 of 1989 which reformed foreign 
investment legislation. The purpose of Law 230 was to enhance the objectives of the 
previous law and to remove the difficulties and uncertainties inhibiting foreign 
investment. The new law added additional incentives to lure foreign investment which 
other countries enjoy, so that Egypt can be competitive. It offers certain guarantees, 
privi-leges, and exemptions to foreign investors. The investment privileges fall into 
five categories: 
- guarantees against expropriation; 
Obstacles, that led imtial investor response to be lower than antiCipated could be insufficient incentive%. hureaucraiic 
difficulties. shortage of foreign exchange, public scctor problems. and poor infrastructure (underdeveloped sources of 
communication, transportation, and energy). For details see (Bishop, 1985. pp. 552-558). But it should be noticed in 
addition to changing the trivesinient law, the Egyptian government renovated and updated all nic-ans of transport and it 
improved source,, of communications. 
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- exemptions from certain labour, business, and other laws, 
- privileges with respect to exchange controls and repatriation of funds-, 
- exemption from taxation and customs duties; and 
- special procedures for the settlement of investment disputes. 
To be entitled to these incentives, a foreign investment has to be in an "approved 
project", that is, approved by the General Authority for Investment (GAFI). 10 This 
screening function is designed to guarantee that a given project fits into the country", 
economic development programme, thus reducing the chances of a costly conflict at a 
later date. 
Law 230 has made changes in these particular areas and in the overall framework for 
foreign investment in general. It is helpful to begin with a brief review of the major 
characteristics of Law 230. 
4.10 Overview of Investment Law No. 230 of 1989 
As mentioned earlier the purpose of the new Law 230 of 1989 was to introduce 
considerable liberalisation of policies and procedures relating to FDI. The law 
determines the principal aspects of investment in Egypt. These could be outlined as: 
- Fields of authorised investment, 
- Joint ventures with locals, 
- Foreign Exchange Requirements and repatriation of profits and funds, and 
- Incentives and guarantees of investment. 
These issues will be dealt with in detail in the following discussion. 
4.10.1 Fields of Authorised Investment 
Law 230 states that investment activities should be within the framework of the 
general policy of the country and the aims and priorities of the national plan for 
economic and social development. Hence, the law refers to some priority areas in 
which foreign investment is invited. It highlights clearly land reclamation, industry, 
tourism and housing as activities for FDI. However, other fields may be added 
according to the requirements of the country, on the initiative of the GAR 
Unlike Law 43, banks, investment companies, reinsurance companies, transportation 
companies, construction companies and technical consultancy companies may no 
10 For facilitating routine procedures for investment. the government Issued In june 1901 a "negative statement" which 
ýJ in 11 1 re any Involves prt jects to be approved by the GAR A. U other projects not included ý the statement wI not requ 
approval. 
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longer be established under the new law. It is clear. for instance, that the authorities 
consider that there are enough banks in the country. 
4.10.2 joint Ventures with Locals 
Generally, joint ventures in developing nations entail at least three chief parties: 
MNCs, national partners and the governments of the host countries. Law 43 contained 
a clear statement of principle; that projects under the law, other than Free Zone, 
projects should have participation by Egyptian capital. In three cases, the minimum 
Egyptian participation was specified: joint venture banks (51 c7c), construction 
contracting companies (50%), technical consultancy companies (49%). These 
activities are in any case on-litted in the new investment law. Joint ventures 
undertaken in conjunction with local enterprises and individuals are more highly 
favoured by the Egyptian government than those with state-owned companies. 
Unlike Law 43, Law 230 involves no such declaration of principle and no specified 
minimums. Hence the law permits approved projects to be full foreign ownership 
whatever the activity of the project. This obviously is a liberal attitude to foreign 
investrnent, compared with many other developing countries. 
4.10.3 The Repatriation Guarantees on Invested Resources as a Safeguard to 
FDI 
The legal regulation governing the repatriation of invested funds is of considerable 
significance to the FDI decision. This being so, attention should be paid to two 
problem areas, namely, the exchange regulations on the one hand, and repatriation of 
income and company capital on the other hand. 
The freedom to acquire foreign currency is essential to the operation of FDI. For 
instance, Law 230 gives projects a general right to operate a foreign currency account. 
Guaranteed rights to repatriate invested capital on the liquidation of a corporation and 
to remit profits and capital are extended to foreign investors by Law 230. 
Law 230 mentions that the remittance of profits shall be within the credit balance of 
the foreign currency account of the company. This means that if a company earns 
sufficient foreign exchange, its profits will be transferred with no limitations. But if 
the foreign currency are not sufficient, the company may acquire foreign exchange 
from the free market in order to fully transfer its profits. 
As far as FDI is concerned, companies under the investment law are pen-nitted to 
maintain foreign currenc), accounts in Egypt in the form of working capital, foreign 
loans, proceeds of sales and other remittances from abroad. There are no exchange 
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control restrictions imposed on transactions with these accounts, but quarlerly reports 
must be submitted to the GAFJ regarding the operation of the accounts. 
Apart from companies, banks are also permitted to execute foreign exchange 
transactions within the framework of a general authorisation, without need to obtain 
specific exchange control approval. 
To get the foreign currency needed for imported inputs to their production process, 
the great majority of companies in this study purchased dollars from the free market. 
Another group met its foreign exchange needs from exports. A third group got foreign 
exchange allocations from the official pool, but since these allocations were 
insufficient or delayed, they also had recourse to the free market. A financial 
executive of a pharmaceutical company reported during the field study that the 
company obtains its imports, sometimes, through a credit from U. S. Aid Commission. 
In this case the documentary credit is valid for 6 months. 
4.10.4 Pricing and Profits 
Generally, a foreign investor looks for profitability, safety, and a market. Egypt can 
offer all of these. On the profitability count, products of investment companies are not 
subject to compulsory pricing or profit ceilings since they pay world prices for inputs. 
However, some basic products may be excluded from these exemptions for the public 
interest, such as pharmaceuticals. 
4.10.5 Protection Accorded by the Law 
Article 8 of Law 230 stipulates and guarantees the safeguarding of FDI. These 
guarantees involve: (1) guarantees against confiscation or nationafisation of 
investment projects; (2) guarantees against seizure, requisition, blocking, 
sequestration or custody of project assets and funds; and (3) no expropriation of real 
estate or property, either partial or full. The new investment law states that, in case of 
acquisition for reasons of public interest, fair compensation is payable based upon the 
market value of such property. Companies established in the free zones may not be 
nationalised or confiscated. 
Aside from the law, bilateral agreements for the protection of private investments 
have been signed with some countries. 
4.10.6 Import/Export Regulations 
A large number of developing countries restrict, or require importers to obtain a 
licence for, imports across their borders. The licence is usually a prerequisite for 
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obtaining the foreign exchange necessary to pay for the imports. In Egypt. there i.. " no 
control system on imports by MNCs. Law 230 gives companies the right to import 
their production requirements: materials, equipment and machinery, and in quantitie" 
which are necessary for their activity or an expansion thereof, without any being 
subject to the procedures relating to importation in general. Sirruilarly, to help 
implement an export strategy, the law provides that companies may export without a 
licence. 
Apart from the law, it should be noted that if there are substitutes produced localk, 
imports would be restricted. However MNC subsidiaries often argue that local 
substitutes differ in quality and do not meet their production standards. Therefore, 
they seem to create artificial reasons to obtain their requirements from their parent 
group. Also, the technology transfer contract enables the licensee firm to buy 
materials, components and parts from the technology supplier, which could be the 
MNC in most cases. 
4.10.7 Investment Incentives as a Criterion for Encouraging FDI in Egypt 
Fiscal instruments affecting the formation of subsidiary companies belong to the most 
important category of investment criteria. Apart from attracting direct investment, 
both domestic and foreign, incentives are usually designed to achieve specific 
development goals, such as the development of particular sectors of production or 
services, regional development, export promotion, technology transfer, stimulation of 
employment of nationals, stimulation of training and R&D, and the increased use of 
dornestic inputs in the production process. These incentives take a multitude of forms, 
such as tax holidays and exemption from other kinds of taxes, applying a low rate of 
tariffs. A further investment criterion for foreign companies is the possibility of 
transferring profits and capital. 
Meanwhile, there are some incentives which could be used to achieve economic and 
social objectives rather than simply as mechanisms to attract foreign investment. 'I'his 
is clearly seen in the case of the location of enterprise in free zones to encourage 
exports, or in new cities, and in the use of local content in the manufacture. 
4.10.7.1 Tax Concessions 
The Egyptian government provides fiscal incentives to stimulate investment in basic 
industries and other industrial sectors of special importance, as well as in -various 
geographically-disadvantaged regions of Egypt. Such fiscal policy measures provide 
tax exemptions for a period of time. Under La,, N, 230, several tax Incenti\ es ha, ý e been 
offered to FDI as follo,, N, s: 
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A corporate income tax exemption is granted for a period of five years from the 
first fiscal year following the start of production or commencement of activity as 
determined by the GAFI. This period may be extended for a further fi-%, e years if 
necessitated by reasons of "public interest" taking into consideration project's 
activities, its location and its contribution to exports. employment and social and 
economic development. 
2. Promotion for regional areas. All investment companies are exempted from the 
payment of income tax for fifteen years where projects are established in new 
industrial regions, new urban communities, and remote regions. 
3. Promotion of sectors of the economy. The sectoral incentives relate primarily to 
projects of land reclamation, real estate development, establishment of new cities 
and industrial zones. The tax holidays for these sectors are similar to those that 
are embodied in the regional incentive scheme. To encourage investment in 
medium or low housing, the law gives tax exemption for 20 years. 
4. In all cases, the tax reliefs will be increased by another two years if the 
percentage of the local component in equipment, machinery and outfits exceeds 
60%. It is noticed that funds invested in lands and buildings are not counted in 
the calculation of the percentage. Additionally, an approved expansion of a 
project will benefit from a further five years exemption. 
5. Exemption from stamp duty: Firms established under the investment law are 
exempted from stamp duties and notarisation fees. 
Under the provision of the law, companies operating in free zones are exempted from 
income taxation as wetl as complete customs exemption on capital assets and working 
capital for the life of the firm. The idea of such exemptions is to encourage these 
companies to export their production and to enhance the balance of payments. 
In general, the tax exemptions and extensions available are greater than those under 
Law 43. They now stretch from five years for the basic exemption to 20 years in the 
case of medium or low cost housing. 
4.10.7.2 The Taxation of Distributed Profits 
All dividends from an investment which are remitted to entrepreneurs or undertakings 
not residing in Egypt are exempted from the general tax on income to the extent of 
1017c of the original value of the tax-payer's share in project capital. This exemption is 
raised to 2017c for a joint-stock company which offers its shares for public subscription 
and where at least 40% of its capital has been subscribed. 
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Profits from invested foreign capital can also be re-invested and benefit from a similar 
tax hohday. 
4.10.7.3 Customs Duties 
Law 230 of 1989 offers "special tariff rates" on imports by investment companies. 
Capital assets are exempted from customs duties. All investment projects qualifY for a 
flat 5% customs rate on their requirements. Companies working 'in free trade zones 
are outside the customs territory of Egypt, on the condition that they export their 
production. This gives rise to a different status to merchandise placed within the zone. 
On the other hand, exemption from customs duties encourages foreign company to get 
their production requirements from abroad under the pretence that local requirements 
are not of the same quality. So it is not surprising that the rate of local inputs reaches 
only 22% in the beverage industry, 24% in the car industry and only 4Vc in a 
pharmaceutical company (Issa, 1989, p. 39). Therefore tariffs impetuses should be 
restricted to induce MNCs to buy raw materials as much as possible from the local 
market. 'Mis will help to raise the efficiency of different industries. 
The same problem occurs with equipment and machinery as they are completely 
exempted from customs duties. Foreign companies import all capital goods from their 
parent companies or other sources abroad. Only 8% of these assets were local 
components. Law 230 encourages foreign companies to depend on local components. 
It gives projects tax exemptions for an additional two years if the local component in 
machinery, equipment and outfits exceed 60%. 
It should be noticed that the incentives mentioned above have contributed to an 
expansion of investment activities in Egypt. The accumulative volume of inward 
stocks of FDI were 7.0 and 14.9 billion of dollars from the period 1974 -1979 and 
1974-1984 respectively (UNCTC, 1988, p. 381). Investment in services took up a 
remarkable share in Egypt, accounting for 45% of total investments, from 1974 to 
1984. Table 4.9 shows the value of inflows for the period of 1975 to 1985. 
4.10.8 Critical Comments on Law 230 
There are some drawbacks in La\, N, 230 which could be summarised as follows: 
The law restricted FDI to five main fields for investment. This restriction should 
be revarnped, leaving the decision to the investor. Only banned activities should 
have been explicitly mentioned. 
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Table 4.9 
The Value of Inflows to Egypt 1975-1985 
Year Inflows 
($M) 
OER EEM GDPD Inflows 
(EEM real term,, i 
1975 8.5 0.39 3.32 47.3 7.02 
1980 547.9 0.70 383.53 91.6 418.70 
1981 752.3 0.70 526.61 100.0 526.61 
1982 293.9 0.70 205.10 107.7 190.44 
1983 489.6 0.70 342.70 119.7 286.30 
1984 728.8 0.70 509.60 130.9 389.30 
1985 1177.8 0.70 823.90 144.6 569.78 
OER = Official Exchange rate, GDPD = Gross Domestic Product Deflator. 
Source: Inflow in U. S. dollars from UNCTC (1988a, p. 504); Official Exchange Rate from The Central 
Bank of Egypt, Economic Rcview, various issue; and the Gross Domestic Product Deflator from Khier- 
El-Din (1990). 
2) Because the law is full of exemptions and requires exceptional powers to grant 
privileges this could mislead the investor about his legal rights and obligations. 
3) The role of the GAR is criticised because of long and bureaucratic procedures 
for any approval. The investor has to get an approval for most decisions, such as 
setting up the business, transferring profits abroad and so on. Some people have 
called for the abolishment of the GAR It is believed that the existence of this 
organisation is important to control investing companies. But any delays should 
be overcome and the procedures simplified. 
4.10.9 Are Regulations alone Sufficient to Attract FDI into Egypt? 
The Egyptian government changed policies and regulations affecting MNCs in an 
attempt to spur greater amounts of FDL Despite these changes, however, flows of FDI 
have only increased slightly. Thus, policy changes alone may have a limited impact. 
In developing countries that possess a large and growing internal market or 
substantial productive resources, changes in policies and regulations can prove 
instrumental in helping attract greater amounts of FDL At the same time, the 
experiences of developing countries with policy changes suggests that blanket 
liberalisations may be less effective than changing or adopting specific regulations or 
elements of policy towards MNCs- In addition. some policy changes may he effective 
in certain economic conditions, and not effective in others. This means regulations 
and changing policies are not sufficient to attract FDJ. 
In many cases, the investment decisions of MNCs are influenced by two factors: 
1) Business climate and government's favourable attitude and confidence towards 
foreign investors. Relating to this point, while the overall regulatorY framework 
had been liberalised, the administrative apparatus continued to be combersome 
and time consuming which could impede and give a bad impression about the 
buiness climate in Egypt. 
2) The rate of return on investment. When an investment decision is undertaken by a 
MNC, the corporation puts forward the capital, technology and management, 
bears the risk and receives the returns. In this regard, the ROI should be sufficient 
to cover all risks. 
Therefore the Egyptian government should focus on these two factors as a way to 
attract FDI into the country. 
4.10.10 The Effect of World Transformations on FDI Flows into Egypt 
The Egyptian government should take into account the effect of political and 
economic transformations on FDI in Egypt. In other meaning the establishment of the 
single internal market within the Western European countries at the beginning of 
1993 has already attracted substantial increase in FDI into these countries in 
anticipation of higher external barriers. The increase of FDI into these countries may 
occur at the expense of FDI into developing countries. The more frequently MNCs 
select investment locations within EC, the more likely they will refrain from selecting 
locations in developing countries. 
The ongoing changes in the Central and Eastern European countries, and their 
encouraging linkages with MNCs may also come at the expense of FDI in developing 
countries. 
It is possible that some developing countries may ultimately benefit from the single 
international market. To the extent that increased FDI in the EC leads to an 
intensification of competition, lower-cost offshore production locations "-'thin 
developing countries may become more important. Also. if the larger internal market 
leads to an enhanced competitive position among European MNCs, they may increase 
their FDI in developing countries in order to compete within U. S. and Japanese 
MNCs on a global basis 
4.11 The MNC and Economic Development: The Advocates and Critics 
The activities of the MNC have naturally become a focus for countries interested in 
development and economic transformation and they are considered the most poýverful 
motivation within developing states. Such a commitment is embodied in the United 
Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic order embraced by Arab nations and other third world countries: 
"All efforts should be made ..... to encourage the industrialization of the developing 
countries ..... and win a view to bringing about a new international econornic 
structure which should increase the share of the developing countries in world 
industrial production. "11 
Such a concern in host nations with growth and development, followed the 
disappointment with the unrealized expectations of the First Development Decade. 
There was an inadequacy of aid in the form of an investment-domain in which MNCs 
play an extremely important role (Pearson, 1970). This shift has highlighted and 
added significance to concern about the relationship of the MNC to the process of 
development. 
4.12 The Effect of MNCs on the Egyptian Economy 
In determining the effect of MNCs on the Egyptian economy, three issues should be 
taken into account. These issues can be summarized as follows: 
First: It is essential to determine the yardsticks by which one should assess the 
contribution of FDL The criterion to evaluate MNCs activities in host countries 
should relate basically to the country's welfare, which differs from one country to 
another. 
Second: It is necessary to ask how one can assess and measure the impact of MNCs 
in host countries in the absence of research which would show how host country's 
resources would be used if MNCs were operating elsewhere. In other words, the 
opportunity cost approach will be useful to evaluate the effect of MNCs on using the 
resources of the host country. 
U. N. General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-Vl) and 12021 (S-VI), "Declaration and Action Program on the ENtablishment 
of a Ne", International Economic Order". May 1,1974. reprinted in Guy F. 
Erb and Valenana KaDab (eds), 1975, BeYond 
Depen, denrY: The Developing World Speaks Out. New York Overseas Development Council. pp. 185 - 202. 
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Third: It is very important to assess the effect of MNCs to special issues. such as 
employment. 
The impact of MNC activities on the Egyptian economy will be discussed around 
some elements including: 
a) The effect of MNCs on the balance of payment, 
b) The effect of MNCs on tax revenues, 
C) The effect of MNCs on profit extraction, 
d) Royalty payments by subsidiaries in Egypt, 
e) Return on investments, 
f) The effect of MNCs on providing employment, 
g) Social welfare and MNCs, 
i) The impact of technology transfer and R&D activities, 
j) Marketing, trade marks and names, and 
k) Transfer pricing manoeuvres. 
4.12.1 The Effect of MNC Activities on the Balance of Payment Flows 
Generally, in estimating effects of MNCs on the balance of payments, it would be 
essential to gather information relating to financial flows and outflows between the 
host country and other countries. Information of inflows might be easy to determine. 
Outflows information which involve intra-company imports, profits repatriated, 
payments of royalties, interest charges, and management fees are not easy to depict as 
there is no full disclosure neither by companies nor the Egyptian government. 
Even if we take only the values of exports and imports as an example to assess the 
effect of foreign companies on the balance of payments, the picture will be gloomy. 
Available data for 1982 declared that the value of production was Ef'663.9 million 
while the value of exports amounted to EL17 million. The value of imports amounted 
to U558.8 million (Issa, 1989, p. 20). The comparison between imports and exports 
shows that foreign companies added a deficit of U541.8 million to the balance of 
payments. 
In fact, this condition contradicts with aims of Investment policy in Egypt, from the 
point of the host country. In other words, the project should be self sufficient in its 
hard currency requirements so that the value of its exports cover all imports and 
transfening profits. 
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However, in judging the effect of the operations of MNCs on the balance of payments 
of a developing country, it should be realised that although currency savincy might be t! - 
achieved in terrns of the alternative cost of direct imports of finished goods from the 
same suppliers, the actual outflow of funds from these operations is most likely to 
outbalance the inflow. 
4.12.2 The Effect of Foreign Companies on Tax Revenues 
As mentioned previously, tax revenues are very important as they represent a 
substantial proportion of income for financing the expenditure of the state. Therefore, 
the contribution of foreign investment companies should be viewed in terms of the 
country's total tax receipts. As the investment law gives these companies tax facilities, 
this could have adverse effect on tax receipts and the balance of payment 
simultaneously. In fact, when investment companies are eligible to pay taxes, i. e. after 
expiring the tax holiday period, most of the MNCs might evade taxation, easily, by 
such techniques as transfer pricing, royalties and service fees, and/or submitting 
unfrank statements showing low profits or even losses. This is evidenced by the very 
low level of tax receipts from these companies shown in Table 4.10. 
It is believed that an ineffective tax system and lack of legislation to prevent tax 
evasion, besides financial and economic incentives which the government offered 
resulted in no considerable tax accruing to the country from foreign companies, 
notably those of the big MNCs. Evidence of this is extracted from Table 4.10 as the 
average of taxes paid by those companies over that period was 31-7c of total taxes. 
Though, the amount of taxes increased until 1984/85, reaching Ef-317.2 million, i. e. 
4.6% of total tax receipts. Tax receipts declined in the following two years to EL269.5 
million, i. e. 3.5%. 
The absence of effective control to scrutinise transfer prices, arbitrary allocation of 
administrative expenses and high royalties contributed to minimising the taxes paid 
by MNCs. 
The problem of adrrdnistrative corruption of tax authorities in Egypt might be added 
to factors that induced MNCs to evade paying fair taxes. Therefore, the Egyptian tax ltý 
system is inadequate in terms of its control capacity. 
In surnmary, according to a statement made by a servant in the GAR ", NINCs lookfor 
profit, and they produce goods that are profitable for themseNes". For instance, 
General Motors of Egypt announced that the net income posted a 141 % jump in 1999 
comparing to the year earlier, in spite of the fact it absorbed only 35117c of its capaclt\,. 
It should be noted that the company is still in the tax holiday period. 
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Table 4.10 
Tax receipts from Foreign Companies and its Relative Importance to the Tot-al 
Tax Receipts 1981-87 (Ef M) 
Year Total Tax Total Tax Relative 
Receipt of Receipt from Importance 
the Country Foreign firms 
1980/81 4181.0 48.2 1.2 (I'c 
1981/82 5479.7 59.2 1.1 l7c 
1982/83 5923.5 156.6 2.6 (7c 
1983/84 6148.1 219.9 3.6% 
1984/85 6966.9 317.2 4.6 c7c 
1985/86 7593.6 269.5 3.5% 
1986/87 7909.7 273.7 3.5% 
Source: Tax Administration (1988) Unpublished Data, Cairo. 
4.12.3 The Effect of MNCs on Profit Extraction 
The frequent tendency of the MNCs working in Egypt is to transfer profits abroad. 
Not surprisingly the amount of profits transferred by six MNCs exceed more than the 
half of total profits transferred by all MNCs between 1975 to 1986. These companies 
transferred EE20 million which equals 54% of the total profit transferred abroad. 
Table 4.11 indicates the development of profits transferred by industry sector. The 
table indicates that the relative importance of these transfers has been increasing since 
1984. 
4.12.4 Royalty Payments by Subsidiaries in Egypt 
Royalty payments for technology and services depend on the terms of the contract 
regarding know-how, technical information, use of licences, patents, trademarks, or 
trade names. These payments usually take the form of a given percentage of sales 
and/or a lump sum. 
As far as Egypt's case is concerned, Table 4.12 illustrates these payments made to 
MNCs in different industries. The rate of payment ranges between 1.5(7(- and 5% of 
net sales depending on the technology package provided, the bargaining power of 
technology negotiators, and ýxhether or not royalties are supplemented by other 
technology payments. Despite the fact that these amount', are comparauvei), 
acceptable judging by international standards, what really counts i,, the worthines,, of 
transferred technologies for the royalty rates agreed upon. Also. what is remarkable, 
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as shown in the table is the high incidence of lump sum payments and there is no 
limited time for such payments in some cases. 
Although many find that transfer pricing is difficult to predict for tangible 
transactions, as data is not easily available for many reasons, the problem NA-ith 
intangible transfers are particularly sqiking. This is because of the often 
unquantifiable, amorphous nature of intangibles and the very large adjustments that 
are associated with them. However, a government may, for example, find that a MN'C 
who licenses a patent to its subsidiary might have similar licensing agreements with 
unrelated parties in countries where there is no patent protection and where several 
competitors exist. Although the patent would be less valuable in the latter case, it 
might still be used as a "comparable situation" for the related party transactions, 
taking into account all the facts and circumstances. 
To summarise, payments of royalties and fees by Egyptian subsidiaries to their 
foreign parents are growing more rapidly. Thus, these payments might be used as a 
way to shift profits abroad, especially as the government pays little attention to the 
duration of technology transfer agreements. They may last from 5 years to 10 years, 
renewable year after year, until terminated by either of the parties. 
4.12.5 Return On Investments 
The analysis of income statements for some MNCs for the period of 1984-1987 
showed high return on investment. This return ranged between 10017C and 17517c in 
three companies working in the production of dry batteries, shaving cream and the 
assembling of Xerox-machines; between 50% and 90% in 4 companies producing 
welding wires, pipes, plastic and other chemicals; and between 25117c and 4017c in 6 
corporations producing car batteries, pesticides, and metallic products. (GAFI's 
Follow-up Reports, 1984-1987). 
The reason for achieving high levels of profit can be imputed to, as mentioned 
earlier, the wideness of the local market and the nonexistence of governmental control 
over final price. Not to mention, royalties. licences, technical assistance fees, trade 
marks, and profits from abusing transfer prices. (Sakr. 1989, p-20) 
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Table 4.12 
Royalty Payments by Subsidiaries in Egypt to their Parents. 1988 
Name of MNC Main Product Annual Sales Royalty Payments 
(EfOOO) 11c of net,. ales- Lump, um 
Amgrican L-Qm"nien 
Chemic, d Production for Plasticizer. water 
Construction (CPC) proofing compounds. 
bonding agents 1410 
Crush In Soft-drinks 18000 s5cK)(H) 
Dr. Pepper Co. Soft-drinks 8800 S50200K) 
Gillette Shaving blades 1400 1.35% 
Guardian Industrial Flat glass 53416 3% for 7 vears 
Combustion Engineering 
Pioneer Hi-bred Int. Hybrid corn seeds 8400 S6090M 
Reynolds Int. Aluminiurn products 4899 217r $300OW 
Royal Crown Cola Int. Soft-drinks 5700 
Warner Lambert Co. Biscuits, Chocolates 2452 2.5% 
French Companies 
Bonna Concrete pipes 5000 
Ch, unbon Engineering Wood products 
(Wooden doors) 1332 F. F. 450000 
Equipments Mecaniques High-Pressure hoses 500 F. F. 3138000 
Speclal&s and other rubber 
products 
Evian Source Cachet 
Badoit Mineral water 7800 3% 
Giordano S. A. Solar heating Min. 400 4% if min. sales 
1000 & over (4(X). 000) 
3% if sales IM 
2c/'(, if more than 
I mUlion 
SoeiW des Tuvau 
Bonna Pipe wrapping 5000 S 50(0) 
ý'Ittour (Soci&d Natural spring 3940 517, for 5 years 
General des Eaux water min. fees equal 
of Ef 100000 
Other 
S7 1000 r. a. 
Resuicted imporis 
of material from 
the parent co. at a 
value of F-044(00 
Ef5oooo 
Pa 
jcontjnucdý 
Table 4.12 (concluded) 
same of %INC Main Product 
Italian ComDanie 
Anston Refrigerators 
Insbuto Bio-chýmico Pharmaceuticals 
Italian. t 
Manotto Co. Ready made garments 
japanese Companies 
Maruhon Kohsan Co. Metal spare 
parts & tools 
Yoshida Kogyo, K. Metal & plastic 
zippers 
UK Companies 
IIý 
Annual Sales 
(EfOOO) 
Rovaltv 
11/-z of net sale-. Lump, %um 
3450 Sý 18(MX) 
1080 S270(KKI 
1763 S7 12M) 
2735 Ef 5 11 SO 101( (it 
profii 
10 vear 
735 
Gulness Peat Int. Flat glass 3375 
S. Silka Ready made garments IM (piece) 
German Companigs 
B, avaria Feuer-Loscher Fir extinguishes- 
Pleher Maschinen und Cranes 
Schmubenwerke AG 
VDM Aluminium GMBH Solar heaters 
Other CompAnies 
AJ[ex (Sweden) Painting (Surface 
casting) 
Associated Capsules Pharmaceuticals 
PVT Ltd. (India) (Gelatine capsules) 
Ditta Benedetto/ 
Globe Trotters Men clothing 
01, dy/France) 
568 
DM9M 
900 
916 
12000 
43670 
1.5% 
$400000p. a. 
2.5% if net 
profit > 20 
of equity 
S224(XX) 
DM 1020(K) p. a 
5 c7( 
Capitallsation of 
know-how (max. 2717( 
of total equity) 
with min. fees 
U135000 
$114000 
S4MXX) 
S415000 
p. a. 
Sour(, c - Compded from the GAR's records 
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4.12.6 The Effect of MNCs on Providing Employment Opportunities 
One of the main objectives of economic development plans in Egypt, is to ý: reate new 
jobs to meet the expected labour supply. As the government is responsible for Creatim-1 
jobs, it was believed that FDI would alleviate the burden shouldered by the government 
in this respect. Tberefore, the government requires the MNCs to employ Egyptians and 
train them to acquire new skills. The criterion applied by the government is that the 
number of Egyptian employees in any project should be at least 80% of the total and their 
remuneration not less than 70% of all wages and salaries 
When evaluating the contribution of MNCs to specific problems such as employment the 
vital question would be whether the role of MNCs to this problem is a good contribution 
or not'! Despite the existence of MNCs in Egypt creating new employment opportunities 
and developing skills, their number was few. This is due to the fact that these companies 
tend to be highly capital and skill intensive with little employment implications. MNCs 
are concentrated in industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and to a lesser extent 
engineering. In the first two industries, according to UNIDO (1969, p. 43), the potential 
for substitution of labour for capital is limited to about 5 to 1011-c 
In some industries, MNCs have had negative effects on the tabour market. This can he 
seen when analysing the employment structure in these companies and their policies used 
to attract skilled labour from national companies and not from the new tabour force. This 
rneans that MNCs do not add, in reality, new job opportunities but they take advantage of 
using skilled labours which has accumulated experience and training. Table 4.13 
illustrates the distribution of tabour force recruitment by years of experience, in of the 
some giant MNCs. 
011 the other hand, it should be noticed that MNCs in Egypt continue to operate without 
ian or with only a skeleton expatriate staff. The adequate selection and training of Egypti 
personnel are in a better position to ride the storm. 
In short, MNCs have not created new real job opportunities, but have chosen to draw 
upon the human skills of the country. 
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4.12.7 Social Welfare and MNCs 
It should be noticed that the price levels in Egypt have been affected by several 
factors such as inflation and the appearance a new class of people working in rich 
Arab countries who are prepared to pay high prices, especially for imported goods, 
Also, MNCs increased their prices sharply despite the fact that they have been 
enjoying a long concession period, free from taxation and customs duties and other 
advantages. The government has no right to control prices of foreign companies, or 
even to encourage them to reduce their prices, or to keep them to a reasonable level. 
A frequently heard criticism of MNCs is that they promote consumption of 
inappropriate products through heavy advertising in low income countries (Jenkins, 
1988) 
To judge the role of MNCs in achieving social welfare in Egypt, one should look at 
the type and nature of products manufactured by these companies in Egypt. It is easy 
to notice that a large proportion of these products are similar to those designed for 
advanced country consumers. These goods are considered luxuries and are therefore 
ill-suited to cater for the basic requirements of the middle and lower classes of the 
societY. 
For instance, alun-finium products such as aluminium frames, windows, doors, and 
curtains tend to predominate the metallic industry; and these products are basically 
made to satisfy the housing requirements of wealthy groups as well as office and hotel 
requisites of businessmen and tourist, not the poor's need for shelter. Likewise, the 
principal products of the chemical industries are those primarily consumed by high- 
income groups, such as cosmetics, detergents, floor waxes, etc. The same applies to 
engineering industries, where most products are produced for the luxury market: 
motor-vehicles, elevators, TV screens, cassette tapes, air-conditioners, washing 
machines, refrigerators, fan-heaters and other electrical household appliances. By 
their nature, only pharmaceutical companies direct their products to all different 
classes. 
Because of the over-elaborate characteristics of these products and because their price 
is far above what the poor can afford to pay, none of them has been suitable for 
satisfying the basic requirements of nutrition, clothing and shelter of the majority of 
the population. So clearly, from the social welfare standpoint, MNCs have Involved 
themselves to a large extent in the production of the wrong products. 
Even products available for the majority of people are oriented for consumption. An 
example of these commodities is beverages and mineral water which are not 
11- 
important, at least, for a developing country which suffers from massive economic 
problems. It is likely that national investment will be affected as a consequence of 
lowering the marginal propensity of savings. 
It is likely that MNCs prefer selling domestically in Egypt to exporting, because the 
profit margins are so high. But the government should offer long-term opportunities 
for foreign companies to open export markets, at least in Arab neighbour countries. 
This would help the country as well as companies themselves to generate dollars to 
finance imports of raw materials and capital goods. 
4.12.8 The Effect of MNCs on the Transfer of New Technology 
C1 
One of the government objectives of inviting FDI is to raise existing technological 
know-how. The way this objective is achieved is by requiring that foreign projects 
should introduce advanced technology and production techniques. 
As FDI is, at present, one of the principal vehicles for technology transfer to Egypt, 
the bulk of foreign technology and know-how transmitted through this direct 
investment is very significant. According to the GAFI's statistics, there are 110 
foreign companies acting as technology transferors to Egypt. 'Ilie list furnished is, 
however, far from complete, as it does not cover all means of technology flows. 12 It 
should be noted that most of the industrial MNCs in Egypt are engaged in 
technological-advanced, capital intensive and faster-growing industries, notably those 
characterised by high product differentiation and intensive advertising. MNCs transfer 
usually the same sort of technology used in developed markets and produce the same 
or similar lines of production. In addition, such transactions tend to be in the form of 
comprehensive packages. 
All MNCs working in Egypt, frequently, hold agreements for the provision of various 
services by them especially when joint ventures take place. This means that the extelit 
of technology transfer is influenced by the degree of ownership. Such agreements 
stipulate that the MNC provides technology, know-how and trademarks. The transfer 
of these resources becomes an essential element for the establishment of a joint 
venture manufacturing operation. Even when the subsidiary is "N'holly-owned, MN; Cs 
commonly have know-how agreements to obtain income on their technological 
contributions. 
12 Technology flo"'s uvolve, according to Demkhshani's definition (1983), the acquisition, devclojxnent and utilisation ,I 
technical knowledge by a country other than that in whicli this knowledge originated. 
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Table 4.14 illustrates the different types of technology provided under joint % enture 
(with and without foreign equity participation) and technical assistance and licensing 
agreements. 
In summary, the cost of imported technology is relatively high, particularly if the 
transfer pricing and restrictive business practices are taken into consideration. 
Alongside this, the country tends not to utilise, to a large extent, the technology 
transferred for the following reasons: 
a. the limited learning of training and technical programs provided by MNCs which 
do not help much in increasing the nationals' knowledge on how to absorb, 
master, and adapt technology to local conditions, 
b. the reluctance of technology suppliers to transfer technology information outside 
the borders of the recipient company. Kim and Kim (1985) note that MNCs are 
becoming more hesitant toward technology transfer. Some speculated reasons 
include the emergence of the so-called 'newly industrialised countries' as 
exporting nations. This increases competition in the international and local 
markets; 
C. the weak technological linkage developed with the rest of the economy, 
especially with scientific research institutions and the capital goods industry; 
d. the centralisation of decision making process at parent headquarters; 
e. as indicated above that capital- intensive rather than labour-intensive technologies 
are often transferred to Egypt by MNCs. Consequently it does not absorb 
sufficient labour; and, 
MNCs are often blamed for not facilitating the transfer process, as technology 
agreements include binding provisions. These legal Clauses reduce the 
willingness of the country to produce the same technology. 
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4.12.9 Research and Development (R&D) Activities 
R&D activities are usually centralised in the parent company and institutions in 
developed countries where prevailing market and institutional conditions stimulate 
technological development. In this regard some authors criticise MNCs in Egypt as 
they do not locate R&D activities locally. For example in the pharmaceutical sector, 
"foreign subsidiaries ... have proven to be as poor channels for technology transfer as 
their parent multinational companies. No research and development capabilities to 
speak of are being prepared locally .... Despite the fact that some agreements had 
R&D Clauses, only one drug assessment supplemental to a parent company 
programme was initiated and no R&D contribution is expected from all these 
sources". (Galal, 1983, p. 240) 
In effect, as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, none of the companies covered by 
the study did establish laboratories for basic scientific or development research. What 
was available at best in some companies was simply a division or a department for 
technical service and quality control. To try and set up a separate research division 
was considered a too early commitment and a very costly and risky gesture, given the 
nature and requirements of R&D activities and the features of host developing 
countries. 
In fact, MNCs' behaviour to concentrate their R&D facilities in the headquarters 
countries might be an attempt to tighten control over the subsidiaries. In addition, it is 
argued that MNCs invest abroad to spread their R&D costs over more markets. So, 
they can not be expected to re-incur similar costs just in the interests of the host 
country. 
4.12.10 Marketing Arrangement, Trade Marks and Trade Names 
The foreign investor was assumed to play a significant part in promoting exports and 
opening up new outlets through export commitments, promotional aid, advertising 
techniques, use of trade marks and trade names, and so on. But unfortunately in most 
cases reviewed, the marketing policy was heavily directed towards the domestic 
i-narket with very few exports. Suffice to emphasise that actual exports of alreadý! 
established companies do not surpass at best 5% of total output, which is far below 
what they had originally projected. Only 4 companies reported that they have started 
to export since 1988. The percentage of exports was not significant in comparison 
with the total revenue. Exports were chiefly confined to liquid (car) batteries, shaving 
blades, and pharmaceutical products. The main reason for this is found in the relative 
attractiveness of the domestic market in which they enjoy quasi-monopoly power 
and/or exert price leadership practices. One can also add the reluctancy of foreign 
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investors to expand sales across the borders of the host country, especially in areas 
where they already carry out similar activities or have granted export rights to 
someone else. Frankly speaking, none of the companies seems interested in promoting 
manufactured exports, at least not to their source country or traditional markets. The 
trade marks and names of companies enjoying market recognition, such as Xerox, 
Gillette, Squibb, General Motors, Colgate, Vittal, are widely used simply to expand 
the local market by ensuring high quality control. As shown in Table 4.14 over one- 
fifth of technology suppliers are making such trade marks and names available to 
joint-venture companies most of which are engaged in the production of consumption 
goods, particularly cosmetics, beverage and consumer durables. And to make matters 
worse, a significant number of free zone projects are applying to the GAR for transfer 
into inland projects. 
4.12.11 Transfer Pricing Manoeuvres 
Transfer pricing, as indicated in Chapter 3, can be abused by overpricing of imports, 
underpricing exports, over-evaluation of foreign investor's contribution (e. g., 
overpricing of technical equipment imported), capitalisation of know-how and so on. 
It is very difficult to calculate how much is the overcharge or undercharge, as they 
require full information of transfer prices charged and their arm's-length prices in the 
free market. 
Transfer pricing tends to be, to a large extent, in the form of overpricing of imported 
materials and capital goods, especially if technology suppliers are directly involved in 
the procurement of the inputs and machinery. The sparse information gathered in this 
respect indicates a price differential ranging between 15% and 30'Zc. 
For machinery and equipment which represent about 95% of total assets (Sakr, 1989, 
p. 46), MNCs tend to import all equipments required for production lines as a package 
deal. At the same time, they do not admit domestic substitution, except in small-range 
cases, which could be 5% of the total assets at most. This issue is clear in projects that 
depend mainly on advanced technology and produce marked commodities for the 
local market. Also, in the case of Joint-ventures, the percentage of foreign 
contribution is high, especially for the American contribution. The reason for MNCs 
insisting to import all their equipments is to utillse the exemption from customs duties 
and profits achieved abroad from supplying machineries. Also, the ability of these 
companies to save foreign currencies, required for imports through suppliers facilities, 
and bank loans and guarantees. 
1: 7 
In fact, MNCs are more integrated in their home economies for their requirements for 
inputs of components and raw materials. One study concluded that U. S corporation,, 
tend to import most of their inputs from the U. S. or Europe. In the meantime local 
enterprises have the proclivities to diversify their sources of inputs, including home 
markets (Mason, 1973, p. 353). 
With regards to MNCs in Egypt, the field study illustrates that MNCs depend on 
imports of these goods for assembly and production operations. The percentage of 
imported products amounts to 95% of total value of production requirements in some 
industries as shown in Table 4.15. 
As mentioned previously, MNCs argue that they prefer to get their material 
requirements from abroad because of either the nonexistence of the local counterpart 
or its quality is low. In fact there are some hidden inducements for preferring the 
production requirements importation. They achieve, in most occasions, additional 
significant profits in the forrn of supplying commissions in return for contracting with 
foreign suppliers. Over and above, they could abuse transfer prices, hence shifting 
profits abroad for tax evasion. Also, imported materials might infiltrate to be sold at 
high prices in the local market instead of using them in the production. This extreme 
case could happen in the absence or weakness of the host government's control (SakT, 
1989, p. 48). 
Table 4.15 
Percentage of Production Materials Imported by MNCs in Egypt 
Ratio of materials 
Economic Sector imported to the total 
value of materials (%) 
Pharmaceutical Industries 90- 95 
Mineral Industries 85- 95 
Engineering Industries 70- 92 
Cherfiical Industries 65 -88 
Beverage Industries 70 -851 
Food Industries 60 -72 
Sourcc. - Saki (1989. p. 47). 
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4.13 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed some of the more important aspects of the Egyptian 
environment including the balance of payments, external trade. exchange system. tax 
system, and customs duties. The Egyptian political system and inflation effect have 
also been discussed at some length. 
The last two decades have witnessed many significant changes in the Egyptiaii 
environment. Since 1974, the government has taken steps to attract FDL As FDI is 
now governed by Law 230 of 1989, the main aspects of the law have been discussed 
The general climate for FDI in Egypt is relatively favourable. The Egyptian 
government has sought to create and maintain a business environment that encourages 
inward investment. With regard to incentives of investment, the country can find itself 
in competition with other developing countries as potential locations for FDI and feel 
it must offer incentives to remain competitive. In such situation, MNCs may benefit 
from the incentives without changing their location decisions. 
The existence of MNCs, as well as the widespread nature of the FDI policy has been 
seen to contribute some vital socio-economic consequences to the Egyptian society 
since the adoption of the open door policy in 1974. 
Most of MNCs prefer joint venture investment with national partner, especially public 
sector companies, as they can benefit from their experience to dominate the local 
market at the lowest cost. This involves, for example, accumulated experience and 
knowledge of marketing and a well trained workforce. 
At the same tirne, MNCs prefer to acquire the majority of capital to enable them to 
control the company. For instance, when the UK Chloride Group has established Its 
subsidiary in Egypt with local investors, the basic agreement for the project was that 
if the share of capital of the parent company becomes 50% or less the subsidiary must 
change its name and will not have the right to use the patent at all. 
Whilst the government encourage investment companies to use local components by 
extending the tax holiday, it seems this incentive is not enough. The government 
should necessitate the use of local materials and production components by other 
ways such as low prices or subsidies to complying companies. 
Chapter 5 
Research Design and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
A review of the literature reveals that much of the discussion about MN transfer 
pricing is still based on conjecture and speculation. The basic reason for this is that 
much of the writing is theoretical and lacks an empirical investigation. Hopefully, this 
study will result in the formulation of a refined set of propositions that may be further 
tested in future research. 
The methodology adopted in this study is a multiple case-study approach. It is hoped 
the study will produce some useful suggestions relating to manipulating transfer 
pricing techniques and profit shifting in MNCs. The research goals include 
identifying variables that influence transfer pricing decision, determining the 
relationship among these variables and examining the strength of these relationships, 
and clarifying why such relationships between variables exist. Katz (1965), Simon 
(1969), and Kerlinger (1973) all pointed out the suitability of the case study 
methodology in similar research settings. 
The case study approach represents the fulcrum point of this research, data was 
collected frorn 11 MN subsidiaries in Egypt; in-depth interviews with financial 
executives and other staff were performed. and data from governmental sources and 
an accounting firm was collected. 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology and design of the study. A 
significant amount of the discussion will be devoted to the case study approach. The 
chapter is segregated into 7 parts. Section I deals with the research methodology and 
design. Section 2 presents questions of the research. Section 3 illustrates propositions 
that have been tested in the case study. Section 4 is concerned with the questionnaire 
that was used for collecting data. Section 5 focuses upon the case study approach, 
seeing as it represents the cornerstone of this research. Section 6 discusses the sources 
of data of the field study. The last section discusses the reason of focusing the study 
on pharmaceutical companies. 
IN 
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5.2 Research Methodology and Design 
The collection of data through a case study approach is guided by a protocol. 'which 
should include: (1) an overview of the project, including a statement of the research 
issut; (2) field procedures, including the specification of sources of information-, (3) 
case study questions, including 'shells 'for the data to be collected-, and (4) a guide for 
the case study report, including its outline and format (Yin, 1987). Therefore, the 
protocol is designed to increase the reliability of the research process. 
Where the study involves more than a single case, a replication, as opposed to a 
sampling logic, is suggested (Yin, 1987). Each case is considered equivalent to a 
single experiment, and analysis follows a cross-experiment, rather than a within- 
experiment, design and logic (Figure 5.1). Replication may be either literal or 
theoretical, and is dictated by the theoretical framework, which mentions the 
conditions under which case findings should be the same (literal replication) and 
different (theoretical replication). 
The overall research design was adopting a multiple-case study approach to collect 
data from companies. This research strategy is recognised as strong with respect to 
realism of context, but relatively weak with respect to generalisability and to 
precision in control and measurement of variables (McGrath, 1982). Some factors 
influencing the choice of this approach were as follows: 
The sensitivity and complexity of transfer pricing issues in MNCs makes it 
difficult to collect data from a large number of companies. Using the case study 
approach is appropriate when the sample is limited. This approach could provide 
the breadth and richness of information necessary for the research. 
2- The case study approach is panicularly suited for 'why' and 'how' questions. It is 
these kinds of questions which are considered in this field study. 
A questionnaire was used to collect the required information from each company. By 
using questionnaires in case studies to investigate the problem, two significant merits 
would be achieved. Firstly, findings could be interpreted more rationally. Secondly, 
hypotheses used could be more adequately tested (Katz, 1965, pp. 58-59). 
In addition, another questionnaire was adiTdnistered by interview to government staff, 
to pinpoint how the Egyptian government authorities deal with the transfer pricing 
problem. The authorities involved were GAR customs officials and tax authorities. 
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The major objective of this research is to investigate the relationship between transfer 
pricing techniques and profit shifting in MNCs working in Egypt. The trallsfer 
pricing, as mentioned earlier, is not only extremely complex but also very secretive. 
The chosen methodology achieves the following objectives: 
Acquiring observations from a high ranking persons (general. financial. 
manufacturing, and marketing executives in companies investigated-, and 
government officials). 
2- The interview, as a means of collecting data, is often an effective way to yield a 
high percentage of returns for most respondents willing to co-operate (Kidder and 
Judd, 1986, p. 225, Gorton and Carr, 1983, p. 37), even if the required data is 
beyond the individual's power to provide directly (Cannell and Kahn, 1965, 
p. 330). However, this does not mean that the interview is the best instrument for 
observation in all circumstances. But it is preferred to direct questions to the 
individuals themselves, in the absence of barriers to communication. This might " 
motivate the respondent to answer fully and accurately" (Kidder and Judd, 1986, 
p. 225). 
3- The interview can be managed more effectively and it is easy to explain and 
indicate any ambiguity in the questionnaire. Of course, there are differences 
among respondents and it is not easy to tailor a question for every respondent 
(Cannell & Kahn, 1965, p. 358). So, the question should be in a standard form 
which is understandable to all respondents. The role of the researcher is to 
simplify and clarify the questions to avoid misinterpretations or misleading. 
4- The interview may take a long time, as a consequence of the respondent needing 
to become more oriented to the topic under investigation. In this matter, the 
it recall of relevant material is facilitated" (Miller, 1970, p. 87). This could lead to 
improving the quality of data, hence, securing acceptable findings. 
5- If some questions seem to be sensitive, they could be "carefully sandwiched in by 
the interviewer" (Miller, 1970, p. 87). The researcher has the opportunity to 
observe the respondent's reaction, hence he -can change the subject if necessary 
or explain the survey problem further" (lbid). Also, the researcher has the 
opportunity to ask more questions during the interview. 
The development of research design is very important for carrying out case studies. It 
guides the researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing. and interpreting data. 
Hence, it enables him "to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the 
I 
I 
variables under investigation" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976. pp. 77-78). A research 
design comprises of four components, (1) a study's questions, (2) propositions. (3'ý 
units of analysis, (4) data analysis and interpretation of the findinZ(-: Ys. 
5.3 Key Research Questions 
Defining the research questions is the most important step to be taken in a research 
study (Yin, 1987, p. 19). The research questions represent a basic framework for the 
required data. They could produce propositions to be tested. Since the objective of 
this study is to examine the extent of shifting profits through transfer pricing 
technique in MNCs working in Egypt, a number of key research questions were 
formulated: 
(1) To what extent do MNCs working in Egypt use transfer pricing techniques to 
inflate their profit on account of the interests of the host country and their home 
country? 
(2) What are the important factors taken into consideration when setting transfer 
prices in MNCs'? 
(3) What are the perceived and actual effects of MNCs on host countries in the area 
of profit shifting'? 
(4) How do tax authorities and customs administration deal with the transfer 
pricing problem in MNCs'? 
(5) Do the Egyptian authorities involved issue regulations for the calculation of an 
arm's-length price on intra-group transactions? 
In order to answer these questions, some propositions were developed to be tested in 
the field study. 
5.4 Research Propositions 
The formulation of usable propositions is of central importance as it pinpoints the 
relationship between two or more variables. Detern-unIng the content of the required 
data depends upon the research propositions. Good and acceptable propositions 
should have some the following characteristics: 
Propositions must be specific, conceptually clear. and represent relations 
beo, veen variables. 
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Propositions should have clear and available implications for testing these 
relations (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 15). 
Propositions of this study are based on a theoretical development of the literature. The 
propositions about transfer pricing behaviour are straightforward, i. e.. MNC,,, - set 
transfer pricing policies that differ from their arm's-length prices when they have an 
incentive and ability to do so. As shown in Chapter 3, there are some factors that are 
likely to affect the process of setting transfer prices. Taking these variables into 
consideration means a MNC attempts to shift more income at the expense of the host 
country's interests as well as the home country's benefits. Most of these variables were 
investigated by authors in developed countries. ' Nine propositions were tested in this 
study as follows: 
(1) The more environmental factors that confront and limit the ability of a MNC to 
reap benefits, the greater is the desire of the company to manipulate transfer 
prices and, to a large extent, to restore their financial mobility. 
(2) The larger the amount of intra-company transactions between a subsidiary and 
constituent part of a MNC, the greater the opportunity to shift profits by 
manoeuvring transfer prices. 
(3) The more that a monopoly is employed by the MNC, the greater the manoeuvre 
of transfer prices. 
MNCs might use more than one method of transfer pricing policy. 
(5) MNCs confront the same environmental problems in regard to international 
transfer pricing. 
The greater the risk, either political or economic, in the host country, the larger 
the transfer prices of imports by the subsidiary from the parent or other 
subsidiaries in the same group, and vice versa, and therefore the more profits 
are shifted out of the risky countries. 
(7) MNCs take market conditions and competition into account as an important 
factor when designing transfer pricing policies. 
See for example Shulman (1975) for US comparues, Tang (1979)f or cornpan son bet ween US and Japanese firms, and Arpan 
(1991) for several developed nations. 
1 
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(8) MNCs inflate their royalties paid by Egyptian subsidiaries as a way to shift 
more profits 
The next proposition is related to Kopits (1975): 
(9) If the host country's income and dividend withholding tax rates are (-, reater than 
the home country's income tax rate, the MNC may inflate royalty payments to 
the parent company so that the company's worldwide tax burden is reduced. 
5.5 Questionnaire Structure 
An extensive literature review provided the framework for the development of the 
questionnaires. The review enabled the researcher to identify specific problem areas 
and provided insight as to the identification of key variables. The analysis of contents 
of the company questionnaire and the government officials questionnaireS2appears in 
following two sub-sections. 
5.5.1 Analysis of the Company Questionnaire 
Despite the fact that a case study approach does not require, necessarily, designing a 
questionnaire to obtain data required for investigating the research propositions, a 
questionnaire was used to ensure consistency and completeness in the interview 
process, especially where a tape recorder method was unwelcome by the respondents. 
A cover letter accompanied each questionnaire (Appendix A). During the interview 
specific questions and relevant points which were touched on or were insufficiently 
covered in the questionnaire were discussed with respondents. 
The questionnaire aims at finding the method(s) used in setting transfer prices and 
testing a number of environmental factors which might be taken into account in this 
respect. Also, assessing to what extent the Egyptian authorities are concerned with the 
transfer pricing aspect. 
An effort was made to ensure that the items included in the questionnaire were 
relevant and easily understood. Therefore, the questionnaire was pretested even after 
already having had several revisions. The researcher was interested in the potential 
respondent's evaluation of the study (all were very enthusiastic), such as whether or 
not the questions were clear and readable, and what questions should be omitted or 
added to the questionnaire. The pretesting studý, was carried out in two ways: 
As Arabic versions of que%tlonnaires were used in collecting data, a copy of each questionnaire in Arabic and i, nglish 
language appears in the Appendix. 
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After translating the questionnaires from English to Arabic it %vas tý'Ped by a 
Management lecturer at the University of Mansoura. A former professor in the 
U. S. for more than 10 years, and a current general executive of research and 
information division at the GAR read both English and Arabic versions. 
2- In a five-hour session with two directors of the accounting division of a MNC in 
Egypt, the company questionnaire was examined, and criticallý, evaluated. The 
directors were asked to answer the questions according to the instructions and 
then to carefully review all the items from a critical perspective to seek out 
problems, such as ambiguity or redundancy. 
The results of the pre-test suggested that there was little need for revision. In addition, 
none of the respondents involved in the pre-test indicated any degree of difficulty in 
interpreting the items as presented. 
The tool used in this study may have some limitations in terms of validity and 
reliability, but procedures were used to check these, as reliability is a necessary 
prerequisite of validity; unless measurement is reliable, it cannot be valid. 
Consequently, if the researcher can demonstrate the validity of his instrument, he 
presumes that it is reliable (Suchman, 1967, p. 320). To check reliability, the precision 
and accuracy of items related to transfer pricing aspect, is not easy since any change 
in opinions expressed might reflect a real change. Therefore, in order to ensure 
validity in the questionnaire and the interview, items are repeated in different forms, 
without destroying the conceptual meaning of the variable to be tested. Thus, in order 
to determine the reliability of an item, for example concerning transfer pricing 
determinants, one can check the answer of other items which are also intended to 
determine investment obstacles in Egypt. This method of cross-examination was also 
followed in the pre-testing and in the main questionnaire. On the other hand, 
concerning the question of validity of items, that is, whether the items were really 
measuring what they had to measure, this was established on the basis that the 
measure had been used previously by other researchers (Tang, 1979; and Burns, 
1983). 
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was divided into five sections to obtain data 
regarding veneral company charactefisticsý transfer pricing policies, el", 'ironmental 
determinants of international transfer pricing policies, the importance of transfer 
pricing frorn the Egyptian authorities' point of view, and the allocation of intangible 
assets and joint expenditures between the MNC group. 
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It should be noticed that the subjective-judgements were coded as numerical values. a 
higher number indicating a higher level of the specified criteria. A standardised 5 
point scale was used. For example 5 for "most important", 4 for "very important". 3 
for "important", 2 "fairly important", and I for "not at all important" 
I- General Company Characteristics 
The first section of the questionnaire requests general information to provide 
knowledge about the companies participating. Specifically, information was sought 
on the name and nationality of the firm, the age of the company, industry, method of 
investment, currency used in management accounts, and the name of the person 
responsible for completing the questionnaire. 
11- Transfer Pricing Policies 
Section 11 of the questionnaire contains questions aimed at finding the percentage of 
intra-company transactions, and how frequently cost-based and market-based transfer 
prices were used to price transactions. Participants were asked in 5-point scale fo 
determine how frequently each method of transfer pricing is used. The scale was I for 
"Never used", 2 for "Rarely used", 3 for "Sometimes used", 4 for "Frequently 
used", and 5 for "Usually used". 
Data provided by the participating companies was used to test proposition 5. 
Participants were also asked to indicate their role in establishing and reviewing 
transfer prices. Table 5.1 provides a list of the variables and corresponding questions 
from Section 11 of the questionnaire. 
III- Environmental Determinants of Transfer Pricing 
As the key purpose of this research was to investigate the extent of shifting profits 
through transfer pricing, it was essential to study motives that induce MNCs of doing 
so. By analysing these factors, one could judge, to a great extent, if profits are 
trasferred outside the country or not. 
Therefore, section f1l of the questionnaire is concerned with these factors that have 
greatest influence on formulating transfer prices. A list of 24 factors was developed 
after an extensive review on MN transfer pricing. Although the list is not exhaustive, 
but includes most of the important factors mentioned in the literature. The 
respondents were asked to indicate the purpose of designing transfer pricing policies, 
ranked by order of importance. The responses were scored as I= not at al I important: 
2= fairly important, 31= important. 4= very important and 5= most important. These 
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variables appear in Table 5.2. In the same section, participants were asked to rank the 
five most important variables. 
This Section also includes questions about the importance of MNCs to the Egyptian 
economy and the obstacles that MNCs face in improving their investment in Egypt. 
The rest of the questions from this part are shown in Table 5.3 
IV- The Importance of Transfer Pricing to the Egyptian Authorities 
This section aims to throw light on the importance of the transfer pricing issue from 
the perspective of the Egyptian authorities. A pattern emerged from the questionnaire 
item which requested managers to indicate the importance of MNCs to the Egyptian 
economy. Table 5.4 corresponds to the list of questions of part IV in the 
questionnaire. 
V- Intangible Assets and Allocating Headquarters Expenditures 
This sections deals with the allocation of intangible assets and joint expenditures 
between the subsidiaries of the MNC. As discussed in Chapter 3 transfer prices 
involve all kinds of transactions, for example, goods, services, know-how, loans and a 
like. Table 5.5 provides a list of the variables and corresponding questions frorn 
Section IV of the questionnaire. 
5.5.2 Analysis of the Governmental Authority Questionnaire 
The second group of questionnaires was directed to government authorities including 
GAR tax and customs authorities. The GAR questionnaire aimed to obtain 
information about the degree to which MNCs help the host country's government in 
solving its severe economic difficulties. The questionnaire also sought to determine 
the importance of the transfer pricing issue to the Egyptian authorities and assess any 
restrictions imposed on capital outflow. 
The aim of the questionnaire directed to the tax and customs authorities was to 
pinpoint the possibility of scrutinising transfer pricing and the extent of applying an 
arm's-length basis on intra-company transactions if there is any doubt. Problems that 
face tax and customs authorities over the transfer pricing issue were also included in 
these questionnaires. 
Tables 5.6,5.7, and 5.8 list the variables and corresponding questions on the 
questionnaires directed to GAR Tax Authorities, and Custorn, ý Department 
respectively. 
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Table 5.1 
Survey Source of Transfer Pricing Policies 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
9. 
I U. 
11. 
Information Source 
Factor (Section, Question) 
Percentage of intra-group purchases 11 (1) 
Percentage of intra-group sales 11 (2) 
Transfer pricing policies 11 (4,5,6) 
Extent of existence of external market price 11 (6.7) 
Sources of subsidiary sales distributed between domestic 
market and overseas market (8) 
Restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on the imports 
and exports of the subsidiary H (9,10,11,12) 
Responsibility for setting up and reviewing transfer pricing policies 11 (13,14,15) 
Frequency of reviewing transfer pricing policies 11(16) 
Extent of buying production requirement from outside market 11(17,18) 
The extent of using dual accounting books for the purpose of 
financial statement and income tax H (19) 
The extent of relating the reported profit to the subsidiary 
performance 11(20,21) 
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Table 5.2 
Variables Considered for Transfer Pricing Policies * 
I. Maximisation of the group's overall profit 
2. Differentials in income tax rates and income tax legislation among countries 
I Rates of customs duties and customs legislation in Egypt 
4. Anti-dumping and Anti-trust legislation in Egypt 
Compliance with tax and customs regulations of home country 
6. Restrictions imposed by the Egyptian law on the repatriation of profits and capital 
7. Restrictions imposed on the amount of R&D, royalties and other 
overhead costs charged against the subsidiary 
8. Maintenance of adequate cash flow in the subsidiary 
9. The need of the subsidiary to seek local funds 
10. Shifting profits to another subsidiary to cover part of its losses 
11. Level of inflation in Egypt 
12. Multiple exchange rates 
13. Existence of price controls in Egypt 
14. Existence of export subsidies and tax holidays in Egypt 
15. Market conditions and competition in Egypt 
16. Risk of expropriation and nationalisation in Egypt 
17. Existence of local shareholders 
18. Performance evaluation of each subsidiary 
19. Divisional autonomy 
20. Maintenance of good relations with the host government 
,I- The bureaucratic system to deal with Egyptian authorities 
1 1) 
- Ambivalence of regulations in Egypt 
23. Rules and requirements of financial reporting for the subsidiary 
24, Simplicity and ease of application of transfer prices 
25 Others (to be specified) 
st onnaire. and 3 of the company que, 
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Table 5.3 
Survey Source of Investment Information 
Factor 
I. The importance of MNCs to the Egyptian economy 
Factors influencing the company decision to invest in Egypt 
Major obstacles to investment in Egypt 
The crucial factors that influence investments in Egypt 
Information Source 
(Section, Question) 
Sources of subsidiary finance in order to expand investment in Egypt 
Table 5.4 
111 (4) 
111 (5) 
111 (6) 
IfI (7) 
fl 1 (9) 
Survey Source of Transfer Pricing Importance from the Egyptian Authorities Perspective 
Information Source 
Factor 
4 
5 
(Section, Question) 
The extent of legislating transfer prices by the Egyptian government 
The extent of re-computing intra-group transfers arbitrarily by 
customs departments 
The extent of changing net profits by the tax authority 
Testing transfer pricing policies by external auditor 
Requirement of financial reporting regarding the disclosure of 
transfer pricing policies 
IV (1,2) 
VI (3,4,5) 
VI (6,7,8) 
VI (9) 
VI (10) 
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Table 5.5 
Survey Source of Intangible Assets and Allocating Headquarters' Expenditures 
1) 
3 
Factor 
The extent of allocation of loan interest and other funds 
Rates of allocation of loan interest 
Criteria for allocating intangibles assets 
Table 5.6 
Information Source 
(Section, Question) 
V(I) 
V (2) 
V (3,4) 
Survey Source of Questions Directed to General Authority for Investment 
2 
3. 
4 
6 
7 
1) 
Factor 
Factors attracting MNCs to invest in Egypt 
The extent of involving the Egyptian government in determining 
transfer prices for MNCs working in Egypt 
The extent of adopting transfer pricing policies by MNCs to avoid 
restrictions imposed by the host government 
The extent of exaggerating royalties paid by the Egyptian 
subsidiaries to their parent companies 
The disclosure requirements of transfer pricing policies in 
the financial reporting in Egypt 
Restrictions imposed by the Egyptian authorities on transferring 
profits by MNCs 
The economic environment in Egypt and its affect on MNCs to move 
capital funds out of the country 
The importance of MNCs for the Egyptian economy 
Difficulties of collecting required information from MNCs 
Question Number 
3,4,12 
5 
6,7 
8,9 
1,13 
14,15,16,17 
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Table 5.7 
Survey Source of Questions Directed to Tax Authorities 
2. 
3. 
4 
Factor 
Problems that face tax authorities in assessing the taxable income 
of MNCs 
The extent of changing reported profit by MNCs to decrease the 
tax burden 
Scrutinising transfer prices by tax authorities 
Question Number 
Criteria for treating intangible assets when assessing taxable income 
3,4.5 
6 
Table 5.8 
Survey Source of Questions Directed to Customs Officials 
Factor Question Number 
Problems that face customs officials when determining customs 
duties on imports by MNCs in Egypt I 
3. 
4 
5. 
The extent of underinvoicing of imports by MNCs in order to 
lessen customs duties burdens 2,3 
The extent of using guidelines by customs departments to 
describe the arm's-length price 4,5 
The extent of negotiating customs duties with MNCS 6,7,8 
The average of customs duties rate applied on imports 
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5.6 The Case Study as a Research Strategy 
The ten-n "case study" refers to a fairly intensive observation of an indi-,., idual unit 
(rather than the total population) through discussion and observation in order to thro\A- 
some light on any particular set of questions. fn so doing, it describes a situation or a 
sequence of events, leading up to some particular behaviour. The case study method is 
to be contrasted with statistical methods which yield averages and in which departures 
from average in one direction tend to be offset by departures in the opposite direction. 
The key characteristics of case study method are portrayed in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 
Key Characteristics of Case Study Approach 
1. Phenomeonon is examined in a natural setting. 
2. Data are collected by multiple ways. 
3. One or few entities are examined. 
4. Complexity of the entity is studied intensively. 
5. Experimental controls and manipulations are not involved. 
6. Exploration, classification, and hypothesis development are features. 
7. Results depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator. 
8. Changes in site selection and data collection methods may take place during the research. 
9. Vhy' and 'how' questions may be addressed through operational finks traced over time. 
10. Focus is on contemporary events. 
Sourcc: Adapted from Benbasat el al. (1987). 
Commonly, one purpose of the case study technique is to obtain "a better knowledge 
of the significant variables rather than the final testing of a well-formulated theory" 
(Katz, 1965, p. 65). This instrument provides for flexibility in approach, allows scope 
and apparent freedom to the investigator regarding the quantity of data to be 
collected, the procedure adopted in collecting it, and the sources of information to be 
tapped. So, it is preferred in examining contemporary events (Yin, 1987, p. 19). 
The case study approach has greater depth and more intensity compared to other 
methodologies. The reason is that the investigator focuses study on a small scale, That 
is, a single community or a single group according to its social structure. Hence, the 
interrelation and interaction are more obvious and the process of observation is on- 
going. More details and more perspectives will also be available in the case studý, 
(Katz, 1965, p. 58). 
Case studies are useful in exploratory research. Selltiz et al. (19612) designate it as a 
it stimulating insight" maintaining that the intensive case stud), approach 1,, particularly 
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useful in unformulated areas, where it might suggest hypotheses for further research. 
Yin (1987) emphasises the importance of the case study as a research stratelt, -%, in 
the 
field of social sciences. The purpose of the case study here is to explore more 
infon-nation representing real life and to gain a better understanding of the 
relationships between variables. Katz (1965, p. 75) indicated that the main advantage 
of the case study is its "inductive procedure, its potentiality for discovering significant 
variables and basic relations that would never be found if .... research [was] dictated 
by a hypothetical-deductive model". It is well known that case studies have a number 
of strengths and weaknesses. These strengths and weaknesses matters will be 
discussed after determining the validity and reliablity of case-study approach. 
5.6.1 Validity and Reliability of the Field Study 
The Validity of the method of data collection is concerned with the question "Does 
the researcher measure what should be measured ... ? This requires to gather some sort 
of evidence to give confidence that a measuring tool does in fact measure what it 
appears to measure. The reliability refers to the ability of the analysis to reproduce the 
same parameter values from subsequent sets of preference judgement. The validity 
and reliability of this study can be assured as follows: 
The use of different sources of data (interview and questionnaire) is important III 
contributing to the overall data validity and reliability, as is well recognised 
(Mitchell, 1985). Method variance was thereby reduced. 
2) The generalisability, i. e., external validity, of multiple case study data was 
assessed where comparable data on a reference population are also available. 
3) The composition of case narratives also served an important data validation 
function. Storytelling made sense, so to speak. Internal validity was enhanced in 
that gaps and inconsistencies were exposed and subjected to resolution. External 
validity was tested by the believability of the story to the outsider. 
Multiple case studies are not inexpensive to conduct. However, efficiency may be 
achieved where the work is guided by a conceptual framework and set of 
proceudres that focus the data collection effort. 
Access to companies investigated was not so difficult as is sometimes portrayed. 
Privacy and confidential ity must be respected. 
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5.6.2 Strength of the Case Study Approach 
Kerlinger (1973) considers the case study approach is strong in realism, significance, 
strength of vafiables, theory orientation, and heuristic quality. The realism of the case 
study is obvious because it reflects real life. Generally. "the more realistic the 
research situation, the stronger the variables" (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 402). The realism 
similarly increases the external validity, hence generalisation made from the studý' to 
other situations becomes more valid. Heuristic quality is very highly in this field 
because the researcher can use experience and practical efforts to find answers to 
questions or improve the performance. Therefore, this field is "rich in discovery 
potentially" (Kerlinger, 1973, pp. 407-405) 
As the case study has unique merits, the investigator could expect more information. 
The reason being that "people involved in communication activities maintain many 
contacts and often have information which does not appear in their official reports 11 
(Katz, 1965, p. 69). Stake (1981, p. 32) has emphasised that a good case study could 
"provide different and better knowledge /than statistical generalisations by/ providing 
more valid portrayals, better bases for personal understanding of what is going on, 
and solid grounds for considering action". 
It is most likely that some information obtained from various respondents would be 
discrepant, which requires additional exploration. The researcher might find, by extra 
investigations, whether these differences "are a function of idiosyncratic perception 
and experience or a reflection of group membership and role differences" (Katz, 1965, 
p. 70). Advantages of case studies could be dilated as follows: 
I- The case study tends to continue over a period of time, so it is likely to maintain 
continued observation. The usually prolonged involvement of the researcher 
rneans that interconnections of events can be traced over time, so that processes 
can be inferred. This allows the cross-checking of data and findings. 
2- Observation techniques can be employed directly, so it is easy to obtain a 
description of the same sets of data described by interview respondents (Bower, 
1970, p. 28, Gorton and Carr, 1983, p-37). 
The case study technique allows interdependent reactions and mutual perception 
to be obtained from various individuals whose behaviours are interrelated to 
make up the social structure. 
4- Case studies are unique in enabling the researcher to observe events of the study I 
in its natural occurrence. They can also give depth of understanding to survey 
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findings. The researcher can have more rich insights and hypotheses for more 
rigourous expenmentation. 
5- The case studies can furnish the essential information, hence increasinL, the 
chance of the study being more successful. Also, case studies al-IoNA' the 
researcher to utilise a the whole series of methods of data collection (Brymaii, 
1989, p. 172). 
5.6.3 Limitations of the Case Study Approach 
As a technique of research, the case study approach has a number of weakness and 
limitations. Katz (1965); Bloom and Fischer (1982); and Yin (1987) mention some 
aspects that weaken the case study approach. These weakness could be summarised in 
the following points: 
The lack of rigour, because of either the dubiousness of evidence or biased views, 
influence the direction of findings and conclusions. The investigator must take 
these issues into consideration and work hard in order to overcome these 
problems. 
2- Like all exploratory research, findings of a single case study should be seen as 
tentative. However, a number of insights can be gained and hypotheses suggested 
for future research. It is believed that a single case study can not be representative 
of the whole population, although within multiple case studies there is a 
conscious attempt to increase the range of generalisation. It is proposed by many 
writers that findings of any case study could be considered as a part of the 
theoretical framework and a guide for generalising to similar studies in the future 
(Yin, 1987; Zikmund, 1984). Furthermore, case studies should be evaluated in 
terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that are generated (Yin, 1987). 
Some methodologists however are suspicious of generallsation based on 
statistical deduction at a single point in time. Findings based of samples, however 
large, are often stripped on their context when generalised across time and space. 
Cronbach et al. (1980, pp. 231-235) have suggested the term of extrapolation to 
solve the dilemma of general isations. Unlike the usual meaning of the term 
loge neralisation't, an extrapolation obviously signifies that one has gone beyond 
the narrow boundaries of the study to consider other applications for the findings. 
Extrapolations are modest conjectures on the likely applicability of findings to 
other situations under similar, but not identical, conditions. Extrapolations are 
logical, thoughtful, and problem- oriented rather than purely empirical, and 
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probabilistic. Extrapolations are helpful when based on information -rich surnples 
and designs. 
Data collection procedures are not routinised. This means data could not be 
conducted by a researcher assistant. Skills required for collecting case study data 
are much more demanding than in experiments and surveys. In this situation, 
there is a little room for the traditional research assistant. The required skills 
n-ýight be represented in: 
a) The researcher should be able to ask good questions and secure valid and 
reliable answers. Questions should be carefully worded and presented to 
facilitate obtaining answers which give useful information to the objectives 
of the survey (Chisnall, 1986, p. 137). 
b) The researcher must be a good listener to assimilate large amounts of new 
information without bias. 
c) The researcher must be adaptive and flexible, so that newly encountered 
situations could be seen as opportunities, not threats. 
d) The researcher should be unbiased from preconceived notions, including 
those derived from theory. This means that he should be sensitive and 
responsive to contradictory evidences. 
4- Another problem facing the case study approach is the likelihood of the lack of 
co-operation by respondents. This problem is related to the time required for 
investigation. The case study requires much time on the parts of both the 
investigator and the interviewee to obtain the required information. A respondent 
might make excuses not to meet the researcher under the pretence that he is busy 
on important work. The respondent often takes a special interest in the problems 
at issue, he becomes more knowledgeable and more critical and, to that extent, 
less representative. Also, he might change his behaviour as a result of the greater 
awareness produced by repeated questioning. This could have an affect upon the 
research objectives. Nevertheless, successful case studies can make unique 
contributions. 
5- The investigator should indicate the nature of the study and its objectives and 
. ive information interviewees. 
The problem that emerges here is the amount of I 
information that has to be given. This problem is also connected with the time 
allowed for the study. Of course. this obstacle is clear if the study is wide in its 
coverage. 
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To ensure that the interview is effective, the researcher has to ta-ke into 
consideration the following aspects during the interview: 
a) The main objective of the study should be clear to the respondent. 
b) The researcher must work through the specific areas for investigation. 
C) The researcher's third task is to help the respondent once he has begun to 
perceive his problem in a new way, to envisage a constructive approach and 
to be fully acceptable to the respondent. The new approach involves the 
creation of a new attitude in the respondent towards the problem. However, 
the interviewer should remain as neutral as possible and avoid interjecting 
any personal views. 
d) Appropriate questions and behaviour should be used during the interview. 
Here, the questionnaire administration needs to be clearly understood, with 
the application of standard procedures and instructions. The researcher might 
define the main objective of the study and investigate all areas relevant to the 
problem situation. If he is unable to decide what questions are germane and 
accurate and express them in easily understood language to the respondent, 
he will not be able to accomplish his study effectively. 
e) The researcher should be able to deal with the occasional aggressive, 
suspicious or difficult respondent. This requires the researcher to remain 
interested in and enthusiastic about the study even when he faces some 
difficulties. A rapport can be established between researcher and respondent 
to create a good climate. Hence, the researcher must be able to advance the 
cooperation without being coercive, in order to avoid the resentment of the 
respondent (Hoinville et al. 1987, p. 106). 
The observer n-dght pry into different aspects of the study and attempt to gain 
access to records in order to obtain sufficient information. This behaviour might 
be seen unwelcome by the respondents. However, this problem might be 
overcome, depending on the researcher directing the interview. 
In summary, it is only by means of good planning and thorough preparation before a 
case study is carried out, that problems to be faced can be satisfactorily overcome. In 
such a situation, the knowledge in case studies is more concrete, and more contextual 
compared to other methodological techniques. 
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5.6.4 The Choice of Sample for the Field Study 
The present study focuses on practices of MNCs in Egypt to shift profits through 
transfer pricing devices. Hence, four objectives are realised in the study. The first is to 
investigate the current state of transfer pricing practices in MN subsidiaries in Egypt. 
The second is to identify the order of importance (ranking) of factors that affect the 
design of transfer pricing systems. The third is to determine the conflict between the 
company and the revenue collection authorities as regards transfer pricing issue. The 
last is to propose an optimal solution for settling the problem. 
As aforementioned, the empirical investigation undertaken, in this study, involved II 
foreign companies located in Egypt. 3 Multiple in-depth interviews were oenerallv 
with the directors having financial management responsibility, such as the financial 
manager, cost accountant, and financial analyst. Personal interviews were also 
conducted with manufacturing, marketing and planning officers. Standardised 
questionnaires were employed to collect data in order to increase reliability and 
comparability. 
Several interviews were held with interested government agencies to record different 
views on the transfer pricing problem. This group involved officers in the GAR 
Customs Departments, Tax Administration. An interview also took place with officers 
from an Auditing firm. 
Companies were chosen from four industries, pharmaceutical (4), chemical products 
(3), engineering and metal products (3), and textiles (1). These sectors were chosen 
because they have several common characteristics. There is a high degree of 
commitment to foreign operations in Egypt. They depend on parent companies for 
importing production requirements, i. e., the percentage of inward transfers is 
significant, especially for the first three sectors. These characteristics are important 
because the study was to determine the extent of transfer pricing and profit shifting in 
MNCs. 
Meanwhile, these companies are categorised, according to the legal system, into three 
groups: three companies working under company law (Lax 159 of 1981 which it 
replaced Law 26 of 1954), seven joint venture companies according to Investment 
Law 230 of 1989 which replaced La", 43 of 1974, and one foreign wholly-owned 
conipany working under the latter law. Table 5.10 furnishes a break-down of these 4ý 
3 The case %iudý- approach can he conducted on one companý. Some advantages can tv gained I rýlw multiple ai,, c-siudy 
approaches. -niese nients include increasHig the confidence in the generahsation of the rewlts, especially 1, )r MN tran, ter 
pricing topic that is too complex. Likoýkise, comparisons. through multiple case studies, allow the special features ,t cases to 
be identified much more readik, . 
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companies by country of origin and industrial branch. The interview pursued the same 
general questions, in a flexible style that permitted the inclusion of interesting Zý 
experiences, and were conducted by one or two of the participants in this study. 
The companies were selected from two sources: (1) a guide (The Situation ol 
Economic Opening in Arab Republic of Egypt, 1988) prepared by the Central Agency 
for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMS) in Egypt, and (2) an "Ini, esror', ý 
Guide, 1985", published by the GAFI. Some criteria have been taken into account in 
selecting the sample: 
The researcher intended to focus the field study on the petroleum and 
pharmaceutical industries. The initial list of company names included 4 joint 
venture companies and a further 5 foreign concession companies in the petroleum 
sector. The researcher had interviews with managers of four companies besides 
an interview with a financial manager of the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Authority (EGPA) which controls all oil activities in Egypt. After discussion, the 
petroleum sector was excluded from the field study. The reason for this is the 
agreements between the national partners (public sector) or the government 
represented in EGPA, and the foreign investors based on prod uction- sh arin g 
schemes. Under this system, Egypt represented by the EGPA does not bear any 
initial risks or costs of exploration, or any at all if no oil is found. The foreign 
investor recovers all costs and expenses in respect of all exploration, 
development and related operations under the agreement, to the extent of 4017c of 
all crude oil produced. Such crude oil is referred to as "cost recovery crude oil". 
The remaining quantity 60% of the crude oil is shared between the national side 
and foreign investors. In the production- sharing system, payments of royalties are 
generally included in the government share of production. According to the 
agreement, the government is entitled to 10% royalties on the total quantity of 
the petroleum produced. 
Therefore, MNCs do not set transfer prices for the transactions with the parent or 
any part of the group. But the question emerges: What is the price that should be 
used bY the company when it pays income taxes to the Egyptian tax authorities 2 
To answer this question, it should be noticed that Egypt adopts a flexible pricing 
policy according to the international prices. So, this price is used when the N-1NC 
pays taxes. 
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2- The researcher had to prepare another list and got the approval from the GAPMS. 
He intended the sample to represent the four industries mentioned earlier, 
especially the list included 20 companies, where 9 of them refused to participate 
in the research. 
3- Among the firms participating in the study, 45.5% were U. S. nationality. This is 
due to the fact that the U. S. is considered the hub of MNCs' activity to the extent 
that the words American and MNC became synonymous especially in 1960s and 
1970s. The size of U. S. investments in Egypt is considerable4, despite its 
fluctuation, compared to other countries. Table 5.11 depicts the amount of 
investments, income and capital outflows by U. S. companies in Egypt till 1989. 
The nationality of the other companies participating in the study was 45.5"-/(- 
European MNCs and 9% Japanese MNCs. 
Table 5.11 
U. S. Direct Investment in Egypt ($ millions) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Direct Investments 1,926 1,807 1,669 1,670 1,802 
Income 494 85 219 208 315 
Capital Outflows 378 -113 -150 -86 77 
f Current Business, vol. 70 (8), 1990. Source: U. S. Direct Investment Abroad. Sun, eý, o 
5.6.5 Obstacles of Carrying out the Field Study 
The field work took three months during the period of the beginning of December 
1989 till the end of February 1990. In the course of the fieldwork, some difficulties 
were encountered, The field work required obtaining two approvals from Egyptian 
authorities before (,, oing there. After contacting the Egyptian Cultural Bureau in 
London, a copy of questionnaires was sent by them to the Mission Department in 
Cýdro in May 1989. The first approval, from the Security Department of the %, linistry 
of Education, was not difficult to obtain before going to Egypt. The other approval 
The lar, 2e size of US i nvestments was concentrated in the petroleum sector, as it totalled S 1,447 million in 1989. 
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was from the CAPMS in Egypt. The procedure of getting this approval was loncy and 
complicated. It took nearly seven months and even required personal contact. 
Two copies of questionnaires (Arabic versions) and a list of company names were 
presented to the CAPMS. After getting the approval, the researcher had to get a letter 
from the Mission Department, the Ministry of Education directed these to each 
company involved in the study. Hence, the letter and a copy of the approval of the 
CAPMS Were presented to each company. 
The availability, proximity and willingness of companies to participate was found to 
be substantial. As the case study methodology required the co-operation of these 
companies, therefore a willingness to participate was an essential element for the 
successful completion of this study. The researcher contacted each company by 
telephone to have the first appointment with the company representative. 
Given the possibility of non-response, nine companies indicated unwillingness to 
participate in the survey, either because of the information confidentiality from their 
point of view or because of the corporate policies against such reporting. These 
companies cover three sectors: Engineering (4), Chemicals (3), and Textiles and 
Clothing (2). More efforts were made with these companies to encourage their 
cooperation, but these efforts did not produce any positive response. Hence, they 
inclined to provide this type of information. 
A financial manager of a MN subsidiary that produce photocopying equipments 
pointed out that the information requested is confidential. He said: 
"This issue is very confidential, and I am reluctant to discuss it with you. " 
Another manager of a company that produces dry batteries commented that the policy 
of the headquarters in the U. S. is not to give any information to researchers. It was 
known that the parent company stipulated that the Egyptian government did not 
establish other projects producing the same product for 5 years. Moreover the parent 
company exported finished goods to market them in Egypt for two Years before 
constituting the joint venture company, as a way to study the Egyptian market. 
Another manager of a computer corporation emphasised that he has to get an approval 
from the U. S. parent company before participating in the project which is difficult. He 
said: 
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"We do not give information to any researcher without an approval. from the parent 
company in the U. S. / doubt they will agree to participate in this work. " 
The same unwillingness was from a U. S. auto company. Despite two appointments 
with the financial manager to discuss the issue, the Vice Chairman (French) did not 
agree because of the confidentiality of transfer pricing aspects. 
Another company declared that the year-end closing (here officials were engaged in 
preparing annual financial statements) precluded its participation in the study. 
Despite these problems, it was possible in the end to collect data for the case study 
which may give some indications about abusing the transfer pricing by MNCs to 
coincide with their interests, hence meagre or even negative net flow for Egý, pt as a 
host country. 
Some of the required data was difficult to obtain from the surveyed companies or the 
Egyptian authorities concerned. Such data included the cost of production, value 
added in Egypt, cost of intra-company exchanges and so forth. 
5.7 Data Collection Sources 
As mentioned earlier, the data required for this research was collected from three 
groups: MN subsidiaries, government officials, and an auditing firm. Questionnaires 
were designed to collect the data and were administered to respondents during the 
interviews conducted in Egypt (beginning of December 1989 - end of February 1990). 
This section provides a description of these groups, and the number and position of 
persons frorn each group participated in the research. 
5.7.1 Population and Sample of MNCs 
For the purpose of this research a MNC is defined as a manufacturing company 
operating under Egypt's Foreign Investment Code and wholly or partially owned by 
f'oreign investors. The data for the survey were obtained through case-study approach 
of II MNCs in Egypt. The researcher chose these companies that are likely to give an 
access to the somewhat extnesive volume of information contained in the survey. 
Names of these companies have been orriitted because of the sensitive and 
confidential nature of the information. Hence, disguised names A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, 
and K will be referred to companies participating in the study. The names of Manager 
interviewed also are anonymous. 
It should be noticed that the empirical investigation might be seen as a preliminary 
test not yielding conclusive evidence but aiding the identification of the motives of 
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transfer pricing manoeuvres by MNCs in Egypt. As this has not been investigated in 
this country previously, some further explanation will be demanded. 
Professional contacts with the general manager were used in each company to 
develop a short list of candidates for participation. Data gleaned thTouoh in-depth 
interviews with executive officers in the financial departments and other functional 
departments at the subsidiaries were of the utmost significant for the case reports and 
the data analysis and interpretation. The interviews were based on structured 
questionnaires. The interviews have been begun with a pre-arranged sequence of serni 
open-ended questions, then continued with more and more structure as the knowledge 
about specific characteristics of the investigated companies gradually increased. 
Table 5.12 lists the companies and number of persons interviewed, according to 
function. The number of persons interviewed varied between 2 and 8 with mean of 6. 
A total of 63 managers were interviewed during the period. The number of visits at 
each company ranged from two to five. The interviews lasted from one hour to three 
hours. 
As shown in Table 5.12, interviews were held with company executives because of 
the confidentiality and sensitivity of the transfer pricing issue. The letter from the 
Mission Department, Ministry of Education and the letter attached to the 
questionnaire were directed to the financial executive in each company. The financial 
executive identified the executive identity to be interviewed. Financial managers in 
two companies authorised one of their assistants to deal with the researcher. Financial 
executives' opinion were to hold interviews with senior executives for some reasons: 
I- They have more knowledge and are involved with transfer pricing aspect more 
than low level staff. 
The confidentiality and sensitivity of the transfer pricing issue. Therefore, senior 
managers are often reluctant to reveal any information which is likely to cause 
problems to the company. 
All interviews were held on a completely confidential basis, with neither the 
interviewees nor their firms being identified in any way. 
A tape recorder was carried with the researcher during the interviews. All 
interviewees conditioned not to use it during the interviews because of the sensitive 
nature of transfer pricing topic. They stated that they can talk freely without 
recording. Therefore, writing-up was the only means to record the Interview with 
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respondents. It should be noticed that it was impossible to obtain any document 
relating to intra-company transactions. 
Some managers preferred to fil-l the questionnaire by themselves and they kept a copy 
after completing it. Others preferred to talk freely whilst the questionnaire was filled 
in by the researcher. 
Despite foreign investors prefer to have their business run by Egyptian managers, it 
has been realised some positions were run by foreigner. 5The reason for preference 
the Egyptian manager seems to be that he is useful for the administration of the firm 
with regard to national business and commercial rules and regulations. Consequently, 
the questionnaire was prepared both in Arabic and English languages in order to 
overcome problems for both local and foreign co-operators. All interviews also were 
conducted in Arabic except one as the financial manager was not Egyptian. Hence. 
the interview was administered in English, and the English copy of the questionnaire 
was used. 
Besides using the questionnaire to glean information, additional notes were recorded 
using writing up as mentioned above. As the knowledge about transfer pricing 
techniques increased from the practical viewpoint, it was possible to test tentative 
hypotheses. The approach used was very similar to the to the approach used by 
Walton (1983, pp. 30-3 1): 
In the field, I try to develop rich description of the situation. I search for comparative 
data between organizations or between different time periods in the same 
organization. During the early stages of making sense out of the data, I rely primarily 
on inductive processes. I immerse myself in the data, let it soak, and then gradually 
organize it, searching for themes, contrasts, and causal relationships among aspects 
of the situation studied. 
This approach does not lend itself to structured interviews, since it is designed to 
identify the relevant variables and suggest hypotheses about relationships between 
them, rather than to test hypotheses that have already been formulated. As the 
multiple case-study approach is used to glean infon-nation, the companies investik., ated 
will be discussed case-by-case. 
Generally, many of the respondents declared that when the parent company sets 
transfer prices it takes into consideration what suits the organisation to sho\N. its 
profits, and how the prices of transactions would contribute to the group profits, rather 
than from calculations based on market prices. The respondents doubtless intended to 
Top management and technical posts were to a large extent occupied by kweigners, at least from the home company country. 
a consequence, in 10 out of the II companies, the manazi ng director was nominated by the t oreign irv, e stor. 
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argue that arm's-length pricing was not available, as is so often the case. or perhaps 
irrelevant; but the effect of such contention is simply to establish that pricing methods 
do shift profits- and by design. 
Table 5.12 
Summary of Data Collection Effort 
Number of Interviews 
Company General Financial Other Total Number of 
Managers Managers Managers* Visits 
A 
Total 8 43 12 63 37 
* Primarily in manufacturing, marketing and planning. 
The greater centralisation of the internal control of MNCs has clearly reinforced such 
tendencies, It is well known that this tendency has gone much further among 
American MNCs, than among European ones. When MN subsidiaries are largely 
autonomous, transfer pricing which would reduce the subsidiary's declared profit in 
favour of another part of the group is apt to be resisted by local management. 
Centralisation impairs such resistance, and when profit plans are drawn up on a 
I ý(-) 
divisional basis, transfer prices are less likely to allow for the susceptibilities of local 
management. 
Generally speaking, there was little evidence of deliberate, large deviations from 
arm's-length pricing, but arm's length prices tended not to enter into the calculations. 
5.7.2 Population and Sample of GAFI's Officers 
During the field work, an initial meeting was held with the staff of both the Research 
and Information and the Administrative Affairs divisions of the GAR. The meeting L- 
was aimed at: 
I- specifying the main functions undertaken by each section within the structure of 
the GAR and 
2- identifying the name and position of the people responsible for carrying out these 
functions. 
This helped in specifying those people with whom the subject could be discussed and 
from whom the required data might be collected. 
Officers were interviewed from different divisions as follows: 
- Members of the GAR's Board of Directors. 
- Industrial projects division. 
- Follow up and Auditing division. 
- Agricultural and Construction projects division. 
- Investors Relation division 
- Promotion division 
- Legal Affairs division 
- Research and Information division 
The main function of the first three divisions is to evaluate foreign manufacturing 
investment proposals, follow up their actual operations, and submit recommendations 
to the Board of Directors. 'Merefore, it was decided to meet as many of the Board 
members and the officers working at these divisions as possible. 
Although the last four divisions are not involved directly in investment decision- 
making they were expected to provide valuable information for the research. The 
Investors Relation, and Promotion divisions were expected to provide information 
about the rn *or problems facing foreign investors, and the factors thei ýkj L- ir 
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decision to invest in Egypt. The Legal Affairs division was expected to provide 
information about the legal conditions within which foreign investments take place "I 
Egypt. Finally, the Research and Information division was expected to provide some 
quantitative data which might help in supporting the research's results and findings. 
Table 5.13 shows the number and position of the GAR officers who participated in 
the research. 
Regarding Tax Departments and Customs Departments, the researcher interviewed 19 
people in the former, and 16 in the latter. In the accounting firm, 2 people were 
interviewed and gave information relating to the study. 
5.8 Why Focusing on Pharmaceutical Companies? 
The phan-naceutical sector is one of the most heavily represented by MNCs in both 
developed and developing countries. These companies dominate approximately 50 to 
60% of the world production (IRM, 1985). 
This sector is one of the most successful industrial sectors in Egypt. Investment in the 
drug industry was one of the main objectives of the first plan for industrialisation in 
Egypt in 1957. In fact, the industry has relied on FDI in a prior stage of opening 
policy in Egypt. Hence, by 1958 the Egyptian Higher Organisation for Drugs strived 
to encourage foreign companies to enter into license agreements with local investors 
to set up subsidiaries in Egypt. 
As a consequence, four drug MNCs commenced their activities in Egypt in the 
forefront early in the 1960s after long negotiations with the government over the 
extent of ownership. The agreement was reached giving those companies 60% of 
share capital, and hence effective control of the joint venture. Domestic 
pharmaceutical companies also held numerous licence agreements with international 
firrns for the acquisition of technology and know-how. 
In fact, MNCs which have been aware of the implications of a developing country Is 
decision to put restrictions on imports and have accepted to take the risk in setting up 
operations inside Egypt are now reaping the advantages. These are represented in 
great opportunities in terms of substantial increases in sales as well as the benefits of a 
secure and stable market for which production programmes can be well planned in 
advance and safely executed. As regards the Egyptian market for pharmaceutical 
MNCs, it has held many attractions because the population is relati%ýely large (about 
57 million people in 1991) and partly because of the ease to get any kind of medicines 
without a prescription. The pharmaceutical sector has been chosen for four reasons: 
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The pharmaceutical industry, as m. -Intioned above, represents a major set of 
industries in which Egypt is host to inward FDI. Six foreign joint venture 
companies and one wholly-owned subsidiary play a significant role iri the 
production of medicineS. 6 Those companies accounted for 46.717c of the total 
number of drug companies in 1986 with total sales fE186.6 million (35%). Table 
5.14 outlines some facts of the Foreign companies compared to national ones. 
2- Because the most over-pricing was found in this industry. 7 Pharmaceutical 
companies inflate prices of components sent to their subsidiaries in order to gain 
more benefits at the expense of other parties. It is also possible that due to 
monopoly rights which will be discussed below, potential profits of foreign 
subsidiaries are high as compared to the local companieS. 8 Subsidiaries therefore 
feel compelled to reduce the book value of its profits by reporting high costs. 
In this matter, all pharmaceutical subsidiaries in Egypt buy their requirements of 
effective materials from the parent company or any subsidiary in the group at 
exaggerative prices (Issa, 1987, p. 274). Overpricing of raw materials can be 
observed by comparing the percentage of raw materials imported in both foreign 
and national companies in Egypt. The percentage in the former ranges between 
60% and 90%, whereas in the latter was 48.3% (GOD, 1987, pp. 45-52). 
It has been realised during an informal interview with officials in the GAR that 
pharmaceuticals companies stipulated some restrictive conditions in their 
agreements. These conditions stipulated that intermediate products must be 
purchased from within the parent company group. Companies argued that the 
importation from that source guarantees obtaining raw materials easily and with 
high quality control. The Code of Foreign Investment agreed to this, in return 
companies provide enough information about import transactions to the GAR. 
In fact, it is difficult for the GAR to compare transfer prices with competitive 
prices, especially as the number of patented names and kinds of chemicals and 
raw materials exceed 22000. So, the control over transfer pricing is very limited 
by the GAFI. 
Some leading MNCs have been set up after carrýing out the case study, e. g., Glaxo 
n 7 As dotailed in Chapter 3. most evidence comes from pharmaceutical industr-, in developino count es. For instance, Vaitsos 
(1974) found that in the Columbian industry. income flows was a major motive for overpricing intra-company transactions. 
It is generaBy the case that the prices of subsidiary products are afl higher thail their domestical]v produced equivalents. 
S it s not wi-pri'strig to fmd f ()reign subs diaries ak hieve particularly the former brands are general-IN, accepted as superior. So, ii 
high profits. 
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Table 5.14 
Foreign and National Pharmaceutical Companies in Egypt up to 1986 
Project Ist Year of 
Production 
Number of 
Employees 
Capital 
EE. M 
Sales 
kE. M 
Public Sector 
Misr 1937 2320 14.2 42.5 
Memphis 1940 1900 13.1 36.5 
CID 1950 3000 15.2 57.3 
Alexandria 1963 782 8.0 29.7 
Nile 1963 2800 15.9 63.5 
EI-Kahira 1963 2050 15.7 51.7 
El-Nasr 1964 2097 13.0 43.5 
16492 100.9 347.3 
Private Sector 
Hoechst-Orient 1962 502 5.7 45.1 
Pfizer-Misr 1962 466 8.2 27.3 
Swiss Pharma 1965 497 10.5 63.2 
Squibb Egypt* 1979 316 17.0 40.8 
lbico 1986 221 9.5 10.2 
ABI 1987 95 6.7 - 
Farco 1987 105 5.4 - 
2202 63.0 186.6 
Total 18694 163.9 533.9 
The parent company has merged with Bristol-Myers company in 1990. The latter had 
a scientific bureau in Egypt for marketing its pharmaceutical products. Hence. after 
this merger the n, -une of the subsidiary became Bristol-Myers Squibb Egypt. 
Source., The Gene ", Organisation of Drugs 
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Hndoussa (1974), in her research on the pharmaceutical industry in EL, ý'pt. 
pointed out that a subsidiary used transfer pricing mechanisms so that the 
difference between the local value paid by the subsidiary and the arms-length 
price of imported inputs exceeded the value of royalties and profit repatriated to 
the parent company in the same year (1965). 9 These practices happened In spite 
of the existence of a central agency to monitor imports of drugs and their 
manufacturing requirements. Unfortunately, there is no role for the government 
to control transfer prices and compare them with competitive international price,,,. 
The overcharging on payments for royalties, technical know-how, overhead 
allocations, commission fees by foreign subsidiaries to their parents are likel-N, to 
be used as an alternative device to shift profits outside the country. Patent co-ver 
is an important source of monopoly profits in pharmaceutical industry. Although 
the percentage of royalties is not high'O (the maximum limit is 511k by law), some 
companies obtain these payments for a long period, even after the production 
know-how becomes expired. 
4- With regard to commission fees, the agreements between subsidiaries and parent 
companies always include the payment of such fees for the Purchase and 
installation of machinery (which often originates from the parent company). But 
the more crucial, continuous and questionable payments which is included in 
most agreements between Egyptian companies and MNCs is the allocation of a 
fixed percentage of the sales of licensed products towards the advertising 
expenses of the publicity office of the parent company in Egypt, payable in local 
currency. 
Moreover, with regards to production, it has become painfully apparent that 
MNCs are far better able to ride the crisis than national companies. Hence the 
structure of local markets is changing in favour of greater MNC shares in most 
places. 
5.8.1 Royalty Payments in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Proprietary technology and trademarks are major determinants of the success of the 
pharmaceutical industry, and the strategy of companies is to maintain close control 
over technology, as well as over marketing variables having to do with quality and 
reputation (especially among the medical profession) such as brand narne, image, 
sales force recruitment, training. and relations with government health authorities. 
The oveqiricing amounted 159% of competim e prices. For more detail-, see Handoussa (1974, pp. 116-118). 
10 The percentage of royalties on modem dru,,.,, in sonie countries might equal 2tY/-, or more. Nainhardt, 1()7 1) 
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This sector is one of the most active fields for licensing in Egypt. It should be noted 
that most of products are manufactured under licences of the parent's kno%\ -ho,. \. 
Licensing contracts are concluded between a MNC and its subsidiary which 
implements the contract, under general principles laid down by the supervisory 
organisation. These principles stipulate a maximum royalty of 517c payable on net 
factory price, for a period of five to ten years. In addition, the licensor may demand 
payment for various technical assistance services it provides, so long as the amounts 
are within the range in effect in similar cases. 
5.8.2 R&D in Pharmaceutical Companies 
An interesting facet of the pharmaceutical industry is that accounting profit rates are 
higher than the average for all manufacturing industries. In some years the rate was 
double of the average because of increasing R&D. The sector is also unusual in 
having the lowest proportion of purchase as a percentage of turnover. Moreover, 
pharmaceutical MNCs gain royalties in return for giving licences and selling know- 4-- 
how to national companies. 
There is no doubt that the pharmaceuticals industry is highly research- intensive. The 
cost of R&D is very high compared to other industries, as it is a fundamental 
characteristic of the drug industry. Drug companies spend an average 8-121-/c of their 
turnover in R&D with some going as high as 15% (IRM, 1985, p. 14). It is noticed that 
R&D is usually centralised activity in the home country. This is due to the dramatic 
increase of the cost of innovation. It is estimated that funding and developing a new 
drug cost approximately $100 n-ffllion (IRM, 1985, p. 4). The related question to this 
study is should the prices of drugs produced in Egypt among developing counties 
include contribution towards the R&D outlays of the MNC group (even though R&D 
is undertaken in the home country). There is an argument that R&D costs are not 
applicable to foreign subsidia-fies just because the product was primarily developed 
for the domestic market. Again, this is a question of an equitable distribution of costs 
and the allotment of corporate resources. Some MNCs that conduct R&D abroad have 
formed R&D pool accounts, and the world-wide cost of R&D is spread over all sales 
by all subsidiaries on the basis of sales volume by product. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has been devoted to discussing and presenting the main elements of the 
research method, in an effort to shed light on the eleven MNCs participating in this 
study. A case study approach was followed and a questionnaire was used for 
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collecting data. Data from government authorities including GAR tax departments, 
and customs officials. 
Pros and cons of the case study approach have been presented. A major problem for 
the case study approach is the accusation of limited generalisation. It is not difficult to 
overcome this problem, since the purpose of case studies is to generate or test a 
theory, not represent a wider population. Although, using multiple case studies can 
enhance the degree of generalisation. 
The result of the data collection process was a dossier of materials: completed 
questionnaires; organisational documents; and interview notes. 
Chapter 6 
Research Findings 1: Case Study Analyses 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has focused on variables that affect MN transfer pricing strategies. This 
chapter is devoted to analysing the case studies which involve II MNCs undertaking 
their activities in Egypt. The findings of the field research will be presented \N'hich 
have bearing upon the projected argument. Each company involved in the field studý' 
will be discussed separately. 
It is necessary to mention that the empirical study depends on different means for 
collecting required information from investigated companies. These tools include in- 
depth/free interview, questionnaire and direct observation as well as using 
information and statistics from other sources. 
Several issues will be discussed in each case study. The first part of the case study 
defines the company and discusses the important sources of data, the ownership and 
capital structure, intra-company trade, annual sales, and so on. The second part 
documents transfer pricing strategies used by the company. The third part examines 
factors that affect transfer prices. The study will extend to cover other issues such as 
technology transfer, how intangibles are allocated, performance evaluation, and so 
forth. The fourth part will provide additional information on the motives and 
obstacles of investment in Egypt. 
Chapters 7 and 8 will continue the analysis where necessary to further the plan. 
6.2 Company A 
6.2.1 Facts About the Company 
Company A was established in 1962 and commenced manufacturing in 1965. The 
share capital whereas subsidiary is a consortium. three Swiss MNCs own 60% of the , 
local private sector and individuals own the rest. The registered capital was Ef 11.2 
million and it has been duplicated in 1990. With 570 employees, the Company 
produced more than 100 items of pharmaceuticals and sold them locally In 1989. The 
volume of production and sales was EE92 million which covers 12.2% of the local 
market. 
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For the production, high quality-control standards are applied in the company. 
Generally raw materials in pharmaceutical companies are divided into two kinds. 
called effective materials and auxiliai-y materials like bottles used to fill medicines. It 
has been found in all drug companies that effective materials are supplied through the 
parent company or any part of the MNC if it is not produced locally. For company A. 
the effective materials represent 8517c of imports from parent companies. 
The herald financial results of foreign drug companies in Egypt showed net losses 
since 1986. These losses are due to the increasing costs of raw materials. especially 
those of basic ingredients. Wages and energy costs have been rising as well. 
Pharmaceutical companies argue that the principal reason for losses is due to the price 
controls implemented by the Egyptian authorities', and at the same time costs of 
production have risen. 
It is not surprising since the public interest aims at protecting the consumer and keep 
the supply of medicines at reasonable prices. Of course, consumer protection limits 
the manager's freedom to control his marketing decision variables. However, prices of 
medicines have been increased sharply during 1990 and 1991. The continuous 
increase in prices of medicines will help companies to improve their operating rates 
and consequently enjoy higher profitability. 
Losses could also be due to the higher rates of inflation and domestic currency 
fluctuations in Egypt. Moreover, profit/loss margins may differ because of various 
intra-company payments, such as management charges for services performed by the 
parent company and royalties. However, differences in profit/loss margins which r-I 
persist over long periods are consistent with the use of "profit shifting" transfer 
pricing. 
6.2.2 Technology Transfer 
Pharmaceutical companies, often, acquire the technology from their parents. A 
contract for know-how is signed between the parent company and the subsidiary. The 
common rate and duration of royalties are: 517c of net turnover for the first ten years, 
3% for the next five years, and 217c for the last five years. 
Generally speaking, royalty payments represent a heavy burden on pharmaceutical 
subsidiaries. In Company A, the amount of royalties paid to parent companies for the 
Since 1970 nearly all drug companies in the world suffered from declining profitability. This is due io the fact that costs have 
risen faster than pri ceý, and %uggested profit margins. Therc are regulations in most countries either developed or de-ý' eloping 
countries extending to prices and margin of drugs. For more details, see RIM (1985) pp. 21-32. 
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period of 1966 until 1979 amounted 366% of the issued capital. The amount in 1979 
only was Ef464,438 which represents 148% of the subsidiary capital. 
Likewise, all pharmaceutical companies in Egypt establish a scientific office to be 
responsible for the promotion of medicines. These offices get fees from the subsidiary 
which represent significant amounts. For instance, Company A paid Efl. 346,000 in 
1979 to its scientific office. But whatever the role of scientific offices, they are, in 
fact, a legal way to shift funds outside the country. Table 6.1 summarizes facts about 
the amounts of royalties and fees paid by the Company A. The inflated rate of 
royalties and fees leave no room for doubt that the cost of technology is a source for 
the repatriation of profits from Egypt to abroad. 
Table 6.1 
Value and Percentage of Royalties and Fees Paid for the Period 1966-79 
(Amounts in Ef) 
Capital in 1967-68 
Sales 1966-79 
Royalties paid 1966-79 
Fees paid to the Scientific Office 
Percentage of royalties and fees to sales 
Percentage ofToyalties and fees to capital 
(Annual Average) 
Sow-ce: Case study survey and calculated by the author. 
6.2.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
Amount and Rate 
313,000 
77,360,354 
1,146,643 
8,146,643 
12 I-1c 
216.6% 
The determination of transfer pricing strategies is the responsibility of the parent 
company. Usually transfer prices are calculated according to a standard variable cost- 
plus formula, including production costs, marketing costs, and profit. Although 
pharmaceutical MNCs accept the principle that transfer prices '. "hould be at arm'ý., -, 
length basis, they argue that arm's length prices must entirely cover R&D and other 
costs which should be spread over the whole product range, and not historically 
identified on a product-by -product basis. As Might be expected, this can bring them 
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into conflict with government authorities. e. g.. customs and tax authorities RRM. 
1985, p. 30). 
6.2.4 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
One of the most important factors in recent years which has had an impact on transfer 
pricing is the exchange rate fluctuation. Very large swings have taken place, in 
particular in the value of US dollar against the Egyptian pound. 
"When the company confronts environmental obstacles it should be vigilant to lakc 
them into account when transfer pricing isformulated. " 
The vice president of the company feels that this policy is valid for all companies 
practicing their activities under uncertainty conditions. 
6.2.5 Motives for Investment in Egypt 
The enormous local market and satisfying the high demand for pharmaceuticals in the 
Egyptian market were main factors leading to investment in Egypt. Most of the 
company's production is absorbed by the domestic market. During the interview with 
the executive manager of marketing division, he quoted: 
"Egypt has an enormous market that grows at an increasing rate with developed and 
varied requirements. We want to see our various products in the top quadrille of 
market shares, if the market share is too low the company will be whipsawed by the 
competition ". 
The availabi-lity of a highly productive labour force constituted a strong reason for 
investing in Egypt, especially as the level of wages is reasonable compared to other 
countries. 
6.2.6 The obstacles to Investment in Egypt 
On the other hand, Interviewees were asked to point out problems that affect the 
climate for investment in Egypt. A list of the most common problems was prepared in 
advance to help interviewees. In all interviews this list was shown at a later time so 
that the interviewee would not be limited by problems mentioned in the list. 
For Company A, four type of problems were identified: 
I- Economic instability, as it affects profit margins. 
2- Price ceilings by the government have a direct effect on the profitability of the 
company. And sometimes the final price does not cover even direct costs of the 
product. 
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The difficulty of obtaining the required foreign exchange from the banks to pay 
imports, because of its shortage. The company had to get a part of the foreign 
exchange from the black market. 
4- The bureaucratic and formal procedures when dealing with government 
authorities might affect the production plan. 
6.2.7 Allocation of Intangible Assets and General Services Fees 
Generally speaking, all companies investigated in the study emphasised that 
administrative and management service fees rendered by the parent company are 
charged on an actual basis. On the other hand, parent companies do not charge them 
for interest on excess cash supplied. However, if they obtained loans from the parent 
company or any part of the MN family, the interest rate is determined according to the 
market. As indicated during the interviews, all companies usually depend, for 
borrowing, on local sources. 
With regard to R&D costs, the two parent companies allocate them on a world-wide 
basis, so they are added as a given percentage to the cost of imports by Company A. 
Transportation costs and technical assistance fees are charged at actual basis. It has 
been found that royalties are charged as a percentage of production for a period of 
twenty years as follows: 5% for 10 years, Yk for 5 years, and 2% for other 5 years. 
With regard to the tax authorities, these ratios are acceptable as there is an agreement 
between the subsidiary and the parent company. However, from the tax authorities' 
view, the period of charging royalties is too long and it could be a way to minimise 
the taxable income. 
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6.3 Company B 
6.3.1 Company Background 
Company B was founded in Egypt in 1961 as a joint venture subsidiary for a West 
German MNC and started production in the following year. The parent company has 
60% of equity while the rest is owned by individuals and private sector. Company B 
is specified in producing drugs (69%) and chemicals (31%). The annual sales (local 
market) amounted Ef, 93 million in 1989. By the end of that year the company had 850 
employees. Its issued capital is EE5.7 million. 
Generally speaking, the MNC is the largest company in terms of world drug sales 
(IRM, 1985, p. 2). The financial manager stated that although the MNC had 
opportunities to set up plants in Mexico or Argentina, where it could obtain much 
more favourable terms as compared to Egypt at the time (1958). The choice of Egypt 
was based on the awareness that the opportunity might not be available for long. 
The policy of the company, as revealed by one of the top managers, often coincides 
exactly with the country in which it is doing business. This means the company 
prefers to minimise any conflict with the Egyptian government and be a good 
corporate citizen. 
As far the company is dependent on the parent company for supplying the effective 
materials, the amount of intra-company purchases has amounted to 60% of inputs in 
1989. 
6.3.2 Performance Evaluation and Management Reporting 
The parent company designed an evaluation system tailored to the company's goals, 
organisational structure, products and markets. Each subsidiary prepares regular 
management reports to be presented to the headquarters' controller. These reports are 
oriented heavily toward products and performance of the subsidiary. It also examines 
financial issues such as cash flows, assets, receivables, inventories, and capital 
purchases on a quarterly basis. 
On a monthly basis, reports of production and sales quantity and value are sent to the 
headquarters. Some other items are also sent such as cost of sales, and selling 
expenses. All statements are translated into the home-currency through a monthly 
accounting rate. It should be noted that exchange gains and losses are considered to be 
the responsibility of the parent company treasury and not of the subsidiary. 
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The headquarters' top management examines these reports regularly to measure the 
performance of each subsidiary. The parent company believes in manai! ement bY 
objectives; operations managers list their objectives at the beginnin--(, of each vear, 
both financial and other, such as staff development and maintenance of good relations 
with the host government. In fact, the financial performance is the most significant 
factor in making an evaluation, but the company feels that other, more subjectiVes 
elements, such as staff training, leadership abilities, appearing as a goods citizen and 
maintaining a safe working environment, must be considered. 
6.3.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The basic policy relating to establishing and reviewing transfer pricing policies is 
determined at the top executive level of the parent headquarters, but it is the pricing 
department that has full world-wide responsibility for implementing company pricing 
policy. 
The standard variable cost plus a margin method, is frequently used for intra-company 
pricing. On the other hand, while tax regulations are recognised as a basic parameter 
in determining transfer pricing strategy, the company finds that certain competitive 
factors play inevitably a very crucial role. For example, several of Company B's rivals 
are themselves MNCs who coordinate pricing and sourcing on a world-wide basis and 
every company likes to take the lion's share in the market. Therefore, transfer prices 
must be consistent with current market conditions. 
6.3.4 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
In determining a suitable transfer prices, one of the basic considerations must be the 
spread between the final sales price to the customer and the costs incurred by the 
company. In certain circumstances, pharmaceutical companies have taken losses to 
penetrate a market that has a long-range profit potential. The theory is that the losses 
are an investment in the future of the market, and that they are a necessary cost of 
tI uture business. 
In working forward, from costs plus an acceptable margin to a transfer price, there is 
the danger that the product will then be priced out of the market. Company B, 
therefore. examines this factor in setting the price. 
Like other companies, company B had been affected by the acceleration of the high 
rate of inflation and government price controls. 
17/4 
6.3.5 Difficulties Encountered 
The company faces government regulation over the final prices of medicines . Other 
problems had risen from the inflationary situation which had made it hard for the 
company to depend on borrowing locally. Interest rates had been running upwards of 
20 percent per annum. 
6.3.6 Technology Transfers 
Generally, the parent company provides the technical equipment and training. Getfino 
a maximum return on amounts invested in R&D activities is a touchstone of most 
MNCs, especially pharmaceutical ones. This is represented in royalties for licence 
and patents used. The percentage of royalties paid by Company B to parent 
companies was 296% of capital for the period of 1963-79. Table 6.2 shows royalties 
and fees paid as a value and percentage of capital and revenues, 
Table 6.2 
Value and Percentage of Royalties and Fees Paid for the Period 1963-79 
(Amounts in HO 
Capital in 1967-68 
Sales 1963-79 
Royalties paid 1966-79 
Fees paid to the Scientific Office 
Percentage of royalties and fees to sales 
Percentage of royalties and fees to capital 
(Annual Average) 
Amount and Rate 
624,000 
33,428,259 
1,832,975 
2,006,531 
11.517c 
36.217c 
Source: Case study sw-vey and calculated by the author. 
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6.4 Company C 
6.4.1 Facts About the Company 
The company C was founded in 1962 to produce and market pharmaceutical, .; in 
Egypt. The company is based on a joint venture between a U. S. MNC. which acquires 
60%, of shares, and individuals and private sector. The MNC is one of the strongest 
companies in the drug industry and investors consider it a ieader in the international 
pharmaceutical industry (Sammon & Geman, 1987, pp. 59-6 1). 
The company employed an average of 494 workers in 1989. The capital has amounted 
approximately Ef8 million, whereas the sales turnover was EE52 million in that year. 
As many MNCs in Egypt produce for the local market, there is no outflow of intra- 
company transactions. It is important to note that the percentage of intra-company 
purchases amounted 70% of inputs in 1989. In an interview, a senior manager in the 
company mentioned that: 
"The parent company is recommending the specifications of raw material to produce 
the same products as in the home country. This is why we are purchasing the raw 
materialsfrom the same source that provides them in the home countrv. " 
The company has achieved no profits in the 1980s. However it continued its 
expansions without resorting to government subsidies. It relied on local sources to 
finance heavy investment in new machinery and plant. This shows that 
pharmaceutical companies can be forced, fundamentally with profit levels, to rethink 
their financial strategies (IRM, 1985, p. 31). 
6.4.2 Performance Appraisal 
The parent company evaluates performance basically on the basis of financial results 
and achieving the plan. The subsidiary managers report to their board of directors 
which is composed of senior headquarters executives. The parent controls its 
subsidiaries through the board structure. 
The most important measure of performance is comparing actual profit before taxes 
against budget. Other criteria are sales, gross margin, capital tied up in stocks, trade 
debt and overhead. The company is currently placing a strong emphasis on market 
share, but this is not reported monthly or quarterly because of the difficulty in getting 
data. 
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6.4.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The determining and reviewing of transfer prices is done by the tax department in the 
parent headquarters and subsidiary executives. Of course, the tax dl\, ision tries to 
rriinimise the total tax to the extent possible within the tax rules and regulations of 
host countries. Usually, via the intra-company price for any product or component, 
the negotiated based and arm's-length based-methods are frequently used. Changes in 
the methods used for pricing are taken into account in the strategy. Auditing transfer 
pricing policies are done on a flexible basis. The company reviews these policies 
when some external factors affect the strategy, e. g., the effect on final price of the 
product. 
Intuitively, the subsidiary decision-making. should be proportional or nearly 
proportional to its contribution to the overall goal achievement, i. e. the more the 
subsidiary contributes to the fulfilment of goals of the parent company and the entire 
corporation, the higher its decision-making should be. 
6.4.4 Analysing Factors Detern-tining Transfer Pricing 
Data available for the assistant production components (auxiliary materials) imported 
from the parent company showed that prices have escalated between the period of 
1980 and 1982. For example, the price of Bottle L30 rose 2911/-c, Liquid Petroleum 
216%, Apple Flavour 301 % (in 1981 compared to 1980). The price of Vilas 5CC 
increased 313% in 1982 compared to 1981. The same thing for the rest of auxiliary 
materials (10 items) where the increase in prices ranged between 1991/-c and 21867c. 
It has been concluded during the interview with the financial executive that 
government-enforced price controls have an important effect in formulating transfer 
pricing strategies. 
Also, drug companies are confronted by the degree of competition in the local market 
as each of them tries to acquire the greater share of it. 
6.4.5 Royalties and Fees Paid 
The total amount of royalties paid to the parent company amounted Ef 1,993,341 
between the period of 1963 and 1979. The amount of royalties represented 166% of 
the prQject capital (EE1,200,000). Table 6.3 shows royalties and fees as a value and 
percentage of capital and revenue. 
1 -1 - 
Table 6.3 
Value and Percentage of Royalties and Fees Paid for the Period 1963-79 
(Amounts in Ef) 
Capital in 1967-68 
Revenue 1963-79 
Royalties paid 1966-79 
Fees paid to the Scientific Office 
Percentage of royalties and fees to sales 
Percentage of royalties and fees to capital 
(Annual Average) 
Amount and Rate 
1 .2 00.000 
51,129,500 
1,993,341 
3,358,493 
10.5 %' 
26.21-/c 
Source: Case study survey and calculated by the author. 
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6.5 Company D 
6.5.1 Facts About the Company 
Company D operates in the pharmaceutical industry and is 10017c owned hý, its, U. S. 
parent company registered in Panama for tax and tariffs purposes. Its main objectives 
in Egypt are to produce medicines for local and foreign markets, especially after the 
abolition of its Lebanon subsidiary. Other objectives are to develop drugs and demand 
for its products. 
The MNC represents an interesting example of merger with other pharmaceutical 
companies to undertake major strides and become a global competitor in all markets it 
serves. For example, it merged with Beech-Nut life Savers in 1968. One of the 
company's most recent and potentially most successful joint ventures is that with 
Bristol-Myers company for approximately $11.5 billion stock swap. After this 
acquisition, it was considered to be the second world's biggest drugs company. In fact, 
this joint ventures will enable them to have drug sales of $4.5 billion and to invest 
$600 million a year on R&D2which is second only on research to Merck company. 
Nevertheless, the company still commits itself towards massive investment in product 
R&D and efficient production for its own purposes. 
Company D was established in Egypt in December 1974 under the Investment Law 
43 of 1974 and started its production in 1979. In 1989 the number of employees was 
239 whereas its capital was $27.5 million. It has been realised that the proportion of 
highly skilled and semi-skilled personnel were greater than labourers. Hence, the 
number of labour decreases because of adopting high technology in production. The 
annual sales has amounted to Ef 66 n-ffllion. 
6.5.2 Organisational Structure and Reporting System 
The financial executive stated during the interview that the position of the company 
as a wholly-owned subsidiary permits a greater degree of action and total control 
within the system of the parent company. The administrative structure of the NINC 
well fits the so-called mother-daughter structure, i. e., foreign subsidiaries report L_ 
directly and exclusively to the parent company. The parent always makes strategic 
decisions about the management operations and human resource functions of the 
2 Nlwi\ of the big pharmaceutical companies have been keen to thrive on partnership. co-product, on and joint ventures with 
diffe rent foreign comparues to gain economic,, of scale in R&D and marketing. Costs in both these areas have been 
escalating due to more stringent government safety rule., 
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subsidiary as well as its financing. The subsidiary's top management. which con. sists 
of the foreign general manager and six Egyptian executives, reports to both parent and 
Egyptian government officials regarding problems of plannin(2, control, and 
evaluation. 
The reporting system is highly formalised and standardised and divided into different 
items. Needless to say, monthly and quarterly reports differ in both form and contents. 
The monthly reports include information on sales turnover and other key figures, 
whereas the quarterly reports are more diverse and detailed, including information on 
the income statement and balance sheet statement, etc. The subsidiary also formulates 
its annual budget and forward it to headquarters for the purpose of preparing the 
preliminary budget of the MNC. This annual budget is considered as a co-ordination 
tool rather than a control mechanism, whereby the perfon-nance of the subsidiary is 
evaluated in accordance with the degree to which budget figures are achieved. 
6.5.3 Importation of Raw Materials 
As far as the degree of interdependence is concerned, the volume of intra-company 
transaction has amounted 85% to 90% percent of purchases in 1989. The financial 
manager has reported, during an interview, that the high ratio of production 
components imported from within the group is due to the fact that chen-Licals used in 
production are not available locally and the fact that high quality control is required 
for producing drugs. To quote: " 
"All medicine manufacturing processes in the subsidiary must be based on the 
research of the parent company and products must carry the trade mark of the MNC. 
As a consequence, all activc raw, materials of drugs should be importedfrom the 
MNC's group, This is because active components are measured in thousandths of a 
gram and should be tested according to high standards of quality control". 
The financial manager claimed that they do not employ transfer prices as a 
mechanism to shift profits or achieve advantages on the account of the host 
government's interests. As he declared: 
"lVe do not use transfer pricing mechanisms to shift profits outside the countr , 
1'. 11 
someonc likes to be a confident that the transfet pricing technique is not uscd. lie can 
check the intra-company transacti . ons through Ow financial statements. The inconit, 
statement showed losses since, the compain, commenced its activities in in 
1979. The nujin reasons (ýfthesc losscs art, high production costs and prict, controls 
imposed I?. v the Egyptian government". 
180 
On the other hand, an example for abusing transfer pricing by the companýý was 
mentioned in a report by the GOD in 1985. An Italian exporter offered to supply an 
active material for Decacilien at $360 per kilogram, while the parent company's price 
was $780 per kilogram. When the subsidiary's management was asked by the GOD to 
reduce its transfer prices the head office argued that the Italian offer \. vas of doubtful 
quality and hence not comparable for negotiation. The overpricing in this ingredient is 
217%. 
The parent company prices intra-company transfers at levels determined at the annual 
budget meeting except under special circumstances, such as unexpectedly higher 
volume or a complex tax situation. In the former case, the subsidiary manager is 
expected to negotiate a price. In the latter case, management in the U. S. may set the 
price. 
6.5.4 Transfer Pricing Policies 
From the financial manager's point of view, transfer prices should be legally 
acceptable but should maximýise company profits. Transfer price setting is 
concentrated at the parent headquarters' level. And they can not be made by the 
company's subsidiaries, especially in the complex market where customs duties and 
different tax rates influence marketing decisions. Transfer prices are determined 
according to standard variable cost plus a margin basis. The parent company policy 
permitted transfers at other than standard variable cost plus if some critical conditions 
occurred. 
As the economic environment in Egypt is complicated, particularly the level of 
inflation, special accounting and control procedures have been adopted by the 
company. For instance, using monthly average cost figures for charging inventory 
into costs of goods sold, the quarterly or even monthly revision of standard costs, and 
using the "current assets" method for translating balance sheets from local currencies 
into dollars. By this method of translation, current assets and liabilities in local 
currency terms were translated by dollar exchange rate prevailing at the time of 
translation, while long-term assets and liabilities were translated by dollar exchange 
rates prevailing at the time of their acquisition, that is, by "historical rates". In the 
budgeting process, a "best guess" estimate of the likely rate of inflation was 
incorporated by the financial manager in the budget prepared by his staff. 
6.5.5 Technology Transfers 
As mentioned above, the company operates as a wholly-owned subsidiary, the 
financial manager commented that most U. S. companies apparently prefer to exercise 
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an equity interest in the use of their intangible assets and proprietan7 knowledge in 
order to protect their competitive positions. The company is strengthening its 
representation in Egypt, especially with respect to licensing technology into the 
country. It has a dominant, fairly stable position in the local market. 
The technical services of the parent company took in hand not only the construction 
but also the preliminary studies and the execution of various stages of the project. 
Production Operations demand a permanent presence of several foreign experts as 
well as seveTal visits by specialists from the parent company to do certain specific 
jobs. Parallel to this, the financial management and administration must be organised, 
staff have to be recruited and technical supervision must be set up. Naturally, 
technical assistance by the parent company does not stop on the first day of 
production. It must continue to ensure regular and high-quality production, to 
maintain or replace equipment, to make plans for expansion, to launch new medicines 
required for the market, to maintain efficient management and train personnel, etc. 
The technology used is very sophisticated, some of machinery and equipment are very 
complicated. No training takes place in the parent company, local resources are being 
adequate for the required technical level. If the production requires very sophisticated 
knowledge, technicians from the parent company come on the spot and bring 
complementary know-how. 
When the Egyptian subsidiary started operations, it signed a contract with the parent 
company, according to which royalties would be 5% of net turnover during the first 
ten years, 3% for the following five years, then 2% for other five years. 
The technical fees allocated to the subsidiary account for about 10% of net sales. 
These fees are not monitored by either GAR or GOD, as they do not appear In the 
financial statements of the subsidiary and partly due to the lack of experience to deal 
with these types of expenses. The agreement of establishing the subsidiary includes 
also paying to the parent company I 011-c of net sales for advertising costs. 
6.5.6 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
The primary issue in designing a transfer pricing system for the company 11, 
determining its business objectives. The evaluation of managers 1.,, - conducted 
according to the extent of achieving specific objectives assigned by the MNN 
rnanagement. It can be concluded that the most important variables of designing 
transfer pricing system from the point of the company are hyper-inflatlon and 
multiple exchange rates in Egypt. 
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The other three factors considered very important by the company were maximisation 
of overall corporate profit, minin-lisation of overall corporate income taxes, and price 
controls on drugs by the GOD. 
Other factors deemed to be important were maintaining good relations with the host 
country, simplicity and ease of applications, maintenance of adequate cash flow. and 
existence of competition among pharmaceutical MNCs in Egypt. 
Factors rated by the company as fairly important include maximisation of the group 
overall profit, differentials in income tax rates and legislations, the bureaucracy of 
dealing with the Egyptian authorities, and performance evaluation of the company. 
The remaining factors, including the political and cultural, rates of customs duties and 
stem customs legislations, anti-dumping and anti-trust legislations, restrictions on 
profit and capital repatriated abroad, requirements of financial reporting, and 
divisional autonomy, were judged by the company as being not at all important. 
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6.6 Company E 
6.6.1 Facts About the Company 
Company E was founded in Egypt in 1987 to be a manufacturer and marketer of 
cosmetics, professional, pharmaceutical and health products. The American parent 
company holds 80% of equities, whereas the remaining (2017c) is allocated to different 
nationalities. The MNC has world-wide subsidiaries in 176 countries with 
consolidated corporate sales having reached $15 billion in 1989. The parent company 
has placed great emphasis on marketing. Advertising, selling and administrative 
expenses came to a significant proportion of net sales. 
The registered capital of the Egyptian subsidiary amounted to EE4 million. The 
annual sales were EL6 million, whereas human resources were 50 workers in 1989. 
As the MNC has subsidiaries mostly all over the world, sales of the Company E cover 
only the local market. 
The parent company supplies the Egyptian company with raw materials which 
accounted for 40% of production requirements in 1989 and supplies it with machinery 
and equipment. 
6.6.2 Marketing Strategy 
Despite the young age of the company, it has acquired a significant position in the 
Egyptian market. As the target of the company is to dominate a great share of the 
market and to maximise the return on shareholders' investment. So the policy of the 
company depends on making an enormous progress in introducing new products to 
create the perfect business opportunity. 
The policy of the company is also to develop a corporate marketing strategy built on 
an appreciation of its standing, in terms of market-share, technical and market 
strengths and weakness, competitors' strengths and weakness and overall market 
trends. The company responds to the problems of managing its products' life-cycles 
and adopts the most appropriate marketing strategies. 
6.6.3 Measure of Performance and Budgeting and Reporting System 
The administrative structure of the MNC is similar to its counterpart of company D, 
that has been discussed earlier, i. e., mother-daughter structure. It should be noticed 
that the subsidiary is run as an investment centre. "Return on assets employed" based 
184 
on local currency calculations, is used as the primary basis for evaluating S ., -ubsidiar%, 
executives. 
Because of the recent establishment of the firm, a complete activity report has to be 
sent to the parent company every month. The management reporting system is highly 
conclusive and standardised as it is a powerful tool for communication. fi2ourous C 
control of the business and approval of business decision. The major aim of the 
reporting system in the company as it has been revealed by the financial manager 
"is to keep a tight lid on costs. It is our prime method of implementing cost 
reduction ". 
This provides a motivation for managers to work towards targets that accord with 
business strategies. Reports include precise descriptions of all improvements in 
production and marketing. 
The evaluation of each manager is done by the level above. The focus is on planning, 
results and most recent estimates. This provides the company management with an 
opportunity to determine whether short-term actions are being taken at the expense of 
the long-range targets. 
The system of budgeting and forecasting extends three years into the future. The first 
year of the long-range forecast becomes a preliminary budget for the year ahead. A 
year later, the budget is reforecasted, a comparison is made between it and the 
original forecast, and changes are accounted for. 
This means that the annual budget should comprise data for three years, i. e., present 
year data, estimates of the following year and forecasts for the year after. This 
medium-term plan with a horizon of two years has to be strategic as it is a 
consideration of major operational decisions, such as to expand certain activities or to 
curtail others. 
Monthly and quarterly reports are prepared and sent to the parent company. The 
monthly reports involve information on the quantity and value of sales, production 
costs and inventory. The quarterly reports are more specific and comprise information 
on the income statement and balance sheet statement, etc. 
The Measurement of performance is related to the objectives of the whole strategic 
plan and annual budgets that are derived from the plan. The primary financial 
measure is the success in achieving the subsidiary's net income. Other measurements 
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include Return on investment (ROI), net income to sales ratio, market share, 
inventory and receivable tumover rates, and currency exposure. 
But ROI is a key measure of performance for the company. The ROI for the 
company's products is measured at least once a year, which results in careful 
management of inventories and receivables. The evaluation of the subsidiary's 
manager himself encompasses other measurements. These involve how well he has 
dealt with government relations, the progress he has made toward achieving certain 
targets such as increasing market share and his success in maintaining good employee 
relations. 
As a result, the company has very sophisticated measures of financial performance. In 
summary, when Company E sets its budgets, it shows three categories of forecasting: 
Forecasts for the present year. 
Forecasts for the next year. 
Forecasts for the year after next year showing what is expected. 
6.6.4 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The company uses a standard variable cost-plus formula for determining transfer 
prices. The prices are formulated by group headquarters. The percentage added to the 
cost of overhead and profit incurred by the transferor. The way used to evaluate intra- 
company transactions differs from that which is used for other sister subsidiaries in 
the parent country as the market price is based on four components (cost of goods, 
sales expenses, advertising and promotion, and general and administrative expenses). 
Only two of which should be loaded into the intra-company price (cost of goods plus 
advertising and promotion expenses). 
The final price is decided upon by the parent controller working in conjunction with 
the executive vice president, financial manager, and marketing manager of the 
subsidiary. The committee have the authority to adjust the transfer price. The point to 
note is that transfer prices are determined in dollars, so the burden of exposure 
management is shifted to the subsidiary. However transfer prices are reviewed 
continuously according to the economic conditions in Egypt. In the area of taxes there 
is some world-wide co-ordination in order to maintain close scrutiny on all tax 
matters. 
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6.6.5 Analysis of Factors Affecting Transfer Pricing System 
Contributing corporate cash flow to the Egyptian subsidiary is high on the list of 
priorities. Tax minimisation is a part of the game but this factor is not important as the 
company still enjoys the tax holiday exemption. The company is concerned about the 
drastic upturn in inflation as it affects its potential for growth, 
Because of the econornic destability in Egypt the company treats all capital expenses 
as current expenses. As a result, company profits would be lower but it would keep 
the capital of the company. This procedure per se is a sign that the company tends to 
shift profits abroad. 
The main problems facing the company are the level of inflation and the rate of 
exchange. Of course the company is concerned to keep the real value of money. 
Therefore these two factors are very important when transfer pricing strategies are 
formulated. 
The company pays too much attention to the competition factor as it affects its 
strategy. To quote the financial manager of the company: 
"In our business, we deal with mass markets where competitivc pressures are the 
dominant feature of our pricing. We closelY watch the competi . tors and ensure that 
we watch them in terms of marketing and cost control. Our major controllable is our 
sales mix and I want to ensure we keep a tight control on this. " 
6.6.6 Allocation of Intangible Assets 
Because it is so difficult to determine objectively the price of many intangibles, the 
pricing of intangibles is one of the most politically sensitive questions faced by the 
MNC. Basically, royalties for R&D costs and technical services fees are allocated in 
accordance with the profitability of each subsidiary. Despite the fact this technique is 
subjective it helps, particularly, new projects in the start-up period where the profit is 
low or negative. 
6.6.7 Incentives for Investment in Egypt 
When this point was discussed with managers during the interview, all of them 
pointed out that taking part in the local market represents the main target for 
investment in Egypt. The marketing manager in Cornpaný, E mentioned that: 
"1--gypi has an enormous nwrket that grows ar an increasing rate Ivith developed arid 
varied requirements and tastes. " 
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Another objective for the investment in Egypt is the possibility of exporting to I- 
neighbour countries, especially Arab nations. If this purpose is successfullý' achieved. 
the parent company could gain more profits through reducing costs of shipping from 
other subsidiaries in Europe and U. S. 
6.6.8 Technology Transfer 
The main forrns of technology inflows to the Egyptian company come from the parent 
company. The type of technology applied in the company is especially capital 
intensive in production for the following reasons: 
I- to save time and increase the productivity of labour and develop new skills, 
2- to improve the quality of production, hence to increase it and increase the size of 
exports; and 
3- to adopt an approach which is more profitable and more suitable to both local and 
international markets with regard to the competition factor. 
I "I" 
6.7 Company F 
6.7.1 Facts About the Company 
Company F entered Egypt in 1978 according to the Investment Law 43 in joint 
venture with Egyptian shareholders and a U. K. corporation. CompanN, F Is Involved in 
the manufacture of electrical elevators. The English parent company has 5117c of 
shares. The headquarters of the pairent company is in Finland. The registered capital is 
ELI million. In terms of annual sales, it has accounted for EL4 million in 1989. The 
number of labour force reached 180 in the same year. 
Company F operates in the engineering industry and is characterised by a low degree 
of product diversification. It sells in the local market whereas its product serves 
special customers like hotels, investment hospitals, and the construction sector. The 
company is mainly supplied by various divisions of the parent corporation. About 
70% of inputs were being imported from the parent company and another subsidiary 
in Belgium, and this called for extra effort on the part of the home office to ensure 
that the key items were continuously expedited. The remainder of production 
components were being bought from the local market. 
The technology employed in the manufacturing process cannot be judged as 
sophisticated even though the parent company invests considerable amount',, ', in R&D 
in order to keep abreast of actual and potential changes in the use and design of its 
products. R&D is centrally performed in the parent company. 
The structure of competition is characterised as oligopolistic since two companies 
including company F, dominate the domestic market. 
6.7.2 Performance Appraisal 
The parent company believes in giving more autonomy to local management than is 
typical of many US MNCs. At the group headquarters, the emphasis is on strategic 
planning. Though it is informed of the progress and problems of subsidiaries on a 
regular basis, the headquarters is predisposed not to interfere with the day-to-day 
operational problems. 
In evaluating the performance of the subsidiary, the parent company is working 
toward standards that INL11 hold good for a number of years, yet recognise the current 
position of the business in its life cycle, and reflect the requirements of shareholders. 
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6.7.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The assessment of transfer pricing policies are done bly the participation of the 
subsidiary and headquarters of the parent company. A committee includim, the 
international controller, domestic controller and vice president of the subsidiary. are 
responsible for designing these prices. The final decision should be approved by the 
head office. 
It should be noted that the company calculated its sale prices differently. since most 
of its sales are on a contract basis. The first step is to estimate the original contract 
price by adding the replacement cost of inventory items on the day of sale, and a 
normal sales markup. Then, on the day of payment, the standard escalator clause is 
applied to the mark-up value of the goods as of the day of purchase, and this price 
adjustment is added to the original contract price. This results in an apparent profit 
spread that is quite high, but the higher replacement cost of inventory works out to be 
the same as the spread in the original contract estimate. 
Company F prefers to use independent price indices for its elevator clauses, but where 
these are not available or not accurate, the company computes its own index. This is 
done by adjusting the portion of the contract related to matenals on the bases of the 
prices of steel, copper, and other basic materials whose costs are generally known-, 
and when adjusting the labour cost portion of the contract either on the basis of a 
general labour index or an average company cost in certain labour categories that can 
be certified by a local independent accountant. The point is to construct the index in 
such a way that and customer can reconstruct it to see that it is fair. 
The company experiences suggest strongly that a deeper analysis of pricing practices 
by firms operating in inflationary econon-Lies is necessary to improve profit 
performance. Even in such stable countries, the replacement cost principle should be 
used because of the effect that labour contract changes and price increases in basic 
industrial materials and raw materials can have over the course of a contract sale with 
long delivery and credit terms. 
6.7.4 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
In an attempt to explain factors affecting transfer price formulation, the financial 
manager pointed out economic conditions have a great effect. The high rate of 
inflation and currency devaluation were the most important determinants in designing 
transfer prices. Also, the market share is highly considered in such conditions. The 
financial manager revealed that a devaluation of the Egyptian pound against hard 
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currency, especially the U. S. dollar, lead to sharp increases in the prices of imported 
raw materials. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that overall profits of the company and 
performance evaluation have only a moderate degree of importance on exercising 
transfer pricing policies. 
The company does not give any account to political aspects. The financial executive 
commented: 
"The political situation in Egypt is more stable, and at the same time the invcstment 
law guarantees projects against any confiscation. Hence, were not bothered at aill'ol. 
the political risk ." 
6.7.5 Incentives for Investment in Egypt 
The executive manager of the company pointed out that there are enormous 
advantages for the company to invest in Egypt. Peaceful trade unions, new 
development in infrastructure and communication, cheap and well trained labour were 
the most important issues from the manager's viewpoint. The lower import tariffs 
guaranteed to investment companies have been mentioned to be a stimulus to invest 
in Egypt. Also, the company captures a large share of the local market, as the 
company is in a oligopolistic position with another company. 
Additionally, the flow of foreign capital into Egypt looked to the manager as a gesture 
of confidence. He pinpointed that the freedom to ren-fit abroad 10017c of profits and 
unlimited royalties are very important issues for the investor and stimulate him to 
investment in the country. 
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6.8 Company G 
6.8.1 Facts About the Company 
Company G is the youngest subsidiary in this study, as it was established in 1989. It is 
based on a joint venture between a Japanese MNC and individual shareholders. The 
MNC is one of four big Japanese companies which have come to dominate the world 
market for motorcycles. 
Table 6.4 exhibits the percentage of equity for investors. The subscribed capital is 
EE15 million. After steadily improving for its position through 1989, the company 
produces light trucks, especially pick-ups and minivans. From the beginning of 1992, 
the company will start the production of vehicles after it has got the approval of the 
ministry of industry in Egypt. 
Table 6.4 
Type of Joint Venture and Percentage of Capital in Company G 
Investor 
Private sector and Individuals 
Foreign investor 
Parent company 
Equity Percentage 
5 117c 
29% 
20% 
The company is paying particular concern to management skills such as team 
building, motivation, delegation, staff communication and performance appraisal. It is 
known that all the leading Japanese manufacturers are in a position to build their auto 
factories all over the world especially in Europe. According to the financial manager 
during the interview: 
"We established in a number of important niche markeis and wc have been groWing 
asfast as if notfasier than some subsidiaries of our parent companY abroad". 
As a result of demand in the overall new vehicle market, the value of annual sales has 
arnounted to EL2 million. The human force was 100 workers. Company G assembles 
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road cars as it imports intermediates from the parent company. The percentage of 
intra-company purchases amounts to 8017c of inputs. Despite the fact that the companY 
has started its operation recently it has started to export a part of its production to 
Arab countries (an estimated 10% of its outputs). 
6.8.2 Performance Appraisal 
Results are basically reported to headquarters based on how the subsidiary i, "" 
managed. The evaluation of the performance of the subsidiary and manager is based 
mostly on financial results, but managers are also appraised more judgementallý'. Like 
most Japanese companies, the parent company has been successful because it makes 
investments which do not appear to have a return in the short term, as the financial 
executive stated. 
The policy of the parent company is to have managers with very high standards. 
Managers must not only identify events that may make it difficult for them to reach 
their budgets but must also describe the contingency plans they would follow should 
such events occur. If descriptive events take place, the manager must convince 
headquarters management that the appropriate steps were taken in line with a 
contingency plan to minimise the negative impact of these events. Failure to do so 
may lead to corrective action. 
Like several Japanese firms, the company has successfully improved its competitive 
position by adopting a management style that emphasise the quality control, 
encourages worker loyalty, and requires an inordinate devotion to details. 
6.8.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The parent company has a considerable influence over setting transfer prices. The 
financial manager revealed that the headquarters often formulates transfer pricilig, 
policies on the basis of standard full cost plus fixed margin. 
As a general rule, the parent company does not maintain any controls in the area of 
intra-cornpany pricing, as each situation is treated on an individual basis. Each 
subsidiary is responsible for its own profit and tax situation; as long as the profit t7 
picture remains satisfactory, company headquarters does not interfere. Although the 
parent headquarters design a transfer pricing system, every subsidiary has the 
authority to review prices in the light of its conditions. 
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6.8.4 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
The policy of the company is to take political aspects of risk and the company's 
ability to operate in a country into account. The parent company ranks countries in 
categories, and it expects a higher return from countries in which the risk is hi(, her. 1ý7 
The method is subjective, but it is a step towards incorporating country risks into 
performance evaluation system. The company regards political conditions in Egypt as 
stable and does not pay any attention to the headquarters. 
The strategy of the company is to keep costs as low as possible. One of the most 
perplexing problems that the company faces is the impact of local currencN, 
fluctuations notably on performance evaluation. 
The financial manager pointed out that the parent company, like most Japanese firms, 
take into account income taxes and tax rate differences in order to maximise their 
profits. Nevertheless the company enjoys tax concessions for 15 years according to 
the Investment law in Egypt, the manager emphasised that the corporate tax rate is 
high (32%). Therefore, this could motivate the company to abuse transfer pricing. 
It has been realised also that the decision of transfer pricing is influenced to a fairly 
large extent by the volume of transfers. The manager stressed that MNCs often make 
their decisions according to costs/benefits analysis. If the quantity and value of intra- 
company transactions are significant, the probability of manoeuvring transfer pricing 
increases. 
6.8.5 Technology Transfer 
The parent company provides assistance in training personnel which takes place in the 
subsidiary in Egypt. The company pointed out that the scale of operations in Egypt is 
similar to that in Japan and this is part of the reason why parent company policy is to 
provide assistance for these training exercises. 
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6.9 Company H 
6.9.1 Facts About the Company 
Company H is of American nationality and specialises in producing detergent and 
floor cleaning goods. The MNC is considered a leader in each of its bu, "iness 
categories and its main objective is to expand world-wide into emerging countries. 
The approval of establishing the company was 1978, whereas it commenced its 
production in the early of 1982. It is based on a joint venture with an Egyptian public 
sector company and investors from Saudi Arabia. The percentage of capital for each 
investor is shown in Table 6.5. The company is quite capital intensive and has high 
fixed costs. The productive workforce was 48 workers, whereas the production has 
amounted Efl. 3 million in 1989. The subsidiary is very profitable and enjoys a great 
deal of autonomy from the parent company. Therefore the parent treats the subsidiary 
as a profit centre for the purpose of managerial control and evaluation. It sets annual 
budgets in terrns of pre-tax profit and judges local managers largely on their ability to 
meet or beat the targeted figures. 
Table 6.5 
Type of Joint Venture and Percentage of Capital in Company H 
In vestor 
Parent company 
Public sector 
Foreign investors 
Equity Percentage 
55% 
35% 
10 l7c 
6.9.2 Marketing Strategic Policy 
The MNC follows a creative marketing policy and focuses on new product 
development efforts in order to be a world-wide marketer with above-average 
profitability. Additionally, the company has specific long-term corporate objectives or 
goals that it is dedicated to achieving: 
The company wants to remain a privately owned company. In order to do so, It 
needs to continue as a financially sound company. Therefore it cannot allow its 
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debt ratio to get out of control, and so its borrowing capacity is not unlimited. 
Also, it needs to achieve significant profit margin and return on investment. 
2- It wants to maintain its world-wide initiative by expanding into emerging L_ 
countries. The company is in various stages of negotiations in a number of 
countries around the world because it wants to establish a presence in these 
countries for long-term growth. 
3- The company wants to be a leader in each of its business categories. 
4- It wants to maintain a highly competent, effective management tean-1, and 
increasingly productive work force. 
5- It wants to continue as an outstanding corporate citizen wherever it operates. 
The policy of the company before introducing a new business is based on some 
criteria as follows: 
Products should be characterised by high standards of quality and safety, the 
company has built the goodwill of its customers world-wide. In new business 
planning, it avoids markets that could damage this goodwill. The lack of 
government regulations in some countries can lead to markets being created 
based on false, misleading claims and inferior products. 
2. The new product should have potential for growth and profits. The potential 
return on operating assets should be greater than the ongoing return, and high 
marketing and adrninistrative costs must be taken into account. It is also 
necessary to achieve a positive cash flow within a reasonable time on which, the 
degree of risk, anticipated growth rate, profit potential, and working capital 
required for the estimated life of the business, will be based. 
3. To achieve the previous criteria, there should be an opportunity for the new 
product to expand into many overseas markets. Labour and capital will be of 
average or lower intensity relative to national industrial norms. The products also 
can be a building block for multi-product lines or business. 
The above criteria should help the company to distinguish between different 
opportunities and to establish priorities for new product investigations. 
Relating to the Egyptian subsidiary, the volume of intra-company purchases and sales 
have amounted 20% and 10% respectively in 1989. Goods that were bought from the 
parent constitute effective materials which are very expensive and cannot be supplied 
domestically. The rest of ra,, N- materials used in production were purchased locallIN, 
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from indigenous manufacturers. Apparently, the subsidiary decision-making power 
involves the degree of its influence over purchasing raw materials elsewhere. But. the 
purchasing executive mentioned that the foreign partner should test such materials in 
order to be sure that they are consistent with the quality control standards required by 
the parent firm. 
6.9.3 Performance Appraisal 
The measurement of the subsidiary's performance is done in both local currency and 
dollars because of inflation and currency fluctuations. However. as the subsIdIarV VVIII 
ultimately have to return dollars to the US parent company there is inore focus on 
dollar results. 
Local currency sales and operating expenses are monitored closely in evaluatint(--, both 
the subsidiary and the management. 
6.9.4 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
Company H arrives its transfer prices by a standard variable cost-plus formula. The 
determination of transfer pricing is done by both the parent headquarters group, 
consisting of the corporate controller, director of taxes, and legal counsel, and vice 
president of finance of the subsidiary. Once the formula is determined, it is the 
responsibility of the MNC controller to see that it is implemented on a world-wide 
basis. The parent company did not attempt to allocate variances to the subsidiary. 
Standard variable cost-plus transfer prices were established on an annual basis and 
were not adjusted if market prices moved below this basis. 
The audit of transfer pricing is made on a periodic basis by the parent internal audit 
department. From time to time, there is a review of the entire transfer price structure 
by the tax department to determine if the cost-plus fon-nula falls within the range of 
general US tax guidelines. 
The general manager of the company believed that communication was the k-ey to 
making a transfer pricing policy work-, since constantly changing conditions 
necessitated changes in transfer prices. He commented: 
"Any (, olý, pally nci, cr makes enough adjustnictits in Me system if it does flot have 
enough communication with its enti6cs. A company always has changing condit, ()jIs 
Situations never develop exactli, as it is predl'oed. 
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6.9.5 Analysis of Factors Affecting Transfer Pricing Strategy 
It is increasingly important that the subsidiary looks to the future and has strategies 
which anticipate changes. Strategic decisions are based upon a complex set of factors, 
many of which, given sufficient lead time, can be influenced by the astute subsidiary 
general manager. 
Concentrating the attention to maxin-dse the subsidiary's profit performance and 
contribution to the MNC, the scope of the company is to dominate local market share. 
as a key measure of success. This allows the company not only to enjoy the local cost 
advantages related to scale of manufacture and generate high returns, but also it can 
benefit from the sharing of production technology and improvements with the parent 
company. The policy of the company is to be aware of local competitors with a more 
flexible production process offering a wider variety of products to the local market. 
Faced with problematic competition, the subsidiary was able to enhance its position 
and expand production by drawing upon the MNC technological expertise, as well as 
being aware of market opportunities and the capacity situation. 
The company turns cautious about the rate of inflation in Egypt. An even greater fear 
is that the sales will be affected by the rate of inflation in Egypt. With the sharp 
increase in inflation in most countries, inflation-adjusted data are gaining increasing 
acceptance as a more realistic measurement of performance. The MNC modifies its 
results for inflation, internally as part of the evaluation process of subsidiaries. 
6.9.6 Contribution of the Company to the Egyptian Economy 
The parent company was involved in production in Egypt to satisfy the local market 
requirements and passing the tariff barriers. The general manager emphasIsed that the 
Egyptian subsidiary will contribute to the economic life of Egypt through taxes paid 
after the concession penod. The firm has never shown any losses, thus taxes on 
profits will be considerable. Not to mention, the company policy is to show positive 
face and behave as good corporate citizens. As the general manager said laconically: 
"PeopIc have to seeYou and know you as afriend" 
6.9.7 Technology Transfer 
The transfer of technology from the parent company to its daughter in Egypt consists 
fundamentally in applications of basic research carried out in research centres of the 
parent company. 
I C) 1ý 
A challenge facing the subsidiary's managers is the location of development and 
innovative activities. There is a natural tendency for development activities like new 
product or process research, or the development of new business to be performed by 
the parent company. Generally the role of the Egyptian subsidiary is to pick up on 
these developments and translate them into the local environment. 
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6.10 Company I 
6.10.1 Facts About the Company 
Company I was founded in 1982 to produce razor blades. It is a joint venture between 
a US. MNC and Egyptian individuals. The MNC acquires 70% of capital, whereas the 
remainder is allocated to local shareholders. The registered capital is EE9 million, 
whereas the labour forces reached 180 workers in 1989. The annual sales of the 
company have reached EL2.5 million, 60% of them in the local market and 4017c for 
exporting to countries in Africa and Europe. The percentage of intra-cornpany 
purchases amounted 50% of the total of production requirements. 
The policy of the parent company is to convince subsidiaries' managers that they are 
responsible for world-wide operations. Thus, a part of every manager's job is to make 
his business grow inside and outside. 
The financial manager declared during the interview that the company buys its 
requirements from constituent firms for strategic or huge cost reduction reasons. 
The structure of the market for the company appears to be oligopolistic as it captures 
the lion's shares of the local market. When the company entered the local market there 
were two rivals producing similar products, one of them which was a public sector 
company became unable to compete. So the market is now oligopolistised by two 
MNCs. 
The parent company uses international planning and control systems with long-range 
strategic focus. The corporate planning process involves deciding: (1) the 
corporation's objectives, (2) how these objectives will change over time, (3) the 
resources used to attain these objectives, and the policies that govern acquisition, use 
and disposition of the resources. For the company, planning involves incorporating 
the economic, social, legal, and political characteristics of each operating 
environment into the company's overall master plan. 
6.10.2 Performance Appraisal 
The parent company divides its performance measures into two groups, ]on(-, -term (at 
least one year) performance measures and short-term measures. The basic long-term 
measures are cash flow generation by product and return on investment. In its cash 
flow measure the company seeks to determine whether a product earn enough I 
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money for its plant replacement, its share of corporate costs and have some excess 
profit to finance a level of growth that the head office feels it is realistic. 
6.10.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
Basically, transfer pricing decisions originate and come to the attention of the head of 
international operations at the headquarters, if insoluble difficulties arise. However 
designing and reviewing transfer pricing policies are to be co-ordinated between the 
headquarters and subsidiary managers. The parent company uses standard full cost 
transfer prices and allocates all variances in an attempt to measure the total financial 
responsibility of the subsidiary. 
Some problems n-dght arise, since the cost manager of the subsidiary often felt the 
subsidiary is being charged for variances that they were beyond his control. At the 
root of this problem was the manner in which standard full costs were set. The 
problem was exacerbated by the lack of criteria for performance measurement, 
evaluation, and rewards, which largely based on financial results. 
6.10.4 The Problem of Transfer Pricing 
Several interviews have taken place at different levels within the company. The cost 
manager of the company believes that the subsidiary should operate independently 
and realise the best possible performance in each country. The apparent business 
policy is based on three facets: 
The company is in business to serve customer requirements and consider its 
profitability. 
Through a profit-centre orientation, the company wants to optimise the returns on 
its individual business on a 'stand alone' basis. 
3- The company looks at capital investment on the basis of incentives provided by 
the government particularly in the area of taxes. 
The cost manager's point of view is based on the fact that conflict will exist when 
adjustrnent in transfer prices negativelY affect performance measures and financial 
rewards. 
The marketino manager of the company doubts the wisdom of trying to optimise tý 
i-eturns on a stand-alone basis. In his view, the transfer pficin. (.! problem "is only a 
symptom of a more deep-seated problem related to the definition and operating of 
profit centres. Transfer pricing can be viewed as a mechanism for allocating profit 
between profit centres. 
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Properly used, it should motivate autonomous units to take independent decislotis that 
lead to an optimum result for the corporation. 
6.10.5 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
The decision of transfer pricing is influenced by cash flow advantages and greater 
profits. Income tax consideration was given high ratings. This i's because corporate 
profits may be affected by differentials in income tax rates and income tax legislation. 
The financial executive stated during the interview that the company is concerned 
about econorrfic difficulties prevailing in Egypt. These involve the hyperinflation and 
decreasing purchasing power of the Egyptian pound. 
Determining the subsidiary's performance was mentioned by the manager to be one of 
other criteria to the promotion of corporate effectiveness. The other requirements are 
measurement and motivation. But, performance evaluation takes a low degree of 
importance when designing transfer prices. 
It was understood that the parent company balances between the manipulation of 
transfer price and performance evaluation to prevent any contradiction. 
6.10.6 Incentives and Disincentives for Investment in Egypt 
In general, there is a desire for any investor to expand investment abroad in order to 
benefit form comparative advantages. Requiring higher returns has a priority over 
other issues when the investment decision is made. Guarantee programmes were 
useful for the investment decision. 
The proximity of Egypt to the Arab region was stressed to be an important factor for 
investing in Egypt, as quoted by the marketing executive: 
"Our objective to operate in Egypt is not just for nzark-eting locally, our W-hole 
approach is to produce and export to ncar countries even to Europe and Africa. 
Manufacturing in Egypt is more profitable to our parent as the costs o production 
are lower in compari . son the parent's costs. " 
Relating flaws of investment. it was mentioned that the transfer of earnings is subject 
to the approval of GAFL The authorisafion for such remittances often takes long 
procedures to be granted. 
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6.10.7 Technology Transfer 
The main form of technology mechanism received is engineering technology, 
documents, and various forms of media. The parent company supplies the subsidiary 
with machinery. There is also exchange of personnel for the purpose of training. 
A production manager has expressed that the subsidiary has acquired the same 
technological operations used by the parent company and other subsidiaries in 
developed countries. He said: 
"Of course, this help us to produce the same standard qualit-Y and cxport to 
European and African countries. " 
6.11 Company 
6.11.1 Facts About the Company 
Company J is a minority-owned French corporation with a majority of equity held by 
an Egyptian public sector company. The subsidiary was established in 1980 and 
started its first production in November 1981. The company is engaged primarily in 
the textile industry, as it produces in mass ready suits and sells them in the local 
market and exports a part of its production. The parent is a holding company own.,, 
seven subsidiaries in France and other overseas subsidiaries in U. S. and ECYvVt. 
It should be noticed that before the company was established as a joint venture with 
the public sector company, the latter had an idea for the constitution of a new 
company in the garment industry. The company failed to reallse the idea prior to 
adoption of the open door policy in 1974, as a result of a number of financial, 
technical, institutional, and administrative determinants. 
The total investment capital of the company when it was established was about Efl. 2 
shared between three groups. Table 6.6 shows the percentage of equity for each 
partner involved in the joint ownership. The joint venture in this company has a time- 
limit on its duration which is 25 years. Of course, this period must be sufficient to 
allow the foreign investor to recover the capital invested with a fair and reasonable 
profit for his contribution, taking into account any risks that may be entailed in the 
future. As the textile industry is rather labour intensive, at least as compared with 
other industries in Egypt, the labour force was 600 workers in 1989. The amount of 
annual production was Ef II million in the same year. 
The factory has a daily production capacity of 750 jackets, 1,250 pairs of trousers and 
260 vests. The company distributes its production through its own retail stores and 
also in many public and private shops in the rest of the country. A part of the 
production, also, is exported, notably to the Middle East countries. Since 1985 the 
company introduced a peculiar service to individuals who want their suits tailored 
using their own fabrics. 
The relationship between the Egyptian company and its parent is very beneficial. 
From the viewpoint of objectives, it is clear that this joint venture has been a success. 
The Egyptian partner had to find a partner willing to manufacture a neýv product in 
Egypt which required, at the time of start-up, an advanced technology. This means the 
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contribution of real technology seems obvious, for simple reason that without an 
association with the MNC, products of the company will not satisfy consumers' 
requirements. For the foreign investor, the objectives were two-fold: first of all to sell 
technology, and secondly to make a profitable investment. As the financial executive 
said: 
"We have put in a lot of hard work over the last nine years building an infrastructurc 
for the future. The rrwst important goal for us is to produce garments for different 
fashions. Thus in afew years we must be able to build up a solid histon, of sales arid 
profits that allow us to be quoted as one of the best in the market. Then we can 
obtain capital to really allow us to expand. " 
From the viewpoint of economic results and effects, the company has shown the 
traditional effects of a firm which works well and whose activities are a credit to the 
history of progressive industrialisation in Egypt. It created new jobs, improved the 
standard of living, increased professional training, substituted for imports and brought 
about confidence in the competence and seriousness of the local partner. 
The main objectives of the company start with buying raw materials or piece goods. 
The purchase of fabrics is made in large lots from the manufacturer which is the 
Egyptian investor (public sector company). This purchase constitutes 60'/'C, whereas 
10% of production requirements are supplied locally and the remainder from the 
parent company (30%). The manufacture process includes cutting and sewing fabrics 
to be ready garments and clothes. Finished products are marketed in both local and 
foreign markets, where the former represents 85% and the latter is 15cl-c. 
Table 6.6 
Type of joint Venture and Percentage of Capital in Company J 
Investor Equity Percentage 
Public sector company 5 517c 
Parent company (French) 2517c 
Foreign investor 
(Arab Investment bank) 0 C/C 
The company pays attention to customer service. marketing and sales skills. The 
planning period is one season, i. e. a half year. The reason is production and sales are 
made up by the autumn/winter, and spring/summer season. The management of the 
company does set transfer prices in collaboration with the parent company', '-, 
headquarters. 
6.11.2 How the Minority Parent Company Controls the Subsidiary 
As the French parent company is in a minority position (25c7c), an important question 
is to arise which is whether the minority ownership gives the company undue 
influence on the control of the Egyptian subsidiary?. The answer to the question can 
be understood by considering the organisation of the subsidiary's board of directors. 
The board involves a French manager who is a specialist and has more technical 
knowledge and skills in garment industry. The board gives him full authority for 
decision making with the co-operation of the marketing manager who has more 
information about markets and public tastes. 
In this type of joint venture with shared-management according to Killing's 
classification (1983, p. 54), both partners have an active role in the management of the 
joint venture. 
It should be noticed that the distribution of ownership of joint ownership may be 
thought of as primarily aimed at clarifying the joint objectives of partners. In many 
cases in developing nations "the question of majority or minority participation is 
essentially a symbol rather than a reflection of the actual degree of control exercised 
over the operations of the enterprise" (Friedmann & Beguin, 1983, p. 15). This thus 
makes it likely that the control of policy in joint partnership, even where there is 
minority participation by the foreign company, may be decided in relation to the 
parent company's strategy. As one manager of a parent company explained his 
enterprise's philosophy: 
We do not like to put too much capital in a developing country, so 20-25 per cent of 
a joint venture's equity is ideal for us. But whether we own 10 per cent or 51 there 
are three things we must control - product quality, the decision to expand the 
company's equity base and any design directly related to the product", design or 
manufacture. 'Illis means that we always have a few of our own people in 
nianagement positions in tile venture. (Killing, 1983, p. 72) 
This statement shows many analogies to the ownership pattern and the proportion 
held by the parent company in its subsidiary venture. The French inanager essentially 
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controls the processes of the product's quality, product design and manufacture, as the 
vice chairman of the subsidiary indicated. 
6.11.3 Technology Transfer 
Generally speaking, the textile industry stood at the technical heart of the 
industrialisation process in Egypt since the 1930s, as a result of constructing two big 
mills. 
One of the main incentives which stimulated the Egyptian partner to enter into a joint 
venture was because the French company had more experience, skill and familiarity 
with technology, as well as a brand name tied to the French design in the garment 
industry. 
So, the subsidiary uses highly advanced technology acquired from the parent 
company. A production manager indicated during the interview that the company uses 
the same types of technology, both product and process, which are already applied in 
the parent and other subsidiaries in France and West Germany. He cited: 
"We are proud that we are in theforefront of using the latest advanced technology ill 
our company. You imagine! There is no difference between what we use and what is 
used in the parent country and other subsidiaries in France. " 
The company uses this advanced technology, especially in the first stage of 
production, design and cutting and in the finishing stages. It has been indicated that 
the type of technology applied required a labour intensive approach in most of the 
production process stages. As a result, the company employed a reasonable size 
labour force (600)3and created new jobs in the region. 
The Egyptian firm depends on R&D activities of the parent company in France, 
where very advanced R&D is available to continuously develop production. nese 
facilities comprise introducing new methods of production to deal with competition in 
both local and international markets. 
The contract of know-how and technical assistance between the Egyptian subsidiary 
and the parent company concluded that the inputs of required technology would be 
such that the production of the local partner would be rendered possible, and that this 
new technology would be quickly assimilated. The services furnished by the parent 
company can be summarised in the following manner: 
Ilie number of work force when the company staried its production in 1981 was YX) employees. 
So, it means the number has 
doubled in 9 year\. 
I- All the available know-how, knowledge and process in all firms in the developed 
countries which belong to the ready garments division of the parent companv are 
at the disposal of the Egyptian partner. 
2- The TeSUItS of ongoing research as well as all new processes or industrial 
machinery developed by the firms of the group are also brought to the attention 
of the Egyptian subsidiary. 
3- The same goes for other services such as organisation. programming, 
maintenance of machines, marketing, etc. 
6.11.4 Transfer Pricing Policy Applied 
In general, the financial executive has a certain opinion about foreign companies. Thi, 111 
view is based on the correct position for MNCs which should comply with the 
national intent and spirit of the law in the country. 
It has been mentioned above that the company depends heavily on local sources for 
suppling raw materials especially from the Egyptian partner. At the same time the 
company is dependent upon imported machines and other essential components 
bought from abroad (France, Germany and Brazil). 
The market transfer pricing system that would prevail in an arm's-length transaction is 
applied in the company. The policy offers a number of advantages to the company as 
follows: 
The accounting practices of many MNCs today have come under increased 
scrutiny by host governments, which often view them as mechanisms to achieve 
some benefits on the account of the host country. Consequently, a sound, 
consistent, straightforward transfer pricing policy would put the company in a 
good light with the fiscal authorities of the country. 
2- Market transfer pricing supports the decentralised profit centre concept and 
allows the company to be consistent with the competitive environment in the 
country. 
3- It encourages the subsidiary's management to re-price products in the market 
place on a consistent and competitive basis , \, N, 
hlle aiming at making an 
acceptable return. 
The process of formulating transfer pficing is done by the headquarters of the parent 
company. Transfer prices are set on an annual basis during budget preparation and 
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usually do not change during the year. Typically, these prices are agreed upon 
subsidiary executives. 
6.11.5 Analysing Factors Detern-dning Transfer Pricing 
The financial manager revealed that the volume of intra-company transactions is not 
too large (30%). He believes that even if the parent company manipulates transfer 
prices, the effect will be very limited. This is because of the small amount of 
transfers. However, the company is concerned basically with profit consideration and 
rate of income taxes in Egypt. These two variables received the highest rating by the 
manager. Other variables to which high ratings were given by the executive were the 
competitive position in the local market and maintaining good relationships with the 
Egyptian government. 
Several variables were given very low rankings. These involved risk of expropriation 
and nationalisation, strict capital control and shifting profits to other subsidiaries in 
order to cover some losses. 
6.11.6 Contribution of the Company to the Egyptian Economy 
The parent company was concerned to invest in Egypt for several reasons. The cost 
structure representing cheap labour and raw materials availability within different 
markets as well as local marketing policy makes it considerably cheaper comparing it 
to other subsidiaries. The possibility of opening more markets in other Arab states or 
in the Middle East countries can absorb the firm's production 
The parent company was also induced to invest in Egypt as the competition from 
other companies was low, except for one public company. Moreover the parent firm 
has more privileges than local companies. Concessions in the investment law 
especially tax holiday (15 years) also had an influence on the decision to invest in 
Egypt. 
The financial executive considers. under current conditions and in the rnarket 
economy of Egypt, the company's presence contributes to the development of the 
country. The company absorbed technology capable of generating its own up to date 
technology in order to develop its products. 
Concerning factors influencing the investment decision, it ha" been indicated that 
geographical proximity, investment climate, availability of raw materials, and labour 
forces. were the main incentives to the forelim inve,. ý, tor to enter into a -joint venture 
with the public sector company. 
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6.12 Company K 
6.12.1 Facts About the Company 
Company K was formed by a UK MNC in 1980 and commenced its production in 
1982 on the basis of a joint venture as indicated in Table 6.7. The MNC is widespread 
geographically which is perceived as one of its main strengths. 
Concerning Company K, the amount of capital is EL9 n0jon, and about 450 persons 
were employed in 1989. The invoiced sales amounted to EL60 million. Of total sales, 
20% was for export to Europe, Arab countries and Nigeria. It is worth nothing that in 
1989 only 10% of inputs represents intra-company transactions frorn the parent 
company. The reason for the low percentage of transfers was that raw materials are 
available in Egypt. Even intra-company materials supplied can be obtained locally, 
but the company was under pressure to obtain them from the parent company. 
Table 6.7 
Type of Joint Venture and Percentage of Capital in Company K 
Investor 
Parent company 
Public sector 
Private sector and Individuals 
Foreign investor (Commercial bank) 
Equity Percentage 
50% 
38 cl(- 
10% 
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The contract of establishing the joint venture company stipulated that the General 
Company for Batteries (the national investor) should close down its production. Not 
to mention the Egyptian government has guaranteed neither to permit or constitute 
other similar projects under the Investment Law nor local projects, even expansion of 
existing projects. Naturally, Company K has got concessions to the extent that it is in 
a monopolistic position. 
The basic agreement of establishing the company stipulated the parent company 
should supply all machinery and equipment. Also, technical and management 
assistance. patent, licence, and loans should be through the parent itself. On the other 
: 1u 
hand, the national partner contributed its share of capital in cash by borrow-ing the 
amount from the Ministry of Finance at annual interest rate of II 9c. 
The company has manufacturing as well as marketing operations as it benefited from 
the experience of the public sector investor in this respect. 4 It produces four kinds of 
batteries, electrical, industrial, automotive and lid acid. Automotive and industrial 
batteries contribute 80% of turnover. The demand for automotive batteries, for 
example, is heavily dependent on the number and range of motor vehicles operated. 
Using the number of motor vehicles operated in the host country, one is, able to 
estimate the growth rates of the demand for the product of the company. As regards 
the market for the power generation apparatus the competitive conditions are 
undoubtedly oligopolistic since it dominates the output and distribution of this 
product. 5 The growth rates of the demand for this product are in increase during the 
last 8 years. 
6.12.2 Management Appraisal 
The subsidiary reports directly to its headquarters. The reporting system takes a 
highly standardised format and comprises monthly and quarterly data. Monthly 
reports, as a rule, include data on preliminary turnover, orders received, orders 
invoiced and inventory. Quarterly reports contain the balance sheet and income 
statement, stock and sales analyses and gross profit in each product line. 
Evaluation and control of performance and behaviour of sales are heavily based on 
the degree to which budget figures have been achieved. The subsidiary sets its own 
sales forecasts for the future after having received important targets and general 
infon-nation from company headquarters. The corporate and subsidiary top executives 
meet at headquarters to discuss and formulate the final annual budget. 
Therefore, the basic standards of performance evaluation are (1) budget, which 
includes projections of financial issues, vs actual and (2) the present year's 
performance vs last years'. In setting up the budget, the company tries to incorporate 
expected economic conditions for the coming year. But as the economic conditions 
change, updated forecasts are made once a month, and further adjustments to the 
forecasts are made twice a month to reflect current conditions. The budget itself is not 
4 17he basic agreement for establishing the CompanN conditions that officers of the joint company ha,. c the right to scr-dtinise 
records of the public company with regards to producing and marketurIg batteries to ease establishing the joint compariv. 
When the company F started its activity in Egypt it dumped the domestic market Aýith imported 
batteries as a waý to study it. 
One can deduct that the companY trampled the local industm,. 
The agreement between the MNC and the national public 
company to stop producing and seffing eleCIrical. batteries which achic, ed a great profit in the past. 
Of course this ai: rcement 
constrained the national pariner by liquidating a successful project that 
had a great share in the market- 
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revised, only the forecasts. If managers do not meet their budgets because of 
uncontrollable events, they are still held accountable for an explanation. They can 
explain why an objective was not met, but they must also explain what actions they 
took to overcome conditions that had not been anticipated in the plan 
Furthen-nore the subsidiary is obliged to prepare verbal annual plans specifying action 
programmes by which budget figures are to be achieved and commenting on and 
clarifying different aspects of its respective budget. Since the company started its 
production in Egypt, it has achieved annual profits except in the years of 1984/85 and 
1985/86. 
6.12.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
The subsidiary holds a considerably high degree of decision-making over transfer 
pricing design. Because of the practice of trying to maxirnýise the return of sales in the 
market, Company K has been allowed to formulate transfer prices according to the 
prevailing conditions in the Egyptian context. As a result, the executive vice-president 
and the divisional managers have in fact ultimate authority in determining specific 
transfer prices. A guideline is established at company headquarters and transfer prices 
are determined at the subsidiary level in accordance with this guideline. The 
controller of the subsidiary reviews periodically the transfer prices to see that they fall 
within the broad framework of corporate guidelines. 
Intra-company transactions are computed on the equation of standard variable cost 
plus mark-up (15%). This method is usually used by the company. 
When discussing other transfer pricing policies that can be used by the company such 
as market price, the financial analysis manager emphasised market prices would be 
used if the company really gained something. It is a big pain to set market prices as 
they are prone to fluctuation. 
It has been concluded from an interview with the cost manager that the local price of 
plastic containers used in assembling car batteries was less than the parent price by 
40%. The subsidiary does not import these containers, but depends on local supplIe's 
as the strength and quality of the containers is similar. 
6.12.4 Analysing Factors Determining Transfer Pricing 
Concern was expressed about the effect of transfer prices on performance 
measurement, evaluation, rewards. but the econorruc declsion had prority over these 
concems. 
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Keeping good relations with customers is an important factor when transfer pricing 
polices are set. The sales manager mentioned: 
"We have products but the key to our success is in targeting large customers and 
offering them a complete service which precludes them from ever contacting our 
competitors. Sure we lose money on some products, but that is a cost of cenicniinc 
the customer relationship". 
The UK MNCs are, in general, ahead in most countries when they come to 
incorporating inflation into their financial analysis. The parent companY makes 
allowances for price-level increase in both internal and external reporting. It 
recognises the importance of inflation in the financial management of its business, 
both in performance appraisal and in project evaluation. 
6.12.5 Royalties Paid to the Parent Company 
Royalties paid are 4% of total sales. Of course this percentage is high, not least 
because the technical know-how is presented by the national partner (public sector). 
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6.13 Summary 
This chapter has presented comprehensive findings about 11 case studies of MNC,,, 
practicing their activities in Egypt. The characteristics of companies and their transfer 
pricing practices were discussed. It has been found that companies often obtain their 
requirements of raw materials from the parent company. Purchasing outside the 
domestic market was allowed in some cases especially the chemical company. 
Table 6.8 summarises some facts about companies investigated in the case studies. It 
should be noticed that all data in the table is for the yearof 1989 except the capital of 
company A which has been replicated in 1990. 
Of the environmental factors of MN transfer pricing, it was found that overall 
company profits and maximising con solidated- after-tax profits were the two most 
important objective of most companies. 
All MNCs exerting their business in Egypt are confronting a particularly complex 
array of economic variables that affect their profitability and investment. 
Motives and perplexities of investment in Egypt, technology transfer, royalty 
payments and other issues were discussed as well. 
The next chapter will present the overall findings of the case studies. SurveYs of 
government authonties that have an interest in transfer pricing wiH be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 7 
Research Findings 11: Overall Analysis of Case Studies 
7.1 Introduction 
The analysis in this chapter attempts to provide overall comparisons of findinj i gs on the 
basis of interviews with executives of the companies investigated. 
Different issues will be discussed in this chapter, including the characteristics of 
companies investigated, materials transfers, and transfer pricing policies. A.,, 
discussed in Chapter 3, MN transfer pricing systems are markedly affected by a group 
of environmental variables, this chapter is designed to identify these variables. 
Incentives and disincentives for investment in Egypt axe discussed at the end of the 
chapter. 
7.2 Ownership Structure 
The field study involved II MN subsidiaries, whose names were anonymous. Some 
useful empirical findings have been indicated by the study. The joint venture was the 
most common type of business. The findings of this study suggest that companies 
with wholly foreign companies and majority foreign companies are concentrated in 
industries such as pharmaceutical, chemical, and engineering. On the other hand, the 
two companies with minority foreign companies were concentrated in the fields of 
textiles and engineering, where the foreign shares were 25% and 20% respectively. 
It has been noticed in most surveyed cases that MNCs tend to concentrate the control 
over their subsidiaries in their own hands, even in a minority ownership case. This is 
through the management board as they exercise control firmly over the critical 
decisions. In general, it has been found that foreign managers in these companies are 
mainly responsible for: 
a- choice of technology, feasibility studies, product design and other related 
activities such as quality control, and 
b- establishiný, detailed plans for operation. 
Therefore maintaining the control over subsidiaries is vital for organising MNCs' 
operations in a harmonised way. In this vain, it may be useful to note that, the U. S. 
Chen-dcal Marketing Association in its advice to its members recommended: 
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"If you have the necessary balance of resources, a whol-ly owned subsidian- is 
preferablc to a joint-venture: If you use a Joint-venture secure control. but anv share 
of ownership is better than a licensing agreement" (Balasubramanvam. 1984, p. 730). 
7.3 The Financial Structure 
For the companies investigated, it was found that the capital per project differs, 
considerably from industry to industry and from one project to another. While some 
companies were found to have a fixed capital of some millions, others haN, e about a 
million Egyptian pounds. In addition, companies with sizeable fixed capital were 
found to be mainly concentrated in chemicals, pharmaceutical, and engineering. 
The other feature that characterises the financial structure is the source of finance. It 
was found, contrary to the premise that ownership structure is usually coincident "vith 
the source of finance, that there is no straightforward connection between the two in 
Egypt. Some companies with a majority foreign ownership, raised the largest part of 
their capital in the local market, mostly via loans. Such a source represented in some 
cases 90% of the total capital of such companies. This is due to the fact that MNCs 
often have privileged access to local capital giving them a competitive advantage over 
local firms. 
7.4 Sources of Raw Materials and Production Requirements 
It was demonstrated that all companies in the survey obtain their requirements of raw 
materials and intermediate products from their parent companies. The senior manager 
of a pharmaceutical company which obtain the lion's share of its requirements from 
abroad commented: 
"Our parent company i's recommending the specifications of materials to produce the 
same product as in (the home country). This is why we are purchasing raw materials 
from the same source. " 
As the main issue of the research is to investigate the extent of manipulating transfer 
prices as a means to shift profits outside the host country, it was important to assess 
the source and authority of purchasing production goods (raw materials, intermediate 
goods, and so on). 
Basically, all companies in the study import their requirements through their parents 
either directly or from other subsidiaries. Even, if they are not available from the 
group, the headquarters recommends the source of purchasing which is often the 
mother country. In some cases, special permission would have to be obtained from the 
parent company if imports from other sources were found to be necessary. Not only 
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had permission to be obtained for the import of some quality of raw materials, but the 
quality had to be checked and closely controlled. 
The foreign partner, as it is demonstrated in table 7.1 was alone responsible for 
production goods sources in 55% of the cases. Meanwhile, about 18% was left to both 
foreign and local partners together, and in 27% of the total cases the choice was 
concentrated in the local partner's hands only. 
Meanwhile, it was found that purchases of raw materials in the local market are 
concentrated in the textile industry. 
Table 7.1 
Representation of Choice of Sources of Production Goods 
Number % 
Parent Company 655, cl, 
Local Partner 2 18 C/'C 
Both Foreign and Local Partner 327 c7c 
Total 1 100% 
Source: Case Study Results. 
Nevertheless, further insight into the 27% of co-operatives, reveals that such co- 
operation is a myth rather than a reality. In the three companies indicated in Table 7.1, 
it was apparent that the local partner was a public sector company. Hence, in such a 
situation, the representation of the local side becomes a necessary formality. But the 
final decision was left to the foreign partner. 
7.5 Corporate Transfer Pricing Approaches 
The forty three financial executives interviewed were asked to indicate the frequency 
of use of the various transfer pricing methods. As discussed in Chapter 1, these 
methods could be based on cost or market. Cost-based methods range between actual 
or standard, variable or full, added a markup or not, marginal cost, negotiated price, 
and dual price. Market-based prices are dichotomised into two methods: arm's-length 
and adjusted market price. Interviewees were asked if other methods were used, such 
prices were assessed by the host govemment. 
"IS 
The results of these methods were tested statistically using the Minitab PackaLe to 
extract both the mean and standard deviation. 
The mean for each method was calculated on the basis of giving a scale for each 
response. For example, observations of arm's-length price method were: (2) never 
used, (7) rarely used, (3) sometimes used, (11) frequently used, (20) usually used. The 
mean response would be 33.80 (=((2x 1) + (7x2) + (30) + (I I x4) + (20 x 5)) / 5). 
The standard deviation (s) is the square root of the sum of squared deviation from the 
mean divided by the number of observations less one. Algebraically this can be 
shown as: 
S: 1, (X-X-)2/(n- 
The higher the mean, the greater the relative importance of the methods to the 
respondents in the sample. The higher the standard deviation, the greater the 
dispersion of judgements concerning relative importance. The standard deviation 
explains to what extent the respondents agree on the rating of the individual methods. 
Table 7.2 displays the empirical results pertinent to the frequency of use of transfer 
pricing methods. In Table 7.2 the mean score, standard deviation, and rank for each 
pricing method are shown. 
The most popular transfer pricing method used by MNCs operating in Egypt was 
standard full cost plus fixed markup method. The second, third, and fourth most 
widely used methods by companies were, negotiated price, actual full cost plus fixed 
inarkup, and prevailing market price, respectively. 
The theoretical transfer pricing methods, such as incremental cost, opportunity cost 
(including the mathematical programming techniques) were not used by the 
companies investigated. 
No company acknowledged using the dual price method. When asked if the transfer 
pricing method used for external reporting purposes differs from that used for internal 
purpose, all respondents indicated using the same basis. However. prices could 
chan(-, e frorn one transaction to another in order to achieve the goals of the cornpaný'. 
These findings do not support the contention occasionally voiced by government tax 
at, encies that the majority of MNCs often use dual transfer pricing methods. Thus, in 
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most cases, the transfer pricing used for performance evaluation is a price that iýs 
acceptable to tax authorities. 
The findings coincide with other studies such as Shulman (1975) and Brook and 
Renuners (1970) that MNCs consider the costs of maintaining several records are too 
high. 
For the three chemical companies in this study, the standard variable cost plus fixed 
markup method was the most widely used in pricing intra-company transactions, On 
the other hand the standard full cost plus fixed markup was most frequently used by 
the motor vehicle company. 
The adjusted market price was the most frequently employed method by two 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Meanwhile, as the field study involved 5 U. S. companies, two of them set their 
transfer prices according to negotiated prices and prices determined at corporate 
headquarters. 
Table 7.3 shows how the transfer pricing basis is selected in the surveyed companies. 
It might be concluded that the subsidiary normally has little direct participation in the 
setting of transfer prices, even in the most decentralised of parent/subsidiary 
relationships. The main reason for this is the perceived necessity to evaluate and 
integrate international factors which may influence overall profitability (including tax, 
foreign exchange, and financing factors). Of course, these factors cannot be fully 
appraised at the subsidiary level. But this does not mean that the local management 
does not have any influence on transfer prices. 'ne rational headquarters takes into 
account the subsidiary reaction to its pricing practices. This, however, is only an issue 
that parent and subsidiary objections might overcome without modifying transfer 
prices. 
7.6 Analysis of Variables Affecting Transfer Pricing Strategies 
A basic objective of the study was to assess the extent of manipulating MN transfer 
prices in order to shift profits outside Egypt. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are 
various variables that induce a MNC to function transfer prices for this purpose. 
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Environmental variables can pose a problem if they have not been taken into account 
when developing transfer pricing systems were discussed with interviewees. The sixty 
three executives were asked to indicate the extent of importance of variables that 
prove troublesome for a transfer pricing system. The weighting of the variables is 
based on a five point scale ranging from I= not at all important to 5= most important. 
Table 7.4 presents the ranking of the average importance and the standard deviation 
of importance for each of the 24 factors. The standard deviation describes to what 
extent the respondents agree on the rating of the individual factors. 
Table 7.3 
How the Transfer Pricing Basis is Selected 
Formulating Reviewing 
Number 
By Parent Headquarters 8 
By Subsidiary Managers I 
Both Parent & Subsidiary 2 
% Number % 
73% 666 II-c 
99% 2 18% 
18% 3 281/( 
Total 
ýource: Case Study Results. 
II 100 ck I1 100% 
It can be seen that "competitive and market conditions" received the highest rating by 
respondents closely followed by "Level of inflation in Egypt", and "multiple 
exchange rates". 
The two corporate factors of transfer pricing policies "maxinusation of the group's 
overall profit" and "performance evaluation of the subsidiary" were considered to be 
the most important factors. The financial controller of one company pointed out: 
"/t is no good buying a business and sitting on it- I might as Well put the nwne. v in the 
stock market, at least then I (, an get hold of the nwney agai .n qui . ckly. If I am got . fig to 
buy a business I havc to he able to see an opportunity to add to the valuc of the 
business. " 
Table 7.4 
Rank Order of Variables Affecting Setting Transfer Prices 
Rank Variabie 
Not Fairly "V erý Nh 
Impor- ImPor- Impor. Impor. Im 
tant tant tan t tant tar 
at ail 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
I- Market conditions and competition in Egypt 2 5 10 1ý 31 _5 1.40 62.10 
2- Level of inflation in Egypt 2 5 15 26 15 47.20 43.10 
3- Multiple exchange rates 2 8 21 17 15 44.80 33-10 
4- Maximisation of overall profits - 9 29 12 13 43.60 35.10 
5- Performance evaluation of the subsidiary 3 8 27 14 11 42.20 31.90 
6- Maintenance of good relations 
with the host government 8 13 15 15 12 39.80 22.60 
7- Differentials in income tax rates 
and income = legislation 27 14 16 6 - 25.40 17-08 
8- Existence of export subsidies 
and tax holidays III Egypt 8 11 23 13 8 38.20 24.10 
9- The bureaucratic system to deal 
with Egyptian authorities 8 12 22 11 10 38.40 22.70 
W- Simphcity and ease of application of 
transfer prices 15 13 17 13 33.80 16.72 
11- Existence of local shareholders 4 20 21 12 6 37.00 22.05 
I, - Maintenance of adequate cash flow 
in the subsidiary 2 12 38 11 - 36.80 46,70 
13- The need of the subsidiary to seek 
local funds 12 18 9 16 8 35.80 19.08 
14- Ambivalence of regulations in Egypt 12 14 24 9 4 33.60 23.30 
15- Comphance with tax and customs 
regulations of home country 12 21 16 8 6 32.80 13.75 
16- Restrictions imposed by the Egyptian law 
on the repatria6on of profits and capital 1-5 18 18 7 5 31.60 14.60 
17- Divisional autonomy 19 18 13 10 4 30.60 10.71 
19- Existence of price controls in Egypt 30 5 5 20 3 30.00 28.90 
19- Rates of customs duties and customs 
legislation in Egypt 29 11 12 11 - 26.20 16.77 
20- Rules and requirements of financial 
reporting for your subsidiary 21 24 16 2 - 25.00 22-29 
21- Shifting profits, to another subsidiary 
to cover pan of its losses 26 23 9 5 - 23.80 16-50 
Il- Anti-dumping and Anti-trust legislation 
in Egypt 30 17 11 5 - 23.40 14.21 
23- Restrictions imposed on the amount of R&D, 
royalties and other overhead costs charged 
against the subsidiary 32 19 12 - - 2110 
19.47 
24- Political risk in Egypt 28 27 8 21.20 
22.50 
The mean of each variable Is based on multiplying the number of observations by the scale given for each response. 
v erý NJ ost 
Impor- impor. Impor- Mean Standard 
tant tant tant Ranking Deviation 
During an informal interview with a manager of an investrnent bank Nisr fran 
Development Bank), he stated that the foreign investor is concerned xith the profit 
contribution, and the decision of establishing the enterprise depends basically on this 
factor. 
These factors will be discussed briefly as follows: 
7.6.1 Market Conditions and Competition 
Marketing and competitive consideration was investigated as a determinant to transfer 
pricing strategy. Table 7.4 shows that the competitive posItIon determinant has 
received very high ratings. According to the financial executive of a chernical 
company: 
11 the MNC might want to penetrate a market with a product that is made elsewhcre. 
In such cases, the company tends to decrease the transfer price of manufacturer even 
below an arm's-length price to make it more competitive. " 
The results of the study supports those reported by Bums (1983) and Tang (1979) that 
market conditions and competition was a major determinant of MN transfer pricing 
policies. 
7.6.2 Inflation Rate 
Inflation is a problem worldwide, most countries suffer from its effects particularly 
developing ones. As mentioned in Chapter 4 the rate of inflation in Egypt is soaring, 
especially during the 1980s. 
Faced with a persistently high level of inflation in Egypt, the investigated companies 
gave this factor a high degree of importance when they designed their transfer pricing 
systern. As shown in Table 7.4 the inflation is the most important factor that 
influences setting transfer pricing policies in Egypt. This result is consistent with 
those found by Tang (1979) and Yunker (1982) that inflation played very important 
role in affectina the transfer pricing strategies in MNCs. r-- 
7.6.3 Local Currency and Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
All companies involved in the study employ a host-currency perspectix, e for preparing 
management accounts and evaluating both the subsidiary and its manager. However, 
financial reports sent to the parent company are translated into the parent-currency 
perspective. 
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The continued increase in the value of the hard currency, notably the U. S. dollar 
relative to the Egyptian pound causes profits calculated in terms of the Egyptian 
currency and translated into dollars to decrease. The reduction in the transferred 
profits would affect the "overall profit maximisation" objective. 
In the opinion of foreign investors, the shortage of foreign exchange hinders the 
smooth flow of their investment into Egypt. It is important, when considerin(-, 
investment in Egypt, to have assurance that foreign exchange will be avallable M 
adequate quantities within the foreseeable future in order to meet the demand for the 
import of raw or semi-finished materials, to service external debt. and to repatriate 
dividends. 
In addition, executives indicate that the availability of foreign exchange is equally 
important for projects designed to export their products. Foreign exchange is needed 
during the critical start-up phases of such projects in order to import production 
requirements and working capital. Such expenditures must take place before the 
project is able to generate export earnings. 
The scarcity of foreign exchange in Egypt compels companies to seek exports to third 
markets, even though they are essentially import- substitution projects. This poses a 
vexing problem for large MNCs which must integrate the output of their Egyptian 
plants in a global marketing strategy, thus competing in markets served by other 
subsidiaries of the same MNC. 
The results shown in Table 7.4 indicates the importance of this factor relative to 
transfer pricing policies. And the results substantiate those found by Tang and Yunker 
that currency fluctuations played a slightly important role in affecting the transfer 
pricing policies in MNCs. 
7.6.4 Prorit Maximisation 
Table 7.4 concludes that maximisation of overall corporate profits 'was one of the 
most important determinants of NIN transfer pricing policies 
The result of this study confirms the findings of Tang (1970, pp-80-81), Wu & Sharp 
(1979, p. 78) and Yunker (1982, p. 1 12) that maxImIsatIon of overall corporate profit 
was one of the most influential factors of transfer pricing policies by U. S NINCs. 
Furthermore, the result was found \vith respect to insurance of reasonable profits for 
subsidiaries to be consistent with that reported by Burns (1983, p. 25). 
7.6.5 Performance Evaluation 
The impact of performance evaluation on MN transfer pricing strategies was 
examined. When asked to assess if the transfer pricing policy used maY distort the 
subsidiary evaluation, executives responded No in most cases. As shown in Table 7.4 
this factor is important for transfer pricing bases. However, some interviewed 
managers indicated that when MNCs give a primary importance to corporate profit 
maximisation they do not use divisional profits solely for performance evaluation 
purpose. This result coincides with a survey of 52 MNCs, reported by Yunker (1982). 
The issue of whether MNCs use the same transfer pricing for both tax and internal 
purposes was also considered during the interview. All financial and cost accounting 
executives reported that they use the same transfer pricing method for such purposes 
as the cost of establishing different transfer pricing methods for different purposes 
represents significant factor in this matter. 
This result coincides with a study done by Czechowicz et al. (1982). They report that 
89% of U. S-based MNCs use the same transfer pricing method for both purposes 
despite a potential resource misallocation from doing so. The reason for this is 
explained in the following quotation from a manager of a US MNC: 
We've talked about developing a system that would (use) dual (transfer) prices- one 
for the tax authorities and one for internal control. But the cost and time needed to set 
up and administer such a system would be substantial. Furthen-nore, if the tax 
authorities find out that we are using a dual pricing system, we might encounter some 
difficulties. So we probably won't make any modifications in our system 
(Czechowicz el al. 1982, p. 6 1) 
On the other hand, executives were asked to indicate the extent that the reported 
results of the subsidiary reflect precisely their performance. Their responses are 
shown in Table 7.5 
The results exhibited in Table 7.5 indicates that 55% of executives are satisfied or 
totally satisfied with the criteria by the parent company for evaluating their 
performance. Of the 63 respondents 8% have no idea about the measurement criteria 
applied by the parent company, and thus their response was simply "do not kno"". 
The remaining 3717c are not satisfied with the reported prof-its for the performance 
evaluation. The nature of the response of the last group is attributed to one or more of 
the following reasons: 
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Price controls by the Egyptian government. This might be true as the majority of 
respondents that were not satisfied belonged to pharmaceutical companies. 
2) Economic instability in Egypt and foreign exchange fluctuations affected the 
reported results. 
Table 7.5 
Executives' Responses as to whether they are Satisfied with Reported Results to 
Evaluate the Company Performance 
Totally Satisfied Do not Unsatis- Totally 
satisfied know fied satisfied 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
9 14% 26 41% 5 8% 23 37% 
Source: Case Study Results. 
7.6.6 Maintenance Good Relations with the Host Government 
Total 
No. % 
63 10017c 
Table 7.4 shows the importance to MNCs of keeping goodwill with host countries. In 
fact, MNCs and a host government should recognise each other objectives and 
develop policies which lead to greater cooperation between them for their mutual 
benefit. For example, the Egyptian government is working to provide a favourable 
business environment for FDI and MNCs conducting their activities in Egypt. 
MNCs, when dealing with their foreign investment, are now pursuing long term 
objectives and have to have good relations with the host government. They recognise 
the effect of the strong economy in the host country on the position ot their 
subsidiaries operating there. Therefore, instead of profit maximisation at any expense, 
MNCs are now concerned with the economic stability of the host country because this 
economic stability has a great influence on the performance of the subsidiary and its 
profits 
7.6.7 Corporate Taxes 
Table 7.4 shows four issues related to the impact of corporate taxes on MN transfer 
pricing strategies. These issues are differentials in income tax rates, income tax 
legislations arriong countries, compliance with tax regulations of home country, and 
existence of export subsidies and tax holidays in the host country. 
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Companies reported that the first factor is the most important in designing transfer 
pricing policies. Companies tend to report higher costs of production, other than 
wages and salaries, to reduce their reported profits for tax purposes. For the followini! 
two factors, they played a fairly important role in deten-nining transfer prices, The 
results suggest that export subsidies and tax holidays played an important role in the 
development of transfer pricing policies. The result is understandable since export 
subsidies are widely granted in the less developed nations. where hard currency are in 
short supply. The results coincide with of those reported by Tang (1979, pp. 80-81) 
and Yunker (1982, pp. 114-115) that minirnisation of corporate income taxes ", as a 
key factor of transfer pricing policies of MNCs. 
7.6.8 Bureaucratic System to deal with Government Authorities 
Interviewees mentioned bureaucratic procedures dealing with the government 
authorities. For example, when they intend to transfer their profits and other funds 
abroad, long procedures are required to obtain approval. Table 7.4 shows that the 
companies investigated gave only a slight degree of importance to this factor relative 
to transfer pricing policies. 
7.6.9 Simplicity and Ease of Application 
The result of the study is consistent with the findings of Yunker (1982) that simplicity 
and ease of application was considered by MNCs as an important factor of transfer 
pricing policies. 
7.6.10 Existence of Joint Ownership 
The study declared the existence of local partners does not affect formulating transfer 
pricing policies to a great extent. The results of the study are consistent with those 
shown by Tang (1979) and Wu and Sharp (1979). On the other hand, the study and 
results with respect to joint ventures are inconsistent with those by Kim and Miller 
(1979). 
7.6.11 The Effect of Tariffs on Transfer Pricing 
Theoretically, customs duties should be of great importance in designing transfer 
pricing policies especially for MNCs operating in developing nations. This is because 
of the much higher levels of ad valorem tariff rates. As it is mentioned in Chapter 3 
there is a contradiction between the minimisation of income tax from one hand and 
import duties from the other hand. 
Some empirical studies mentioned that the lessening of customs, duties influence 
transfer pricing policies to a fair] large extent (Kim and Nliller. 1971). Tang, 1979, y Z: ý 
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Yunker, 1982; Bums, 1983). Table 7.4 shows the same degree of importance to th" S 
factor. The reason is that foreign companies practising their activitie', -, under the 
investment law are exempted from ad valorem tariffs for capital goods and a reduced 
rate (5%) is applied on production requirements. 
In summary, tariffs are of little consequence to MNCs in Egypt. Rates are low and do 
not, generally, represent serious problems. However, companies pay attention to the 
amount of duties as it is influenced by exchange rate fluctuations. On the other hand, 
non tariffs restrictions are of much greater importance. Prior authorisation to import is 
required. 
7.6.12 Government Restrictions on the Repatriation of Profits 
Despite the fact that the Egyptian Investment Code does not impose restrictions on 
the transferability of profits, some barriers might defer such transfers. The Investment 
Code mentioned that the approval of GAR is required it is the responsibility of a 
company to find out a source of foreign exchange. However, these issues do not 
represent significant problems at all. It is expected that this factor does not Influence 
transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs in Egypt. 
7.6.13 Subsidisation of Subsidiaries 
This factor has a special importance in pharmaceutical companies. The result 
elucidates that strength of competitive position and increasing market shares have 
formidable degree0f importance according to designing transfer pricing policies. This 
due to the existence of a fairly large domestic market with increased needs for 
industrial and consumer products, resulting from the increase in number and the 
enhancement of the standard of living of the population. The results of the study 
concur with Tang's study (1979). 
7.6.14 Price Controls 
This factor is applied on pharmaceutical companies in nearly all countries, to the 
extent that it can be a rule rather than an exception in the industry. 
All drug companies involved in the field study revealed that government controls 
limit their ability to operate with a reasonable amount of independence. Of course 
their output and profitability are affected by prices. 
7.6.15 Political Factors 
The political stability means that the host -oovernment 
does not face political turnioll, 
civil wars, racial policies. human fights violation, and so on. The continued political 
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stabHity within Egypt encouraged foreign investors to seek profitable investment 
opportunities. 
Table 7.4 indicates that political factors have a little degree of importance relative to 
transfer pricing policies. Respondents added that the policy of MNCs is to keep 
investments as low as operations permit if the political system is unstable, hoping thus 
to minimise the cost of confiscation. This result is consistent with Shulman's 
contention (1975) that a firm operating in a nation with unstable political environment 
might resort to transfer pricing strategies in order to keep as little cash as possible in 
that nation. 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the Investment Law 132 of 1989 guarantees the legal 
protection of foreign investors against the occurrence of expropriation action or any 
violation by the government. In case of confiscation the government guarantees the 
investor adequate compensation for a loss sustained as a result of such actions. At the 
same time, the political conditions are characterised to be stable in Egypt, at least 
compared to other countries in the region. 
So, political determinants are unimportant in setting MN transfer pricing policies. A 
vice president of a company commented that: 
"These jactors affect the company investment decisions more than its transfer pricing 
system. " 
7.7 Overstating Transfer Pricing by Pharmaceutical Companies 
Noteworthy, pharmaceutical companies overstate transfer prices not only to divert 
profits outside the country, but also as a gimi-nick to circumvent the price controls by 
the government. Every company has to submit a detailed statement of production 
costs for each product to the GOD, in order to set the final price of drugs. Therefore, 
it is the benefit of a company to inflate its transfer prices as the final price will be 
higher in this case. 
7.8 Capital Goods Are supplied through the Parent Company 
Managers interviewed revealed that machinery and equipment are often supplied by 
the parent company. Even in the case of joint venture ýwith a local public firm 
producing the sarne products, the MNC did not acquire machinery and equipment, 
under the pretence that old capital goods are not technolot-, ically adN, anced. In an 
interview, an executive declared that: 
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'7t is easier and safer to purchase plant and machin erýy from abroad. Since Ie come 
buck locally produced ancillary products may or may notfit equipments. " 
Executives interviewed were asked to pinpoint to what extent they can get machinery 
and equipment from outside sources. Table 7.6 summarises company executl\, e,, ' 
responses to this question. 
As the above Table shows, only 12% of responding executives mentioned that the), 
can purchase capital goods from outside markets without the parent company 
approval. Meanwhile, 26% revealed that the approval of the parent company is 
required to buy these goods, and they have to clarify the reasons for not buying these 
goods through the parent company. The majority of respondents (62'k) stated that 
capital goods are bought through the parent company for the reason of producing the 
same quality of products. 
Table 7.6 
Executives' Responses as to the Extent to which they buy Capital Goods outside 
the MNC 
Allowed with 
Complete 
Freedom 
No. % 
Allowed but Subject 
to the Approval 
of Parent Company 
No. % 
Not Allowed 
Total* 
No. % No. % 
7 12% 15 26% 36 62% 58 10 0 /-c 
* Only 58 executives gave their responses to the question. 
Source: Case Study Results. 
The issue was discussed briefly with the executives that mentioned they are allowed 
to buy capital goods from outside sources. It was found that the permission applies 
only on spare parts and auxiliary units. 
Certainly the parent company, in many occasions, practices some restrictive business 
over the subsidiary. For example the U. S. Goodyear Company stipulated that its 
subsidiary in Egypt should get machinery and equipment from it. The company 
charged the subsidiary for the price of capital goods and 217(- as a commission . 
An example shows the extent of manoeuvring transfer prices of capital goods. a 
parent company offered to supply machinerý, and equipment to its subsidiary in Egypt 
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for Ef, 58 million. At the same time, it offered to provide the same goods to all 
independent company (public sector) for EL38 million (cited by lssaý 1987, pp. 283- 
284). This means that the transfer price is exceeding the arm's-length price by 53(7(-. 
So, the final word for technology choice decisions always rests with the foreign 
partner. Even the decision of acquiring capital goods was made by both local and 
foreign partner, the latter often recommends some alternative sources from v. -hich 
purchases should be made. In the end, the chosen source was a company froni the 
home country. According to one manager: 
"We accept this situation as a way for advanced technology transfer. And frankly 
they are more competent than us in this regard. " 
Table 7.7 shows the parent company has the lion's share of choosing capital goods in 
the investigated companies. 
Additionally, it was acknowledged from the executives interviewed that the parent 
company was responsible for feasibility studies, product design, plant construction 
(its technology, and its supervision). and the accounting system. Thus, the more 
technology, the more the MNCs is concerned and the less is the role of the local 
partner, and vice versa. 
Table 7.7 
Representation for Acquiring Capital Goods 
Number 
Parent Company 
Local Partner 
Both Foreign and Local Partner 
Total 
Sourcc. - CLsc Study Results. 
7.9 Supply and Installation of Machinery 
7 64% 
I 917, c 
32 717c 
II 100 C/C 
It, chn*cal serv*ces relating to the Machinery suppliers are often 
in charge of most te III 
procurement of machinery and equipment, which comprise installafion. start-up, 
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maintenance, and testing operations. To ensure effective operation and maintenance 
of production facilities, parent companies normally provide their Egyptian 
subsidiaries with all technical information and assistance. These include detailed 
manuals and operating instructions, a list of recommended plant spares. material 
specifications, quality control, manpower requirements and safety procedures. 
It was concluded that the contribution of the foreign investor was great in this issue. 
In all cases, his role was quite obvious, as the bulk of machinery was furnished by 
him either directly as a share of the company's capital or by placing orders to the 
manufacturing facilities of the parent company, or indirectly by recommending 
certain manufacturers specialised in the field and with whom he had already done 
business. During negotiations, the foreign investor insisted on being involved in one 
way or another to make sure that A machinery and equipment are adequately capable 
of meeting production requirements and in accordance with the highest specifications 
of quality production. The consent of the local partner was given in most cases on the 
ground that it is desirable to make the foreign investor legally responsible for this 
task. This is because the foreign investor has more knowledge to judge the adequacy 
of machinery and equipment and to make sure that suppliers furnish the necessary 
guarantees and certificates of fitness. This phenomenon was noted not only in 
relatively small concerns where local partners do lack technical capability, but also in 
large undertakings where technological requirements appear to be too sophisticated or 
complex. 
7.10 Technology Transfer 
One of the vital benefits of foreign investment or of MNCs practicing in host nations 
is the technology transfer. This involves transmitting knowledge including secret 
technical know-how, new systems of production and skills, and utilizing and servicing 
this technology in the host country. 
It was found that the MNCs working in Egypt have an international reputation for 
their technology. As a matter of fact, all respondent managers were proud Of using 
high advanced technology similar to that used in the parent country. In almost all 
cases studied, respondents showed that production operations and techniques were 
solely chosen by foreign investors. The investigation of the field study showed that 
the parent company restricts its E_gyptlan subsidiary indirectly to buy capital goods 
and production components from it. This behaviour could be interpreted in the light 
that MNCs tend to transfer more or less the same sort of technology used in the 
advanced markets without significant adaptation. So, the sort of technology provided 
requires a high quality and particular inputs that might not exist in the local market. 
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Moreover, MNCs n-fight provide technological services in a given stage of production, 
for example, operation technology, or product design. In this case the subsidiar-ý, has 
to seek the parent as a source for its requirements. 
Of equal importance, all the main technological services related to the investment 
process (design and construct of the project, head office in Egypt. marketing. etc. ) are 
done by the foreign investor. 
In brief, the bargaining power of MNCs increases with the level of technology 
introduced into host countries. The more advanced the technology, the stronger the 
position these companies have. In addition, the MNCs position gets stronger, the more 
the host countries' dependence on them for such elements as technology, marketing, 
and advertising increases (Lecraw, 1984, pp. 30-41) 
7.11 Cost of Technology Transfer 
The findings of the study proved that Egypt has experienced different kinds of 
technology costs. To start with direct costs, it was found that they take the form of 
royalties, equity, lump sums or a combination of some of these. It was found that 
royalties (as shown in Table 7.8) represent the dominant form of payment for the 
surveyed companies. In this respect, 90% of companies' payments for technology 
took the form of royalties either separately or in combination with other forms. This 
was followed by lump sum and equity forms for 36'Zc and 9% of the companies, 
respectively. 
Table 7.8 
Distribution of Payments for Technology 
Form 
Royalty 
Lump Sum 
Equity 
Source: Case Study Results. 
Number 
I () 90% 
39% 
1 9% 
N. B. The sum of these companies is more than the lotal 
surveyed, because there are some companies which 
mentioned niore than one form of payment. 
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Hence, it is clear that the surveyed companies prefer payments in a form of royalties. 
It was, also, observed from information provided by GAR, that this form is more 
common in the pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and engineering industries. Not only that. 
but also its level was higher in these industries compared to other industTies, -whilst it 
was 567c in average for the former', it was 2% for the latter. 
However, it was noted that the level of royalty payments in Egypt, in general, is lo%A- 
compared to the international levels. While the rate in Egypt is around 1.5 to 517c, it 
was estimated to be round 10 to 30% in most developing nations (Patel, 1974, p. 10). 
There is some evidence that transfer pricing in fees and royalties is now more activelý, 
used to shift profits than the pricing of goods. A financial manager of a subsidiary 
whom I interviewed expressed the opinion that in his industry (phan-naceutical), 
MNCs were now avoiding tax in Egypt to a far greater extent by payments of fees and 
royalties than manipulation of product prices. 
As mentioned, when discussing case studies in Chapter 6, most of the pharmaceutical 
MNCs set up scientific offices in Egypt. The purpose of establishing such offices 
could be compensating the low percentage of royalties paid by the Egyptian 
subsidiary. Accordingly, parent companies held a separate marketing agreement 
stipulating the payments by licensee to licensor of 10% of net sales as a contribution 
to these offices. Additionally, as mentioned erstwhile, a certain percentage of sales is 
allocated to Egyptian subsidiaries to meet advertising costs by their parent companies. 
As far as the analysis is concerned, however, the percentage contribution to scientific 
offices for advertising can be treated identically to the percentage of royalty 
payments. If fact, the objective of all these ways is to shift more profits outside the 
Egyptian borders. 
7.12 Allocation Methods for Headquarters Services 
General costs or certain corporate services that are traceable to foreign units should be 
allocated to the benefited subsidiaries according to the concept of matching cost and 
revenue. This concept is fair to measure the profitability of each subsIdjary. However, 
the basis for allocating general expenses may be more or less complex depending on 
the structure of MNCs and the extent to which various costs are common to the group 
as a whole, or pertain only to certain subsidiaries. 
As indicated in chapter 6, pharmaceutical companies pay royalties %&ith certain rates and 
duration penod as tollows: . 
5% for 
10 years, 3% for the next 5 years, and 2% for the last 5 vear\. I 
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It is difficult to come up with a method of allocation that is not arbitrary to some 
extent. MNCs might employ a variety of allocation techniques, such as a percentage 
of sales or production, direct usage, parent- su bsid iary negotiation or some other 
reasonable and systematic basis. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, general expenses involve costs of R&D. management and 
overhead, technical assistance, transportation and advertising, interest on loans, and 
so on. It is likely that subsidiaries in less developed countries are more dependent on 
headquarters' services than those in developed countries. 
To assess current practices of the Egyptian subsidiaries in utilising these services 
interviewees were asked to indicate whether these expenses are allocated to their 
subsidiaries. 
In the case of R&D, all companies participating in the study would in all probability 
seek to undertake these activities in their parent countries. This is because of the high 
costs and large uncertainties of these activities. 
It has been found that R&D expenses are allocated to subsidiaries on different bases. 
These bases are an actual (4 companies), a percentage of sales (2 companies), a 
percentage of production (one company) and an estimated rate added to the cost of 
irnports (2 companies). Two companies showed that R&D expenses are not allocated 
to them. 
With regard to the transportation cost of imports, it is added to the cost of imports in 6 
companies, and allocated on an actual principle in 5 companies. Technical assistance 
fees are not allocated in 2 subsidiaries. The remaining are allocated on an actual basis 
in 7 companies; a percentage of sales in one company-, and according to the 
profitability of each subsidiary (one company). 
Management expenses are allocated only in 3 subsidiaries either as a percentage of 
sales in 2 companies or a percentage of production in one company. The cost of loans 
from the parent companies are allocated according to the rate of interest in Egypt. The 
results of allocation of general services are summarised in Table 7.9, as it shows, the 
i, najority of subsidiaries admitted that the cost of headquarters' services are allocated 
to thern. 
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Table 7.9 
Intra-Company Allocation of General Expenses 
Item 
R&D 92 
Management Expenses 
Transportation Costs 11 
Technical Fees 
Source: Case Study Results. 
7.13 The Exaggeration of Technical Fees 
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Technical assistance fees represent a significant part of the costs in joint venture 
companies. For instance, in a study by the United Nations for projects in African 
countries, it was found that salaries paid to foreign consultants represent 50 times the 
salaries paid to nationals (Issa, 1987, p. 276). 
In Egypt, a report by the General Organisation for Industrialisation stated that salaries 
paid to foreign experts and technicians are very amplified, being on average 9 times 
their Egyptian counterparts (Issa, 1987, p. 276). The findings of case studies declare 
the differentials in salaries are due to additional costs such as cost of living 
differentials, the expense of moving families, annual vacations back home at 
company expense, and children's educational expenses. 
With regard to surveyed companies, it has been noticed that salaries of foreign 
consultants exceed by several times, (without specification to figures as they were not 
accessible either from companies or the GAR), those paid to their local counterparts 
undertaking similar work. 
7.14 A Proposed Role of the Government to Control Licenses 
As investigated, subsidiafies paid inflated royalties and services fees as a result of 
abusing the cost of technology transferred by parent companies. 
The government can control license fees. from an unrelated and potential licensee to a 
license for similar patents. Such control is based on one of the factors to be 
Allocated Not Allocated 
considered in the absence of an arm's-length basis. So, suppose royalties have been 
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adjusted by the authorities for the purpose of income tax, the next step is to compare 
financial statements of the subsidiary, calculated by decreasin2 roN, altv expense. with 
the profitability of unrelated manufacturing company. Such a way relies on an 
economic theory as the commensurate-with income standard. Th's theory assurne,, 
that each company in an industry should earn a similar profit rate (Bonnev and 
Sherwood, 1989, p. 95). Of course it is not easy to apply this method and considerable 
problems are anticipated. And some issues must be taken into account when 
determining comparison such as: 
- "Whether the license is exclusive or nonexclusive; 
- The extent of trademark and patent rights; 
- Terrns of the agreement; 
- Ten-nination rights of the parties; 
- Whether there is any transfer of know-how through the exchange of technical 
drawings and other documents, or through the loan of personnel by a company to 
its affiliate; 
- Quality standards imposed by the licensor; 
- Control exerted by the licensor in manufacturing and marketing the licensed 
product; 
- Ownership of any improvements made to the intangible; and 
- Requirements to purchase materials from the licensor (tie-ins). " (Bonney and 
Sherwood, 1989, p. 96) 
Besides the above factors, in order to get a fair comparison, the key question is 
whether the companies would earn "substantially similar profits from substantially 
similar transactions" (Bonney and Sherwood, 1989, p. 97). Some other factors should 
be considered, such as the similarity of the existence of collateral transactions or 
ongoing relationships, the size and economic development of the market, and the 
level of economic risk. 
7.15 Audit Process of Egyptian Subsidiaries 
Like any company, MN subsidiaries carry out two types of auditing, internal and I 
L- 
external, The ain-i of the internal auditing is to ensure that all financial transactions are 
precisely recorded. It has be found that this sort of auditing is implemented by both 
the internal auditing department of the subsidiary and the department of auditinL, of 
the headquarters. 
The second type is the external auditing which is executed by an independent 
accounting firm to examine the subsidiary's accounts and prepare a report on the 
fairness of the financial statements. This audit is done according to general accepted 
auditing standards. 
Naturally, tax admýiriistration has the right to access the subsidiary's books and 
investigate its reports in order to determine the taxable income. The GAR also have 
the same right, but only over companies established according to the investment law, 
in order to evaluate the company performance and determine profits transferred 
abroad. In the meantime the General Organisation for Drugs (GOD) has access to 
pharmaceutical companies' books for the purpose of controlling selling prices. 
7.16 Flow of Transfer Pricing Information to Government Authorities 
Executives were asked if the information prepared for the government authorities, i. e. 
GAR and Tax Authorities, involve transfer pricing policies. Financial executives (43 
interviewees) indicated that the financial reports required by the GAFI include the 
balance sheet, income statement, inflow and outflow of foreign currency, and follow- 
up reports. Tax Authorities required only the first two reports. None of the companies 
involved transfer pricing policies in their reports because there are no regulations in 
this respect. 
Having identified the reports prepared and submitted by MNCs, executives were 
asked to state the extent to which they would accept providing transfer pricing 
infon-nation and disclose it in their financial reports. Executives' responses were on a 
5-point scale ranging from "totally acceptable" to "totally unacceptable" and are 
presented in Table 7.10 
Table 7.10 indicates that the majority of executives (79%) are not willing to disclose 
tTansfer pricing information. This was attributed to the general feeling prevailing 
among executives that transfer pricing disclosure might affect their competitive I 
position in the market. These results indicate that almost all executives regard the 
confidentiality of transfer pricing information as very important in running their 
business. 
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Table 7.10 
Executives' Responses as to the Extent to which theywould Accept Disclosing 
Transfer Pricing Information 
Totally Accept Accept Unaccept Totally 
accept to some unaccept Total* 
extent 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % N, 0. c7c 
2% 3 7% 5 12% 11 26 c7c 23 53% 43 10 () (/-c 
The question was directed only to financial executives as they are responsible for providing 
financial reports to competent authorities. 
Source: Case Study Results. 
7.17 Motives for Investment in Egypt 
There are some factors that influence a company's decision to invest abroad. Foreign 
companies might be attracted to invest in Egypt for several considerations. For 
example, the Egyptian market structure, the opportunity to maximise profits over 
world-wide operations, and political stability might represent principal determinants 
for investment there. The Egyptian Investment Code, as mentioned in Chapter 5, 
provides a number of incentives that attract FDI to take part. 
To assess these determinants in the filed study, the research intended to derive 
company executives' perceptions of the motives for MNCs to establish operations in 
Egypt. During the interviews, companies' Executives were asked to pinpoint their 
views as to the factors that attracted their parent company to set up its activities in 
Egypt. The effect of each factor was on a 3-point scale to show high, medium and 
low. 
To indicate the positive factors that affevt the flow of FDI into Egypt, each of the 
factors are ranked according to the relative effect of each facto on such flow. This 
done as follows: 
I) Since the effect of each factor is measured on a 3-point scale to show the degree 
of importance. a numerical value of 1,2, and 3 is used to calculate the overall 
effect of each factor. This is calculated (for each factor) by multiplying the 
number of respondents selecting each response by 1,2, and 3 respectiN ely. 
4() 
2) The summation of the above calculation could be used to rank the factors. but the 
problem was that not all respondent (63 executives) provided response to all 
factors. The total number of respondents ranged from 45 to 60. Therefore the 
ranking order based on the absolute number would be misleading. To avoid this 
problem the summation of the above calculation (for each factor) is divided hv 
the total number of respondents producing the mean value. Based on the mean 
values, factors are ranked in descending order. 
Table 7.11 shows executives' responses to the factors that influence the decision 
making of MNCs to invest in Egypt. The Table draws the frequency and percentage 
of respondents and the numerical mean response. 
It can be observed from Table 7.11 that the most important factors for investment in 
Egypt are (1) Government policy towards FDI, (2) dominating the local markets, and 
(3) political and social stability. Foreign companies find Egypt a potentially attractive 
market, especially as it has an estimated population of 57 million (in the middle of 
1991). The results of the study are consistent with a similar study of 33 foreign 
companies in Egypt (EI-Haddad, 1988) which found political stability to rank quite 
high as an influence on FD1 decision. 
The result of this study, relating to the market factor, coincides with a study carried 
on 22 joint venture companies and 3 wholly-owned companies in Egypt, where 90% 
of answers mentioned that the basic incentive of direct investment is to dominate the 
large domestic market (cited by Essa, 1989, p. 22). 
This issue was known to both the local partner and the government authorities 
responsible for foreign investment in Egypt. For instance, some companies got 
concessions to import finished goods and market them in the domestic market before 
starting production. The purpose of this is to get advantages over the domestic market 
and by providing it with imported products, especially where there is a growing 
respect for whatever is foreign and a disdain for everything national. 
Other reasons for the investment decision in Egypt were the political stability, 
freedom of profits and capital repatriation, circumventing trade restrictions, secure 
access to raw materials, and a cheap and well-trained labour force. Egypt is the most 
industrialised country in the Arab world. So, it has an encouraging potential to export 
products to these countries' markets. The latter factor was accorded somewhat less 
important than preceding ones. Tax credits were an important incentive for US MNCs 
to invest abroad. These tax credits provide an additional benefit to U. S. MNCs in 
allowing that taxes paid directly to foreign governments on income and dividends 
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received from abroad will be credited against their tax liability to the U. S. 
government. 
The ability of a foreign firm to transfer its profits represents one of the most important 
factors considered in a company's decision to establish an overseas operation. Such an 
ability depends largely upon the host government's regulations. The Egyptian 
investment Code grants the right of foreign investors to transfer their profits. 
Interviewees in textile and engineering industries pointed out that the availability of 
raw materials for these two industries was an important impulse for the investment 
decision in Egypt. But it was found that the availability of raw materials ha., --, some 
limited importance in the other companies. Cheap labour was a very important 
incentive for the investment decision, as it was mentioned above that foreign experts 
command high salaries compared to their local counterparts. 
The issue of export by Egyptian subsidiaries was a less important incentive for 
investment in Egypt. Some MNCs even practice restrictions on export market to 
prevent the discrepancy among their subsidiaries. 
In summary, the results revealed that MNCs set up their activities in Egypt for a 
number of factors as follows: 
(1) Government policy towards FDI. 
(2) Political and social stability. 
(3) The large domestic market 
Repatriation of profits and capital). 
(5) Maximising return on investment. 
(6) Tax holiday and other tax exemptions. 
(7) Attractive growth prospects of Arab markets. 
(8) Cost advantages (raw materials and labour force) 
Factors 6 to 8 represent the government policies aimed at pursuing foreign 
investment. Factors I to 5 represent those factors which are related to the Egyptian 
economy, political and social conditions and which may have a positive impact upon 
the flow of foreign investment into Egypt. Z: ' 
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7.18 Identifying Companies' Problems 
To identify the major problems facing MNCs, executives were asked to give their 
perceptions of the factors causing problems to their operations. The major problems 
might be summarised as follows: 
I- The bureaucracy and formal procedures when dealing with government officials. 
Dealing with various government bodies represents one of the major factors 
causing problems for MNCs- 
The bureaucracy in Egypt seems to be the result of overstaffed government 
offices, and the change of government policy toward investment happening 
without educating and training the civil servants in how to deal with foreign 
investors. Bureaucracy is also the result of civil servants lacking the ability and 
efficiency to deal with investors. These feelings were expressed by company 
executives in many ways. One executive stated that: 
"The main problem is that we have to deal with civil oyfficers who lack the abilitY to 
take a decision either because they are riot qualified, or because they are riot willing 
to take responsibility. " 
Another executive expressed the situation by saying that: "thc civil officer hesitate to 
undertake decision". In his view, this is due to two main reasons: first, the fear that 
their decision might be wrong; and second, the fear that they may be accused of 
being bribed. Consequently, he further said: 
it civil officers tend to have several signatures on a document in support of their own 
which implicity means niore time is required. " 
-iinates between local companies and those established The government discrin 
under the investment law either foreigners or nationals. For example, the 
government subsidises energy costs supplied to local firms, whereas it sells it to 
investment companies at the actual price. However, it should be noticed that the 
government controls the final price of products of the former group. 
3- Local inputs with the appropriate quality are not available easily. So, if a project 
used the local alternative of raw materials it is likely to lose its competitive 
advantage especially in the foreign market. 
4- Related to the preceding point, when the project depends on imported production 
requirements it should have an approval from the GAFI. Import procedures 
requires the government approvals which are alxays too long. Also, there are the 
fluctuation in exchange rate affects and the shortage of foreign exchange. 
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5- The exchange rate is one that has steadily worsened. MNCs have to face rapid 
fluctuation in exchange rate as well as soaring inflation In Egypt. The problem 
was further accentuated by the fact that a high proportion, much higher than 
usual, of the total cost was in equipment and materials imported. 
6- Instability of economic measures was considered by the responding executives as 
a factor negatively affecting their profit margins. 
7- The responding executives complained about the different and conflicting 
regulations applied by the government authorities they have to deal with. Aji 
example was given by one executive who mentioned: 
"To transfer profits you have to get an approval from the GAFI. The GAFI trics to 
reduce the transferable profits by negotiating with the investor as to the amount of 
fixed assets depreciation. The GAR usually argues that depreciation is 
underestimated., and thus it should be increased. If we look at the Tax Authorit-1, we 
willfind completely opposite tendency. In its own interest, the Tax Authoritv tries to 
increase the taxable profits as much as possible. The wa 
-y 
in which it does that is to 
decrease the operating costs. Again the main element negotiated bly the 7ax 
Authority is thefixed assets' depreciation". Hefurther explained that "in both cases 
(i. e. decreasing the transferable profits or increasing the tuxablc profits) the 
investors will not be able to get his authorised benefits. The invcstor also may lose 
the expected returnfor which he established his ini, cstment. " 
8- Executives in two companies complained that the GAR does not rneet some of 
its previous undertakings, for instance on market protection. One executive stated 
that: 
"despite thefact that there is an agreement with the GAFI not to give licenses to new 
investors for five yearsfrom production start-up, a production license was given to a 
foreign company. " 
Another executive revealed that: 
"two Egyptian firms are known to be negotiating with foreign companies to form 
joint venture to produce similar products". He added that "this contradicts the 
agreement ývith the GAFI not to approve new investment projects for four years of 
starting up our production. " 
It was understood that approving new projects affect the available production 
capacity of the existing companies. 
Of course, it is more naivete from the government as it has had an obligation not 
to approve establishing similar projects either foreign or national. More t7 
interestingly. existing projects of the same industry are not allowed to expand 
their activities. These examples emphasise that MNCs preferred to be in a 
monopolistic condition. 
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7.19 The Effect of Operating Problems on Investment Decisions in Egypt 
Given the problems facing MNCs, interviewees were asked to give their perception as 
to the possibility of undertaking new investment projects in Egypt. Table 7.12 
summarises executives' responses. 
In case of expanding the subsidiary's activities in Egypt respondents were asked to 
determine the source of finance. Executives' responses are displayed in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.12 
Executives' Responses to the Effect of Operating Problems on the Investment 
Decision in Egypt 
Investing Reluctant Do not Invest 
No. % No. % No. % 
14 25% 23 42% 18 33% 
Total* 
No. % 
55 100% 
* Only 55 of 63 executives gave their views on the question. 
Source: Case Study Results. 
Table 7.13 
Executives' Responses to the Source of Finance in Case of Expansion the Firm's 
Activities in Egypt 
Perception Executives' Response* 
No. % 
Self-finance either internally or through 
the parent company 21 3 217c 
BoiTowing from financial institutions 44 6817c 
Total 65** 100% 
Only 48 executives have given response to the question. 
17 executives mentioned that they would depend on the two ways of finance. 
Source: Case Studv Results. 
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These results indicate that 69c7c, of responding executive perceived that forei2n 
projects depend on borrowing from domestic financial institutions. Interviews pointed 
out that the reason for preferring this way of finance is due to the ease of getting 
loans. It is believed that the economic instability in Egypt, especially foreiizn I- 
exchange did not induce subsidiaries to depend on self finance, neither reinvesting 
profits or borrowing from the parent company. 
7.20 Summary 
This chapter presented findings and results of the case studies. Data analysis was 
based on responses of 64 executives interviewed during the field study. 
Different issues were discussed in this chapter. These involved the characteristics of 
companies, transfer pricing policies, environmental factors affecting transfer prices, 
the extent of overestimating royalties paid by the Egyptian subsidiaries to their 
parents, incentives for investment in Egypt and other issues. 
This chapter concluded by analysing the results of this study in relation to various 
propositions concerning transfer pricing practices and profit shifting in MNCs. In 
many cases the results were consistent with the theory. On the whole, the study's 
findings were consistent with those of previous surveys which examined the transfer 
pricing practices of MNCs. 
Chapter 8 
Research Findings III: Perceptions and Attitudes of Government 
Officials in Egypt 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding two chapters identified and examined transfer pricing strategies mII 
MNCs. To complete the picture, this chapter identifies and discusses government 
authorities' perceptions and attitudes towards transfer pricing practices by these 
companies. The opinion of the external auditor is discussed also. 
The data upon which the identification and discussion tasks are based was collected 
from a survey questionnaire administered by interview to parties interested in MN 
transfer pricing topic. These parties consisted of tax authorities, customs departments, 
GAR and the external auditor. 
8.2 The Attitude of Tax Authorities 
For the purpose of this research data have been collected from tax administrations in 
both Cairo and Alexandria cities. Interviews took place with 19 officials to collect the 
required data. A questionnaire was used as a guide which was administered to them 
during the interviews (see Appendix Q. The purpose of the interviews with tax 
officials was to determine the extent of scrutinising transfer prices, and if they do, 
does it result in conflict with MNCs'? On the other hand, can national tax policy take 
into account transfer pricing response in a way that satisfies national objectives'? 
The first question directed to tax officials was to state problems that face the Tax 
Authority in determining the taxable income in MNCs. These problems might be 
summarised as follows: 
1) Bookkeeping methods are sometimes different from the corru-non methods. Also, 
a foreign language is used in the majority of MNCs for recording accounts, 
Hence, tax officers might find it difficult to understand financial reports and 
accounts. 
2) Overestimating amounts paid to the headquarters for technical and admýinistrative 
services. Officers were asked to determine exactly ho", they judge that the items 
of these expenses are overvalued. Most answers mentioned that these expenses 
were higher than those in the national companies. 
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3) In some cases. MNCs do not provide the tax authority with the required data and 
documents that support some items in the financial reports and accounts. 
Regarding scrutinising transfer prices by Tax officials, it has been found that they 
accept prices on the import invoices provided by MNCs. The reason for this is that 
they rely on the fact that the prices were checked by Customs Authorities 
The general manager of tax department at Alexandria pointed out, during all 
interview, that investment companies seek to minin-lise their tax burdens through 
many ways, such as inflating royalties and other expenses payments to their parent 
companies. With regard to the artificial prices of imports, the tax authority does not 
adjust them. This is because the tax authority often accepts the price mentioned in 
invoices submitted by the company. He added also that there is no instructions to 
adjust the price. The lack of experience of taxation staff to deal with issues such as 
transfer pricing and intangibles is a problem for the tax authorities. 
The general manager has emphasised that for tax purposes, steps must be taken to 
scrutinise and compare these payments with arm's-length transactions. Tax staff 
should be well trained to deal with the MNCs. The government should re-evaluate 
and tighten the existing financial control process of determining the transferred profits 
and income tax of foreign companies. 
Unfortunately, there are no rules in Egypt requiring foreign companies to provide the 
tax authorities with transfer pricing information. Some tax officials expressed that 
some foreign companies are very aggressive tax-payers. Officials built their opinions 
upon the fact that tax liabilities for those companies are disproportionate with their 
gross receipts. Of course there is tax revenue lost. Some officials see that MNCs 
might take into consideration taxes as an element of production costs. 
In general, tax authorities face difficulties to assess transfer prices for two reasons: 
1) because, by their nature, MN transfer prices are beyond the direct scrutiny of any 
one taxing jurisdiction-, and 
2) because of the immensity of the auditing effort that may be necessary to be in a 
position to challenge management. In this matter, it has been found that most of 
tax officials do not understand, precisely, how the transfer pricing affects 
financial results of the company. Potentially, the absence of transfer pricing 
regulations is the main reason for this misunderstanding. 
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8.2.1 Fees for Centralised Administrative, Management and Other Services 
Central management or administration expenses by the parent compan% Y might be 
categorised as follow: 
(a) Expenses that are incurred by the parent company in its "custodial" capacitV, 
i. e., as a shareholder managing its investment in subsidiaries rather than in the 
provision of services to its subsidiaries (these expenses should be borne by the 
parent and applied against its income from investment)-, 
(b) Expenses incurred for the benefit of a subsidiary in the group and are 
associated with the provision of specific identifiable services to that 
subsidiary. An example of these expenses, technical assistance costs that are 
clearly incurred for the benefit of a single subsidiary or more in the group, 
(c) Expenses that are incurred for the benefit of a number of subsidiaries of the 
group as a whole and are shared services and facilities, such as marketing and 
advertising costs if they are centralised for convenience or economy. 
Of course, the basis of recognition expenses and charges to be deducted from the 
taxable income must be supported by documents. 
A preliminary issue where fees for centralised management, administrative and 
similar services are charged to an Egyptian subsidiary is whether any portion of the 
fee is subject to Egyptian tax. These charges can be abused against Egyptian 
subsidiaries by parent companies. Under the general rules of Egyptian tax law, these 
fees and charges must be incurred for the purpose of earning income in order to be 
deductible from taxable income. 
In summary, there are no regulations to monitor transfer pricing for MNCs. The 
government should propose regulations for this issue to enable tax authorities to get 
the required information. Of course, this is not easy, as the government may lack 
sufficient relevant data and expertise and due to the ability of the tax-payer to comply. 
8.3 Interviews with Customs Officers 
The objective of the questionnaire directed to customs officials was to appraise the 
role they practice over transfer prices. The interviews took place in t", k-o customs 
departments in Cairo and Alexandria. The former deals only with investment 
companies and the latter is a general one. 
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Because of the importance of customs duties as a source of government revenue. there 
is growing recognition to establish accurate market prices and trends so that 
regulatory controls can be applied more effectively. 
Officers were asked to state the extent to which they find themselves in dispute with 
MNCs regarding the value of imported goods. Officers' responses to that question are 
presented in Table 8.1 
Table 8.1 
Customs Officers' Responses to the Extent to which they find themselves in 
Dispute with MNCs about the Valuation of Imported Goods 
Never Sometimes 
No % No % 
19% 8 50% 
Always 
No % 
31 36% 
Total 
No % 
16 100% 
The results presented in Table 8.1 indicate that the majority of responding officers 
have found themselves in dispute with MNCs in this respect. The response of officers 
could be explained by the fact that MNCs might attempt to underestimate the value of 
goods to reduce the value of customs duties. As mentioned during the interviews 
almost all disputes are successfully settled during negotiation between the Customs 
Authority and MNC's management. 
Respondents were asked to state the basis of calculating customs duties in cases of not 
relying on the invoice. It was found that one of the following bases might be used: 
1) Price guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Economy, 
Prevailing market prices, 
3) Otherwise, estimated prices might be used such as approved prices for previous 
similar cases. Contacting th e suppliers is used as well to arrive to reasonable 
prices. 
Officers were asked about the ad valorem rate that applied on MNCs' imports. It has 
been found that they apply the GAFI's regulations, i. e. full exemption of duties t'OT 
capital goods and 511c for production requirements. 
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Officers were asked if there is any kind of co-ordination between them and Tax 
Authorities to provide the latter with information related to the reasonable prices of 
imported goods. All interviewees pointed out Tax officers never asked them for this 
kind of information. 
It has been investigated during the field study that customs authorities suffer from 
many administrative deficiencies. Officials can not get correct information about 
MNCs' behaviour internally or internationally. This is in addition to the difficulties of 
evaluating such information, supposing they obtain it. Authorities are not equipped 
with an efficient administrative apparatus capable of coping with MNCs practices. 
8.4 The Attitudes of GAR 
As the GAFI is responsible for evaluating and foflowing-up the performance of 
foreign investment companies in Egypt, interviews with 26 officers took place during 
the period of the field study (December 1989 to February 1990). The purpose of the 
interviews was to investigate if the GAR is concerned to scrutinise transfer pncing 
policies as they affect disclosed profits of the company. 
Interviews were conducted, separately, with the head of each division, and the head of 
each department within each division of the GAFI. A free discussion and a 
questionnaire were used to collect the data required. The questionnaire (see Appendix 
B) was administered to them during the interviews as it happened with other 
government authorities. 
Some questions were similar to those discussed with company executives. These 
involved the importance of MNCs for the national economy and advantages and 
obstacles of investment in Egypt. Other questions were about abusing transfer pricing 
by MNCs and the role of the GAR in this matter, the extent of controlling royalties 
and other fees transferred abroad, and the requirements of foreign investment 
companies to improve the investment environment in Egypt. Hence, these matters 
will be discussed briefly as follows: 
8.4.1 Abusing Transfer Pricing 
The problem of transfer pricing was the main issue during several interviews with 
officials in the GAR. The question discussed with GAFFs officers was to what extent 
is the Egyptian government involved in determining transfer prices for MNCs 
working in Egypt'! Generally, the Authority does not pay attention to transfer pricing 
technique's of either overestimation or underestimation of the value of imported 
inputs, However, an GAFFs staff member said: 
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"If the GAFI is in doubt about the investor's data, it will seek information about the 
project's import requirements in the international market and use it as a basis fior 
comparison. " 
it was explained that since it was established in 1974, the GAR has not checked the 
prices provided by investors in any case. 
Officers were asked if the parent companies stipulate Egyptian subsidiaries to import 
production inputs from them. Table 8.2 summarises officers' responses to this 
question. 
Table 8.2 
Executives' Responses to the Question of Whether the Parent companies 
Stipulate Subsidiaries to import their requirements from them 
Never 
No 
Sometimes 
No 
Always 
No 
Total* 
No % 
4 17% 6 25% 12 58% 24 100% 
* Among the 26 responding officers, only 24 of them have given a response to this question. 
It is clear that the majority of responding officers perceived that MNCs condition 
their subsidiaries in Egypt to obtain their production requirements through them. 
Some officials indicated that, often, the foreign partner dictates conditions to his local 
counterpart, even in cases with n-iinority foreign ownership. Raw materials are to be 
imported from the parent company or through it. A senior official mentioned one case 
which clarifies the extent of abusing transfer pricing, as the foreign partner obliged 
the subsidiary to purchase raw materials at 150% over its market price. In some cases, 
it is not allowed to assemble parts produced locally except after written approval by 
the parent company. 
8.4.2 Inflating Royalty Payments 
The issue of inflating royalties paid to the parent companies was discussed with the 
GAFI's officials . As Table 
8.3 shows, 5717c of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that royalty payments could be used to shift profits from subsidiaries in Egypt. 
Meanwhile, 31% disagree or strongly disagree that these payments are inflated. The 
remaining respondents (i. e. 12%) agreed to some extent. Cý 
25' 3 
Table 8.3 
Officers' Responses to the Question of Inflating Royalty Payments to Parent 
Companies 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
No % No % 
19% 10 38% 
Agree to some 
Extent 
No 
12 '-7c 
Disagree 
No 
12 c7, 
Strongly Total 
Disagree 
No % No c7c 
1917( 26 100% 
Relating to the above question, two issues were discussed with officers. These were: 
(1) if it is believed that MNCs shift more profits outside Egypt, and (2) whether or not 
the Egyptian government play any role in preventing such undesirable transfers, i. e. 
through transfer pricing techniques. The results of the officers' responses for the first 
issue are presented in Table 8.4. All respondents indicated that the Egyptian 
government has no role over MNCs to prevent them to shift profits. 
During an interview with an executive at the GAR it was mentioned that know-how 
contracts are considered a main channel to shift profits as the government does not 
oppose on conditions of the contract held between the subsidiary and its foreign 
company that transfers the technology (which is most cases the parent company 
itself). For instance, an executive quoted: 
"Foreign companies often use know-how contracts to shift profits outside Egypt, This 
because there is no legislation to monitor these fees. The government therefore 
should pay nwre attention and regulate the technology transfer". 
Another officer has revealed that there is a programme with the UNIDO to 
standardise the percentage of royalties, which will be used as a guideline for MNCs in 
Egypt. 
The officials stressed that the Egyptian government should mandate a law dealing 
with technology transfer by foreign companies. A government approval for all 
technology agreements should also take place. Moreover, it should motivate these 
companies to provide their technology to local firms in order to participate in the local 
market. 
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8.4.3 The Role of GAFI in Performance Evaluation of FDI 
The process of evaluating company performance by the GAR starts with collecting 
the data required for evaluation purposes. Such data are basically extracted from three 
financial reports submitted by the companies: the follow-up report: the balance sheet , 
and the income statement. 
Table 8.4 
Officers' Responses to the Extent that MNCs Shift their Profits outside Egypt 
Never Sometimes Always 
No % No % No % 
5 22% 7 30% 11 48% 
* Only twenty three officers have given their views. 
Total* 
No % 
23 10017c 
The first report is prepared by the FDI, and includes the following data: 
Capital structure: sources of capital (shareholders' equity, long-terrn loans, and 
short-term loans) classified into foreign and local capital. 
2- Output: volume and value classified into local sales, exports, and inventory 
(opening and closing balances). 
3- Employment: number of employees grouped according to nationality (nationals, 
and foreigners), and wage payments for each group. 
As for the balance sheet and income statement, there is no designed form to be used to 
collect the items in these two reports. Companies are left free to submit them 
according to their own accounting sy,, tem. 
Based on the data extracted from financial reports, company operations are evaluated 
for the purposes of: 
Ascertaining that the company is conducting the same business activity as 
approved by the Authority's Board of Directors. 
, I- ations, generate Measuring the company's ability to meet its financial oblig 
profits, and efficiently utilize its available resources. 
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The first objective is simply achieved by comparing type of product(s) current1% 
produced by the company and those mentioned in its feasibility stud. y. If a company is 
found to be producing other products(s) or conducting another business act'\'It\'. the 
general action undertaken by the GAF1 is to tax the profits generated from this 
activity even if the company is still enjoying a tax holiday. 
To achieve the second objective the GAR applies financial ratio analysis techniques. 
These ratios are classified according to their purposes into four categories: 
1) Financial Ratios: long-term debt/equity ratio, and total debt/equity ratio. 
2) Liquidity Ratios: current ratio and quick ratio. 
3) Profitability Ratios: return on investment ratio, and return of equity ratio. 
4) Turnover (Efficiency) Ratios: inventory turnover ratio, total assets turnover ratio, 
and working capital turnover ratio. 
Given the data about a company's operations over a number of years, the above 
financial ratios are calculated and the company's performance is evaluated. Time 
series analysis of a crude type is used. 
It was realised during the interviews with GAFFs officials that the Authority relies on 
the company's external auditor's report which includes the expression of an opinion as 
to the fairness of the financial statement presentation. In addition, an auditing office at 
the GAR reviews and audits the company reports to ascertain that: 
a) the company has submitted its tax declaration and discharged all taxes as well as 
other obligations due to the State. 
b) relevant depreciation rates on fixed assets have been applied. 
c) a relevant method has been applied to evaluate inventory, and this method does 
not change from one year to another. 
d) accrued revenues are generated from the company's activity. and this activity has 
been approved by the GAFI's Board. 
e) reserves, especially those for bad debts, are sufficient to meet the purposes for 
which they have been set aside. 
-' 
Officers were asked what would happed if a company exerted transfer pnCing 
techniques to shift its profits. In answering this question it was mentioned that if the 
GAR was in doubt about the value of the company's import and export transactions. 
then world prices are taken as the main price trend in reevaluating these transactions 
and thus in recalculating the company's declared profits. When officials "vere asked 
how often this happens, no specific answer was given. It was further stated that the 
range of profit/equity rates which is considered reasonable for foreign manufacturing 
companies is 15 to 30% . This range is sometimes compared with the actual (reported) 
rate of return. If the actual rate was more or less than 3017c this may be taken as an 
indication of the use of transfer pricing techniques by the company concerned. 
8.4.4 Comment 
The process of performance evaluation by GAR relying on a company's external 
auditor's report has shortcomings for three reasons: 
1) the difficulty of ensuring the independence of an external auditor who is paid by 
the company being audited. 
2) the limited interest of external auditors. They are basically concerned with the 
fairness of financial reports. Issues such as transfer pricing and management fees 
paid to the parent company have very little interest or no interest at all. This is 
particularly true in Egypt where the private sector accountants have no great deal 
of experience with these issues. This is due to the ignorance of international 
business studies in accounting departments of universities, and the absence of 
foreign business operations during the two decades that followed the 1952 
revolution. 
3) The process ignores the possibility of transfer pricing techniques to distort a 
company's reported profits. The range of profits/equity used by the GAR to 
judge if the company employed transfer pricing techniques is not enough. Most 
companies are still enjoying the tax holiday (i. e. the fifteen years of tax free 
production according the Law 230 of 1989). After this period foreign companies 
are likely to distort their reported profits. 
Therefore, the government is particularly recommended to: 
perform its own auditing and investigation functions and not rely heavily on the 
company's external auditor's reports. Such reports should be used as 
supplementary factor during the auditing and investigation process not a,, the 
basic one. 
2) consider the possibility of using the transfer pricing techniques to distort reported 
profits after the tax holiday period. 
8.4.5 The Role of GAFI Over Royalties and Fees Paid to Foreign Companies 
As mentioned previously, know-how contracts must be registered at the GAR. But it 
should be noticed that the Authority does not have real power to adjust the amount of 
royalties and fees in cases where they are exaggerated. 
8.4.6 Factors Affecting the Flow of FDI into Egypt 
It was mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7 that this issue was raised for discussion with 
company executives. It was important to identify the major factors that positively 
affect the flow of FDI into Egypt from the government's viewpoint (represented in 
GAFI's officials). 
Executives were asked to provide their perception as to the effect of each factor on a 
3-point scale to show high, medium and low. To identify the major factors affecting 
the flow of FDI into Egypt, each of factors are ranked according to their relative 
effect on such a flow. 
Table 8.5 presents executives' responses to the factors which positively affect the flow 
of FDI into Egypt. It shows the frequency and percentage of respondents and the 
numerical mean response. 
Table 8.5 shows that the Egyptian government policy to attract FDI, large domestic 
market and political and social stability are the most important factors having positive 
effect on the flow of FDI into Egypt. Cost advantages and growth of Arab markets, 
seem to have a relatively small positive effect on the flow. The following is a 
description of the results obtained and interpretations for each factor. 
8.4.6.1 Government Policy towards FDI 
The government policy towards MNCs may have a strong influence on inward 
investment. The openness policy in Egypt with the packages of incentives and 
guarantees against non-economic risks led to significant changes in the flows of 
inward investment. 
Table 8.5 shows 771/-c of respondents considered this factor as having a high positive 
effect, and 23% of them perceived it as having a mediurn positive effect. At the same 
time, no respondent mentioned that this factor has a minor effect on the flov., of 
inward investment. 
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8.4.6.2 Growth rate of the Domestic Market 
This factor is primarily considered as one of the main motives for \I-\Cs to invest 
abroad. The result coincides with Lecraw's study (1991), in that market potential is 
one of the most important determinants for investing abroad. A similar result ", a,, - 
produced by Brooke (1986) as he found that 80% of 120 MNCs regarded dominating 
the market is the main reason for FDL 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Egypt has a big and wide market as it has a large 
population compared to the region's other countries. As Table 8.5 shows, non of the 
respondents disregarded the positive effect of the large domestic market on the flow 
of FDI into Egypt. About 73% of respondents considered this factor as having a high 
positive effect, and 27% of them regarded it as a having a medium positive effect. 
8.4.6.3 Political and Social Stability in Egypt 
Political instability of a country affects negatively the economic and social welfare of 
its people, this in turn negatively affects FDL Since drawing up the peace treaty with 
Israel in 1979 and ending the state of war, Egypt has become more socially and 
politically stable than before. Despite some events that threatened the political 
stability, such as the assassination of President Sadat in 198 1, and the riots and 
mutiny of Central Security Forces in February 1986, Egypt is regarded as politically 
and socially stable. 
These results agree with those of Lecraw's study, in that the extent of political risk in 
a host country is regarded one of the most important factors that influences the 
decision making of MNCs to invest abroad. Lecraw found that "the greater the 
decrease in country risk, the greater FDI inflows" (199 1, p. 17 1). 
8.4.6.4 Maximising Return on Investment 
As a general rule, generating profits is the major objective of doing business. This is 
particularly true when a company invest abroad where greater risks are involved. 
Officers differed in their response to the effect of this factor on the flow of FDI into 
Egypt. As shown in Table 8.5,46% of executives considered this factor as having a 
high positive effect and 42% regarded it as having medium effect. The remaining 
12% viewed it as having a low effect. 
The findings of this study are consistent with those of Brooke (1986), who found that 
ensuring achievement of profits is one of the main incentives to conduct busiriess 
abroad. 
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8.4.6.5 Repatriation of Profits and Capital 
The possibility of remitting profits and capital was also highlighted as an important 
factor influencing the MNCs' decision to invest in a particular country. As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, the Egyptian Code gives foreign companies the right to ren-Lit their 
invested capital and transfer their generated profits. But the ability of a company to 
transfer its profits and/or capital depends largely upon: the company's foreign 
exchange generating capacity; and its negotiating capability with the GAFI to get the 
approval for such transfers. 
Table 8.5 depicts that 54% and 27% of respondents regarded the transfer of profits 
and capital as a factor having a large or medium effect on the flow, of inward 
investment to Egypt. Only 27% of respondents considered this factor to have a low 
effect on the investment decisions. 
8.4.6.6 Tax Holiday and other Incentives 
Tax incentives are one of the most common sets of investment incentives used by host 
governments to encourage FDI- In Egypt FDI is exempted from several types of tax 
for a particular period of time which can be up to 15 years for some kinds of projects 
(see Chapter 4). 
The effect of tax incentives on the flow of FDJ into Egypt seems to be significant. As 
Table 8.5 shows, 54% of respondents regarded this factor as having a high degree of 
influence on the investment decision and 27% of them considered it to influence the 
investment decision to a medium degree. On the other hand, 19% of respondents 
viewed it have a low effect on the flow of inward investment. 
8.4.6.7 Cost Advantages 
MNCs are sometimes lured to move abroad to benefit from the cheap raw materials 
and labour force. Cost advantages seem to have only a little positive effect on the 
flow of FDI into Egypt. As Table 8.5 shows, only 17% of respondents considered this 
factor as having a high positive effect. It should be noticed that respondent officers 
mentioned that FDI is attractive in extractive sectors such as oil and mining. Of the 23 
officers, 35% indicated that this factor influences the investment decision to a 
medium extent. The majority of responding officers (489c) revealed that the cost 
advantages factor has a low influence on the flow of investment into Egypt. 
It is believed that MNCs are attracted to invest in Egypt because of the low costs of 
labour compared to other countries. At the same time, they Mtend to supply their 
subsidiaries with raw materials. 
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8.4.6.8 Attractive Growth of Arab Markets 
Egypt is located in the centre of the Arab world. It is relatively more developed than 
the other Arab countries. It has the biggest human resources, and a relatively efficient 
industrial capital for the area. This gives Egypt a major role in the socioeconomic 
development process in the Arab world and makes its collaboration necessary in any 
regional initiatives. Therefore it was expected that the MNCs would be interested in 
Egypt, to make use of the available manufacturing facilities to produce goods and 
supply the Arab markets. 
Unlike the prior expectations, Arab markets do not seem to have a substantial positive 
effect on the flow of FDI into Egypt. Table 8.5 depicts that the majority of 
respondents (67%) considered this factor as having a low effect. Otherwise, 3317c of 
respondents regarded this factor as having either a medium positive effect (19%) or 
having a large effect (14%). 
This could be explained by the fact that MNCs are interested basically in the Egyptian 
market and then (if feasible) in the Arab markets. 
8.4.7 Common Requirements of Foreign Investors 
The foreign investor always stipulates a number of guarantees from the government, 
such as an adequate infrastructure (port facilities, roads etc. ); water, and electricity at 
reasonable prices; exemption of equipment from import duties; and external tariffs 
airned at protecting products from competitive imports. Some investors dictate 
royalties in the form of a lump-sum technology purchase instead of a flat percentage 
of the value of sales. In some extreme cases, the investor conditions royalties to be a 
combination of a lump sum representing capitalisation of a proportion of expected 
royalties (which the supplier may then convert into an equity shareholding in the 
recipient entity without actually having to lay out capital) plus regular royalty 
payments based on the value of sales or the volume of output. The amount of royalties 
and management fees is often exaggerated. In some cases, MNCs refuse to export and 
commercialise the output in excess of local demand. 
8.4.8 Comment 
In conclusion, the GAR disregards the possibility that transfer pricing techniques 
may be used by MNCs to avoid exchange control, inflation rate, and more importantly 
to distort the profitability of subsidiaries. The empirical studies on the MN transfer 
pricing policy (Chapter 3) indicate the likelihood of abuse of this policy by 
enterprises in host developing countries. Therefore, it is the duty of the government to 
keep this in mind and not to disregard the results given by this study. 
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8.5 General Comments of Government Authorities 
Four general comments have been made by interested government agencies on the 
ways in which control measures should be improved. 
First, nearly all authorities contacted consider that control over transfer pricing 
techniques should be exercised primarily for capital and intangible assets. The), also 
generally believe that a combination of regulatory and competitive controls is 
necessary tO iMpTove this issue. 
The second general observation was to emphasise the importance of government 
developing and sustaining negotiation skills in the area of transfer pricing. 
The third comment was to stress the importance of augmenting monitoring and 
enforcement of controls on declared qualities and quantities of imported and exported 
products. 
Finally, a majority of government officials advised that there is a need for some 
centralised and co-ordinated investigation in specialised areas where the particular 
government authority's resources and expertise are insufficient. 
8.6 Auditors' Opinions 
An interview took place in a big accountancy firm that audits most foreign investment 
business in Egypt. The purpose of the interview was to investigate the role of the 
auditor in auditing transfer pricing policies. 
During the interview two questions were asked. First, Does the external auditor check 
the transfer prices'? Second, what will happen if investors intend to use the transfer 
pricing technique either to overestimate or underestimate the value of imported 
inputs'? 
In general, financial reporting for MNCs is not governed by legislative requirements 
applied to public sector companies. Also, there is no statutory requirement that the 
financial statements should be published. 
In answering the first question, it was stated that the auditor's role is to audit financial 
I There is no statements in accordance with International Auditing Guidelines. 
responsibility for the external auditor to exan-une transfer pricing policies. Only, the 
auditor's report to the shareholders must include any significant information which he 
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thinks should have been disclosed, or which he believes should be brought to the 
attention of the shareholders. ' 
With respect to the second question, it was pointed out that the external auditor does 
not pay attention to this matter. Information should contain the amount of intra-group 
transactions that have taken place. Because of nonexistence of international transfer 
pricing disclosure requirements, the auditor would have no responsibility for verifying 
the reasonableness of assigned transfer pricing values. 
8.6.1 Comment 
As mentioned, none of the MNC subsidiaries working in Egypt are under obligation 
to disclose their financial performance publicly, thus enabling the foreign corporates 
to keep them commercial confidential. 
When the matter of disclosure was discussed with company executives they were not 
in favour of extending disclosure requirements to subsidiaries of MNCS in Egypt. 
It should be noted that the United Nations' report (1988) requires the company as a 
whole to disclose in its financial statements, the accounting treatment applied for 
transfer pricing policies. In particular, it should indicate whether such transactions 
have been made on the basis of market prices or, in the absence of such prices, other 
methods which should be described. In discussing this issue with auditors interviewed 
they mentioned that the subsidiary is required only to disclose the volume of such 
transactions. 
On the other hand, the auditor would need to consider the effect of audited financial 
statements on any third party claims which require valuation adjustments or 
additional liability provisions. The auditor would have the responsibility to be 
satisfied that intra-firm transactions are accounted for in a manner which is consistent 
with their underlying economic substance. In consequence, the disclosure of transfer 
pricing should be harmonised to give the auditor both (1) a standard for judging fair 
presentation and (2) responsibility for obtaining adequate audit evidence as to the 
accuracy of the disclosure. 
In summary, the auditor's responsibility for examining international transfers are 
derived from his duty to examine and report upon company financial statements. So, 
it appears that auditor's responsibilities for examining MN transfer prices are derived 
frorn his duty to examine and report upon company financial statements. He is 
I For details of information that should he disclosed. see UNCTS (1989, pp. 32-'14). 
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charged with making such tests as he considers "necessary in the circumstances" in 
order to express his opinion whether the financial statements examined are "presented 
fairly" in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
The independent auditor, exercises little influence on the valuation of intra-firm 
transfers and no professional responsibility is specifically recognised in this respect. 
There is also no guide for the performance of such a function which includes the 
disclosure of such transfers. 
Of course disclosure of intra-company transactions may enable the user of the 
financial statements to identify amounts that are not based on the arm's-length 
transactions and to assess the extent of any dependence on intra-company activities, 
This disclosure could take many forms, ranging from revealing only that such 
transactions exist to detailed descriptions of transfer transactions, and pricing 
methods. 
8.7 Summary 
A part of the field study was to investigate the attitudes of the Egyptian authorities 
about abusing transfer pricing by MNCs. These departments comprise of tax 
authorities, customs authorities, and the GAFL Some interviews took place with 
officials in each department. 
Meanwhile, the external auditor's concern is to report to the shareholders the state of 
affairs of the business. The responsibility of the auditor involves the verification of 
the correctness of herald profits/losses which might be affected as a result of dubious 
transfer pricing policies. A part of the field study was to investigate the attitudes of 
external auditors in Egypt towards auditing the MN transfer prices. 
This chapter presented the role of governmental authorities in scrutinising transfer 
pricing strategies. It has been concluded that only the customs authorities have a role 
in examining intra-company pnces for the purpose of excising tariffs. There is neither 
co-ordination nor co-operation of exchange transfer prices information between tax 
and customs authorities. In general the Egyptian government is largely unaware of the 
transfer pricing aspect. 
On delving further into the problem, the chapter exhibited the appraisal of the role of 
the external auditor in verifying transfer pricing policies. It has been found that his 
role is currently very limited. 
Chapter 9 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
9.1 Introduction 
Transfer pricing is one of the most considerable sources of conflict between M-NCs 
and their host countries. A major purpose of this study was to survey transfer pricing 
and profit shifting practices by MNCs, with the case study of Egypt as a host country. 
This chapter summarises the key issues of the study including research objectives. 
research methodology, principal survey findings and conclusions and lirruitations of 
the study. Suggestions as to the contributions of this study will be presented toward 
the end of the chapter. 
This research's concern with MNC transfer pricing practices in Egypt is based on 
theoretical and practical studies. It should be noted that the findings and 
recommendations of the study cannot solve the problem. However, it is, hoped the 
study will encourage the government authorities to give more concern to the transfer 
pricing problem and raise more vital questions which may suggest further studies in 
this field in the future. Also, the study pinpoints some important consequences of 
MNCs and foreign investment policy on the Egyptian economy. 
Transfer pricing techniques are used to control the allocation and distribution of 
goods and resources within a company, either domestic or MN. Establishing MN 
transfer prices are more complicated as it is affected by external factors. So, MN 
transfer pricing strategies are generally the result of regulations enforced by the 
various taxing authorities in both host and home countries, foreign exchange rates, 
and other variables. MNCs, by the very nature of their international operations, are 
engaged in risk-pooling. Thus, they are keen to determine the prices of their 
transactions, whether exports or imports, dependent on those prevailing on the 
international markets. 
9.2 Findings and Conclusions from the Literature Review of the Transfer Pricing 
Topic 
In fact, the transfer pricing topic has been subject to attention by many academics 
from economics, accounting, operations research, and behavioural backgrounds. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have dealt with the theoretical background of the transfer pricing 
issue. 
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Different approaches to solving transfer pricing problem have been examined in 
Chapter 2. These included economic models which include both market and marginal 
(incremental) pricing. The second technique was mathematical programming models 
which equate the transfer price with the opportunity cost of the Intermediate product, 
deal with multiple divisions and multiple products, and allow for the inclusion of 
realistic production constraints. The third approach was the accounting one which 
focuses on allocating intra-firm, resources in order to optimise the overall profit and, 
at the same time, motivate the subunits' managers and provide a fair performance 
evaluation. This approach suggested cost-based methods for determining the transfer 
price. The final approach was a behavioural orientation which dealt with transfer 
pricing in a social system context, i. e. considering such factors as the degree of 
decentralisation, interdependence, degree of integration and specialisation, and extent 
of cooperation in the company in order to arrive at the best of the previously given 
methods for a given company. Some features have been extracted from studying 
transfer pricing approaches: 
I- Despite the extensive work on the transfer pricing subject, none of these 
approaches resolved the essential problem in a satisfactory way. 
2- It is suggested that the market price is probably the most acceptable price if a 
reasonably competitive market exists. If no such market exists, however, the 
firm should set the transfer price on an appropriate basis for both divisions 
taking into account the overall profit. 
9.3 Determinants of Transfer Pricing Strategies 
When MNCs make their transfer pricing decisions they take into consideration 
external and internal variables. These determinants have been presented in Chapter 3. 
The chapter discussed also the most important rules that countries use to tackle 
transfer prices for taxation purposes. ne best taxation rules for such purposes are 
argued to be those of the U. S. 482 Internal Revenue Code and OECD. The main result 
of Chapter 3 can be summarised in five points: 
I- Generally, MNCs are accused that they do not hesitate to make their benefits- at 
the expense of host countries, for the sole purpose of increasing profits through 
different ways such as restrictive business practices and transfer pricin(-'. The 
latter device, i. e., transfer pricing. is the most important, being used to conceal 
profits in high income tax countries to be accumulated in more lenient 
countries. 
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2- There are a large number of transfer pricing variables that encourage MNCs to 
manipulate prices of intra-company transactions. 
3- Despite some nations, in particular developed ones. that have developed 
regulations for dealing with the transfer pricing issue, many host countries have 
been handicapped in dealing with the problem. 
4- When a subsidiary makes remittances to its parent company based upon 
artificially high transfer prices, it causes a reduction in the subsidiary's earnings 
and hence a reduction in its taxes due. So, such transactions must be based upon 
truthful and accurate pricing. The international code, such as the one by OECD, 
could be highly useful to companies as well as governments in this matter. 
5- Intemational organisations, e. g., the UN and OECD, should help developing 
countries in regulating MN transfer pricing practices. Also, for the interest of 
developed countries in the long-run to help developing nations by supplying 
them with information about arm's-length prices. 
9.4 Principal Conclusions Reached on the Business Environment and the Role 
of FDI in Economic Growth in Egypt 
As described in Chapter 4, a significant improvement in the Egyptian investment 
climate has taken place. Since the early 1970s, the government has had a convergence 
of attitude towards FDI and MNCs as they play an increasingly important role in 
economic development. Egypt, with its resources and strategic location, offers a 
stable business and social environment. The chapter produced some results as 
follows: 
The Egyptian government tried to stimulate FDI by offering a wide range of 
incentives including tax concessions, official financial support and other 
measures pertaining to exchange controls, and well trained labour forces. 
The government should continue in future to attract and accelerate foreign 
inveswient into Egypt. The most important issue for the government is to 
remove any doubt among foreign businessmen over whether the bureaucratic 
obstacles have really been removed. This means the government should devote 
greater efforts to streamlining and simplifying its administrative structure. 
3- But the production of MNCs should be a substitute for imports and directed to 
the export market which may save foreign exchange. This because MNCs 
produce interriationally known brand names and can take advantage of the 
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distribution networks of their parents overseas. AdditionallY, the government 
should follow the policy of "import substitution" to "export promotion" via 
substantial tax benefits to be granted to investing companies, as a motiN, e to 
increase exports. 
4- Foreign investments eligible for tax breaks should be restricted to those 
concerning the transfer of high technology. 
5- Tax breaks should be given to corporations contributing to the balance of 
payments, providing a given number of job opportunities, and those engaging in 
large-scale capital investment projects. 
6- The activities of MNCs include negative as well as positive effects upon the 
Egyptian economy. With the exception of their employment impacts. there is 
clear evidence that these companies tend generally to carry out policies which 
are primarily in their interests but which adversely affect the economic welfare 
of the host country. This result suggests that adequate and effective host 
government control is necessary for making foreign investment beneficial to the 
national economy. 
7- MNCs might exaggerate the technology transferred, particularly when it is 
presented as a part of the capital of a joint venture project. For example an 
Egyptian refrigerator company that is considered as one of the most successful 
public sector companies had an agreement with a French company for a joint 
project. The agreement stipulated that four main marketing buildings and the 
headquarters building would be valued at half a million Egyptian pounds, while 
the goodwill of the foreign partner would be valued at Efl. 8 million (Kasem, 
1984, p. 213). This agreement was unfair because of undervaluing the tangible 
assets and overvaluing the intangible one. This agreement does not involve the 
transfer of technology in the full sense of the word, but it means also using 
patents which are used to protect the technology indirectly. Therefore, the 
government should consider not accepting contributing technology as a share of 
joint venture capital. 
8- MNCs should consider preparing detailed country-by-country reports showing 
both tangible and intangible contributions to the host nation. Information in the 
reports should include their contribution to job opportunities and spreading ne", 
technology, and so on. This procedure xvill improve the picture of NINCs- 
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9.5 Rationale for Future FDI 
Egypt has to strike a reasonable balance between inflows of FDI and technology and 
the outflows of foreign exchange in terms of remittances of royalty, technical know- 
how fees, dividends and also repatriation of capital. The liabilities resulting from FDI 
should be carefully considered vis-d-vis the benefits to the economy in terms of 
technology upgrading, higher production, improved productivity, quality-cum-cost 
competitiveness and export additionality. The rule of thumb for encouraging FDI 
appears to be that it should not result in a net outflow of foreign exchange. The 
country's need for FDI and the technology is of a continuing nature because these are 
essential inputs for accelerating the development process and keeping pace with the 
rapidly changing world in the field of science and technology. 
9.6 Research Methodology 
The methodology of the study has been presented in Chapter 5. Case Study 
methodology was followed to collect required data for the research from II MNCs 
operating in Egypt. Extensive interviews with officers in companies were held and a 
questionnaire was used during the interviews. As the sample of the study was small, 
there was no need to use statistical techniques to analyse the collected data. 
9.7 Major Findings and Conclusions From Case Studies 
This study has mainly sought to assess the extent of the use of transfer pricing 
strategies by MNCs to shift profits outside the host country. As Egypt was concerned. 
case studies of MNCs practicing their activities there have been investigated. Hence, 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide an overview of transfer pricing practices in companies 
involved in the field study. The role of government authorities was described in 
Chapter 7. 
The findings of Chapter 6 indicate that the pretence of the use of certain variables, 
particularly market price, does not imply the use of the market price method. 
Companies involved in the case study are using cost-based or cost-based plus the lost 
contribution margin methods even when market prices for intra-company transfers are 
available. Companies ignored methods such as mathematical programming and 
marginal costing in favour of cost-based methods due to the complexity of the fonner 
methods. The findings of the case studies are: 
It has been found that employing transfer pricing techniques to shift profits 
outside the country is due to various dimensions or determinants. 
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2- Economic conditions in Egypt have first position in order of importance when 
MNCs design their transfer pricing systems. 
3- The results revealed that "market conditions" received the hi2hest ratino of ýt 
importance by MNCs in Egypt. Four other variables to which high rating ýxere 
given by U. S. companies are: competitive position, performance evaluation, 
income taxes and the level of inflation. 
4- The most important factors that induce MNCs to shift profits via transfer 
pricing techniques are the increasing of the overall profits, inflation rate, 
exchange fluctuations and tax rates. 
5- Variables given very high rating by pharmaceutical companies are competitive 
position of the subsidiary, price controls over medicines, multiple exchange 
rates, and the level of inflation. 
6- Factors that have received very low ranking include political aspects because 
the investment law guarantees foreign investments against the risk of 
nationalisation, expropriation and so on. Other very low rating factors were 
anti-trust legislation, and rules and requirements of financial reporting. 
7- Payments for interest, royalties, and technical assistance and management fees 
have grown more rapidly than profits. It is believed that MNCs use such 
intangibles to shift funds outside the country. There is no restriction imposed by 
the Egyptian government on such repatriations. 
The accounting profession appears to have ignored the transfer pricing problem. 
It has tended to exan-iine the issue of transfer pricing from a management 
accounting perspective, with relatively little attention being given to external 
financial reporting (Masson, 1979, p. 56). 
9- MNCs, when dealing with their foreign investments, are now pursuing a long 
term objective, i. e., to achieve a strong position in the host country, which 
depends on its economic stability. To encourage MNCs to help in the 
development of the host country, it is the responsibility of the host country to 
adopt measures to improve the business environment such as implementing 
educational, agricultural, and industrial development programmes. Also, the 
business environment in the host country is influenced by the exchange rate of 
its currency relative to the MNCs home currency, inflation rate, rate of customs 
duties, restrictions imposed on repatriation of profits and any other restrictions 
and regulations related to investing and conducting business in that country. 
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10- In order to encourage MNCs to adopt reasonable economic policies toward their 
subsidiaries, a host government should provide a favourable business 
environment. Measures toward this objective might comprise: 
(a) providing tax relief for new and heavy industries in the country. 
(b) reducing restrictions, 
(C) lower tariffs, 
(d) providing foreign subsidiaries with access to local markets, and 
(e) adopting policies to reduce the rate of inflation. 
H- On the other hand, MNCs should help in the economic development of the host 
country by understanding and supporting its development objectives and 
requirements and accommodating them when processing their policies in order 
to guarantee a strong competitive position for their subsidiaries in that country. 
In addition, MNCs might adopt policies to enhance their position in the country 
such as keeping adequate cash in the subsidiary and maintaining good relations 
with the host government by complying with the host country's regulations such 
as financial reporting requirements and business regulations. 
Government authorities in Egypt have no control over MN transfer prices, as 
mentioned in Chapter 8. In such a case, some recommendations would be useful: 
The magnitude of overpricing becomes obvious to the authorities when arm's- 
length prices become available on the international market and these prices are 
compared with the prices charged by parent companies to their subsidiaries. The 
government therefore should be aware that it is necessary to examine and 
monitor prices of imported goods to ensure that they represent arm's-length 
prices or are similar to international competitive prices. A special committee 
should be constituted to overhaul transfer prices used by MNCs in Egypt. 
Members of the committee should be specialised and qualified in the area of 
MN transfer pricing, either intra-company transactions or transfers of 
intangibles. Officials must have a clear idea of the causes of transfer pricing so 
that they will be able to detect the malpractice. The number of members 
t gate transfer pficing issue, available should also be enough to develop and li i L- 
This procedure should encourage MNCs to review carefully current transfer 
pricing policies and the documentation and support for such policies, as they 
face an increased likelihood of government scrutiny. 
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2- The government should press for more resources and enforcement powers to 
seek documents from MNCs- Also, tax administration auditors should be 
allowed time to work. 
3- In fact, when any government attempts to regulate transfer pricing it will be 
confronted by the MNC. This is because the MNC has private information 
about the parent unit's costs which is not available to the host government. If the 
host government suboptimally regulates the MNC it may encourage the parent 
company to misreport its costs in order to maximise net global profit. In this 
regard, the host government must entice the MNC to reveal transfer pricing 
policies. The host government can control the final good's price through 
providing a subsidy (tax) to guarantee non-negative profit and impose a profit 
remission restriction. 
4- It is almost universally recognised by tax authorities that combating artificial 
pricing depends on being able to establish arm's-length prices. So, in carrying 
out an international audit, tax authorities should stress the importance of 
applying the arm's-length principle to intra-company transactions. However, if 
arm's-length pricing is impossible, the consistent application of approximations, 
such as the cost plus method, might suffice. At the same time, the financial 
statements required for tax purposes must report the volume and value of 
imported inputs from related parties. The tax authorities then compare this 
information to that on normal prices to see if arm's-length pricing is being 
observed, In this matter, tax authorities could adopt the arm's-length principle 
consistent with the Section 482 regulations of the US IRS. 
5- In case of special problems arising as a result of the difficulty of obtaining the 
documents necessary to ensure that the transfer price is reasonable, tax 
authorities should be authorised to request the subsidiary to produce foreign- 
based information that is relevant to the tax authorities. This procedure could 
take a formal form, i. e., all subsidiaries might be requested to provide such 
information in a form annually. It is believed that this situation will ensure 
better tax-payer reporting and compliance where cross-border transactions are 
involved. 
Anti-avoidance rules should be introduced as a part of the tax reform process. 
Such rules should apply to all tax-payers and not be specifically directed against 
MN or foreign companies in Egypt. 
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7- The government should focus to a considerable extent on determinini,. the 
royalties paid to the foreign transferor or licensor. This entails information from 
or audit of companies outside of the Egyptian jurisdiction and, under the current 
status of international co-operation, requires voluntary disclosure of such 
information by the foreign parent or related company, which in many cases is 
not forthcoming. 
8- The tax authorities should pay attention to charging R&D expenses, i. e., the 
reasonableness of the basis for allocating them, and be sure that there is no 
double-charge involved (as for example when these expenses are also a 
component in establishing transfer prices). In cases where royalties and similar 
payments were exaggerated, tax authorities should impose withholding taxes at 
a higher rate than applied as a way to limit them. Egypt has entered into a 
number of bilateral international tax agreements with other countries for the 
purpose of avoiding double taxation. 
Many international tax agreements may involve provisions concerning incoi-ne 
allocation in accordance with arm's-length principles. Also these provisions 
attempt to provide a framework in which an adjustment to profits in one country 
may be offset by a corresponding adjustment in the other country. Therefore. 
the Egyptian government could get advantages from more detailed information 
acquired through bilateral agreements. 
9- Foreign companies should be obligated to export a designated portion of their 
output, in order to help the Egyptian government develop new markets for its 
products, eam foreign exchange, and overcome balance of payments problems. 
10- The government representation in the GAR, or any control authority should 
follow some accounting analyses such as cost/benefit analysis to assess the 
effect of MNCs' activities on local companies' growth, indigenous technical and 
management learning and domestic market structure. 
Foreign companies should be encouraged to adopt reasonable economic policies 
toward their subsidiaries in the country. This requires the Egyptian government 
to provide a favourable business envLronment to FDI and MNCs. For example 
reducing restfictions, providing tax exemptions for ne", and heavy industries in 
the country, and giving permýission to NINCs to sell in foreign currency in the 
local market. 
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12- On the other hand, MNCs themselves should help in the economic development 
of the host country by understanding and supporting its development objectiVes 
and needs and accommodating them when formulating their policies in order to 
guarantee a strong competitive position for their subsidiaries operating in the 
country. In addition, MNCs might adopt policies to enhance their position in the 
country such as keeping adequate cash in their subsidiaries and maintaininL, 
good relations with the host government by complying with the host country, " 
regulations such as financial reporting requirements and business regulations. 
9.8 The Absence of Efficient Control over Transfer Prices by the Egyptian 
Government 
Since at least the mid-1960s, governments that are host to MNCs have been high]), 
suspicious of transfer prices used by these companies to evaluate intra-company 
transactions. The problem emerged because the host governments failed to realise that 
the MNCs optirrýsation problem was not static. 
Shifting profits through transfer pricing techniques is very difficult to control. Tax 
authorities have no power to scrutinise transfer prices. Even, if they have authority, it 
is difficult to obtain the information to test these prices. Also, it is difficult to assign a 
fair price if arm's-length prices cannot be found. Sometimes alternative methods, such 
as apportioning global value-added on a cost-plus basis, cannot be applied. 
The Egyptian government does not pay attention to this issue. This matter requires a 
kind of coordination among the various Egyptian authorities that have an interest in 
transfer pricing. The regulation of transfer pricing is vital, particularly as many MNCs 
are starting their activities in Egypt. 
It should be noted that the tax authorities in Egypt do not have the power to compel 
MNCs to disclose unpublished data about costs and prices. More important, perhaps, 
is the lack of qualified staff. There is no information about the number of inspectors 
assigned to MNCs. At the same time, tax officials do not check the prices of intra- 
company transactions as they rely on customs officials in this matter. It is hard to 
avoid the impression that the Inland Revenue regards transfer pricing as a problern of 
minor importance. 
Therefore, Internal Guidelines must be developed with respect to the audit of transfer 
pricing issues and training sessions for tax personnel should be held across the 
coulitry. 
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What one can deduce from this study is that the possibility of manipulatinL, transfer 
pricing in Egypt does exist and its use by MNCs may increase, especially after the 
expiry of tax exemption incentives. It has been argued that the ta\ differential 
between countries is one of the greatest stimuli for abusing transfer pricing by MNCs t. . (Lall, 1983). In addition, there are no monitoring measures or any policy to control 
imports by MNCs in Egypt. Hence, companies are free to negotiate their transaction 
terms. 
9.9 Royalties and Technology Transfer 
MNCs might regard fees and royalties to be "either a substitute for. or supplement to, 
dividends as a means of remitting earnings" (Brooke and Remmers, 1970, p. 102). 
MNCs might use this device especially in under-developed countries, where there is a 
scarcity of officials capable of discussing such matters with MN management on an 
adequately informed basis. Some governments appear to prefer that forei. (-, n 
companies repatriate income by these hidden routes, rather than as dividends which 
may be politically sensitive. US MNCs in joint ventures attribute a considerable 
importance to royalties as a means for shifting profits because partners do not share in 
them. As a general manager of the Far Eastern area of a US MNC mentioned, the 
Japanese subsidiary is a joint venture, "And we're putting a damn sight more into it 
than our partner is. So, as compensation for this additional effort-our trademarks, and 
our product developments that we're giving-we are getting a royalty payment which is 
rightly due to us. " (Robbins and Stobaugh, 1974, p. 88) 
With regard to the position in Egypt, the tax regulations do not involve any 
administrative principles for the allocation of income between related taxpayers with 
domestic and foreign income. 
Royalties paid to the MNCs constitute a substantial element of technology transfer 
costs. In most cases, royalties are computed as a percentage of sales revenues, and 
sometimes an arbitrary amount is paid when signing the license contract, i. e., before 
starting production. 
In most cases, overcharging royalties is the predominating feature in returns on L- 
technology transfer, especially in the case Of joint ventures. For example, in the 
Wilkinson project for producing razor blades, the foreign partner stipulated that the 
Egyptian partner should pay the following amounts: 
I- Ef 100,000 within 90 days of establishing the project. 
2- 417c royalties on net revenues paid in hard currency, 
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Another 2c7r- royalty payments every 3 months, 
4- In case of delaying paying the above amounts 717c interest will be applied 
(Kassem, 1984, p. 215). 
Royalty rates ranged between 1.5% and 7% for 10 to 25 years. However, an extreme 
case is an aluminium company which held an agreement to pay royalties of 1.517c of 
net sales for 50 years to the foreign investor (Abdel-Rahman, 1986, p. 313). In the 
engineering sector, a German company (Siemens) stipulated that the local partner 
should pay royalties of 3% of net revenues, and the percentage will go up to 7.517c if 
the production exceeds a certain limit (Abdel-Rahman, 1986, p. 314). Some 
recommendations could be suggested in this matter: 
I- As a result of the momentous size of outflows of royalties and fees for technical 
assistance paid out to MNCs as an alternative way of profit shifting, the 
government should study even more closely the technology transfer contracts 
which link foreign companies to their Egyptian subsidiaries. 
2- Following on from the previous point, the government should enact legislation 
relating to the acquigition of technology and know-how by MNCs. Also, it should 
study of appropriateness of imported technologies concerning the priorities and 
economic objectives of the country. 
3- The government should pay attention to the amounts paid to the scientific offices 
in pharmaceutical companies as those amounts represent a way to shift funds 
abroad. 
It is not reasonable to hold technology transfer contracts that requires the 
payment of royalties for long periods, especially at the present time where the 
technology changes continuously because of ongoing R&D. Thus technology 
contracts should be limited to a period of not more than 10 years. 
9.10 MNCs and Disclosure of Transfer Pricing Policies 
Of course, transfer pricing disclosure is essential to the govemment in its efforts to 
obtain from MNCs more beneficial arrangements. The Egyptian government should 
determine its own information requirements on transfer pricing and prescribe 
appropriate disclosure rules based thereon. 
In the light of the unfairness of the transfer prices used by MNCs, It would be 
necessary to regulate the disclosure of additional information regardinL, transfer 
pricing policies. Such disclosure will be in addition to the annual financial statements 
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required by the government and should be applied to all subsidiaries of NINC'. 
regardless of their size. If disclosed prices are different from the market price, full 
details must be given by the company, including reasons for the use of such price", 
and why they are thought to be close approximations to the market price. 
9.11 Policy Implications of the Study 
The Egyptian government does not pay attention currently to the poll I icies that MNCs 
practice in order to shift more profits outside the country. The most important 
technique used for shifting profits is transfer pricing. 
It is hoped that the results of this study should help the Egyptian government in Livin(, L- 
more attention to the issue to encourage MNCs to set economically meaningful 
transfer prices. At the same time, rules and regulations govern FD1 should be 
simplified. 
9.12 Power to Require Information 
Tax authorities should have power in certain circumstances to require the production 
of information for tax purposes. They may require a company to produce information 
which is relevant to the adjustment of transfer prices. 
Also, in certain circumstances tax authorities may require books and accounts and 
other documents or records which are relevant to transfer pricing adjustment to be 
produced for examination by an Inspector of Taxes. 
It should be noted that officers are governed by very strict rules about the 
confidentiality of information received by them in the course of their duties. They are 
prohibited from disclosing such information except for tax purposes. 
9.13 Exchange of Information with Other Countries 
As the Egyptian government holds agreements for the relief of double taxation with 
some oher countries, disclosure should be permited with tax authorities in these 
countries. Transfer pricing information should also be exchanged for the purpose of 
ensuring that tax is adequately charged. 
9.14 Necessity for Establishing a Section for Transfer Pricing Problems 
In the absence of transfer pricing rules imposed by the taxing authorities, MNC. s have 
opportunities to maximise their profits. 
NearIN, all tax officials interviewed suggested areas on which they would welcome 
assistance. These ranged from the investigation of certain freight, capital equipment 
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and bulk supply contracts to the validity of particular manaLlement senices, I- 
consultancy fees, loan arrangements and licensing of technology. The opportunity for 
such a section for transfer pricing problems to provide an overall co-ordinatIng role 
was also stressed. It could provide government authorities with early warning of 
changes in the methods and areas of transfer pricing manipulation. Additionally. it 
could be the natural focus for liaison with international authorities and other 
governments concerned with transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs. 
9.15 How Would the Section for Transfer Pricing Problems Operate? 
The main features of the proposed section have been discussed in some detail with 
interested authorities and would be as follows: 
9.15.1 It Would be Located in Tax Authorities 
Transfer pricing information is usually extracted from tax returns or obtained in 
connection with a tax audit by making use of normal procedures under which the tax 
payer in many countries may be required to submit all information deemed to be 
relevant by the tax inspector to the determination of transfer prices. For instance, 
transfer pricing information in the U. K. may be obtained from taxpayers using general 
powers for obtaining information either by a local tax office in the course of its 
normal procedures, or by the special Head Office Unit dealing with major transfer 
pricing investigations. However, special information powers which exist as part of the 
U. K. transfer pricing provisions can be used. 
It is recommended that the proposed section should be located in tax authorities. Its 
location in tax authorities is preferable to all other authorities for the following 
reasons: First, a key element in the successful operation of the section will be free and 
ready access to information. Comprehensive powers are already available to tax 
authorities to obtain information for income tax assessment and collection purposes. 
SecoLidly, as any government's major concern with the effects of transfer pricing 
manipulation is the loss of revenue, the location of the section in tax authorities "AI 
ease liaison with those sections responsible for enforcement and recovery of tax. 
Finally, this location would facilitate the benefits the section could derive from the 
Authority's links with international taxation developments. 
9.15.2 It Would Have a Small Permanent Core of Staff and be Assisted by 
Relevant Departmental Officers. 
There is general agreement that the best combination for the permanent core staff of 
the transfer pricing section would be an accountant with ta, \ investigation e\perience 
and an economist with a business background in a developing country. 
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9.15.3 Enforcement and Audit Policy 
The objective of auditing transfer pricing policies and related MN' transactions, is to 
ensure that Egyptian subsidiaries have reported their appropriate share of total income 
by paying no more than or receiving less than, reasonable arm's-length prices In their 
transactions. 
Where the committee should decide to review a subsidiary's intra-company 
transactions, experienced auditors could examine each component in the package, i. e., 
transfer prices, royalties, intra-company financing, service fees, etc. This might 
prevent, for instance, the double deduction for parent's R&D costs, once by way of an 
intra-company royalty or cost-sharing arrangement, and again as an element of the 
transfer pricing. 
9.16 How "Prorit-shifting via Transfer Pricing" might be Estimated: 
For various reasons, MNCs are reluctant to disclose information relating to the use of 
transfer pricing for profit outflows. Such information could trigger tax investigation 
and further tax payments. There are examples of cases involving the use of transfer 
pricing not being defended in the court. ' In Egypt, no study has been reported to 
estimate the amount of profits shifted outside the country via transfer pricing 
techniques. 
Examining transfer prices requires data on product prices, whether import and export 
prices or domestic prices found in other countries, which are rarely available. Hence 
most researchers rely on comparisons of value added expressed as a proportion of 
sales, or net output per employee, either between similar sectors in different countries 
or between different sectors in the same country. 2However, using this technique to 
investigate transfer prices is not conclusive proof of shifting profits. Differences in 
value added comparing one sector with another may be due to more efficient 
production techniques, or economies of scale. 
9.17 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study examined transfer pricing strategies and profit shifting in II MNCs that 
have activities in Egypt. The sample of the study restricts its general, sabillty. To help 
establish generalisations of the findings, further research could be done in this area. 
The following suggestions could be bases for further study: 
See for example, the case of Litton Industries, which was accused of intra-company transfcr Pricing Illegafly to defraud the 
US Government of import duiie,,, cited in Craypo (1975). 
2 1-his procedure is used in Stew. iri (1977) where value added is expressed as a percentave of sale-s. 
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A more comprehensive study of most MNCs operating in Egypt would 2ive 
general conclusions about transfer pricing strategies and profit shifting. 
2- The conditions suggested in the literature for a particular method to be used were 
discussed in Chapter 3. It would be of interest to collect data relating to these 
conditions and to include these in the analysis. 
3- A study might be carried out on companies that have started to pay taxes, i. e., 
after the expiration the tax holiday periods. This might shed additional light on 
the importance of tax factors on formulating transfer pricing strategies. 
4- As shown in Chapters 6 and 7, the parent company frequently formulate transfer 
pricing policies, therefore, another study should be carried on parent companies 
as well their subsidiaries in Egypt. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix (A) 
Interview Guide and Questionnaire for Company Executives 
W 
WARWICK 
BUS IN E SS SCHOOL 
Dear Manager 
I am conducting a study of transfer pricing policies through case studies of MNC. s 
working in Egypt 
At the present time I am engaged in gathering data for a doctoral thesis. The purpose 
of the research is to determýine factors that the company take them into consideration 
when setting transfer prices 
Your Company can be great assistance to me by spending a short tirne with you to 
discuss this issue. Any proprietary information would be disguised, of course, 
including the name of the company, if you are desired. All data is to be strictly 
confidential and anonymous. 
Please feel free to make any additional comments or remarks that you may wish to 
make. 
Yours sincerely 
Sabri EI-Segini 
Ph. D Scholar 
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boom 
THE u"I VERSITY OF WARWICK COVENTRY CV4 7AL UNITED KINGDOM 
TELEPHONE (0203) 524306 TELEX 317472 UNIREG FAX (0203) 523719 OR 52441 1 
Interview Guide and Questionnaire for Company Executives 
This questionnaire falls into five sections, as follows: 
Section 1. Company Information. 
Section 111. Formulating Transfer Prices. 
Section H1. Variables Affecting Transfer Pricing Policies 
and the Importance of these Variables. 
Section IV. The Importance of Transfer Pricing from the 
Perspective of the Egyptian Authorities. 
Section V. Intangible Assets and Allocating Headquarters 
Expenditures. 
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Section I 
Company Information 
I- Name and address of the establishment: 
2- Nationality of the parent company: 
Year in which the subsidiary commenced operations in Egypt- 
4- Type of activity in Egypt: 
5- Method of Investment in Egypt: (please tick one of the following) 
a) Wholly foreign-owned 
b) Joint venture 
c) Other (please specify) 
6- If your company is a joint venture, who are your partners? (please fick) 
a) Local private sector company (s) F7 
and/or individuals 
b) Local public sector company (s) 
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c) Different nationalities I 
d) Other (please specify) 
7- What is the currency used by the company in its management accounts? (please 
tick the appropriate) 
a. Parent country currency 
b. Host country currency 
C. Other (please specify) 
8- Name and job title of the person who completes the questionnaire: 
Section 11 
Formulating Transfer Prices 
Approximately what percentage of your total purchases are intra-group 
purchases'? 
2- Approximately what percentage of your total sales are intra-group sales? 
When your subsidiary imports products, raw materials or services from the 
parent company or another subsidiary, one or more transfer pricing methods 
could be used to price these transactions. Please indicate (on a five-point 
scale) how frequently each of following methods is used. (please tick) 
[Never Rarely Sometimes 
[used used used 
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Cost-Based Prices 
Actual variable cost 
Actual variable cost plus markup 
Actual full cost 
Actual full cost plus markup 
Standard variable cost 
Standard variable cost plus markup 
Standard full cost 
Standard full cost plus markup 
Marginal cost (long-run) 
Negotiated price 
Dual price (one price for the transferor, 
another for the transferee) 
Market-Based Prices 
Arm's-length price (prevailing price) 
Adjusted market price 
Some other price. (please specify) 
Frequently 
used 
4 
1 
Usually 
used 
5 
5 
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4- If your subsidiary exports products, raw materials or services to any part of 
the group, one or more transfer pricing methods could be used to price these 
transactions. Please indicate (on a five-point scale) how frequently each of 
the following methods is used. (please tick) 
[Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Usually 
[used used used used used 
2345 
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Cost-Based Prices 
Actual variable cost 
Actual variable cost plus markup 
Actual full cost 
Actual full cost plus markup 
Standard variable cost 
Standard variable cost plus markup 
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Standard full cost 
Standard full cost plus markup 
Marginal cost (long-run) 
Negotiated price 
Dual price (one price for the transferor, 
another for the transferee) 
Market-Based Prices 
Arm's-length price (prevailing price) 
Adjusted market price 
Some other price. (please specify) 
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5- If the subsidiary uses more than one method for transfer pricing, what are the 
reasons for this? 
6- Does an external market price exist for your intra-company transactions'? 
Yes 
7- 
No = 
If Yes, how would you describe the market for these transfers'? (please tick) 
Very uncompetitive Very competitive 
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Approximately what percentage of your sales goes to the folloA, -in2 markets? 
a. Domestic market 17c 
b. Overseas market 17c 
Total 100% 
9- Are there restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on your imports? 
Yes No = 
10- If your answer is yes, what are the kinds of restrictions'! 
11- Are there restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government on your exports'! 
Yes No = 
12- If your answer is yes, what are the kinds of these restrictions'! 
13- Who is responsible for formulating and reviewing transfer pricing policies in 
your subsidiary'! (please tick) 
190 
a) Parent headquarters 
b) Subsidiary managers 
c) Both a and b 
d) Other (please specify) 
Formulating Reviewing, 
14- If the transfer pricing policies are fon-nulated by the parent headquarters. is 
there a conflict if these prices affect the performance evaluation of your 
subsidiary? 
Yes No = 
15- If your answer is yes, how great to this conflict'? 
Little conflict 
I 2 3 
much conflict 
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16- How frequently are transfer pricing policies reviewed'! 
a) Monthly 
b) Quarterly 
c) Bi-annually 
d) Annually 
e) Other (please specify) 
17- Does your parent company allow your organisation to purchase from outside 
sources the following kinds of goods which could also be supplied by the 
parent company or another subsidiary? 
-)() I 
YeS, with Yes, suhiec, 0 
complete to the approval 
freedom of pa ren t compa n 
a) Raw materials 7-7 
b) Intermediate 
products 
F-7 
c) Capital goods 
18- If your organisation purchases capital goods from the parent company, are 
their prices differ from prices in a free market'? (please tick) 
Lower The same Higher 
19- Are intra-group transfers assigned the same values for financial statement 
purposes as for income tax purposes? (please tick) 
Never the same Always the same 
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20- Do you, as a manager, believe that the reported profit for your subsidiary 
reflects your performance'? (please tick appropriate answer) 
a) Yes, it is a fair measurement of management performance 
b) A few imperfections, but still a useful measurement 
C) Serious flaws, I do not think it is a fair measurement 
21- If you checked (b) or (c) above, please comment upon the most significant 
imperfections or flaws. 
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Section III 
Environmental Variables Considered in Determining Transfer Pricing Policies 
and the Importance of these Variables 
This part indicates a list of variables that may influence the settino of transfer 4ý 
pricing policies in MNCs. Please indicate (on a five-point scale) the degree of 
importance that your parent company attaches to each of the following variables. 
[Not at all Fairly Very Most 
[important important Important important important 
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Variables considered for transfer pricing policies: 
I- Maximisation of the group's 
overall profit 
2- Differentials in income tax 
rates and income tax legislation 
among countries 
3- Rates of customs duties and customs 
legislation in Egypt 
4- Anti-dumping and Anti-trust 
legislation in Egypt 
5- Compliance with tax and customs 
regulations of home country 
6- Restrictions imposed by the 
Egyptian law on the repatriation 
of profits and capital 
7- Restrictions imposed on the amount of 
R&D, royalties and other overhead costs 
charged against the subsidiary 
8- Maintenance of adequate cash flow 
in the subsidiary 
9- The need of the subsidiary to 
seeklocalfunds 
10- Shifting profits to another subsidiary 
to cover part of its losses 
H- Level of inflation in Egypt 
12- Multiple exchange rates 
13- Existence of price controls in Egypt 
14- Existence of export subsidies 
-)9- 
and tax holidays in Egypt 
15- Market conditions (competition) 
in Egypt 
16- Risk of expropriation and 
nationalisation in Egypt 
17- Existence of local shareholders 
18- Performance evaluation of 
each subsidiary 
19- Divisional autonomy 
20- Maintenance of good relations 
with the host government 
21- The bureaucratic system to deal 
with Egyptian authorities 
22- Ambivalence of regulations in Egypt 
23- Rules and requirements of financial 
reporting for your subsidiary 
24- Simplicity and ease of application 
of transfer prices 
25- Others (please specify) 
2- Referring to the above list, which five are the most important influences on 
transfer pricing policies for your subsidiary'? 
3- What is the dorninant corporate objective of your transfer pricing system'? 
a) to maximise consolidated after-tax 
profit of your parent 
b) to minimise payments on income taxes, 
customs duties, and other taxes paid 
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to home and host countries F-7 
C) to maximise sales volume 7--ý 
d) to evaluate the perfon-nance of subsidiaries 
e, ) other (please specify) 
4- What is the importance of MNCs to the Egyptian economy'? (please tick) 
[Not at all Fairly Very Most 
[important important Important important important 
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1 
a) Serving to increase the stock 
of investment and capital 
b) Providing employment opportunities 
C) Providing government revenues 
(taxes and customs duties) 
d) Increasing national output 
and raising social welfare 
e) Transfer of new technology 
f) Other (please specify) 
5- The following are some factors that attract MNCs to invest abroad. In your 
opinion, to what extent each of following factors influenced your company to 
invest in Egypt'? (please tick) 
Low Medium High 
123 
1) Government policy towards FDI 
2) Access to new markets 
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3) Political and social stability 
4) Maximising return on investment 
5) Repatriation of profits and capital 
6) Tax holidays and other incentives 
7) Cost advantages (raw materials and 
labour force) 
8) Attractive growth of Arab markets 
9) Other (please identify) 
I] II 
I] I] I 
I] I] [ ] 
I] I] { ] 
I] I] I ] 
I] I] ] 
6- To your knowledge, what are the major obstacles that MNCs face in improving 
the investment environment in Egypt? 
7- Please list in order of importance the five most crucial factors which have 
influenced your continued production in Egypt. 
8- Do you consider, by reference to other subsidiaries "in the group", that : 
2) 96 
a) Your organisation's profit is: 
High 
b) Egyptian tax rates are: 
High 
Reasonable Lo w F--, 
Reasonable Low = 
9- If your subsidiary wanted to expand its investments in Egypt, what kind of 
finance would it rely on? 
a) Self-finance, whether internally or through 
the parent company or another subsidiary. 
b) Domestic borrowing from financial institutions. 
c) Other (please specify) 
Section IV 
The Importance of Transfer Pricing from the Perspective of the Egyptian 
Authorities 
This section attempts to throw light on the importance of transfer pricing from the 
point of view of the Egyptian authorities 
Do government authorities legislate to ensure that transfer prices are set on 
arm's-length bases? 
Yes No = 
If there are regulations to determine transfer prices according to an arm's- 
length method, how do they define it'! (please circle) 
i) Competitive prices 
I ý, ) -, 
(market prices for the same or similar products sold to an independent third party under the same or similar circumstances) 
Resale prices method 
iii) Cost-plus method 
Jv) Any other method found to be acceptable (please explain) 
3- Do customs departments often re-compute your intra-group transfers 
arbitrarily for the sake of raising customs duties'? 
Yes Sometimes No = 
4- Do negotiations take place with customs officials with regard to the price of 
intra-group transactions'? 
Never Sometimes Always 
5- If your answer is sometimes or always, would you please explain the nature 
of these negotiations according to the increasing of prices. 
6- Does the tax authority attempt to change your declared profit in order to 
decide the income to be taxed'? 
Yes Sometimes No 
Please comment on your answer. 
19N - (s 
7- Could you please indicate the extent to which your company finds itself in 
dispute with the tax authority with respect to taxable income. 
Never Sometimes Always 
If your answer is sometimes or always, could you please briefly describe the 
most recent dispute and how it has been settled. 
9- Would the external audit program usually involve any tests to ensure transfer 
pricing policies have been applied ... 
Yes No 
a) accurately'? 
b) consistently with prior periods'? 
10- If financial reporting in Egypt requires the disclosure of transfer pricing 
policies do you think that this might affect the information confidentiality in 
your subsidiary'! 
Yes No = 
Please comment on your answer. 
299 
Section V 
Intangible Assets and Allocating Headquarters' Expenditures 
This section is concerned with all types of intangible assets that you receive frorn 
your parent company, including headquarters charges that have to be allocated to the 
MNC. These intangible assets include royalties, and research and development fees 
(R&D). Headquarters expenditures comprise joint expenses like management and 
marketing costs, and transportation costs and loan interest. 
Are the cost of loans, equity or other corporate funds allocated by the parent 
company to your subsidiary? 
Yes No = 
2- Is the rate allocated for the use of loans or equity by foreign operations 
determined on any of the following factors: 
a) the current weighted average cost of corporate capital 
b) the home country prime rate 
c) a historic average rate 
d) an average regional rate 
e) other (please indicate) 
3- What is the basis of charging or allocating the following expenses: 
a) Management and other overhead expenses 
b) Research and Development expenses (R&D) 
c) Transportation costs 
-300 
d) Interest on excess cash invested by the parent company 
e) Technical assistance 
4- What are the criteria for allocating R&D cost, know-how' and patents, for 
services supplied by the parent company or by other affiliates? 
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Questions Directed to the Egyptian Authority for Investment about the 
Economic Effect of MNCs and the Importance of the Transfer Pricing Aspect 
from their point of view. 
There some factors that attract MNCs to set up their investments in a particulai- 
country. 
In your opinion, to what extent each of following factors positively affectim-, the 
flow of FDI into Egypt? (please tick) 
Low Medium High 
a) Growth rate of the domestic market 
b) Political and social stability 
c) Maximising return on investment 
d) Government policy towards FDI 
e) Maxim-ising return on investment 
f) Tax holiday and other incentives 
g) Repatriation of profits and capital 
h) Cost advantages 
i) Attractive growth of Arab markets 
j) Other (please specify) 
2- To what extent is the Egyptian government involved in determining transfer 
prices for MNCs working in Egypt'! 
In your opinion, do MNCs adopt policies through their intra-group transaction.,, 
to avoid restrictions imposed by the host government'! 
Yes No 77 
4- If your answer is yes, how do the Egyptian authorities control company 
operations? 
5- In relation to the economic contributions of MNCs to Egypt, do you believe that 
the dividends, royalties, and other payments which MNCs receive from their 
activities in Egypt are fair to the Egyptian government: 
Not at all fair Very fair 
12345 
6- Do the requirements of financial reporting in Egypt involve the disclosure of the 
bases of transfer prices by the MNC'? 
Yes No = 
7- If your answer is yes, what are these bases'? (give examples) 
319 
Do the Egyptian authorities impose any restrictions on transferring profits bý, 
MNCs across national frontiers" 
Yes No = 
9- If your answer is yes, would you please indicate briefly these restrictions 
10- Does the economic environment in Egypt, induce MNCs to move capital funds 
out of the country'? 
Yes No = 
If your answer is yes, how does the Egyptian government prevent the outflow of 
capital'! (please tick) 
a) Restriction of the rerrfission of earnings at a certain percentage of total 
earnings 
b) Taxing earnings transferred above a certain percentage of capital at a 
higher rate 
c) Other (please specify) 
32( 
12- For subsidiaries in which the government has an interest in the equity, do you 
think that the share of income is appropriate. i. e., the subsidiary has not unfairlY 
shifted funds to the parent or another subsidiary'! 
Yes No = 
13- Please, explain from the Egyptian point of view, what degree of importance do 
MNCs play in Egypt with regard to the following points'! (please tick) 
[Not at all Fairly Very Most 
[important important Important important important 
12345 
a) Gross national product "value added" 
b) Opportunity costs incurred by 
the host country (Egypt) 
C) Benefits imputed to foreign investment's 
effects on exports and imports or the 
balance of payments 
d) Increase of the national income 
e) Increasing domestic investment by creating 
backward or forward linkages 
f) Improving technical knowledge and management 
skills through employment and training by 
the foreign subsidiary 
g) Social welfare 
h) Other (Please specify) 
14- Does the Investment Authority face difficulties in collecting required 
information from MNCs'? 
Yes No = 
321 
15- If your answer is yes, what are these difficulties'! 
16- Does the auditor face difficulties in obtaining sufficient evidence relating to 
transfer pricing bases? 
Yes No = 
17- If your answer is yes, how much and what kind of difficulty does the auditor 
face'? (please give examples) 
ccø 
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Appendix (C) 
Questions Directed to Tax Authorities 
", 2 ,ý 
Questions Directed to Tax Authorities 
What kinds of problems do you face when assessing the taxable income of 
MNCs? 
2- Do you think that companies change their reported profit to decrease the tax 
burden? 
Yes No = 
3- When you assess MNC's taxable income, do tax authorities take into 
consideration transfer prices'? 
Yes No = 
4- If your answer is yes, do you find a substantial difference in transfer prices 
between the tax holiday period, and the period after when the company starts to 
pay income tax'? 
Yes No = 
5- If your answer is yes, how do tax authorities deal with transfer prices to 
determine taxable income'? 
6- What are the criteria that tax authorities follow for deducting the followirit-I 
expenses from taxable income: 
a) Payments for royalties 
b) Trademarks 
c) Commissions and fees 
e) Head office and management expenses 
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Appendix (D) 
Questions Directed to Customs Officials 
Questions Directed to Customs Officials 
Would you please mention the problems that face your department whell 
determining customs duties on imports by MNCs in Egypt. 
2- Do you think that these companies adjust invoice prices in order to lessen 
customs duties burdens'? 
Yes No = 
If your answer is yes, what does your department do in order to pinpoint the 
customs duties? 
Are there guidelines to describe the arm's-length price'? 
Yes No = 
5- If your answer is yes, how is the price determined'? (Please tick one of the 
following methods 
a) prevailing market price 
b) Selling price 
c) Cost plus profit margin 
d) Other (please specify) 
6- Do negotiations take place with MN subsidiaries with regard to the price of 
intra-group transactions'? 
Never Sometimes Always F-7 
7- If your answer is sometimes or always, would you please explain the nature 
of these negotiations. 
Do Negotiations lead to decreasing customs duties? 
Yes No = 
9- What is the average of customs duties rate of last year on the following 
products: 
a) Raw materials 
b) Inter-mediate products 
C) Finished goods 
d) Capital goods 
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